JACK HUMPHREY v. B.L. RADDEN PAINTING; SPECIAL FUND; HON. THOMAS A. NANNEY, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE; and WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
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RENDERED: December 23, 1999; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO. 1998-CA-002622-WC
JACK HUMPHREY
v.
APPELLANT
PETITION FOR REVIEW
OF A DECISION OF
THE WORKERS’ COMPENSATION BOARD
NO. WC-96-72131
B.L. RADDEN PAINTING; SPECIAL
FUND; HON. THOMAS A. NANNEY,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE; and
WORKERS’ COMPENSATION BOARD
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
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BEFORE: COMBS, EMBERTON, and GUIDUGLI, Judges.
COMBS, JUDGE: Jack Humphrey (Humphrey), pro se, petitions this
Court for review of a decision of the Workers’ Compensation Board
(the Board) affirming the decision of the Administrative Law
Judge (ALJ).
In an opinion rendered June 19, 1998, the ALJ found
Humphrey to be 15% occupationally disabled due to his neck
condition and awarded both permanent partial and temporary total
disability benefits due to a November 1, 1996, work injury at
B.L. Radden Painting (B.L. Radden).
Arguing that the work injury
totally disabled him, Humphrey appealed to the Board and then
petitioned this Court for review.
Having reviewed the record as
well as the parties’ arguments, we find no error.
Hence, we
affirm.
Both in his appeal to the Board and in his petition to
this Court, Humphrey argues that the award which he received from
the arbitrator should not have been taken away by the ALJ and
that he has always been — and continues to be — totally disabled.
The Board carefully and fully addressed both of these
its thorough opinion.
issues in
Therefore, we adopt the Board’s opinion in
full as our own.
Jack Humphrey (“Humphrey”), pro se,
appeals from the decision of Hon. Thomas A.
Nanney, Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”),
awarding him 15% occupational disability and
temporary total disability benefits for the
period of December 8, 1996, through and
including March 12, 1997.
Humphrey was injured on November 1,
1996. He was pulling some scaffolding along
a sidewalk and apparently a wheel came off
and it fell into or near a high voltage line.
There is some question about whether or not
he sustained an electric shock injury but, as
a result of the event, he complains of low
back pain, headache, dizziness, numbness and
tingling in both hands, problems with his
back and foot, aching in both legs, neck
pain, and arm and shoulder discomfort. He
has seen a variety of physicians. Humphrey
does not believe he is capable of working at
this time and testified that he continues to
experience significant symptomatology. He
has pain into his right shoulder as well as
pain in his left knee, both of which he
testified occurred at the time of the
incident. He indicated he advised physicians
early on after the incident that he was
experiencing shoulder and leg pain. He
acknowledged that a history related to one of
the physicians about the development of knee
pain after getting up from a couch was not
new but merely an aggravation of pain that he
was already experiencing.
Medical evidence was submitted from
treating orthopedic surgeon, Dr. Gregory
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D’Angelo, who diagnosed Humphrey with
degenerative disk disease in the cervical
spine, assigned 4% to that condition but
assessing no physical restrictions. This
opinion was rendered on March 12, 1997. Dr.
D’Angelo also assigned a 1% impairment rating
to Humphrey’s knee problems but was unable to
attribute that condition to the work injury.
Dr. Vicky Young testified that
Humphrey had a cervical strain with low back
pain and significant deconditioning.
Dr. Gregory Anderson, a neurologist,
also diagnosed cervical, lumbar and thoracic
strain with significant pain. He did not
believe Humphrey was capable of yet returning
to active gainful employment.
Dr. Michael Best, an orthopedic
surgeon, examined Humphrey at the request of
B. L. Radden Painting (“Radden”) and believed
Humphrey was engaging in malingering
activities. He could not find any evidence
of functional limitation or any need for the
assessment of an impairment or any
restrictions. He believed that there was no
evidence to suggest that an electrocution
injury had occurred nor any need to limit
Humphrey from any work for which he was
qualified.
This pro se appellant has attached to
his brief on appeal a number of medical
records which were not introduced before the
ALJ. Many of these records were as the
result of examinations that occurred after
the rendition of the ALJ’s award. While we
understand the difficulty faced by
individuals proceeding pro se, the limitation
on this Board is to consider only the
evidence that was presented to he ALJ. In
reviewing this matter, we operate under this
limitation. KRS 342.285 prohibits the
introduction of any new or additional
evidence at the Workers’ Compensation Board
level. So long as there is evidence to
support the ALJ’s conclusion, it may not be
disturbed on appeal. Wolf Creek Collieries
v. Crum, Ky. App., 673 S.W.2d 735 (1984).
When, as here, the appealing party had the
burden of proof before the ALJ, then that
appealing party must show that the evidence
compelled a contrary result. Special Fund v.
Francis, Ky., 708 S.W.2d 641 (1986).
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Compelling evidence is evidence that is so
overwhelming that no reasonable person could
fail to be persuaded by it. Reo Mechanical
v. Barnes, Ky. App., 691 S.W.2d 224 (1985).
When, as here, there is conflicting evidence
or evidence which is subject to multiple
reasonable inferences, those inferences and
interpretations are for the ALJ and not the
Workers’ Compensation Board. Jackson v.
General Refractories Co., Ky., 581 S.W.2d 10
(1979); and Smyzer v. B. F. Goodrich
Chemical Co., Ky., 474 S.W.2d 367 (1971).
When Humphrey initially filed his
claim, it was assigned to an Arbitrator.
After the presentation of proof, the
Arbitrator also found a 15% occupational
disability based upon the evidence. However,
unlike the ALJ, the Arbitrator awarded
temporary total disability benefits through
June 16, 1997. After the Arbitrator entered
his award, Humphrey, by counsel, requested a
de novo hearing before the ALJ. After the
presentation of proof and a hearing, the ALJ
found as referred to above.
First, Humphrey argues that what he
received before the Arbitrator should not be
taken away since the employer did not appeal.
However, regardless of who requests a de novo
hearing before the ALJ, once that has been
taken the finality and the existence of the
Arbitrator award ceases to exist. It has no
legal effect. The ALJ, pursuant to the
statute as enacted on December 12, 1996, is
to make a totally independent determination
based upon the evidence that is presented to
him. Therefore, so long as there is evidence
before the ALJ which would support his
finding of the termination of temporary total
disability as of March 12, 1997, his decision
may not be disturbed on appeal. The evidence
of record includes a form filled out by Dr.
D’Angelo, a treating orthopedic surgeon,
indicating that as of March 12, 1997, he
would assign no physical restrictions and he
would assess a 4% functional impairment.
Although there was evidence to the contrary
of record, that evidence standing by itself
is sufficient to support he ALJ’s termination
of temporary total disability as of March 12,
1997. Epling v. Four B & C Coal Co., Ky.
App., 858 S.W.2d 216 (1993).
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As best we can interpret Humphrey’s
argument, he believes that he continues to be
totally disabled at this time. The ALJ
believed that the medical evidence as a whole
raised a question concerning whether a
rotator cuff injury was related to the
original incident. Although Humphrey directs
our attention to certain medical records
which indicate he was complaining of neck and
arm pain and he asserts in his brief that he
complained of shoulder pain from the date of
the injury on, the medical evidence itself is
much less clear on this issue. Dr. Best
found no physiological problems at all. Dr.
D’Angelo in his initial reports focused
solely upon the neck and back with some
radiating pain into the arms. Dr. D’Angelo
indicated that the shoulder condition, as
ultimately discovered, might be related to
the original injury, but we believe that it
was well within the ALJ’s authority to infer
from the overall circumstances coupled with
the medical testimony that the work injury
did not result in the shoulder difficulties.
Ultimately, this appeal is on
questions of fact. KRS 342.285, which
establishes the appellate process to the
Workers’ Compensation Board, limits this
Board’s authority on appeal. We are without
authority to substitute our judgment for that
of the ALJ’s. In fact, so long as there is
evidence to support that ALJ, we are
prohibited from reaching a contrary result.
It is simply not enough under the standard of
review in Kentucky for there to exist some
evidence of record which would support a
contrary conclusion so long as there is
evidence that would support the conclusion
reached by the ALJ. See McCloud v. BethElkhorn Corp., Ky., 514 S.W.2d 46 (1974). As
the evidence was presented to the ALJ for his
consideration, it would have been within the
ALJ’s authority to rely upon the testimony of
Dr. Best and find that there was no
occupational disability. However, the ALJ
chose to rely in significant part upon the
testimony of Dr. D’Angelo, who assessed a 4%
functional impairment but did not direct any
specific restrictions. Ultimately, the ALJ
has the authority to rely upon different
medical providers regardless of whether they
are treating or examining physicians and
regardless of their speciality. See Yocom v.
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Emerson Electric, Ky. App., 584 S.W.2d 744
(1979).
Humphrey may have wished for the ALJ
to rely upon different evidence of record,
but the ALJ did not do so. In our opinion,
there was more than ample evidence to support
eh ALJ’s conclusion and, therefore, we cannot
conclude that the evidence compelled a
contrary result. Pruitt v. Bugg Brothers,
Ky., 547 S.W.2d 123 (1977).
Accordingly, the decision of Hon.
Thomas A. Nanney, Administrative Law Judge,
is hereby AFFIRMED and this appeal is
DISMISSED.
The decision of the Workers’ Compensation Board
affirming the opinion of the Administrative Law Judge is
AFFIRMED.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE
B.L. RADDEN PAINTING:
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT PRO SE:
Jack Humphrey
Lexington, Kentucky
James R. Carpenter
Lexington, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE
SPECIAL FUND:
David W. Barr
Louisville, Kentucky
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