H.R. by GUARDIAN AD LITEM, EVAN TAYLOR v. DAVID REVLETT TO BE HEARD WITH SUZANNE REVLETT JAGOE v. DAVID REVLETT
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RENDERED: August 27, 1999; 10:00 a.m.
TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
1998-CA-002514-MR
H.R. by GUARDIAN AD LITEM, EVAN TAYLOR
and SUZANNE REVLETT JAGOE
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM DAVIESS CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE THOMAS O. CASTLEN, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 94-AD-000006
v.
DAVID REVLETT
APPELLEE
TO BE HEARD WITH
NO.
1998-CA-002517-MR
SUZANNE REVLETT JAGOE
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM DAVIESS CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE THOMAS O. CASTLEN, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 94-AD-000006
DAVID REVLETT
and H.A.J., an infant
APPELLEES
OPINION
VACATING AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
COMBS, EMBERTON AND McANULTY, JUDGES.
McANULTY, JUDGE: This is the second time these parties have been
before this Court on appeal.
H.R., (“H.R.”) by and through his
Guardian Ad Litem, and Suzanne Jagoe (“Jagoe”) appeal the trial
court’s order denying the petition to involuntarily terminate the
parental rights of David Revlett (“Revlett”) to his son, H.R.
We
find that the circuit court incorrectly determined that it was
controlled by the prior decision on appeal pursuant to the law of the
case doctrine.
We therefore vacate the findings of fact, conclusions
of law and judgment and remand for the entry of new findings,
conclusions and judgment.
In light of our holding, an exhaustive review of the facts
is unnecessary.
However, it is helpful to review the procedural
history of this case.
In the first trial, the circuit court found
that Revlett had neglected and abandoned his son and therefore
terminated his parental rights in Findings of Fact, Conclusions of
Law and Judgment entered April 26, 1995.
In a decision which was
ordered depublished by the Supreme Court, a panel of this Court
reversed on the grounds that H.R. had not been a party to the action.
D.R. v. S.R., No. 95-CA-1643-MR (Opinion Rendered July 19, 1996 and
Modified October 4, 1996) (“1996 opinion”).
This Court further
explained in the 1996 opinion that it would have reversed on the
merits in that the evidence did not support a finding that Revlett
neglected or abandoned his son, as required by KRS 625.090.
On remand, the parties corrected the procedural error and
the trial court heard additional proof on the neglect and abandonment
issue and determined that Appellants failed to present additional
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evidence which would support a different conclusion from that reached
by this Court.
The trial court specifically concluded, in denying
the petition, that it was duty bound to rule within the confines of
the 1996 opinion because of the law of the case doctrine.
Therefore,
the trial court denied the petition to involuntarily terminate
Revlett’s parental rights in its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law
and Judgment entered September 15, 1998.
The “law of the case” doctrine provides that:
When an appellate court decides a question
concerning evidence or instructions, the
question of law settled by the opinion is final
upon a retrial in which the evidence is
substantially the same and precludes the
reconsideration of the claimed error on a
second appeal.
Siler v. Williford, Ky., 375 S.W.2d 262, 263 (1964).
The crucial
requirement is that the appellate court enters a final decision on
the question rather than merely commenting on the issue.
To that end, Appellants Jagoe and H.R. assert that the
discussion of the issues of neglect and abandonment in the 1996
opinion was merely dicta.
In support of this contention, Appellants
rely on Judge Wilhoit’s dissent in the modified opinion which refers
to the dicta in the majority opinion.
The trial court understandably
rejected this argument based on the particular language of the 1996
opinion.
While we find that the trial court’s reliance on the 1996
opinion was entirely reasonable under the circumstances, it was
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nonetheless incorrect.
We now determine that the portion of the 1996
opinion discussing the evidence concerning neglect and abandonment is
dicta.
We reach this decision because the former appeal turned on a
procedural inadequacy which deprived this Court of jurisdiction.
The 1996 opinion vacated the trial court’s decision and
remanded for further proceedings based on the failure to name a
necessary party to the action.
KRS 625.080(2) clearly requires that
the minor child be named as a necessary party to a petition for the
involuntary termination of parental rights.
In the 1996 opinion this
court stated that because the child was never named as a party and
served, the child was never properly before the trial court and the
trial court therefore lacked jurisdiction to enter an order affecting
the rights of the minor child.
Similarly, the child was not named as
a necessary party on appeal which also is a jurisdictional defect
under CR 73.03.
As such, the 1996 opinion turned on a lack of jurisdiction
both by the trial court and this Court on appeal.
Any additional
findings on appeal are superfluous and cannot be binding due to the
lack of jurisdiction.
We therefore conclude that the discussion
following the holding on the procedural deficiency is not the law of
the case, as this Court did not have jurisdiction to consider the
issues presented thereafter.
We perceive that the trial court perhaps labored under a
reasonable but erroneous assumption on remand -- that the appellate
-4-
court had ruled on the merits when in fact it had not.
The actuality
of the situation is that any discussion apart from the jurisdictional
issue in the 1996 opinion is certainly not binding and should not be
considered as a directive or even as guidance by the parties or trial
court.
In light of the fact that the trial court limited itself
from entering its own findings of fact and conclusions of law because
it believed the law of the case doctrine applied, the judgment based
on an erroneous belief must be vacated and this case must be
remanded.
We urge the trial court to enter its findings, conclusions
and judgment as expeditiously as possible so as to bring certainty to
the parties, especially to the minor child.
Because the trial court never ruled on the Appellants’
argument that the definition of an “abused and neglected child” in
KRS 600.020(1) is not applicable in a situation involving the rights
of a noncustodial parent, we specifically decline to address said
argument at this time.
The judgment is vacated and this case is
remanded to allow the trial court to assess the evidence and enter
its own findings of fact, conclusions of law and judgment.
EMBERTON, JUDGE, CONCURS.
COMBS, JUDGE, CONCURS AND FILES A SEPARATE OPINION.
COMBS, JUDGE, CONCURRING: In the first appeal to this
court, the failure to name the minor child (H.R.) as a party was
adjudicated to be a fatal flaw depriving the appellate court of
-5-
jurisdiction to entertain the appeal at all - much less to rule on
the merits.
initially.
Similarly, the trial court had no jurisdiction
Once H.R. was named as a party upon remand, the trial
court was vested with jurisdiction for the first time and was thus
empowered to rule on all matters de novo.
In misperceiving the commentary that transpired during the
first appeal to be binding as to its deliberations upon remand, the
trial court improperly invoked a non-existent law of the case
doctrine; the law of case doctrine was merely a mirage under the
facts of this case.
The essence of this opinion is to urge the trial court to
begin anew and to enter its own findings of fact and conclusions of
law in the exercise of its unfettered discretion.
The life,
happiness, and well-being of a child are the crucial concern of all
of us who have labored on this case, and there has been a
considerable investment of effort by all involved to reach the
correct and just result.
It is surely a most worthwhile expenditure
that we hope will soon conclude.
BRIEF AND ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLANTS:
BRIEF AND ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLEE:
Evan Taylor
William G. Craig, Jr.
Owensboro, KY
Richard T. Ford
Owensboro, KY
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