BOBBY BECKLEY v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: October 1, 1999; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO. 1998-CA-002481-MR
BOBBY BECKLEY
v.
APPELLANTS
APPEAL FROM HENRY CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE DENNIS A. FRITZ, JUDGE
INDICTMENT NOS. 78-CR-00001,
78-CR-00002 and 78-CR-00003
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
BUCKINGHAM, HUDDLESTON and KNOPF, Judges.
HUDDLESTON, Judge.
Bobby Beckley appeals from a Henry Circuit
Court order that denied his motion to vacate the judgments in three
criminal cases in which he entered guilty pleas.
We affirm.
In January 1978, a Henry County grand jury issued three
indictments — 78-CR-001, 78-CR-002 and 78-CR-003 — each charging
Beckley with one felony count of burglary in the third degree (Ky.
Rev. Stat. (KRS) 511.040).
The indictments charged that Beckley
had unlawfully entered the homes of three individuals on three
different occasions in October and December 1977, and stolen
property including furniture and firearms. On May 1, 1978, Beckley
pled guilty to the three counts of burglary pursuant to a plea
agreement.
Under the plea agreement, the Commonwealth recommended
sentences of one year on each count and did not oppose concurrent
sentencing.
After conducting a guilty plea hearing, the circuit
court accepted Beckley’s guilty pleas and postponed sentencing
pending preparation and review of a Presentence Investigation
Report (PSI).
On October 30, 1978, the trial court sentenced
Beckley to serve one year on each of the three counts of burglary
in the third degree with the sentences to run consecutively for a
total of three years.
Some nineteen years later, on September 25, 1997, Beckley
filed a document entitled “Petition for Post-Conviction Relief”
with an attached memorandum of law.
In the petition he alleged
that his guilty pleas were not entered knowingly, voluntarily and
intelligently,
and
that
his
attorney
rendered
ineffective
assistance in relation to the pleas. Beckley requested the circuit
court to vacate the convictions because the guilty pleas were
entered unconstitutionally. In an opinion and order dated July 13,
1998, Henry Circuit Court denied the petition treating it as a
motion to vacate, set aside or correct sentence under Kentucky Rule
of Criminal Procedure (RCr) 11.42.
The court stated that Beckley
was not entitled to relief on the merits because the record refuted
his allegations.
It denied the motion on procedural grounds as
well on the ground that it was untimely.
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This appeal followed.
On appeal, Beckley disagrees with the circuit court’s
treatment of his post-conviction petition as an RCr 11.42 motion,
and suggests — for the first time — that it should be treated as a
petition for a writ of habeas corpus or a writ of coram nobis.
We
reject Beckley’s characterization of his petition and agree with
the circuit court that RCr 11.42 is a more appropriate avenue for
collateral attack in this case than habeas corpus.
Habeas corpus
is available only when the defendant seeks immediate release from
prison.
See, e.g., Hudson v. Commonwealth, Ky., 932 S.W.2d 371,
373 (1996); Brumley v. Seabold, Ky. App., 885 S.W.2d 954, 956
(1994).
Because
Beckley
is
not
currently
incarcerated
in
a
Kentucky state penal institution, a writ of habeas corpus is
unavailable. See also Commonwealth v. Marcum, Ky., 873 S.W.2d 207,
211 (1994)(RCr 11.42 procedure is adequate for collateral attack by
a prisoner in custody under a judgment which he believes is
defective with habeas corpus being an exception available if the
judgment by which he is detained is void ab initio); Fryrear v.
Parker,
Ky.,
920
S.W.2d
519
(1996)(writ
of
habeas
corpus
is
available to persons seeking release from detention or present
physical custody).
Similarly, the common law writ of coram nobis is now
embodied in Civil Rule 60.02.
cases
only
available.
where
a
remedy
CR 60.02 is available in criminal
under
RCr
11.42
otherwise
is
not
RCr 60.02 is not a separate avenue of appeal to be
pursued in addition to RCr 11.42.
As the Supreme Court said in
McQueen v. Commonwealth, Ky., 948 S.W.2d 415 (1997), cert. denied,
521 U.S. 1130, 117 S. Ct. 2535, 138 L. Ed. 2d 1035 (1998):
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A defendant who is in custody under sentence or on
probation, parole or conditional discharge, is required
to avail himself of RCr 11.42 as to any ground of which
he is aware, or should be aware, during the period when
the remedy is available to him.
intended
merely
as
an
Civil Rule 60.02 is not
additional
opportunity
to
relitigate the same issues which could “reasonably have
been
presented”
proceedings.
by
direct
appeal
or
RCr
11.42
RCr 11.42(3); Gross v. Commonwealth, [Ky.,
648 S.W.2d 853, 855-56 (1983).
Id. at 416 (emphasis supplied).
See also Land v. Commonwealth,
Ky., 986 S.W.2d 440, 442 (1999). Beckley could and should have
raised all the issues presented in his current petition while he
was serving his sentence on the 1978 convictions. He cannot now
utilize CR 60.02 as an alternative avenue to raise issues that
reasonably could have been presented earlier by way of an RCr 11.42
motion.
The circuit court properly denied Beckley’s motion on
procedural grounds. RCr 11.42 is available only for “a prisoner in
custody under sentence or a defendant on probation, parole or
conditional discharge . . . .” (Emphasis added). Beckley states in
his appellate brief that he currently is incarcerated in the
federal prison system on a federal criminal conviction.
As the
circuit court noted, he is not “in custody” on the sentence
associated with the 1978 Kentucky burglary convictions or any state
criminal conviction.
The record suggests that Beckley has served
out his three-year sentence on the 1978 convictions and is not on
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probation
or
parole.
Thus,
relief
under
RCr
11.42
is
not
available. See Wilson v. Commonwealth, Ky., 403 S.W.2d 710 (1966);
Sipple v. Commonwealth, Ky., 384 S.W.2d 332 (1964)(“RCr 11.42 does
not provide, expressly or by implication, for the review of any
judgment other than the one or ones pursuant to which the movant is
being held in custody”).
Cf. Maleng v. Cook, 490 U.S. 491, 109 S.
Ct. 1923, 104 L. Ed. 2d 540 (1989)(per curiam)(defendant no longer
“in custody” for purposes of habeas corpus after sentence for
conviction had fully expired).
In addition to the procedural bar, Beckley’s complaints
are without substantive merit.
On appeal, Beckley presents the
following arguments: (1) he was denied effective assistance of
counsel;
knowingly
(2)
his
and
guilty
pleas
intelligently;
were
(3)
not
the
entered
trial
voluntarily,
court
failed
to
establish a factual basis for the guilty pleas; (4) he was not
informed of the consequences of his pleas; (5) he was not informed
of the nature and elements of the offenses; (6) his pleas were
obtained by an unkept plea bargain agreement; (7) he was denied his
right
to
a
direct
appeal;
(8)
he
was
not
informed
of
his
constitutional rights to trial, to confront his accusers, to the
assistance of counsel, to remain silent, to the presumption of
innocence, and to be proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt; and
(9) he was not informed that his convictions could be used for
enhancement purposes later.
Beckley’s motion raises various complaints challenging
the conduct of the circuit court and his attorney.
The record
clearly refutes his allegations concerning the actions of the trial
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court.
Despite his assertion to the contrary, Beckley did appear
in person with his attorney and participate in the guilty plea
hearing on May 1, 1978. The record contains a certified memorandum
of the colloquy involving Beckley, his attorney and the court.
During the colloquy, Beckley’s attorney indicated that he and
Beckley
had
constitutional
fully
discussed
rights
and
the
the
indictment,
plea
his
client’s
agreement.
Beckley
affirmatively acknowledged that his attorney had discussed and
explained
the
indictment
to
him.
The
court
also
read
the
indictment and Beckley indicated that he understood the charges.
The court also carefully and fully delineated his rights to a
speedy trial, to remain silent, to confront all witnesses, to have
the
court
compel
representation
witnesses
and
to
trial
to
appear
by
in
jury.
court,
to
Beckley
legal
answered
affirmatively when asked if he wanted to plead guilty, and whether
he was entering the plea freely, voluntarily, and intelligently
without coercion or under any mental impairment.
The court told
Beckley that he could receive up to five years on each burglary
count and that the court was not bound by the Commonwealth’s
sentencing recommendation. The court also specifically asked: “Has
anybody at all made a promise to you or suggested to you that if
you plead guilty I will go easy on you, maybe give you a lighter
sentence, or probate you?”
The
record
Beckley responded, “No sir.”
contains
a
Pretrial
Disposition
Sheet
outlining the prosecution’s recommendation of one year on each
count and stating that the prosecutor did not object to concurrent
sentencing. This document also states that Beckley was waiving his
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constitutional rights and contains the signatures of Beckley, his
attorney and the prosecutor.
Finally, Beckley signed the document
entitled Waiver of Further Proceedings with Petition to Enter
Guilty Plea explicitly setting out his various constitutional
rights and the absence of any promise of probation by any person.
These documents refute Beckley’s allegations that he was not fully
informed of the nature and consequences of his plea, that the
circuit court did not establish a factual basis for the guilty
pleas, that he was not informed of the nature and elements of the
burglary offenses, that the pleas were obtained by an unkept plea
bargain, and that he was not informed of his constitutional rights.
The
record
shows
that
his
pleas
were
entered
knowingly,
voluntarily, and intelligently. See Commonwealth v. Crawford, Ky.,
789 S.W.2d 779 (1990)(written documents signed by a defendant
explaining indictment and waiver of rights were sufficient to show
valid guilty plea).
Beckley also was not improperly denied his
right to direct appeal because by entering a guilty plea, rather
than going to trial, he waived his right to a direct appeal.
Beckley argues that his guilty pleas were invalid because
he was not informed that his convictions could be used later for
enhancement purposes.
Generally, whether a conviction can be used
for enhancement purposes on a subsequent conviction is considered
a “collateral,” as opposed to a “direct,” consequence of a guilty
plea.
While
a
defendant
must
be
informed
of
all
direct
consequences of the plea before a valid guilty plea may be entered,
a trial court need not inform him of any potential collateral
consequences, including the enhancing effect of a conviction on
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subsequent sentences.
King v. Dutton, 17 F.3d 151 (6th Cir.),
cert. denied, 512 U.S. 1222, 114 S. Ct. 2712, 129 L. Ed. 2d 838
(1994); United States v. Brownlie, 915 F.2d 527, 528 (9th Cir.
1990). More specifically, failure of the trial court to inform the
defendant that his state conviction could be used to enhance his
sentence in a future federal prosecution does not render the state
guilty plea involuntary or invalid.
United States v. Gentry, 782
F. Supp. 1276, 1283 (N.D. Ill. 1992)(involving enhancement of a
federal handgun sentence based on prior state convictions for
burglary pursuant to guilty plea), aff’d, 978 F.2d 1262 (7th Cir.
1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 978, 113 S. Ct. 1429, 122 L. Ed. 2d
797 (1993).
Consequently, the circuit court’s failure to advise
Beckley that his convictions could be used for enhancement purposes
did not render the guilty pleas invalid.
Beckley also argues that the convictions are invalid
because he received ineffective assistance of counsel. In order to
establish ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must
satisfy a two-part test by showing: (1) that counsel’s performance
was deficient, and (2) that the deficiency resulted in actual
prejudice affecting the outcome of the proceeding.
Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984);
Moore
v.
Commonwealth,
Ky.,
983
S.W.2d
479
(1998).
When
a
defendant challenges a guilty plea based on ineffective assistance
of counsel he must show both that counsel made serious errors
outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance,
McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771, 90 S. Ct. 1441, 1449, 25
L. Ed. 2d 763 (1970), and that the deficient performance so
-8-
seriously affected the outcome of the plea process that, but for
the errors of counsel, there is a reasonable probability that he
would not have pled guilty, but would have insisted on going to
trial.
Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58, 106 S. Ct. 366, 370, 88
L. Ed. 2d 203 (1985); Roberson v. Commonwealth, Ky., 913 S.W.2d
310, 316 (1994).
A court must indulge a strong presumption that
counsel is competent, and the burden rests on the defendant to
overcome
violation.
the
presumption
by
demonstrating
a
constitutional
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S. Ct. at 2065;
Humphrey v. Commonwealth, Ky., 962 S.W.2d 870, 873 (1998); Wilson
v. Commonwealth, Ky., 836 S.W.2d 872, 879 (1992), cert. denied, 507
U.S. 1034, 113 S. Ct. 1857, 123 L. Ed. 2d 479 (1993).
Beckley asserts that his attorney failed to do any
pretrial research or investigate the case, that he failed to advise
him of the later enhancement possibilities of the convictions, and
that counsel told him he would receive probation. Beckley fails to
provide any factual support for his contention that counsel did not
perform an adequate investigation.
He has not presented any
specific examples of how counsel’s investigation was deficient or
what information an adequate investigation might have uncovered.
Beckley’s allegation on this point is simply too vague to rebut the
presumption that counsel acted reasonably.
See Strickland, 466
U.S. at 690, 1045 S. Ct. at 2066 (defendant must identify acts or
omissions of counsel);
Centers v. Commonwealth, Ky. App., 799
S.W.2d 51, 56 (1990); Thomas v. Commonwealth, Ky., 459 S.W.2d 72
(1970)(allegation of ineffective assistance of counsel must allege
sufficient facts to support claim).
-9-
Beckley’s complaint that counsel told him that he would
receive probation does not establish ineffective counsel because he
was specifically informed by the circuit court at the guilty plea
hearing
that
probation.
the
court
alone
would
decide
whether
to
grant
Beckley also indicated at the hearing in response to
the court’s inquiry that no one had promised him that the court
would probate him.
receive
probation,
Thus, even assuming counsel told him he would
Beckley
statements prejudiced him.
cannot
establish
that
counsel’s
See Ramos v. Rogers, 170 F.3d 560 (6th
Cir. 1999); Baker v. United States, 781 F.2d 85 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 479 U.S. 1017, 107 S. Ct. 667, 93 L. Ed. 2d 719 (1986).
Finally, Beckley has not demonstrated that counsel’s
failure to advise him of the potential use of the convictions for
enhancement purposes constituted ineffective assistance of counsel.
Even assuming that Beckley’s attorney failed to advise him of the
enhancement
possibilities
and
that
this
constituted
deficient
performance, he has not shown that he suffered prejudice because of
this deficiency.
Beckley does not claim that he did not commit the
three burglaries in 1977 or that the Commonwealth did not have
sufficient
evidence
to
obtain
a
conviction.
The
deficient
performance at issue does not involve any information that would
have affected the outcome of a trial.
Beckley was facing a
potential maximum sentence of fifteen years on the three counts of
burglary upon conviction, whereas under the plea agreement the
Commonwealth recommended the minimum sentence of one year on each
count with no objection to the sentences running concurrently. The
fact that the circuit court later decided to run the sentences
-10-
consecutively is irrelevant to Beckley’s decision to plead guilty
or go to trial because the plea agreement left that option open and
the circuit court would have been free to run the sentences
consecutively even after a jury trial.
In any event, the three-
year sentence was lenient under the circumstances.
Consequently,
Beckley has not shown that even if his attorney had informed him
that
the
burglary
convictions
could
be
used
for
enhancement
purposes upon a subsequent criminal conviction, he would have
decided to go to trial rather than plead guilty.
See United States
v. Gentry, supra; Sims v. Superintendent of Clinton Correctional
Facility, Dannemora, New York, 887 F. Supp. 571 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
In
conclusion,
Beckley
has
failed
to
satisfy
his
burden
of
establishing ineffective assistance of counsel sufficient to render
his guilty plea unconstitutional.1
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the order denying
Beckley’s “Petition for Post-Conviction Relief.”
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Bobby Beckley, pro se
Manchester, Kentucky
A. B. Chandler III
Attorney General
Todd D. Ferguson
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
1
Beckley’s delay in raising this issue until nineteen
years after pleading guilty and only when the state convictions
were used for enhancement of his federal sentence suggests that
the possible enhancement information was not critical to his
decision to plead guilty.
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