JEREMY BRADY v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: JULY 30, 1999; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
1998-CA-001753-MR
JEREMY BRADY
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM HENDERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE STEPHEN HAYDEN, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 98-CR-00050
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
DYCHE, GUIDUGLI AND JOHNSON, JUDGES.
GUIDUGLI, JUDGE.
Jeremy Brady (Brady) appeals the judgment of
conviction and sentence entered by the Henderson Circuit Court on
July 7, 1998.
Brady was found guilty of the offense of
second-degree unlawful transaction with a minor (UTWM)
(KRS 530.065) following a jury trial and sentenced to one (1)
year imprisonment.
We affirm.
On September 26, 1997, Henderson City Police Officer
Jason Short (Officer Short) observed appellant and another
individual, later identified as Billy Rigdon (Rigdon), walking
across private property of a local Henderson business.
As the
two were walking the officer observed Rigdon place something in a
meter box located on the property.
Officer Short stopped the two
to investigate and look inside the meter box, wherein he found a
small baggie of marijuana.
Both Brady, age 21, and his friend,
Rigdon, age 16, were taken into custody and transported to the
police station.
At the station, Rigdon waived his Miranda
rights1 and in the presence of his mother, stated that Brady had
given him the marijuana and that they had smoked marijuana
together at Brady’s house approximately thirty minutes earlier.
Based upon these facts, Brady was indicted by the Henderson
County Grand Jury on February 3, 1998, on charges of UTWM, second
degree (KRS 30.065) and trafficking in marijuana, less than eight
counts (KRS 218A.1421)).
The trafficking in marijuana charge was
subsequently dismissed on motion of the Commonwealth.
At the jury trial on June 10,1998, Rigdon changed his
story and denied he and Brady had smoked marijuana together or
that Brady had given him the marijuana he had placed in the meter
box.
Brady testified that he knew Rigdon to be a juvenile, but
denied he provided Rigdon with the marijuana and further denied
that they had smoked marijuana earlier.
Officer Short testified
as to what he observed at the scene and what statements were made
by the two at the police station.
Brady was found guilty and
sentenced to one (1) year in prison.
This appeal followed.
On appeal Brady raises only one issue.
Brady alleges
that the trial court erred by not granting a mistrial when
1
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d
694 (1966).
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Officer Short, in response to a question from the Commonwealth,
commented that “[Brady] refused to answer any question.”
Although the officer did make the statement objected to, that is
not the complete picture.
During direct testimony, the following
exchange took place:
Q (C.A.)
Did you inform Mr. Brady what
subject matter you were going to
ask him questions about? What was
the purpose of him being at the
station, did you do that?
A (P.O.)
Yes, sir.
Q (C.A.)
What basically did you tell him?
A (P.O.)
I advised him of his Miranda rights
as well, [pause]...and asked him
questions about the substances,
[pause]... and he refused to answer
any questions, he said he didn’t
know what we were talking about.
At this point, defense counsel objected and the attorneys
approached the bench.
Counsel for Brady indicated that the part
of the testimony that “he [Brady] refused to answer any
questions” should not have come into evidence.
The Commonwealth
agreed and indicated he didn’t know where that came from because
Brady had, in fact, given a statement to police.
Both counsel
agreed that Brady had given a statement and they were surprised
by the officer’s response.
The trial judge asked if defense
counsel wanted the court to admonish the jury.
Counsel then
requested a mistrial and stated that an admonition would not
“cure” the situation.
The trial court overruled the motion for a
mistrial and again requested of defense counsel if she wanted him
to give an admonition to the jury.
Again, defense counsel
declined the court’s suggestion of an admonition stating that
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such would not “cure” the problem but only make it worse.
Thereafter, the court was again made aware that Brady had, in
fact, given a statement to Officer Short.
The court then
suggested the Commonwealth specifically ask the officer if Brady
did make a statement to him.
When the Commonwealth resumed questioning the officer,
the following exchange occurred shortly thereafter:
Q (C.A.)
During the time you were with him
at the police station, did he
[Brady] made any statement to you
with regard to the subject matter
of the marijuana?
A (P.O.)
Yes, sir, he did make a statement.
Q (C.A.)
What was the statement he made to
you on the subject of marijuana?
A (P.O.)
That he didn’t know what we were
talking about.
That was the last question the Commonwealth asked the
police officer on direct examination.
Thereafter, on cross-
examination, the following exchange occurred between counsel for
Brady and the officer as it related to the interview with Brady
at the police station:
Q (D.A.)
He [Brady] told you he didn’t know
anything about the marijuana in the
pole.
A (P.O.)
No, he didn’t say that. He said he
didn’t know what we were talking
about.
Q (D.A.)
Did you ask him, “what do you know
about the marijuana in the pole?”
A (P.O.)
I probably did.
Q (D.A.)
And he said, “I don’t know what you
are talking about.” Right?
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A (P.O.)
That is the only statement he would
make to me, and I don’t know if we
went any further after that.
Appellant alleges that he was “clearly penalized by evidential
use of his refusal to submit to police interrogation after [being
read] his Miranda warnings.”
We do not agree.
From the record
it is clear that, despite the officer’s initial statement that
Brady “refused to answer any question,” he quickly added, “He
[Brady] said he didn’t know what we were talking about.”
Later
in his testimony, on two separate occasions, the police officer
clearly pointed out to the jury that Brady had made a statement
in response to his questions about the marijuana.
On each
occasion the officer repeated that Brady said “he didn’t know
what we [the police] were talking about.”
Even the defense
attorney in cross-examining Officer Short used the word statement
in describing Brady’s responses to the police interview.
The cases of Hall v. Commonwealth, Ky., 826 S.W.2d 321
(1993), and Renfro v. Commonwealth, Ky., 893 S.W.2d 795 (1995),
cited by appellant, deal with whether or not the alleged improper
comment on the defendant’s silence can be viewed as harmless
error.
The case of Green v. Commonwealth, Ky., 815 S.W.2d 398
(1991), cited by the Commonwealth, actually deals with the
situation of a defendant’s right to remain silent.
In Green, the
Kentucky Supreme Court stated:
The giving of a Miranda warning does not
suddenly endow a defendant with a new
constitutional right. The right to remain
silent exists whether or not the warning has
been or is ever given. The warning is
required not to activate the right secured,
but to enable citizens to knowingly exercise
or waive it. Recognizing that the right to
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remain silent does not truly exist if one may
be penalized for its exercise, the Supreme
Court of the United States has held, “The
prosecution may not therefore use at trial
the fact that [the accused] stood mute or
claimed his privilege in the face of an
accusation.” Miranda, 86 S.Ct. At 1624 n. 37
(1966). Kentucky authority is fully in
accord. Jackson v. Commonwealth, Ky. App.,
717 S.W.2d 511 (1986); Salisbury v.
Commonwealth, Ky. App., 556 S.W.2d 922
(1977); and Bradley v. Commonwealth, Ky., 261
S.W.2d 642 (1953). This principle is
manifestly logical in view of the ambiguous
circumstances often surrounding an arrest.
Whether an innocent or guilty person feels
the need to speak or remain silent at the
time of arrest depends on a vast array of
confusing factors including unique personal
characteristics of the accused. The Supreme
Court recognized this in United States v.
Hale, 422 U.S. 171, 95 S.Ct. 2133, 45 Led.2d
99 (1975), and concluded that it is difficult
or impossible to identify the reason one may
chose to remain silent at the time of his
arrest and that no reliable conclusion could
be drawn therefrom.
Green, Id. at 400.
However, in Green, the Supreme Court, after determining
that the comments by the prosecutor as to the defendant’s silence
amounted to error, proceeded to affirm the case because the error
was harmless error.
Similarly, as stated above, the issue raised in the
cases of Hall, supra, and Renfro, supra, cited by Brady, is
whether or not the error was harmless or not. In Renfro, the
Court set forth the standard for harmless error as follows:
Although the trial court improperly
allowed testimony by the expert as to the
causation of the accident, the error was
harmless. The test for harmless error is
whether there is any reasonable possibility
that absent the error the verdict would have
been different. Crane v. Commonwealth, Ky.,
726 S.W.2d 302, cert. denied, 484 U.S. 834,
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108 S.Ct. 111, 98 L.Ed.2d 70 (1987);
Commonwealth v. McIntosh, Ky., 646 S.W.2d 43
(1983). An error of constitutional
proportions must be shown to be harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt. Chapman v.
California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17
L.Ed.2d 705 (1967).
Renfro, supra, at 797.
In light of the minimal reference to Brady’s silence,
which was immediately followed by the statement actually made by
Brady to the officer, and the fact that the correct statement was
thereafter twice again presented to the jury (once by defense on
cross-examination), we find that if, in fact, there was error, it
was harmless.
Therefore, we affirm the judgment and sentence
entered by the Henderson Circuit Court.
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ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Irvin J. Halbleib
Louisville, KY
A. B. Chandler, III
Attorney General
Dennis W. Shepherd
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, KY
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