WILLIAM STEVE GIBSON d/b/a GIBSON BODY SHOP v. DONALD POWELL
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RENDERED: November 24, 1999; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
1998-CA-001498-MR
WILLIAM STEVE GIBSON
d/b/a GIBSON BODY SHOP
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM McCREARY CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE PAUL BRADEN, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 96-CI-498
v.
DONALD POWELL
APPELLEE
OPINION AND ORDER DISMISSING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
BUCKINGHAM, GARDNER AND KNOX, JUDGES.
GARDNER, JUDGE:
William Steve Gibson (Gibson) doing business as
Gibson Body Shop (Gibson) appeals from a judgment of the McCreary
Circuit Court for Donald Powell (Powell).
Gibson argues in part
that the trial court’s judgment was interlocutory and thus was
not final and appealable.
After reviewing the record and the
judgment below, this Court must agree, and must dismiss Gibson’s
appeal.
Powell filed an action in November 1996 against Gibson,
alleging that Gibson breached a contract between Powell and
Gibson by failing to timely repair Powell’s vehicle and by
failing to return Powell’s vehicle parts and money.
On the day
Powell filed suit, the court granted Powell a writ of possession
authorizing the retrieval of Powell’s vehicle parts from Gibson’s
property.
On the following day, the writ was executed, and some
of Powell’s property was returned to him.
In December 1996, Gibson filed an answer and
counterclaim wherein he alleged that Powell made
misrepresentations in the discussions leading to the contract and
provided inadequate and inappropriate parts impeding his
performance of the contract and causing him to incur extra time
and expense in trying to fulfill the contract.
Gibson
specifically sought in excess of $2,500.00 for the additional
work and expense caused by Powell’s alleged misrepresentations
and in excess of $2,500.00 for the parts allegedly belonging to
Gibson which Powell converted to his own use and possession.
Discovery proceeded, and in April 1997, Powell and
Gibson testified in depositions.
The court assigned the case for
jury trial to be held on July 10, 1997.
On June 18, 1997,
Gibson’s counsel filed a motion to withdraw.
On June 24, 1997,
the court granted counsel’s motion to withdraw and granted Gibson
ten days to obtain substitute counsel.
On July 10, 1997, neither Gibson nor counsel for him
appeared at trial.
The court held a bench trial and stated that
it would consider Powell’s earlier deposition testimony.
court questioned Powell regarding his damages.
The
In a July 29,
1997 judgment, the court ruled that Powell was entitled to
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judgment as a matter of law.
The court awarded Powell $3,500.00
plus interest based upon the amount Powell paid Gibson, $3,000.00
plus interest for the value of the burned truck that Gibson
allegedly disposed of, $2,100.00 for attorney’s fees, $151.50 for
the cost of depositions, and $50.00 for tow truck expenses.
It
also awarded Powell a writ of possession to secure the remaining
parts that Gibson possessed.
The judgment did not directly
address Gibson’s counterclaim.
Gibson subsequently filed a
motion to vacate and to set the case for trial.
As part of his
arguments, he maintained that the trial court’s judgment was
interlocutory and thus not appealable.
Gibson’s motion.
The trial court denied
Gibson has now appealed to this Court.
On appeal, Gibson argues that the trial court’s
judgment was interlocutory and not appealable, because it did not
dispose of his counterclaim and failed to include language
required by Kentucky Rule of Civil Procedure (CR) 54.02 and
applicable caselaw.
He maintains that the interlocutory judgment
should be set aside and the issues joined by the complaint,
answer and counterclaim set for trial.
We have concluded that
the trial court’s judgment was interlocutory and therefore not
appealable.1
CR 54.02(1) provides,
When more than one claim for relief is
presented in an action, whether as a claim,
counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party
claim, or when multiple parties are involved,
1
Powell maintains that Gibson failed to adequately preserve
this issue below. Gibson raised this issue in his motion to
vacate. Therefore, we conclude Gibson adequately preserved the
issue.
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the court may grant a final judgment upon one
or more but less than all of the claims or
parties only upon a determination that there
is no just reason for delay. The judgment
shall recite such determination and shall
recite that the judgment is final. In the
absence of such recital, any order or other
form of decision, however designated, which
adjudicates less than all the claims or the
rights and liabilities of less than all the
parties shall not terminate the action as to
any of the claims or parties, and the order
or other form of decision is interlocutory
and subject to revision at any time before
the entry of judgment adjudicating all the
claims and the rights and liabilities of all
the parties.
When the parties present more than one claim for relief in an
action, a judgment upon less than all of the claims shall become
final and appealable only if the court states in the judgment
that it is final and that there is no just reason for delay.
Ball v. Beatrice Foods Co., Ky., 395 S.W.2d 594, 595 (1965).
This rule applies where a judgment fails to dispose of a
counterclaim.
Trumbo v. Parsley, Ky., 461 S.W.2d 67 (1970);
O’Nan v. Broadus, Ky., 316 S.W.2d 220 (1958).2
In the case at bar, the trial court’s judgment did not
dispose of Gibson’s counterclaim.
While the court ruled for
Powell and awarded him damages, it did not rule regarding the
damages sought by Gibson.
Further, while the judgment contained
the final and appealable language, it did not state that there
was no just reason for delay, as required by CR 54.02 and
applicable caselaw.
Thus, the trial court’s judgment was
2
Security Federal Savings & Loan Association of Mayfield v.
Nesler, Ky., 697 S.W.2d 136 (1985), relied upon by Powell, is
factually distinguishable from the instant case.
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interlocutory and not appealable.3
For the foregoing reasons
this Court ORDERS that Gibson’s appeal is hereby DISMISSED.
ALL CONCUR.
ENTERED: November 24, 1999
3
/s/ John A. Gardner
JUDGE, COURT OF APPEALS
We find it unnecessary to address Gibson’s other arguments.
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BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Stephan Charles
Manchester, Kentucky
Austin Price
Whitley City, Kentucky
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