BURRELL G. HOWELL v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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November 19, 1999; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
1998-CA-001082-MR
BURRELL G. HOWELL
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM HENDERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE STEPHEN HAYDEN, JUDGE
INDICTMENT NO. 95-CR-00014
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
COMBS, HUDDLESTON, AND KNOPF, JUDGES.
KNOPF, JUDGE.
Burrell G. Howell (Howell) appeals pro se from an
opinion and order of the Henderson Circuit Court denying his
motion to vacate, alter, amend or correct sentence brought
pursuant to Kentucky Rule of Criminal Procedure (RCr) 11.42.
After reviewing the record, we affirm.
In January 1995, the Henderson County Grand Jury
indicted Howell on six felony counts of sodomy in the first
degree (KRS 510.070) and six felony counts of sexual abuse in the
first degree (KRS 510.110) involving several instances of alleged
sexual activity with J.F., D.F., and K.G., all of whom were under
twelve years of age at the time of the offenses.
J.F. and D.F.
were Howell’s nine-year-old great nephews and K.G. was the threeyear old grandson of Howell’s employer.
The indictment alleged
that four of the offenses occurred “on or about the first week of
April, 1994,” that four of the offenses occurred “on or about
September 17, 1994,” and that four of the offenses occurred “on
or about September 28, 1994.”
On January 12, 1995, Howell was
arraigned on the indictment and Martha Polk was appointed by the
court to represent him.
On April 14, 1995, Howell was tried before a jury.
During the trial, the Commonwealth’s witnesses included J.F. and
D.F., J.F.’s mother, K.G.’s grandmother, and the emergency room
physician who treated K.G.
The defense witnesses included
Howell’s wife, Judy Howell, and his landlord.
J.F. and D.F. described acts of oral sex and sexual
fondling committed by Howell on each of them during spring break
from school in early April 1994 and on another occasion in late
September 1994.
D.F. testified that Howell had also sodomized
and sexually fondled him, and had sodomized and sexually fondled
K.G. in his (J.F.’s) presence on September 17, 1994.
K.G.’s
grandmother testified that K.G. had redness on his penis and
rectum shortly after being with Howell on September 17, 1994.
The treating physician testified that K.G. told him that Howell
had “licked” his penis.
At trial, Howell raised a partial alibi defense
suggesting that he was absent from Kentucky on some of the dates
the offenses were alleged to have occurred.
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Judy Howell was the
leading defense witness concerning appellant’s whereabouts in
April and September 1994.
She testified that Howell was in West
Virginia visiting his daughter from April 4 to the middle of
April.
She also stated that she spent a large part of the day of
September 17 with appellant after she got off work at
approximately 2:00 p.m.
On cross-examination, Judy stated that
Howell left for West Virginia on April 4 and that her next
contact with him was on April 7 when she talked to him by phone
from his daughter’s residence in West Virginia.
The jury convicted Howell of five counts of firstdegree sodomy and one count of first-degree sexual abuse based on
the incidents involving all three children in April and September
1994.
Following the sentencing phase, the jury recommended
concurrent sentences of twenty (20) years on each count of firstdegree sodomy and one (1) year on first-degree sexual abuse.
The
trial court sentenced Howell accordingly to serve twenty (20)
years in prison.
The Kentucky Supreme Court affirmed the
conviction on direct appeal.
Howell v. Commonwealth, 95-SC-392-
MR (unpublished opinion rendered February 22, 1996).
In July 1997, Howell filed an RCr 11.42 motion
challenging the adequacy of his trial attorney’s representation.
He alleged that counsel had failed to fully investigate potential
witnesses and to object to irrelevant and prejudicial testimony.
Howell also filed motions requesting an evidentiary hearing and
appointment of counsel.
The trial court granted the motion for
an evidentiary hearing and appointed counsel to represent Howell
at the hearing.
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The trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing on the
RCr 11.42 motion on December 16, 1997.
The only witnesses at the
hearing were Howell and his former trial counsel, Martha Polk.
Howell testified that he had discussed an alibi defense with
counsel prior to trial and had identified several potential
witnesses who could have provided relevant evidence.
He stated
that several of his relatives could have testified at trial that
he was in Tennessee or West Virginia when some of the offenses
were alleged to have occurred.
More specifically, he said that
he had been in Chattanooga, Tennessee, visiting his daughter,
Denise Frost, from March 29 to April 3, 1994.
Howell testified
that he returned to Henderson from Tennessee on the night of
April 3, 1994, but that he had left Kentucky on the morning of
April 4, 1994, in order to visit his sister in West Virginia.
He
indicated that he stayed in West Virginia until April 16, 1994,
then traveled to Florida, where he stayed with his brother,
Merrill, until April 23,1994, and then returned to Henderson.
Howell said that he told his attorney
the persons who could
testify about his presence in West Virginia included his sister,
Charlotte McAfee, and his daughter, Rhonda Bolyard.
He testified
that several persons could have provided information about his
presence in Florida including his daughter, Lisa Cruse, his son,
Billy Howell, and his brother, Merrill Howell.
Howell testified
that he told his attorney that his brother, Wayne Howell, was
living with him and his wife in a house in Henderson from April
23 to September 29, 1994, and that he and Wayne were together
constantly throughout that period.
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Martha Polk testified that she discussed various
possible defenses to the charges with Howell, including an alibi
defense.
She spoke with him about his whereabouts on the
relevant dates and his various trips to Tennessee, West Virginia,
and Florida.
She said that she had attempted to verify this
information by speaking with Charlotte McAfee, Merrill Howell,
and Judy Howell.
Polk stated that although Merrill had attended
the trial, she did not call him as a witness because he could not
provide any pertinent information that Judy Howell did not
testify to at the trial.
Polk said that she asked Charlotte to
attend the trial but that Charlotte indicated she could not
participate because her husband was ill.
Polk testified that
Howell told her he was visiting with Denise on March 29, 1994,
and that he had never informed her that he stayed in Tennessee
until April 3.
She stated that Howell had not told her that
Wayne Howell was living with him.
Based on her conversations
with the appellant, she did not believe at the time of the trial
that Wayne could have provided any useful testimony.
Polk also
indicated that Howell had not mentioned Billy Howell to her prior
to trial.
She testified that she was aware of Rhonda Bolyard and
Lisa Cruse, but she did not subpoena them because they offered no
new evidence that Judy Howell did not provide.
She stated that
she did not attempt to call Denise Frost as a witness because
Howell had not told her he was in Chattanooga after March 29.
On January 20, 1998, the trial court issued an
extensive opinion denying the motion.
The court discussed each
of the potential witnesses and concluded that trial counsel had
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not provided constitutionally ineffective assistance.
This
appeal followed.
Howell argues on appeal that his trial attorney
provided ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of the
Sixth Amendment by conducting an inadequate investigation of
relevant witnesses and by failing to call certain relevant
witnesses, whom he identified in his RCr 11.42 motion.
He
contends that counsel’s failure to call all of these witnesses
represented a denial of his right to present witnesses in support
of his defense in violation of due process.
He asserts that he
was not provided a full and fair trial because “there were no
witnesses presented on his behalf” in support of his alibi
defense.
A person alleging ineffective assistance of counsel
must satisfy a two-part test showing that counsel’s performance
was deficient and that the deficiency caused actual prejudice
resulting in a proceeding that was fundamentally unfair.
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L.
Ed. 2d 674 (1984); accord Gall v. Commonwealth, Ky., 702 S.W.2d
37 (1985), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1010, 106 S. Ct.
3311, 92 L.
Ed. 2d 724 (1986); Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 372, 113
S. Ct. 838, 842, 112 L. Ed. 2d 180 (1993).
The burden is on the
defendant to overcome a strong presumption that counsel’s
assistance was constitutionally sufficient or that under the
circumstances counsel’s action might be considered “trial
strategy.”
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S. Ct. at 2065;
Moore v. Commonwealth, Ky., 983 S.W.2d 479, 482 (1998); Sanborn
-6-
v. Commonwealth, Ky., 975 S.W.2d 905, 912 (1998), cert. denied,
___ U.S. ___, 119 S. Ct. 1266, 143 L. Ed. 2d 361 (1999).
Attorney performance is based on an objective standard of
reasonableness under the prevailing professional norms.
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688, 104 S. Ct. at 2065; Harper v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 978 S.W.2d 311, 315 (1998), cert. denied,
___U.S.___, 119 S. Ct. 1367, 143 L. Ed. 2d 527 (1999).
In order
to establish actual prejudice, a defendant must show a reasonable
probability that the outcome of the proceeding would have been
different.
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S. Ct. at 2068;
Bowling v. Commonwealth, Ky., 981 S.W.2d 545, 551 (1998), cert.
denied, ___U.S.___, 119 S. Ct. 2375, ___ L. Ed. 2d ___ (1999).
reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine
A
confidence in the outcome of the proceeding considering the
totality of the evidence before the jury.
at 694-95, 104 S. Ct. at 2068-69.
Strickland, 466 U.S.
See also Moore, 983 S.W.2d at
484, 488.
With reference to defense counsel’s duty to
investigate, the Court in Strickland stated:
The reasonableness of counsel’s actions may
be determined or substantially influenced by
the defendant’s own statements or actions.
Counsel’s actions are usually based, quite
properly, on informed strategic choices made
by the defendant and on information supplied
by the defendant. In particular, what
investigation decisions are reasonable
depends critically on such information . . .
. [W]hen a defendant has given counsel reason
to believe that pursuing certain
investigations would be fruitless or even
harmful, counsel’s failure to pursue those
investigations may not later be challenged as
unreasonable. In short, inquiry into
counsel’s conversations with the defendant
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may be critical to a proper assessment of
counsel’s investigation decisions, just as it
may be critical to a proper assessment of
counsel’s other litigation decisions.
460 U.S. at 691, 104 S. Ct. at 2066 (citation omitted).
The
Court also noted that “strategic choices made after thorough
investigation of law and facts relevant to plausible options are
virtually unchallengeable . . . .”
Id. at 690, 104 S. Ct. at
2066.
In the present case, Howell contends that counsel was
ineffective for failing to make a full investigation of potential
witnesses and failing to subpoena several alleged alibi witnesses
to testify at trial including Denise Frost, Charlotte McAfee,
Rhonda Bolyard, Merrill Howell, Billy Howell, Wayne Howell, and
Lisa Cruse.
First, we note that none of these individuals was
called to testify at the RCr 11.42 hearing, nor did Howell submit
any verified affidavits from them.1
The only evidence concerning
any exculpatory testimony they could have provided at the
original trial comes from Howell himself.
Generally, however in
raising the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel for
failure to conduct a sufficient investigation of potential
witnesses, the defendant should present evidence through the
actual testimony of the potential witnesses.
If the defendant
does not call these witnesses at the hearing on the motion, it is
1
Howell has attached to his appellate brief four handwritten
letters and one affidavit from members of his family. These
documents have never been presented to the trial court;
therefore, we will not consider them. See Morris v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 488 S.W.2d 680 (1972); Perkins v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 382 S.W.2d 393 (1964).
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incumbent upon him to explain their absence and to demonstrate
with some precision the content of the testimony they would have
given at trial.
United States ex. rel. Cross. v. DeRoberts, 811
F.2d 1008, 1016 (7th Cir. 1987).
Otherwise, the trial court
simply cannot fulfill its obligation under Strickland to assess
whether the defendant has satisfied his burden of establishing
that prejudice resulting from counsel’s error.
Howell’s failure
to call the alleged alibi witnesses he identified in his motion
necessarily weakens his complaint.
Howell stated at the RCr 11.42 hearing that Charlotte
McAfee and Rhonda Bolyard could have provided information that he
was in West Virginia between April 4–16, 1994.
He testified that
Merrill Howell, Billy Howell, and Lisa Cruse could have provided
information that he was in Florida between April 16–23, 1994.
He
stated that Denise Frost could have testified that he was in
Tennessee between March 29 – April 3, 1994.
Howell testified
that Wayne Howell lived with him between April 23 – September 29,
1994 and that Wayne was with him constantly for “24 hours a day”
during that period.
Martha Polk, defense counsel, testified at the RCr
11.42 hearing that she did not call Merrill Howell, Billy Howell,
and Lisa Cruse because their testimony was not relevant given the
fact that the criminal offenses were alleged to have occurred
during the first week of April and on September 17 and September
28, 1994.
She stated that she did not subpoena Charlotte McAfee
and Rhonda Bolyard because Judy Howell, appellant’s wife,
testified at the trial about Howell’s trip to West Virginia in
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April.
Polk testified that Charlotte told her that Howell had
been in West Virginia between April 6–15, 1994.
She said that
she asked Charlotte to attend the trial, but Charlotte indicated
that she could not leave her ill husband.
Polk also stated that
she did not believe any of these witnesses could have provided
new information which Judy Howell did not provide in her trial
testimony.
Polk further testified that Howell never told her
Wayne Howell had lived with him or that Wayne could have provided
information about appellant’s whereabouts.
She also said that
Howell told her he was in Tennessee on March 29, and that he did
not tell her he was there until April 3.
Based on a review of the record, we believe that Howell
has not demonstrated that he received ineffective assistance of
counsel.
Polk’s investigation was based primarily on her
conversations with Howell.
Based on those conversations, she
also contacted Charlotte, Judy and Merrill.
She testified that
she believed the information which the non-testifying alibi
witnesses could have provided was either cumulative or not
helpful because it did not cover the pertinent time periods for
the offenses.
Furthermore contrary to Howell’s testimony at the RCr
11.42 hearing that he was in Tennessee visiting his daughter
Denise between March 29 and April 3, Judy Howell testified at the
trial that she and Burrell returned to Henderson from Tennessee
on March 30.
Judy’s testimony was consistent with Polk’s
testimony at the hearing that she believed Howell was in Tennesse
only on March 29.
Viewing the entire record, we agree with the
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trial court that defense counsel’s conduct constituted sound
trial strategy within the wide range of reasonable professional
assistance.
Howell has not shown that his attorney’s evaluation
of whether she needed to call any of these witnesses was
objectively unreasonable.
Thus, he has failed to demonstrate
that counsel’s performance was deficient.
In addition, Howell has not proven that he suffered
actual prejudice by counsel’s failure to call these witnesses at
trial.
D.F. and J.F. were unable to identify the precise day in
April that the offenses occurred, but their description of the
sexual abuse was compelling and consistent.
Howell stated that
he was in Henderson on the morning of April 4 and during the
entire month of September 1994.
None of the out-of-state
witnesses could have provided information about Howell’s
whereabouts in September and during the relevant time period in
early April.
The trial court found that Howell’s assertion that
Wayne could account for appellant’s whereabouts “for every
minute” between April 23 – September 29, 1994, was neither
credible or plausible.
“When the trial court conducts an
evidentiary hearing, the reviewing court must defer to the
determinations of fact and witness credibility made by the trial
judge.”
Sanborn, 975 S.W.2d at 909 (citations omitted).
Defense
counsel’s failure to call alibi witnesses at trial does not
constitute actual prejudice where the witnesses’ testimony would
only cover a part of the period charged in the indictment and
would not directly refute the defendant’s involvement in the
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offenses.
United States v. Andrews, 953 F.2d 1312, 1327 (11th
Cir.), cert. denied, 505 U.S. 1227, 112 S. Ct. 3048, 120 L. Ed.
2d 915 (1992).
See also Robbins v. Commonwealth, Ky. App., 719
S.W.2d 742, 743 (1986)(ineffective assistance of counsel not
shown by counsel’s “merely failing to produce witnesses in the
appellant’s defense in the absence of any allegation that their
testimony would have compelled an acquittal.”); Gall v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 702 S.W.2d 37 (1985)(failure to call all
witnesses requested by defendant does not create prejudice for
ineffective assistance claim if testimony would not be helpful),
cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1010, 106 S. Ct. 3311, 92 L. Ed. 2d 724
(1986).
Given the inability of any of the proposed alibi
witnesses to provide evidence clearly refuting the charges, and
the fact that Judy Howell’s testimony covered the information
that most of these other witnesses would have provided, Howell
has not shown that he suffered prejudice by counsel’s failure to
call the proposed alibi witnesses in that there was a reasonable
probability the outcome of the trial would have been different.
Therefore, Howell has not satisfied his burden of establishing
either prong of the Strickland standard for ineffective
assistance of counsel.
Therefore, the trial court did not err in
denying Howell’s RCr 11.42 motion.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the order of the
Henderson Circuit Court.
ALL CONCUR.
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BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Burrell G. Howell
Central City, Kentucky
A.B. Chandler III
Attorney General
William L. Daniel II
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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