DWAYNE MCGUFFIN v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: JULY 9, 1999; 2:00 P.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
1998-CA-001075-MR
DWAYNE MCGUFFIN
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM GRAYSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE SAM MONARCH, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 93-CR-49
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
DYCHE, GUIDUGLI, JOHNSON, JUDGES.
JOHNSON, JUDGE: Dwayne McGuffin (McGuffin) appeals from an order
of the Grayson Circuit Court entered on April 1, 1998, denying
his Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure (RCr) 11.42 motion to
vacate his sentence. Having concluded that McGuffin has failed to
state grounds upon which relief may be granted, we affirm.
On April 6, 1993, McGuffin was indicted for Flagrant
Non-Support (Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 530.050). McGuffin
entered into a plea agreement with the Commonwealth on July 20,
1995.
In accordance with a recommendation from the Commonwealth,
McGuffin pled guilty to flagrant non-support.
The plea agreement
provided that, on the condition that McGuffin pay off all child
support in arrearage, he would receive a two-year prison sentence
that would be probated for five years. On August 1, 1995, the
Grayson Circuit Court sentenced McGuffin consistently with the
plea agreement. Throughout the court proceedings, McGuffin was
represented by retained counsel.
On March 24, 1998, McGuffin, pro se, filed an RCr 11.42
motion alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. On April 1,
1998, the trial court entered an order denying McGuffin’s request
for RCr 11.42 relief on the grounds that his motion was “clearly.
. . without basis in fact and that his allegations [were] simply
not true.” This appeal followed.
McGuffin claims ineffective assistance of counsel due
to counsel’s alleged failure to ‘investigate’ the case fully. In
support of this allegation, McGuffin claims that prior to his
indictment for flagrant non-support he transferred property to
his ex-wife in lieu of child support.
McGuffin claims that this
property transfer fulfilled his child support obligations that
had not previously been paid. McGuffin argues that he was wrongly
convicted since his lawyer failed to bring the property transfer
to the trial court’s attention. What McGuffin ignores is his own
responsibility to inform his trial counsel of an alleged property
transfer in lieu of child support. And, of equal importance, the
record reveals McGuffin’s repeated admissions that he did indeed
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fail to timely pay his child support and that he owed his ex-wife
the amount alleged.
RCr 11.42(2) requires the movant to “state
specifically the grounds on which the sentence is being
challenged and the facts on which the movant relies in support of
such grounds.” It appears from the record that McGuffin not only
failed to inform his counsel and the trial court that he had
allegedly already paid his child support through a property
transfer, but that he chose to conceal this alleged fact by,
under oath, pleading guilty to all charges. The burden is upon
the
defendant to identify specific acts or omissions alleged to
constitute deficient performance. Strickland v. Washington, 466
U.S. 668, 690, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2066, 80 L.Ed.2d 674, 695 (1984).
Here, McGuffin failed to advise counsel of the alleged property
transfer, and he failed to identify any error that his counsel
committed in failing to obtain the information about the alleged
property transfer.
The two-prong test for determining whether a defendant
has received ineffective assistance of counsel requires McGuffin
to show that his counsel’s performance was deficient and that the
deficiency was prejudicial. Id. 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. at
2052, 80 L.Ed.2d at 692; see also Gall v. Commonwealth, Ky., 702
S.W.2d 37, 39 (1985).
McGuffin does not claim that he notified
counsel of the alleged property transfer, only that counsel
should have ‘discovered’ or somehow found out about the alleged
transfer. McGuffin’s failure to aid in his own defense cannot be
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construed as a failure or omission on the part of his counsel.
Thus, McGuffin’s contention that his counsel rendered ineffective
assistance is without merit.
Since McGuffin has failed to state any reasonable
grounds for his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel,
there is no necessity for a hearing. Brooks v. Commonwealth,
Ky.App., 447 S.W.2d 614, 618 (1969); see also Lay v.
Commonwealth, Ky.App., 506 S.W.2d 507 (1974).
For the foregoing
reasons, we affirm the order of the Grayson Circuit Court that
denied the RCr 11.42 motion.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Hon. Mark Wettle
Appellate Public Advocate
Louisville, Kentucky
Hon. A.B. Chandler III
Attorney General
Hon. Todd D. Ferguson
Assistant Attorney Gen.
Frankfort, Kentucky
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