ROGER SWANAGAN v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: DECEMBER 23, 1999; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
1998-CA-001044-MR
ROGER SWANAGAN
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM DAVIESS CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE THOMAS O. CASTLEN, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 97-CR-00039
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
KNOPF, MILLER, AND SCHRODER, JUDGES.
KNOPF, JUDGE:
The appellant, Roger Swanagan, appeals from a
judgment of conviction following a jury trial on three counts of
rape in the third degree.
We find that the uncorroborated
testimony of the prosecuting witness was sufficient to survive a
motion for directed verdict.
Hence, we affirm.
On February 3, 1997, the Daviess County Grand Jury
indicted Swanagan on one count of rape in the first degree (KRS
510.040), and three counts of rape in the third degree (KRS
510.060).
The charges arose out of allegations made against
Swanagan by K.B., a juvenile.
At trial, K.B. alleged that she
had sexual intercourse with Swanagan on several occasions while
she was fifteen years old.
K.B. also alleged that, after she had
turned sixteen, Swanagan forced her to have sexual intercourse
with him.
Swanagan testified in his own behalf, denying that he
ever had sexual intercourse with K.B.
Several witnesses also
testified that K.B. had told them that she fabricated the charges
against Swanagan.
At the close of the Commonwealth’s case and at
the close of his case, Swanagan moved for a directed verdict on
the charges, which motions the trial court denied.
The jury
found Swanagan not guilty on the charge of first degree rape, but
found him guilty on three counts of third degree rape.
The jury
fixed his sentence at one year on each count, to be served
consecutively, which the trial court imposed.1
Swanagan argues that there was no evidence other than
K.B.’s testimony that he had sexual intercourse with K.B. while
she was less than sixteen years of age.
He further contends that
K.B.’s testimony was so inconsistent that no reasonable juror
could have relied upon it to find him guilty of rape in the third
degree.
Consequently, Swanagan asserts that the trial court
erred in denying his motions for a directed verdict.
1
The Commonwealth’s brief states: “On March 18, 1998,
appellant was convicted [of] one count of second degree rape and
one count of third degree sexual abuse by a jury who fixed
appellant’s sentence at ten (10) years in the penitentiary (TR
54, 58, 62). The trial court, on April 18, 1998, entered its
final judgment and appellant was sentenced to ten years in the
penitentiary (TR 78-79).” Appellee’s Brief at 2-3. The
Commonwealth’s summary of the jury’s verdict and sentence is
inconsistent with the trial court’s record and orders. Hence, we
have summarized the findings made in the “Judgment and Sentence
on Plea of Not Guilty”, entered by the trial court on April 22,
1998.
-2-
The Kentucky Supreme Court restated the directed
verdict standard in Commonwealth v. Benham, Ky., 816 S.W.2d 186
(1991), holding as follows:
On a motion for directed verdict, the trial
court must draw all fair and reasonable
inferences from the evidence in favor of the
Commonwealth. If the evidence is sufficient
to induce a reasonable juror to believe
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant
is guilty, a directed verdict should not be
given. For the purpose of ruling on the
motion, the trial court must assume that the
evidence for the Commonwealth is true, but
reserving to the jury questions as to the
credibility and weight to be given to such
testimony.
Benham, 816 S.W.2d at 187.
Clearly, Swanagan raised substantial issues regarding
K.B.’s credibility.
Nonetheless, issues regarding the weight of
evidence and the credibility of the witnesses are functions
peculiarly within the province of the jury, and the jury's
determination will not be disturbed.
Ky., 918 S.W.2d 219, 221 (1996).
Partin v. Commonwealth,
We find no basis to set aside
the jury’s determination in this case.
KRS 510.060 sets out the elements of rape in the third
degree in pertinent part as follows:
(1) a person is guilty of rape in the third
degree when
...(b) Being twenty-one (21) years old or
more, he engages in sexual intercourse with
another person less than sixteen (16) years
old.
Through K.B.’s testimony, the Commonwealth established
that Swanagan had sexual intercourse with K.B., and that K.B. was
less than sixteen (16) years old at the time.
The Commonwealth
established Swanagan’s age by other evidence.
The Commonwealth
-3-
was not required to present evidence corroborating K.B.’s
testimony.
Commonwealth v. Cox, Ky., 837 S.W.2d 898, 900 (1992).
Furthermore, the mere fact that a victim’s testimony may appear
improbable is not a sufficient basis to grant a directed verdict.
It is sufficient if the victim's testimony taken as a whole could
induce a reasonable belief by the jury that the crime occurred.
Bussey v. Commonwealth, Ky., 797 S.W.2d 483, 484 (1990).
Although K.B.’s testimony was inconsistent on a number of points
and was subject to attack for its veracity, we cannot conclude
that it was so “intrinsically improbable” that no jury would have
been justified believing at least part of it.
Commonwealth, Ky., 356 S.W.2d 752, 754 (1962).
Carrier v.
Consequently, we
must affirm the conviction.
Accordingly, the judgment of conviction by the Daviess
Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Kim Brooks
Covington, Kentucky
A.B. Chandler, III
Attorney General of Kentucky
Anitria M. Franklin
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
-4-
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