C & W EQUIPMENT COMPANY, INC. v. WATER WORKS SUPPLIES, INC.; GARDNER L. TURNER and KEVIN W. WEAVER
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RENDERED: August 20, 1999; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
1998-CA-001041-MR
C & W EQUIPMENT COMPANY, INC.
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM MADISON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JULIA HYLTON ADAMS, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 94-CI-00853
WATER WORKS SUPPLIES, INC.;
GARDNER L. TURNER and
KEVIN W. WEAVER
AND
NO. 1998-CA-001088-MR
WATER WORKS SUPPLIES, INC.
GARDNER L. TURNER and
KEVIN W. WEAVER
v.
APPELLEES
CROSS-APPELLANTS
CROSS-APPEAL FROM MADISON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JULIA HYLTON ADAMS, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 94-CI-00853
C & W EQUIPMENT COMPANY, INC.
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
EMBERTON, GUIDUGLI, AND SCHRODER, JUDGES.
CROSS-APPELLEE
SCHRODER, JUDGE:
This is an appeal and a cross-appeal from a
judgment in an action by a materialman against a subcontractor to
collect the outstanding balance on an account for materials,
finance charges, and attorney fees.
Appellant argues that it was
error to award attorney fees, while cross-appellants argue that
the court erred in its award on the principal balance on the
account, in not awarding the full amount of attorney fees, and in
not awarding finance charges.
In reviewing the record and the
applicable law, we cannot say the trial court’s findings were
clearly erroneous or that it abused its discretion.
Thus, we
affirm on appeal and on cross-appeal.
In 1987, appellant/cross-appellee, C & W Equipment
Company, Inc. (“C & W”), a subcontractor in the construction and
excavation business, submitted a credit application with
appellee/cross-appellant, Water Works Supplies, Inc. (“Water
Works”), a supplier of materials for the installation of water
and sewer lines.
Thereafter, C & W began purchasing materials
from Water Works for various construction projects.
On
December 1, 1994, Water Works filed a complaint against C & W to
collect on the balance owed on the account for a construction
project on a Wal-Mart store in Georgetown, Kentucky, which
totaled $20,455.71.
Additionally, Water Works sought payment of
finance charges on the account and attorney fees and court costs
pursuant to the credit agreement.
In C & W’s answer, it admitted
it was indebted to Water Works in the amount of $20,455.71 for
materials, but denied any balance was owed on the Georgetown WalMart project and denied that it was liable for finance charges,
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attorney fees, or court costs.
On May 1, 1995, C & W filed a CR
68 offer of judgment, offering Water Works the amount of
$23,000.43, which C & W claimed was the total amount on all
accounts which it owed Water Works at the time.
Water Works did
not accept the offer because it did not provide for its claims
for service charges, attorney fees, or court costs.
On July 6,
1995, the court granted Water Works’s motion for summary judgment
as to the principal amount of $20,455.71 due on the Georgetown
Wal-Mart project, but determining that a factual controversy
existed as to the service charges.
On January 19, 1996, Water
Works filed an amended complaint seeking payment of an additional
$3,066.22 for materials ordered by C & W for three other
projects.
In its answer to the amended complaint, C & W denied
that it owed anything on these projects.
On July 17, 1996, Water Works moved for a trial date,
and the court scheduled a pretrial conference.
At the pretrial
conference, the court set the matter for trial by jury on May 13,
1997 as requested by C & W.
In the pre-trial order, the court
ordered that exhibits of any kind to be presented at trial and
itemizations for all damage claims be made available to the other
side 60 days before trial.
Because Water Works failed to comply
with the order by furnishing exhibits and itemizations as to its
claim for attorney fees 60 days before trial, C & W moved in
limine to prevent this evidence from being admitted at trial.
In
lieu of granting the motion, the court continued the trial until
November 24, 1997.
The trial was again continued to January 28,
1998 due to no fault of either party.
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On January 26, 1998, C & W waived its right to a jury
trial, and the case was tried by the court on January 28 and 29,
1998.
At trial, Water Works sought to prove its claim for
attorney fees through the testimony of its accounting manager and
the introduction of bills from Water Works’s counsel.
C & W
objected to this proof on grounds that Water Works had not
provided C & W with this evidence prior to trial as required by
the pretrial order.
The court did not rule on this motion.
On February 24, 1998, the court entered its findings of
fact and conclusions of law.
The court found that in addition to
the principal amount of $20,455.71 that it had already awarded in
the summary judgment, Water Works was entitled to judgment in the
amount of $2,136.77 on its amended complaint for the balance owed
on the three other projects.
As to the finance charges, the
court found that in looking at the course of dealing between the
parties, no finance charges were owed.
With regard to the claim
for attorney fees, the court found that, in light of the delays
caused by Water Works’s failure to comply with the pretrial order
and the likelihood that Water Works would not prevail on all of
its claims, the claim of $27,135.50 in attorney fees and costs
was wholly unreasonable.
The court did award $7,030 in attorney
fees and costs for the collection efforts related to the
Georgetown Wal-Mart project and $5,000 for attorney fees and
costs expended thereafter, for a total of $12,030.
judgment, C & W appeals the attorney fees award.
From this
Water Works
appeals the attorney fees award, the ruling regarding the finance
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charges, and the amount the court found was owed on the amended
complaint.
We shall first address C & W’s argument that the award
of attorney fees was in error.
KRS 411.195 provides for the
enforcement of a written agreement to pay attorney fees.
It is
undisputed that the credit agreement signed by C & W contained
language providing for the payment of reasonable attorney fees in
the event the services of an attorney are necessary to collect on
the account.
It has been held that even though attorney fees may
be provided for in a contract, “any award of an attorney fee is
subject to a determination of reasonableness by the trial court.”
Capitol Cadillac Olds, Inc. v. Roberts, Ky., 813 S.W.2d 287, 293
(1991).
The reasonableness of attorney fees is to be determined
by the trial court within its sound discretion.
Dingus v. FADA
Service Co. Inc., Ky. App., 856 S.W.2d 45 (1993).
C & W maintains that the award of attorney fees was in
error because C & W admitted owing the principal balance and,
thus, the only issue besides attorney fees which was litigated
was the finance charge issue on which C & W prevailed.
However,
the parties were litigating more than the finance charges.
In
addition, there was a dispute over attorney fees incurred up to
that point and the balance owed on the three other projects via
the amended complaint, which C & W denied owing and for which the
court awarded Water Works $2,136.77.
Further, the court took
into account Water Works’s failure to recover on the finance
charge issue when it found the majority of the claimed fees to be
unreasonable.
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C & W also argues that the initial settlement offer of
$23,000.43, which was rejected by Water Works and which was
greater than the amount Water Works was ultimately awarded for
the materials obtained, should preclude Water Works from
receiving attorney fees.
However, this amount did not include
any amount for attorney fees up to that point.
C & W did not
admit owing the principal balance until after suit had been
filed.
Thus, attorney fees for up to that point would certainly
have been in order.
We would point out that the only reason the
suit was filed in the first place was because C & W would not pay
the account.
Had C & W timely paid the balance owed, none of the
litigation would have occurred and there would be no dispute
regarding attorney fees or finance charges.
C & W also maintains that the award of attorney fees
was in error because Water Works failed to comply with the
pretrial order requiring Water Works to submit itemized proof of
its attorney fees before trial.
At trial, when C & W objected to
the evidence regarding attorney fees because of failure to comply
with the pretrial order, the court offered to keep the record
open for 30 days to allow C & W to put on additional proof
challenging the attorney fees.
Also, C & W had the opportunity
to cross-examine Water Works’s witness who testified regarding
the attorney fees.
Most importantly, Water Works’s failure to
comply with the order was one of the main reasons the court
awarded Water Works only 44% of its attorney fees.
Thus, in our
view, C & W was not prejudiced by the violation of the pretrial
order.
See Sharp v. Sharp, Ky., 516 S.W.2d 875 (1974).
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The trial court is in the best position to consider
all the relevant factors in determining whether the party has
presented sufficient proof of the reasonableness of its attorney
fees.
Capitol Cadillac Olds, Inc. v. Roberts, 813 S.W.2d at 293.
In reviewing the record, we see that Water Works offered into
evidence the billing statements of its counsel, which contained a
detailed itemization of the services performed and the time spent
performing these services.
Water Works also offered the
testimony of its accounting manager who testified that Water
Works had actually paid $13,180.52 in attorney fees up to that
point, which was greater than the amount of attorney fees
awarded.
See Harper v. Citizens State Bank, Ky. App., 652 S.W.2d
871 (1983).
The court considered the result obtained and the
conduct of Water Works during the pendency of the case in
awarding 44% of the requested attorney fees.
In sum, we cannot
say the trial court abused its discretion in awarding the amount
of attorney fees it did.
C & W’s final argument is that under the agreement, the
reasonableness of attorney fees is dictated by Indiana law.
The
agreement states that attorney fees are recoverable “provided
that same are legally allowed by the laws of the State of Indiana
or the state where the subject collateral is situated.”
(Emphasis added).
The evidence established that the subject
collateral was situated in Kentucky.
Thus, this argument is
without merit.
We now move on to Water Works’s cross-appeal.
We shall
first address Water Works’s argument that the trial court abused
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its discretion in not awarding it the full amount of attorney
fees.
As stated earlier, the determination of the reasonableness
of attorney fees is within the sound discretion of the trial
court.
Dingus, 856 S.W.2d at 45.
Water Works did not prevail on
the finance charge issue (which we affirm below), which comprised
a great deal of the litigation in this case.
Further, contrary
to Water Works’s position, Water Works did violate the pretrial
order.
Water Works’s argument that it was not required to
present proof as to attorney fees prior to trial because the
matter was originally set for a jury trial is not well taken.
The order was clear that any claim for damages required itemized
proof thereof to be provided to the other party sixty days before
trial.
Thus, even though a jury would not have heard the issue
of attorney fees, Water Works should nevertheless have submitted
proof of its attorney fees up to that point since it sought
attorney fees from the onset of the case.
Finally, at least one
of the trial continuances was attributable to Water Works’s
noncompliance with the pretrial order.
Given the above factors,
we cannot say the trial court abused its discretion in only
awarding Water Works 44% of its attorney fees.
Water Works’s next argument is that the court erred in
not awarding it the full amount of the balance of C & W’s account
for the purchase of materials.
In particular, Water Works claims
that the trial court should have awarded it $1,453.95 on the
Rogersville job.
The court found that C & W purchased $1,453.95
in materials for that job.
However, during arbitration between
the general contractor and C & W, Water Works represented that C
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& W only owed $524.50 on the job.
Thus, the court awarded
Water Works $524.50 for the Rogersville job because it found that
C & W had detrimentally relied on this account statement during
the arbitration proceedings.
The findings of the trial court
acting as fact finder will not be reversed unless they are
clearly erroneous.
393 (1967).
CR 52.01; Daniel v. Kerby, Ky., 420 S.W.2d
Upon reviewing the record, we cannot say the trial
court was clearly erroneous in finding the amount owed on the job
in question was the amount represented by Water Works in an
earlier legal proceeding.
The amount represented by Water Works
in the arbitration proceeding was substantial evidence of the
amount owed.
Black Motor Co. v. Greene, Ky., 385 S.W.2d 954
(1964).
Water Works’s remaining argument is that the trial
court erred in not awarding it the finance charges on the past
due balances.
It is undisputed that C & W agreed to pay finance
charges of 2% a month on any outstanding balances.
There was
evidence that Water Works used two separate accounting/billing
procedures.
One is a computerized billing statement sent to the
purchaser on a monthly basis.
The other is a handwritten billing
statement which contains only finance charges on overdue
accounts.
Water Works asserted that it sent out the handwritten
finance charge statements every month, but did not collect
finance charges from all customers.
However, Water Works claimed
that it did not agree to waive finance charges as to C & W’s
overdue account.
It was undisputed that the computerized monthly
statement sent to C & W consistently reflected a zero balance for
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finance charges.
Further, C & W denied ever receiving any
handwritten finance charge billings on the account.
There was
also evidence that the finance charge statements were not sent
out every month and were sent only sporadically.
The credit
manager for Water Works testified that no finance charge
statement had been prepared for C & W’s account before April of
1993 and that only one finance charge statement indicated that it
had been sent to C & W.
The testimony of certain Water Works’s
employees indicated that finance charges were assessed on all
customers, but were not collected or enforced unless they were
seriously past due.
One Water Works salesman testified that
another Water Works salesman told him that Water Works assessed
finance charges but did not collect them because of the nature of
the construction business.
A letter dated May 5, 1994 is
contained in the record from C & W informing Water Works that it
had filed suit against the general contractor.
The letter
further states, “It is understood that Water Works has not and
will not charge service charges during this period of litigation
and collection.”
The trial court found that through the course of
dealing between the parties, the agreement to pay finance charges
was modified:
A review of the course of dealing between the
parties in this case is demonstrative of a
pattern of modification made by [Water Works]
in pursuit of customer satisfaction so that
the customer will continue and increase
purchases from [Water Works]. Customer
loyalty is valid consideration.
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Under KRS 355.2-209 of the Uniform Commercial Code, an
agreement modifying a contract for the sale of goods needs no
consideration to be binding.
The course of dealing between the
parties is relevant to show a modification of a contract for the
sale of goods.
KRS 355.2-208.
Evidence of modification of a
written contract must be clear and convincing, although it need
not be uncontroverted.
Wehr Constructors, Inc. v. Steel
Fabricators, Inc., Ky. App., 769 S.W.2d 51 (1988).
We believe
from the course of dealing between the parties, there was clear
and convincing evidence that the written credit agreement was
modified such that C & W was not required to pay finance charges.
For the reasons stated above, the judgment of the
Madison Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT/CROSSAPPELLEE:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEES/CROSSAPPELLANTS:
James T. Gilbert
Richmond, Kentucky
Gardner L. Turner
Kevin W. Weaver
Lexington, Kentucky
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