LEWIS COX v. LINDA FRANK JOHN BRENTON PRESTON and LEWIS COX v. LINDA FRANK, Chairperson, Kentucky Parole Board, and MEMBERS, ET AL.
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RENDERED: July 16, 1999; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C o m m o n w ealth O f K en tu ck y
C o u rt O f A pp ea ls
NO.
1998-CA-000459-MR
LEWIS COX
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FRANKLIN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE ROGER CRITTENDEN, JUDGE
CIVIL ACTION NO. 97-CI-001500
LINDA FRANK
(Chairperson, Kentucky Parole Board)
APPELLEE
NO. 1998-CA-000538-MR
JOHN BRENTON PRESTON and
LEWIS COX
v.
APPELLANTS
APPEAL FROM FRANKLIN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE ROGER CRITTENDEN, JUDGE
CIVIL ACTION NO. 97-CI-001500
LINDA FRANK,
Chairperson, Kentucky
Parole Board, and
MEMBERS, ET AL.
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
GARDNER, HUDDLESTON and JOHNSON, Judges.
HUDDLESTON, Judge.
John Brenton Preston and Lewis Cox appeal from
a Franklin Circuit Court order which dismissed their Petition for
a Writ of Mandamus and/or Petition for Declaratory Judgment in
which they allege violations of their constitutional and statutory
rights.
Preston and Cox are inmates confined at the Green River
Correctional Complex.
In the petition to the circuit court,
Preston contended that his rights under the Kentucky Constitution
and the United States Constitution were violated at an August 1994
parole revocation hearing.
In an amendment to the petition,
Preston alleged similar violations at a April 1996 parole hearing
at which the Parole Board declined to reinstate him on parole.1
Cox alleged that his constitutional rights were violated at his
parole revocation hearing that commenced in August and ended in
October 1995.2
The gist of Preston’s and Cox’s claims is that the
Board’s procedure for determining parole revocation and eligibility
is defective.
This action was filed in Franklin Circuit Court on
October 8, 1997.
The circuit court dismissed the complaint on the
basis that the claims asserted therein are barred by the one-year
statute of limitations contained in Ky. Rev. Stat. (KRS) 413.140
(1)(a).
This appeal followed.
1
Preston met with the Parole Board on April 8, 1996, and was
ordered to serve out a life sentence which was imposed in 1964 for
armed robbery. In the interim, Preston had been released on parole
six times, and his appearance before the Board in April 1996 was an
attempt to obtain a seventh parole release. Not surprisingly, the
Board concluded that Preston was a poor parole risk and listed
several reasons for revoking his parole status.
2
The basis of Cox’s parole revocation was a charge of
terroristic threatening brought by his spouse. The record does not
reveal of what charge he was originally convicted.
The Board
ordered Cox to serve out his original ten-year sentence.
2
There
is
no
specific
statute
of
limitations
declaratory judgment actions under KRS Chapter 418.
for
KRS 413.310
was applied to some lawsuits by prisoners, but it was repealed in
1990 by House Bill 318 (Chapter 176, Section 2).
In repealing KRS
413.310, the General Assembly also amended KRS 44.110 to cover
actions in the Board of Claims by prisoners for monetary damages
and imposed a one-year statute of limitations.
With the repeal of
KRS 413.310, prisoners who file a 42 United States Code (U.S.C.) §
1983 violation of civil rights action are now governed by the oneyear limitation contained in KRS 413.140(1)(a) for personal injury
actions.
Brown v. Wigginton, 981 F.2d 913 (6th Cir. 1992).
See
also Smith v. City of Glasgow, 809 F.Supp. 514 (W.D.Ky. 1993), and
Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 105 S.Ct. 1938, 85 L.Ed.2d 254
(1985).
The Supreme Court has said that KRS 413.140(1)(a) governs
claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Board of Trustees of University of
Kentucky v. Hayse, Ky., 782 S.W.2d 609, 613 (1989), cert. denied,
497 U.S. 1025, 110 S. Ct. 3273, 111 L. Ed. 2d 783 (1990), and 498
U.S. 938, 111 S. Ct. 341, 112 L. Ed. 2d 306 (1990).
See also
Collard v. Kentucky Board of Nursing, 896 F.2d 179 (6th Cir. 1990)
(stating that KRS 413.140(1)(a) applies to a due process procedural
challenge to administrative proceedings).
In McSurely v. Hutchin-
son, 823 F.2d 1002 (6th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 934, 108
S. Ct. 1107, 99 L.Ed. 2d 269 (1988), which involved an allegation
that
an
FBI
agent
violated
plaintiff’s
civil
rights
with
an
unlawful surveillance, the Court found such a violation of rights
3
is an injury under KRS 413.140(1)(a), thus subject to the one-year
statute of limitations.
Because this claim was filed pursuant to KRS 418.040, not
42 U.S.C. § 1983, we are not bound by any of the federal cases
cited. We are of the opinion, however, based on an analysis of the
federal cases cited above and the holding in Hayse, supra, that a
prisoner’s claim for violation of constitutional rights in a parole
revocation hearing is governed by the one-year limitation imposed
by KRS 413.140(1)(a).
Preston’s and Cox’s claims regarding their
revocation hearings are time barred because they brought suit on
October 8, 1997, more than one year after they allegedly were
harmed as a result of the parole board’s actions.
Preston insists that KRS 413.270 saves his state claims
from dismissal.3
Preston filed a federal lawsuit in July 1996
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that his due process rights were
violated because, in April 1996, he was not granted parole for the
seventh time. KRS 413.270 provides that if an action is commenced
in due time and in good faith in any court of this state (including
a federal court), and it is adjudged that that court has no
jurisdiction of the action, the plaintiff may within 90 days from
the time of the judgment commence a new action in the proper court.
KRS 413.270 only applies to an action in which it has been adjudged
that the court has no jurisdiction of the action.
3
Since Cox was not a party to the federal lawsuit, he does
not assert this claim.
4
In the case before us, the trial court properly noted
that the United States Magistrate Judge, who issued the 27 page
Report and Recommendation which was adopted by the District Court
and which led to the ultimate dismissal of Preston’s federal
lawsuit with prejudice, recommended dismissal of the suit not
because of a lack of jurisdiction, but because the federal claims
were either without merit or his complaint failed to state a claim
upon which relief could be granted.
The federal claims have been
adjudicated and thus are not addressable by this Court.
Moreover,
because Preston did not assert any claims arising from the August
1994 parole revocation hearing in the federal lawsuit, those claims
were not “saved” by the timely filing of the federal lawsuit.
The only claim in the federal lawsuit not decided on its
merits was the state claim asserted by Preston, that the Board
factored in his homosexuality in rejecting his bid for parole in
April 1996.
Because this claim was not raised in the circuit
court, we will not address it on appeal.
Preston and Cox also allege that newly enacted provisions
of KRS 453.190, KRS 197.045 and KRS Chapter 454 are unconstitutional. These provisions enable Kentucky judges to dismiss a civil
right claim initiated by a prisoner, sua sponte, if it is found to
be
malicious,
harassing,
legally
without
merit
or
factually
frivolous. They also authorize disciplinary action to be taken
against prisoners who file frivolous lawsuits, and they require an
inmate seeking to commence an action without payment of the full
filing fee to supply certain information to the court and pay at
5
least a partial filing fee. The circuit court dismissed this claim
because Preston and Cox made no factual allegation that any of
these provisions had been applied against either of them.
Rather,
Preston and Cox were complaining that Franklin Circuit Court had
dismissed an action brought by another prisoner and fined him
$20.00
for
his
frivolous
appeal.
The
trial
court
correctly
determined that Preston and Cox lack standing to raise constitutional claims premised on an occurrence not applicable to them.
The judgment is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANTS:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEES:
John Brenton Preston, pro se
Lewis Cox, pro se
Central City, Kenucky
Keith Hardison
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS
Frankfort, Kentucky
6
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