LARRY SYCK AND MARY SYCK v. LEON RAVVIN, M.D.
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RENDERED: April 23, 1999; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
1997-CA-003170-MR
LARRY SYCK AND MARY SYCK
APPELLANTS
APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE GARY D. PAYNE, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 92-CI-3783
v.
LEON RAVVIN, M.D.
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
GARDNER, HUDDLESTON AND JOHNSON, JUDGES.
GARDNER, JUDGE:
Larry and Mary Syck (the Sycks) appeal from an
order of the Fayette Circuit court granting summary judgment for
Dr. Leon Ravvin (Ravvin) in this medical negligence action.
On
appeal, the Sycks argue that the trial court improperly ruled
that their expert witness, Dr. Yale Gerol (Gerol) was not
qualified in this case and improperly excluded his deposition
testimony.
They also maintain that the court below erroneously
granted summary judgment for Ravvin.
This Court affirms.
Larry Syck (Larry) began seeing Ravvin in October 1990,
for treatment of a back condition.
Larry underwent surgery in
January 1991, which entailed removing a portion of a disc that
was pressing on his dural sack, as well as sewing up a tear in
his dural sack.1
Ravvin testified that he noted significant
scarring of the dura, the membrane covering the spinal cord, and
that removal of the scarring resulted in a dural tear with fluid
leakage.
The dural tear continued to leak after the surgery,
resulting in an accumulation of cerebrospinal fluid.2
Additional
surgery was performed in November 1991 to repair and re-sew the
dural tear and remove the accumulation.
Another accumulation of
fluid occurred after the second surgery.
In November 1992, the Sycks filed a medical malpractice
action against Ravvin.
In October 1994, the parties deposed
Gerol, the medical expert called by the Sycks.
Gerol during the
deposition, stated that he had not yet received Larry’s actual
diagnostic studies and had not had the opportunity to review
medical records from three other doctors, the hospital nor
depositions from Mrs. Syck or Ravvin.
This case was originally set for trial in August 1997.
The Sycks were granted a continuance, because they could not
produce Gerol for an evidentiary deposition or as a live witness
at trial.
The court granted the Sycks leave to secure a second
medical expert, but they did not do so before the trial court’s
deadline.
They subsequently advised the court that their only
expert proof at trial would be the discovery deposition of Gerol
from October 1994.
1
The dural sack covers the nerve roots as they exit the
spinal cord, and it contains nerves as well as cerebrospinal
fluid.
2
This condition is known as pseudomeningocele.
-2-
In November 1997, Ravvin moved to exclude Gerol’s
deposition transcript from being read at trial based upon his
lack of qualifications and his having not reviewed all relevant
materials at the time of his deposition.
The trial court held a
hearing on the matter, and ruled that it would exclude Gerol’s
testimony.
The court also granted summary judgment for Ravvin.
On December 5, 1997, a final and appealable order was entered.
The Sycks then brought this appeal.3
The Sycks first contend that the trial court erred and
abused its discretion by excluding Gerol’s deposition testimony,
because they maintain his qualifications clearly indicate that he
had the training, knowledge and experience to be considered an
expert in his field of study.
After reviewing the record below,
we have concluded that the court did not err or abuse its
discretion in refusing to allow Gerol’s deposition testimony to
be admitted at trial.
Courts have not adopted precise standards for
qualifications as an expert, but such standing can be acquired by
acquaintance with an observation of the subject matter.
Kentucky
Power Co. v. Kilbourn, Ky., 307 S.W.2d 9, 12 (1957); Lee v.
Butler, Ky. App., 605 S.W.2d 20, 21 (1979).
See also Washington
v. Goodman, Ky. App., 830 S.W.2d 398, 400 (1992).
A decision
regarding the qualifications of an expert rests within the
discretion of the trial court.
Washington v. Goodman, 830 S.W.2d
3
Ravvin argues in his brief that this appeal is not ripe
before this Court, because the Sycks failed to timely file a
notice of appeal. We decline to address this issue and have
reviewed the case on the merits.
-3-
at 400; Kentucky Power Co. v. Kilbourn, 307 S.W.2d at 12; Lee v.
Butler, 605 S.W.2d at 21.
A trial court’s ruling on such a
matter ordinarily will not be disturbed upon appeal.
Lee v.
Butler, 605 S.W.2d at 21.
In the instant case, the circuit court did not abuse
its discretion in ruling that Gerol’s deposition would not be
admitted at trial.
A review of Gerol’s deposition shows that at
that time he had not received the actual diagnostic studies and
stated that he intended to review the studies should he be called
to testify at trial.
He also stated that he had not reviewed the
records of Dr. Mortara, Dr. Fannin, Dr. Wright nor the Good
Samaritan Hospital records.
He had also not reviewed Mrs. Syck’s
deposition, and he believed that Ravvin’s deposition had not yet
been taken.
He stated that he would find Ravvin’s deposition
valuable and that it could alter his opinions.
Cf. Kabai v.
Majestic Collieries Co., 293 Ky. 783, 170 S.W.2d 357 (1943).
Regarding his general qualifications, the record shows that he
was then retired and had not operated since February 1985.
He
has never had a case dealing with pseudomeningocele, Larry’s
condition, but had a fluid leak case which occurred in 1971.
All
of these facts support the trial court’s decision and show that
it did not abuse its discretion.
extensions and an opportunity
It allowed the Sycks’ counsel
to secure another expert, but
counsel apparently failed to do so.
The Sycks also contend that summary judgment was
improper, because when viewing the record in the light most
favorable to them, it was not impossible for them to obtain a
-4-
judgment in their favor.
The record below shows that under even
the strict summary judgment standards which exist, summary
judgment was not improper in the case at bar.
Summary judgment should only be used to terminate
litigation when as a matter of law, it appears that it would be
impossible for the respondent to produce evidence at trial
warranting a judgment in his or her favor against the movant.
Steelvest, Inc. v. Scansteel Service Center, Inc., Ky., 807
S.W.2d 476 (1991), quoting Paintsville Hospital Co. v. Rose, Ky.,
683 S.W.2d 255 (1985); Farmer v. Heard, Ky. App., 844 S.W.2d 425
(1992).
Summary judgment is properly granted only when there is
no genuine issue as to any material fact, and the movant is
entitled to prevail as a matter of law.
Mullins v. Commonwealth
Life Ins. Co., Ky., 839 S.W.2d 245, 247 (1992); Kentucky Rule of
Civil Procedure (CR) 56.03.
In the instant case, the Sycks after the trial court’s
decision to exclude Gerol’s testimony, were left with no expert
testimony to support their case.
They now maintain that the
depositions of Drs. Tibbs and Benzel contain information which
would support their case; however, they have cited nothing
concrete or specific.4
They have cited no other evidence in the
record which would support their case.
Even under the strict
standard set out in Steelvest, Inc. v. Scansteel Service Center,
Inc., supra, they have failed to show that the trial court’s
decision to grant summary judgment for Ravvin was erroneous.
4
We have reviewed the record and have been unable to locate
these depositions.
-5-
For the foregoing reasons, this Court affirms the
judgment of the Fayette Circuit Court.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Billy J. Moseley
Pikeville, Kentucky
Marshall R. Hixson
Calvin R. Fulkerson
Lexington, Kentucky
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