HARLEY T. EASTRIDGE v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY, CRIME VICTIMS COMPENSATION BOARD; DON F. SCHMIDT; AND DAN E. SIEBERT
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
RENDERED:
September 3, 1999; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
1997-CA-003017-MR
HARLEY T. EASTRIDGE
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE ERNEST A. JASMIN, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 1992-CI-04263
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY,
CRIME VICTIMS COMPENSATION
BOARD; DON F. SCHMIDT; AND
DAN E. SIEBERT
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
HUDDLESTON, JOHNSON, AND KNOPF, JUDGES.
KNOPF, JUDGE:
Harley Eastridge appeals pro se from an October
22, 1997, summary judgment of Jefferson Circuit Court finding him
liable to appellee Crime Victims Compensation Board (CVCB or the
Board), and from the court’s order of the same date dismissing
sua sponte his third-party complaints against appellees Don
Schmidt and Dan Siebert, attorneys who formerly represented him.
Eastridge maintains that the trial court misconstrued his
statutory obligation to the Board and improperly dismissed his
third-party complaints.
For the reasons that follow, however, we
affirm the trial court’s judgment in its entirety.
This being the second appeal in a matter that arose
more than fifteen (15) years ago, a time chart may provide the
best initial summary of preceding events:
1984:
January
Eastridge is assaulted by several men at a motel lounge in
Shively, Kentucky.
He suffers a seriously broken leg and
other injuries.
May
Represented by Schmidt, Eastridge brings suit against the
alleged perpetrators of the assault and against the owners
and managers of the premises where it occurred.
December
Siebert succeeds Schmidt as Eastridge’s attorney of record.
1986:
February
Pursuant to KRS Chapter 346, the appellee Board awards
Eastridge approximately nine thousand dollars ($9,000.00)
for medical expenses arising from the assault.
June
Eastridge agrees to settle his tort suit against one of the
business defendants in exchange for thirty thousand dollars
($30,000.00).
August
Siebert withdraws as Eastridge’s attorney, and he and
Schmidt receive about twelve thousand dollars ($12,000.00)
in fees.
1987:
-2-
November
Represented by new counsel, Eastridge wins a default
judgment against two (2) of the alleged perpetrators of the
assault and is awarded damages of almost two hundred twentyfive thousand dollars ($225,000.00).
The judgment is
unenforced.
1992:
June
The Board brings suit against Eastridge for reimbursement of
the monies it awarded him in 1986.
October
Proceeding pro se, Eastridge answers the complaint and
claims to have expended the $30,000.00 settlement in
justifiable pursuit of the $225,000.00 judgment.
That
judgment remaining unenforced, he contends that his
statutory duty to repay the Board upon ultimate recovery
from the perpetrators or a collateral source has not arisen.
1994:
May
Eastridge files third-party complaints against Schmidt and
Siebert.
His complaints allege that the two attorneys’
negligent representation made his pursuit of the default
judgment more expensive than it should have been.
Oct./Nov.
Agreeing with Eastridge that the settlement and the default
judgment should be considered portions of a single recovery,
the trial court dismisses the Board’s action against
Eastridge, and the Board appeals.
1996:
-3-
March
This Court rejects Eastridge’s justification defense to the
Board’s reimbursement claim and remands the matter to the
trial court for new proceedings.
1997:
October
In light of this Court’s ruling on appeal, the trial court
enters summary judgment for the Board on its claim for
reimbursement.
The trial court also dismisses Eastridge’s
third-party complaints against Schmidt and Siebert on the
ground that the original judgment of October 1994 dismissed
those complaints, and, with respect the them, has become res
judicata.
The October 1997 judgment is the order from which
Eastridge has appealed.
He contends, apparently, that, even if
the Board has a right to seek reimbursement from him, that right
is superceded by the Board’s duty first to seek reimbursement
from the perpetrators of the assault.
He also maintains that the
trial court erred by dismissing his third-party complaints
against Schmidt and Siebert.
is entitled to relief.
Board’s authority.
We are not persuaded that Eastridge
We disagree with his construction of the
Furthermore, although the trial court based
its dismissal of Eastridge’s complaints against his former
attorneys on what may have been a faulty rationale, we believe,
for reasons that follow, that the dismissals were nevertheless
correct.
-4-
We begin by noting the familiar rule that entry of a
summary judgment under CR 56.03 is only proper in the absence of
a genuine issue of material fact, and only then, of course, if
the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.
"All doubts are to be resolved in favor of the party opposing the
motion.
The movant should not succeed unless a right to judgment
is shown with such clarity that there is no room left for
controversy." 7 W. Clay, Kentucky Practice, CR 56.03, Comment 4
(3rd ed. 1974).
Steelvest, Inc. v. Scansteel Service Center,
Inc., Ky., 807 S.W.2d 476 (1991).
With this standard of review
in mind, we turn to Eastridge’s allegations of error.
KRS Chapter 346 authorizes the Crime Victims
Compensation Board to disburse state funds to certain needy
victims of crime.
Section 346.170 of that chapter provides as
follows:
(1) No right of action at law against a
person who has committed a criminal act for
damages as a consequence of such act shall be
lost as a consequence of receiving benefits
under the provisions of this chapter. In the
event any person receiving benefits under
this chapter additionally seeks a remedy for
damages from the person or persons who have
committed the criminal act resulting in
damages, then and in that event the board
shall be subrogated to and have a lien upon
any recovery so made to the extent of the
payments made by the state to or on behalf of
such person under this chapter.
(2) If compensation is awarded, the state is
subrogated to all the claimant's rights to
receive or recover benefits or advantages,
for economic loss for which and to the extent
only that compensation is awarded from a
source which is, or, if readily available to
the victim or claimant would be, a collateral
source.
-5-
The Board claims to be entitled under this statute to
reimbursement from Eastridge’s settlement monies.
This Court,
upholding that claim, expressly rejected Eastridge’s argument
(and the trial court’s initial ruling) that, because the
settlement money had been spent in pursuit of further
compensation, it had merged, in effect, with the unenforced
default judgment.
To the extent that Eastridge’s current appeal
is based on a reiteration of this argument and the trial court’s
initial ruling, the short answer is that the decision in the
first appeal declared that argument invalid and is now the law of
the case.
Eastridge also seeks to bolster his former argument by
noting that KRS 346.180 provides in part as follows:
(1) Any payment of benefits to or on behalf
of a victim under this chapter creates a debt
due and owing to the state by any person
found to have committed such criminal act in
either a civil or criminal court proceeding
in which he is a party.
Eastridge correctly asserts that this statute renders the two (2)
men adjudged to have assaulted him indebted to the state for the
amount of Eastridge’s benefit award.
The trial court did not
err, however, by rejecting Eastridge’s contention that their
indebtedness supercedes his own.
As noted above, eligibility for crime victim
compensation awards is limited to “needy” victims.
Hulsey v.
Commonwealth, Crime Victims Compensation Board, Ky. App., 628
S.W.2d 890 (1982).
KRS Chapter 346 also evinces a clear intent
that victims not recover twice for a single loss.
Lynch v.
Commonwealth, Crime Victims Compensation Board, Ky. App., 748
-6-
S.W.2d 160 (1988).
To further these purposes, both of which tend
to preserve the Board’s operating fund, KRS 346.170 and 180 give
the Board a right of reimbursement against a victim/beneficiary
who has since recovered from another source as well as a
subrogated right of recovery against anyone determined to have
caused the compensated loss.
The Board, of course, cannot recover more than one
reimbursement for any given award, but that does not mean, as
Eastridge suggests, that it may not pursue recovery
simultaneously against anyone and everyone liable for
reimbursement under KRS 346.170 and 180.
On the contrary, the
statutes are clearly intended to maximize the Board’s chances of
recovery, and that intent is furthered if the Board may pursue
recovery wherever it believes that success is likely.
The
construction suggested by Eastridge, by limiting the Board’s
ability to seek recovery in appropriate cases, would tend to
frustrate the statutes’ plain intentions that perpetrators
compensate their victims, that the Board’s assistance be limited
to needy victims’ most pressing expenses, that victims be
discouraged from seeking windfalls, and that the Board’s
resources be carefully conserved so as to be available to as many
eligible victims as possible.
The trial court did not err,
therefore, by rejecting Eastridge’s construction of the statutes
and granting the Board’s motion for summary judgment.
Nearly two (2) years after the Board filed suit against
Eastridge, he filed third-party complaints against the attorneys,
Schmidt and Siebert, who had represented him during the initial
-7-
phases of his suit for damages.
Siebert in particular had been
of record in the case both at the time of the Board’s award and
during the negotiations that culminated in the thirty thousand
dollar ($30,000.00) settlement.
Pursuant to a contingent fee
arrangement, Eastridge paid Schmidt and Siebert about twelve
thousand dollars ($12,000.00) (40%) from the settlement proceeds.
The settlement terminated Eastridge’s claim against
only one of the defendants.
He still hoped to recover from the
second business defendant and from the perpetrators.
cases, however, were not going well.
These other
The second business
defendant entered bankruptcy, and neither Eastridge, his
attorneys, nor the police had obtained evidence showing
conclusively who was directly responsible for Eastridge’s
injuries.
Frustrated with the apparent lack of progress,
Eastridge began to suspect that the police were not investigating
as diligently as they could have.
These suspicions were made
worse when someone who had been at the motel the night of the
assault and had told Eastridge that a former police officer had
been among the assailants changed his account and denied having
seen the policeman.
Eastridge concluded from this change of
stories that the investigating officers were protecting their
former colleague.
Siebert, apparently, refused to share
Eastridge’s suspicions, and Eastridge resented what he regarded
as Siebert’s lack of loyalty and support.
between them to this effect.
There were words
Soon thereafter, Siebert withdrew
his representation.
-8-
The record makes clear that, from the time he received
his award from the CVCB, Eastridge was aware of his duty to repay
the Board should he ever recover from the tortfeasors.
Nevertheless, following Siebert’s withdrawal, Eastridge more than
once employed new counsel on an hourly basis to continue the case
against the perpetrators of the assault and, before finally
winning his default judgment, consumed the balance of the
settlement.
When the Board then demanded repayment, Eastridge
brought third-party actions against Schmidt and Siebert and
alleged that their termination of the contingent-fee arrangement
had been wrongful and had injured him by necessitating a large
amount of additional attorney fees and other litigation expenses.
In the 1994 order that disposed of this case initially,
the trial court did not mention Eastridge’s third-party claims.
Whether it thought that the judgment in Eastridge’s favor against
the Board rendered those claims moot, or whether it meant to
dismiss them on their merits does not appear.
Upon remand from
the Board’s successful appeal, however, the trial court ruled
that the original dismissal had been on the merits of the third1
party claims.
Eastridge’s failure to appeal from the adverse
judgments rendered them res judicatae and thus precluded their
being reconsidered.
Eastridge maintains that he should be
permitted to go forward against Schmidt and Siebert.
We
disagree.
1
Siebert and Schmidt both preserved this affirmative defense
by raising it in their original motions to dismiss Eastridge’s
third-party complaints.
-9-
If the premise of the trial court’s ruling is correct
(i.e., if the original decision can be construed to have reached
the merits of Eastridge’s third-party complaints), then the trial
court’s conclusion is also correct.
S.W.2d 616 (1982).
Brown v. Barkley, Ky., 628
By the same authority, however, if the
original decision did not decide Eastridge’s third-party actions,
there was nothing for him to appeal and so no bar resulted from
his “failure” to do so.
The remand of the Board’s claim against
him would, in that case, merely have reinstated his claims
against Schmidt and Siebert.
S.W.2d 884 (1960).
Id.; Miller v. Miller, Ky., 335
It is by no means clear from the record that
the trial court’s 1994 judgment intended to dismiss Eastridge’s
third-party claims on their merits.
We need not delve into this
issue, however, for it is apparent that, even if the trial court
misconstrued the earlier judgment, Eastridge’s claims against
Schmidt and Siebert are time barred and could have been dismissed
on that alternative ground.2
As our Supreme Court has observed, under KRS 413.245
(the statute of limitations applicable to actions for legal
malpractice),
there are actually two periods of limitation,
the first being one year from the date of the
occurrence and the second being one year from
the date of discovery if it is later in time.
2
For the same reason, we need not rule on the merits of the
motions by appellees Siebert and Schmidt to have the appeals
against them dismissed. As did the trial court in its order,
Siebert and Schmidt predicate their motions on res judicata. In
light of our alternative reason for affirming the trial court’s
order, however, we hereby deny Siebert and Schmidt’s motions as
moot.
-10-
Alagia, Day, Trautwein, & Smith v. Broadbent, Ky., 882 S.W.2d
121, 125 (1994) (emphasis in original).
Eastridge claims to have
been injured by Siebert’s wrongful withdrawal of representation.
He does not explain why the withdrawal was wrongful3, but
assuming that it was, the cause of action4 must have accrued by
October 1987, when Eastridge’s tort claims concluded, and should
have been reasonably discovered at the very latest by June 1992,
when the Board filed its claim for reimbursement.
Eastridge’s
complaints against Schmidt and Siebert, however, were not filed
until May 1994.
They were thus untimely, and the trial court did
not err by dismissing them.
In sum, although we sympathize with crime victims whose
physical injuries must go uncompensated because the perpetrator
cannot be found or when found cannot afford to pay, and whose
dignitary interests must go unvindicated because the legal
assistance necessary to assert them is too expensive, we are not
persuaded that Eastridge is entitled to relief.
As clearly
contemplated under KRS Chapter 346, Eastridge’s settlement
3
Eastridge is convinced that Shively police officers
obstructed both the criminal and civil investigations of the
assault. He seems to contend that Siebert should have added a
claim against the police officers to Eastridge’s complaint
against the perpetrators and that, had he done so, the contingent
fee contract between Eastridge and Siebert would have remained in
effect, with the result that pursuing the default judgment would
not have required the expenditure of so much of his settlement
money. Even if Siebert owed some such duty to Eastridge as
Eastridge claims, Siebert’s purported breach of that duty has no
bearing on Eastridge’s duty to repay the Board. Furthermore, as
explained in the text below, any claim Eastridge may have had
against Siebert for that breach (we need hardly add that we
believe he had no such claim) has long since expired.
4
‘Cause of action’ is synonymous with ‘occurrence.’
125.
-11-
Id. at
enabled him and therefore obligated him to repay the benefits he
had received from the Crime Victims Compensation Board.
He was
fully aware of this obligation, and the facts that he had other
compelling uses for his settlement money, that the Board is
authorized to seek payment from others, or that others might now
be able to afford the debt more easily than he can, do not excuse
it.
In particular, there is nothing in the record to suggest
that Eastridge’s plight should be attributed to the attorneys who
secured his settlement, and, even if there were, Eastridge waited
too long to assert such a claim.
For these reasons, we affirm the October 22, 1997,
judgment of Jefferson Circuit Court.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR THE CRIME VICTIMS
COMPENSATION BOARD:
Harley T. Eastridge, pro se
Louisville, Kentucky
Adele Burt Brown
Lexington, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR DON F. SCHMIDT:
James R. Miller
Louisville, Kentucky
-12-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.