MICHAEL DRURY EVANS v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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September 17, 1999; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
1997-CA-002857-MR
MICHAEL DRURY EVANS
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM CHRISTIAN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE EDWIN M. WHITE, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 97-CR-00277
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
REVERSING AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: BUCKINGHAM, EMBERTON, and JOHNSON, JUDGES.
JOHNSON, JUDGE: Michael Drury Evans (Evans) has appealed from the
judgment of the Christian Circuit Court entered on November 3,
1997, which found him guilty of the crime of escape in the second
degree, Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 520.030, and being a
persistent felony offender in the first degree, KRS 532.080(3),
and which sentenced him to serve a term of eighteen years in
prison.
We reverse and remand for a new trial.
On April 19, 1997, Evans was sentenced to serve a six-
month sentence in the Christian County Jail.
While so
incarcerated, he was allowed to participate in a work-release
program and to go to work each day at a local restaurant.
On May
5, 1997, Evans did not return to the jail after work as required.
At trial, Evans testified that the reason he did not return to
the jail was that his girlfriend needed to be taken to the
hospital for emergency treatment.
After she was released from
the hospital, he testified that he was needed to care for his
girlfriend and her children.
On May 23, 1997, Evans was arrested
and charged with escape in the second degree.
On June 20, 1997,
Evans was indicted on the escape offense, as well as for being a
persistent felony offender in the first degree.
He was tried on
September 4, 1997, and sentenced, pursuant to the jury’s
recommendation, on November 3, 1997.
Evans raises two issues for our consideration in this
appeal.
First, he argues he is entitled to a reversal of his
conviction and a new trial because the trial court refused to
find a constitutional violation, pursuant to Batson v. Kentucky,
476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986).
During jury
selection, the Commonwealth exercised two of its peremptory
challenges to removed the only African-Americans from the jury.
The trial court apparently found that Evans established a prima
facie case of discrimination as it required the Commonwealth to
explain its reasons for the strikes.
In chambers, the prosecutor
stated that it struck Gertie Jackson because she had failed to
list her marital status on her jury qualification form.
The
prosecutor feared she may be a single mother and, for that
reason, might have been sympathetic to Evans’ girlfriend.
The
prosecutor stated that he struck the other remaining AfricanAmerican juror, Timothy Johnson, because he was a young male,
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serving in the military and that a soldier had recently caused a
hung jury in another case.
The prosecutor also stated that
Johnson had an unpleasant demeanor and appeared to be angry about
something.
The trial court gave Evans’ counsel an opportunity to argue
that these purported reasons were pretextual.
However, instead
of determining whether the reasons given by the prosecutor were
sufficiently race-neutral to survive Evans’ Batson challenge, the
trial court stated as follows:
Well, let the record reflect that this is not
a case where [the defendant] is charged with
an offense against a white person, or against
a black person. It’s really a status
offense, either he was in custody or he was
not in custody. So, ah, the record is
protected and the motion is denied. We’re
going to try this today.
Evans argues that the prohibition against
discrimination in the selection of jurors is not restricted to
trials of persons charged with crimes against others.
Further,
he contends that “the reasons given did not amount to a racially
neutral explanation for the challenge.”
In response, the
Commonwealth argues that its justifications for using its
peremptory strikes were race-neutral.
In a footnote, the
Commonwealth, citing Entwistle v. Carrier Conveyor Corp., Ky.,
284 S.W.2d 820, 822-23 (1955), argues that if this Court should
disagree with the trial court’s application of Batson, it should
hold that the trial court’s result was right but for the wrong
reason.
Apparently, the Commonwealth would agree that the nature
of the offense with which a defendant is charged would not impact
the application of Batson, or alter the trial court’s duty to
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determine whether the Commonwealth has engaged in purposeful
discrimination.
Batson and its progeny have established a three-step
process to be undertaken when there is a challenge to a
peremptory strike: (1) the party opposing the peremptory strike
must make a prima facie showing that the proposed peremptory
strike is racially discriminatory; (2) the burden then shifts to
the proponent of the strike to come forward with a race-neutral
explanation for the strike; and (3) if a race-neutral explanation
is given, the trial court must determine whether the moving party
has established purposeful racial discrimination.
Batson, 476
U.S. at 96-98, 106 S.Ct. at 1722-24, 90 L.Ed.2d at 87-89; See
also Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 115 S.Ct. 1769, 131 L.Ed.2d
834 (1995); Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 358-59, 111
S.Ct. 1859, 1865-66, 114 L.Ed.2d 395 (1991); and Commonwealth v.
Snodgrass, Ky., 831 S.W.2d 176, 178 (1992).
Clearly, it is
incumbent on the trial court to determine whether the reasons,
proffered by the proponent of the strikes in step two of the
analysis, are credible or merely a pretext for unconstitutional
discrimination.
Our review of the trial court’s findings in this
regard are governed by the clearly erroneous standard.
v. Commonwealth, Ky., 875 S.W.2d 518, 523 (1994).
McGinnis
And, the trial
court’s findings of fact on the issue of discriminatory intent
are “accorded great deference on appeal.”
Hernandez, supra, 500
U.S. at 364.
In applying these principles to the case sub judice, it
is readily apparent that the trial court erred in failing to
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perform the required third step of the process.
The trial court
stated that since Evans was charged with a status offense it did
not matter whether the prosecutor used its peremptory strikes in
a discriminatory manner.
limited.
The holding in Batson is not so
The evil the Court attempted to remedy in Batson was
not limited merely to the harm caused to a criminal defendant by
the prosecution’s striking of a member of the defendant’s race
from the jury, and it was certainly not to remedying the harm
caused a defendant charged with a certain type of crime.
In
addition to the equal protection rights of the accused, Batson
addressed the rights of racial minorities to serve as jurors and
the harm to entire communities caused by their exclusion from
service due to discrimination.1
The trial court’s failure to make a determination as to
whether the prosecutor’s purported reasons for striking the only
1
The Supreme Court in Batson, 476 U.S. at 87, citing Thiel
v. Southern Pacific Co., 328 U.S. 217, 223-24, 227, 66 S.Ct. 984,
90 L.Ed.2d 1181 (1946), reasoned as follows:
Racial discrimination in selection of jurors
harms not only the accused whose life or
liberty they are summoned to try. Competence
to serve as a juror ultimately depends on an
assessment of individual qualifications and
ability impartially to consider evidence
presented at a trial. A person’s race simply
“is unrelated to his fitness as a juror.”
. . . .
The harm from discriminatory jury
selection extends beyond that inflicted on
the defendant and the excluded juror to touch
the entire community. Selection procedures
that purposefully exclude black persons from
juries undermine public confidence in the
fairness of our system of justice (citation
omitted).
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two African-American jurors were racially neutral requires
reversal of Evans’ conviction.
The Commonwealth’s insistence
that the reasons offered by the prosecutor were race-neutral
ignores the fact that the trial court made no findings concerning
the credibility of the prosecutor’s explanations given in the
second step.
This finding by the trial court of whether there
has been established purposeful racial discrimination is
essential.
The Supreme Court in Purkett, observed that the
“focus” is not on the “reasonableness of the asserted nonracial
motive,” but on the “genuineness of the motive.”
U.S. at 769 (emphasis in original).
Purkett, 514
Likewise, as our Supreme
Court noted in Snodgrass, “the best evidence [of discrimination]
will be the demeanor of the attorney who exercised the challenge.
As with the state of mind of a juror, evaluation of the
prosecutor’s state of mind based on demeanor and credibility lies
‘peculiarly within a trial judge’s province.’” Commonwealth v.
Snodgrass, 831 S.W.2d at 179 (citing Hernandez, supra).
Clearly,
issues concerning the credibility of the prosecutor and the
genuineness of his or her motive are not within this Court’s
purview to address de novo.
Next, Evans argues that the trial court erred in
overruling his objection to statements made by the prosecutor in
his closing argument during the penalty phase of the trial.
This
issue is now moot because of our resolution of the Batson issue.
However, we will address the issue as it may recur on retrial.
The statements to which Evans objected are as follows:
How good a person he is will dictate how soon
the parole board will let him out. Now, they
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wanted to talk about if he’s a model citizen,
how much time will he have to stay in there,
and we talked about he gets three months
knocked off of every year. Well, that’s if
he’s going to serve out the entire sentence.
The odds of that happening--it ain’t gonna
happen. [Defense counsel, “Your honor, I
object.”] He’s gonna meet the parole board,
[Trial Judge: “Overruled.”] and the parole
board is gonna decide to let him out or not.
The Commonwealth argues that the Assistant Commonwealth’s
Attorney “merely gave [the jury] a full, fair comment on
sentencing dynamics in [Evans’] case,” and that “[g]iven the
reasonably wide latitude granted to prosecutors in argument to
persuade the jurors, these comments hardly seem inappropriate[.]”
We disagree.
While the probation and parole officer testified that a
sentence imposed may not be entirely served out due to good-time
and the possibility of parole, he also testified that it would be
possible for Evans to serve his entire sentence.
Certainly, the
evidence of record did not support the prosecutor’s insistence to
the jury that Evans would not be required to serve out his
sentence.
See, Whitaker v. Commonwealth, Ky., 895 S.W.2d 953,
957 (1995); and Drietz v. Commonwealth, Ky., 477 S.W.2d 138, 139
(1972).
Thus, these remarks could only have caused the jury to
be “uncertain as to the legal significance” of any sentence it
imposed.
Perdue v. Commonwealth, Ky., 916 S.W.2d 148, 164
(1995); See also, Ruppee v. Commonwealth, Ky., 754 S.W.2d 852,
853 (1988).
Accordingly, the judgment of the Christian Circuit
Court is reversed and the matter is remanded for a new trial
consistent with the Opinion.
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BUCKINGHAM, JUDGE, CONCURS AND FILES SEPARATE OPINION.
EMBERTON, JUDGE, DISSENTS AND FILES SEPARATE OPINION.
BUCKINGHAM JUDGE, CONCURRING:
I concur with the
majority’s opinion that this case must be reversed and remanded
for a new trial due to the failure of the trial court to
determine whether the Commonwealth’s exercise of two of its
peremptory challenges to remove the only African-Americans from
the jury was racially motivated.
I also agree with the majority
opinion’s statement that a finding by the trial court of whether
there was purposeful racial discrimination was essential and that
this court may not address the issue de novo.
While in some
cases it could perhaps be implied that the trial court made the
essential finding by simply denying the defendant’s motion, that
is not the case here.
It is apparent in this case that the trial
court denied the motion due to the nature of the offense rather
than due to a finding that the strikes were not racially
motivated.
EMBERTON, JUDGE, DISSENTING: I respectfully dissent.
do not necessarily disagree with the majority that the trial
I
court could have more clearly stated its holding.
Implicit in
its ruling, however, is that the prosecutor did state sufficient
race-neutral reasons for the peremptory strikes; the result was
correct and the judgment should be affirmed.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Franklin P. Jewell
Louisville, KY
A. B. Chandler, III
Attorney General
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Shawn C. Goodpaster
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, KY
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