ROBERT NEAL PETTIT v. SUSAN KAY PETTIT
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RENDERED: April 23, 1999; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
1997-CA-002734-MR
ROBERT NEAL PETTIT
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM ROWAN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE WILLIAM B. MAINS, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 95-CI-174
v.
SUSAN KAY PETTIT
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING IN PART AND
REVERSING AND REMANDING IN PART
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
GUIDUGLI, JOHNSON AND KNOPF; JUDGES.
JOHNSON, JUDGE:
Robert Neal Pettit (Robert) appeals an order of
the Rowan Circuit Court entered on September 30, 1997, that
granted sole custody of his daughter to his former wife, Susan
Kay Pettit (Susan), and required him to pay child support based
on imputed income.
Robert argues that the trial court considered
improper evidence in relation to the custody issue and failed to
make required findings related to custody; calculated child
support incorrectly; improperly denied him in forma pauperis
status; and assessed an excessive domestic relations
commissioner’s fee.
After reviewing the record, the applicable
law, and the arguments of counsel, we affirm in part, reverse in
part and remand.
Robert and Susan have one child, Ashley, born in 1987.
They divorced in 1993.
The final decree dissolving the marriage
incorporated the couple’s agreement to share joint custody.
In
the summer of 1995, Susan sought an Emergency Protective Order
and a Domestic Violence Order from the Rowan District Court.
The
district court entered the orders and granted Susan temporary
custody of Ashley.
Both parties moved the circuit court for sole
custody in July 1995.
The domestic relations commissioner
(commissioner) held a hearing over five days in July and August
1997.
Susan.
The commissioner recommended granting sole custody to
Robert filed objections and requested additional factual
findings.
The commissioner entered one additional finding and
overruled the rest of Robert’s objections.
By order entered on
September 30, 1997, the trial court adopted the commissioner’s
report in its entirety.
This appeal followed.
While this appeal was pending, Robert moved this Court
to strike Susan’s brief for failure to cite to the record.
Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure (CR) 76.12(4)(c)(iii).
See
Ventors v. Watts, Ky.App., 686 S.W.2d 833, 834-835 (1985).
motion panel of this Court passed the motion to the merits.
deny the motion.
A
We
It is true that Susan did not satisfy either
the letter or the spirit of the rules.
However, it is also true
that Robert’s references to the record were at times misleading
and out of context.
These deficiencies by both parties forced us
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to review the video record in detail.
Since Robert is also at
fault, we deny his motion to strike Susan’s brief.
In awarding sole custody to Susan, the trial court
modified the previous award of joint custody.
questions the grounds for modification.
Neither party
See Mennemeyer v.
Mennemeyer, Ky. App., 887 S.W.2d 555, 558 (1994).
The record
supports the trial court’s decision to decide custody de novo.
Id.
Robert first argues that the trial court did not make
adequate findings, and that the findings it did make do not
support its custody decision.
We disagree.
The overriding consideration in any custody
determination is the best interest of the child.
Squires v.
Squires, Ky., 854 S.W.2d 765, 768 (1993); Kentucky Revised
Statutes (KRS) 403.270.
In determining the best interest of the
child the trial court must consider all relevant factors,
including those in KRS 403.270(1), and must find the facts
specifically.
McFarland v. McFarland, Ky.App., 804 S.W.2d 17, 18
(1991); CR 52.01.
Findings of fact made by a domestic relations
commissioner and adopted by the trial court shall not be set
aside unless clearly erroneous. CR 52.01; Reichle v. Reichle,
Ky., 719 S.W.2d 442, 444 (1986).
discretion in deciding custody.
The trial court has broad
Squires, supra, at 770.
The commissioner heard testimony from over a dozen
witnesses during five days of hearings.
The witnesses included
the parties, some friends, co-workers, family of the parties, and
some professionals with knowledge of the case.
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In her report,
the commissioner summarized the testimony of each witness and
made recommended factual findings and conclusions of law.
We
have reviewed the portions of the record relevant to Robert’s
complaints.
Susan testified that in the presence of the child,
Robert had been violent towards her and had made disparaging
remarks about her.
marriage.
Susan.
She said this occurred during and after their
There was evidence that the child wanted to live with
The trial court found that awarding Susan sole custody
was in the child’s best interest.
The trial court's order does not cite all the factors
under KRS 403.270, nor does it expressly tie its factual findings
to the statutory factors.
However, the trial court’s summary of
the testimony and its factual findings are thorough and supported
by the record.
The factual findings, in turn, support the
custody decision.
The factual findings relate to the wishes of
the child, the interaction and interrelationship of the child
with her parents, and evidence of domestic violence that has
affected the child and the child's relationship with both
parents.
KRS 403.270(1)(b), (c), (f); KRS 403.720 (2).
The
trial court addressed the factors relevant to this case.
We find
no clear error in any of the trial court’s factual findings and
no abuse of discretion in its custody decision.
Reichle, supra;
Squires, supra.
Robert next argues that the trial court erred by
appointing a Court-Appointed Special Advocate (CASA), a
caseworker who has volunteered her services to the court.
He
alleges that the trial court did not have the authority to do so,
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that the CASA appointed was not qualified to testify as an
expert, and that the trial court abdicated its responsibility by
adopting the CASA’s recommendations.
We disagree with each
contention.
District court judges may appoint a CASA to provide
representation for children who enter the court system as a
result of dependency, abuse, and neglect.
KRS 620.505.
The role
of the CASA is to represent the best interest of the child.
620.505(9).
KRS
“In contested custody proceedings . . . the Court
may order an investigation and report concerning custodial
arrangements for the child.
The investigation and report may be
made by the friend of the Court or such other agency as the Court
may select.”
KRS 403.300(1).
The commissioner recommended that the trial court
appoint a CASA to supervise visitation because Robert had
discussed custody with his daughter in violation of a court
order.
The CASA, Betty Cutts (Cutts), had fulfilled the training
requirements for the CASA program.
Cutts supervised visitation,
observed Ashley with her parents, interviewed people who knew the
parties, and prepared a report.
The CASA recommended that Susan
get sole custody and suggested terms of visitation.
Robert moved
to set aside the order appointing a CASA and to strike the CASA’s
written report.
The trial court denied the motions.
The trial
court decided custody and visitation consistent with the CASA’s
recommendations.
We find no error.
There is no statute specifically
providing for or prohibiting the appointment of a CASA in a
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custody case.
However, we believe this use of a CASA is
consistent with KRS 403.300.
The CASA project under KRS 620.505
can properly be considered an “agency,” and the report that was
considered by the trial court is consistent with the statute.
As to the CASA’s qualifications, there are no precise
standards for qualification of expert witnesses.
has discretion in admitting such testimony.
The trial court
Lack of specialized
training goes only to the weight of evidence, not to competency.
Washington v. Goodman, Ky.App., 830 S.W.2d 398, 400 (1992).
Robert exercised his opportunity to challenge the CASA’s
credentials.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion by
admitting into evidence the CASA’s report and testimony.
We also hold that the trial court did not abdicate its
decision-making responsibility.
The trial court merely
considered the evidence presented by the CASA.
It was within the
discretion of the trial court to consider that evidence and to
give it the appropriate weight that the trial court determined it
deserved.
(1992).
See Chalupa v. Chalupa, Ky.App., 830 S.W.2d 391, 392
The trial court considered testimony from many witnesses
other than the CASA.
court’s decision.
The other evidence supports the trial
The fact that the trial court’s decision was
consistent with the CASA’s recommendations did not make that
decision improper.
Robert next argues that the trial court erred by
considering sealed testimony from the parties’ child.
He
contends he was unfairly denied the right to cross-examine the
child about her wishes.
We disagree.
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The commissioner interviewed Ashley in chambers months
before the final custody hearing.
She ordered the record of that
interview sealed and did not interview her again.
The CASA
reported and testified about the child’s reaction to the custody
battle.
The CASA said that Ashley wanted to live with her mother
but to continue visiting her father.
Both parties introduced
other testimony about what the child had said.
The trial court
found that the child “wishes to have a normal relationship with
her father, but resents his statements about her mother and his
constant attempts to control all aspects of her life.”
There is
nothing in the record to support Robert’s assertion that the
trial court based this finding on sealed testimony.
On the other
hand, the trial court’s finding is supported by the CASA’s report
and testimony.
Robert had the CASA’s report.
He had the
opportunity to cross-examine the CASA about her observations and
conclusions.
KRS 403.300(3).
Since the commissioner permitted
both sides to introduce Ashley’s statements, Robert could have
presented any comments that Ashley made that favored him.
We
find no error.
Robert next argues that the trial court erred by
permitting Jill Riccardo (Riccardo) to testify as Susan’s expert
witness.
the case.
He contends she testified as to the ultimate issue in
We disagree.
Riccardo is a licensed clinical social
worker with a masters degree in social work.
Susan hired her to
evaluate Susan and the child and to make custody recommendations.
Riccardo testified that stability was important to the child.
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Because Ashley was living with Susan at the time, Robert views
this as ultimate issue testimony.
We find no abuse of discretion in the trial court
admitting this evidence.
Testimony by experts retained by the
parties is admissible if the expert is qualified and her
testimony is relevant.
“Indeed such testimony is commonplace in
child custody actions.”
Poe v. Poe, Ky. App., 711 S.W.2d 849,
852 (1986).
Courts commonly rely on social workers’ input in
child custody cases.
(2d ed. 1988).
1 Petrelli, Kentucky Family Law, § 26.19
This includes views on who should be awarded
custody.
Robert cross-examined Riccardo about the basis for her
opinions.
To the extent that Riccardo’s testimony may have gone
to the ultimate issue of custody, the trial court was capable of
evaluating this testimony and giving it the appropriate weight.
Robert next argues that the trial court clearly erred
by imputing income to him to set child support.
We disagree.
The child support guidelines in KRS 403.212 serve as a rebuttable
presumption for the amount of child support.
The statute permits
the trial court to calculate child support based on potential
income, if it finds a parent is voluntarily unemployed or
underemployed.
“A court may find a parent to be voluntarily
unemployed or underemployed without finding that the parent
intended to avoid or reduce the child support obligation.”
KRS
403.212(2)(d) (as amended effective July 15, 1996).
We review the trial court’s determination of child
support for abuse of discretion.
S.W.2d 580, 582 (1995).
Pegler v. Pegler, Ky.App., 895
Robert has a college degree, credit
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hours towards a masters degree, and an expired teacher's
certification.
He worked in financial planning and life
insurance after college, and worked at the Eastern Kentucky
Correctional Complex from 1991 until 1995.
In 1995, he quit his
job to attend school for a nursing degree.
Robert testified that
he had been unable to find other employment.
His only income at
the time of the hearing was from the Army Reserve at $179 per
month.
The trial court found that Robert was voluntarily
unemployed.
It imputed income to him based upon his salary in
his last full time job of $2,064.15 per month.
Citing McKinney v. McKinney, Ky.App., 813 S.W.2d 828
(1991), Robert asserts that for the trial court to impute income
it was required to find bad faith on his part.
However, KRS
403.212(d) does not have a bad faith requirement.
16 Graham &
Keller, Kentucky Practice, § 24.27 (2d ed. 1997).
Robert’s
choice to quit his job to attend school did not relieve him of
his child support obligation.
The statute creates a presumption
that future income will be on a par with the worker's most recent
experience.
(1992).
Keplinger v. Keplinger, Ky.App., 839 S.W.2d 566, 569
Substantial evidence supports the trial court's
conclusion that Robert is voluntarily unemployed.
Based upon his
recent work history and occupational qualifications, the trial
court did not abuse its discretion in its calculation of Robert's
child support obligation.
Pegler, supra.
Robert next argues that the trial court erred in
calculating child support because it excluded Susan’s employers’
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retirement and health insurance contributions from her gross
income.
We agree with part of his argument.
Gross income for child support purposes includes income
from any source.
KRS 403.212(2)(b).
“Significant in-kind
payments or expense reimbursements are also treated as income if
they reduce personal living expenses.”
§ 24.19.
Graham and Keller, supra,
Susan’s employer contributes an amount equal to 2 1/2%
of her income to her retirement account.
This does not reduce
Susan’s living expenses and was properly excluded.
Susan’s employer also provides health insurance of
about $100.00 per month.
This does reduce Susan’s living
expenses and should be treated as income.
The child support
guidelines require the trial court to subtract the cost of health
insurance for the child from the parents’ gross income.
403.212(2)(g)(1).
KRS
The trial court did not adjust either party’s
gross income in this case.
In their separation agreement, the
parties agreed to share the cost of health insurance for Ashley.
On remand, the trial court is directed to include Susan’s
employer-provided health insurance as income, less any portion
attributable to the health insurance for the child.
Robert next asserts that the trial court erred by
denying him in forma pauperis status.
We agree.
A person who is
unable to pay the costs of a legal proceeding without depriving
himself or his dependents of the necessities of life may file or
defend an action without paying costs.
KRS 453.190.
To proceed
in forma pauperis, the party must file a motion and affidavit.
KRS 453.190(3).
A party may not proceed in forma pauperis if
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there is anyone available who has a legal duty and is willing and
able to pay the costs of the action.
Tolson v. Lane, Ky., 569
S.W.2d 159, 161 (1978).
Robert filed a motion and affidavit to proceed in forma
pauperis in July 1997, with his motion for custody.
The trial
court denied his motion in its final custody order because it
found that Robert was voluntarily unemployed.
Voluntary
unemployment is not grounds for denying in forma pauperis status.
Robert’s affidavit meets the statutory requirement.
evidence that Robert’s family was supporting him.
There was
However, it
appears there is no one with a legal duty to pay the costs of the
action.
Tolson, supra.
Accordingly, the trial court should have
granted his motion.
Finally, Robert argues that the trial court assessed an
excessive domestic relations commissioner’s fee.
Commissioners receive a fee of $40.00 per hour.
We agree.
They are limited
to a total fee of $600.00 unless a larger fee is “recommended by
the circuit judge and approved by the Chief Justice for
extraordinary circumstances shown.”
Administrative Procedures of
the Court of Justice, Part IV, Section 4.
Here, the trial court
assessed a fee of $1,520.00 based on the 38 hours the
commissioner spent on the case.
There is no indication that the
Chief Justice approved the fee.
We affirm the trial court’s award of sole custody to
Susan.
We reverse and remand the trial court’s calculation of
child support, its denial of in forma pauperis status to Robert,
and its assessment of the domestic relations commissioner’s fee.
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GUIDUGLI, JUDGE, CONCURS.
KNOPF, JUDGE, CONCURS IN RESULT.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Hon. Ferrell Adkins
Elizabethtown, KY
Hon. Jace Nathanson
Morehead, KY
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