RALPH EDWARD PAYNE, SR. v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: August 27, 1999; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
No.
1997-CA-002691-MR
RALPH EDWARD PAYNE, SR.
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM HENDERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE STEPHEN HAYDEN, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 89-CR-00125
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: EMBERTON, GARDNER, and SCHRODER, JUDGES.
EMBERTON, JUDGE:
Ralph Edward Payne, Sr. (Payne) appeals from an
order of the Henderson Circuit Court entered on October 6, 1997,
denying his motion to vacate, set aside or correct judgment
brought pursuant to Kentucky Rule of Civil Procedure (RCr) 11.42.
After review of the record, briefs and the applicable law,
we affirm.
In September 1989, the Henderson County Grand Jury
indicted Payne on six felony counts of first-degree sodomy
(Sodomy I)(KRS 510,070), five felony counts of second-degree
sodomy (Sodomy II) (KRS 510.080), one felony count of incest (KRS
530.020), two felony counts of first-degree criminal abuse
(Criminal Abuse I)(KRS 508.100), one felony count of first-degree
sexual abuse (Sexual Abuse I)(KRS 510.110), two misdemeanor
counts of second-degree sexual abuse (Sexual Abuse II)(KRS
510.120), and one misdemeanor count of fourth-degree assault
(Assault IV)(KRS 508.030).
These charges involved physical
assaults and deviate sexual acts between Payne and his three
young minor stepdaughters between March 1988 and August 1989.
In
September 1989, Payne’s attorney filed a motion to quash one
count of the indictment, a motion for a bill of particulars, and
a motion for discovery.
The trial court granted the motions for
discovery and a bill of particulars in large part, but denied the
motion to quash.
On November 27, 1989, Payne entered a guilty plea to
all counts of the indictment pursuant to a plea agreement with
the Commonwealth.
Under the plea agreement, the Commonwealth
recommended sentences of twenty (20) years on each of the six
counts of Sodomy I, ten (10) years on each of the five counts of
Sodomy II, ten (10) years on the one count of Incest, ten (10)
years on each of the two counts of Criminal Abuse I, five (5)
years on the one count of Sexual Abuse I, twelve (12) months on
each of the two counts of Sexual Abuse II and twelve (12) months
on the one count of Assault IV.
The Commonwealth also
recommended that all of the sentences run concurrently for a
total sentence of twenty (20) years in prison.
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In January 1990,
the trial court sentenced Payne consistent with the
Commonwealth’s recommendations to serve twenty years in prison.
In August 1997, Payne filed an RCr 11,.42 pro se motion
seeking to set aside his conviction based on ineffective
assistance of counsel.
He also requested appointment of counsel
and an evidentiary hearing on the motion.
The trial judge
ordered preparation of a transcript of the guilty plea hearing.
Upon review of the guilty plea hearing, the trial court denied
the motion in a written order because Payne did not establish
ineffective assistance of counsel or a due process violation.
This appeal followed.
RCr 11.42 allows persons in custody under sentence to
raise a collateral attack on the judgment entered against them.
A movant is not entitled under RCr 11.42 to a hearing if his
motion on its face does not allege facts or state grounds, which
if true, would render the judgment void.
Maggard v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 394 S.W.2d 893, 894 (1965); Lewis v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 411 S.W.2d 321, 322 (1967); Skaggs v.
Commonwealth, Ky. App., 803 S.W.2d 573, 576 (1990), cert. denied,
502 U.S. 844, 112 S. Ct. 140, 116 L. Ed. 2d 106 (1991).
Similarly, the trial court is not required to appoint counsel on
an RCr 11.42 motion where the substantive claim is refuted on the
record or appointment of counsel would be futile.
Commonwealth
v. Stamps, Ky., 672 S.W.2d 336 (1984); Hopewell v. Commonwealth,
Ky. App., 687 S.W.2d 153 (1985).
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Payne raises two issues on appeal.
First, whether his
guilty plea is invalid because he received ineffective assistance
of counsel involving parole eligibility.
Second, whether the
twenty-year sentence without the possibility of parole until he
had served fifty percent (50%) of the sentence violated due
process.
In general, a valid guilty plea waives all defenses
except jurisdictional defenses such as the indictment failed to
state an offense.
Hughes v. Commonwealth, Ky., 875 S.W.2d 99,
100 (1994); Bush v. Commonwealth, Ky., 702 S.W.2d 46, 48 (1986).
However, a defendant may still collaterally challenge a guilty
plea based on ineffective assistance of counsel and the voluntary
nature of the plea.
See United States v. Broce, 488 U.S. 568,
569, 109 S. Ct. 757, 762, 102 L. Ed. 2d 927 (1989).
A guilty plea may be rendered invalid if the defendant
received constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel under
the Sixth Amendment.
Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 344, 100
S. Ct. 1708, 1716, 64 L. Ed. 2d 333 (1980); Shelton v.
Commonwealth, 928 S.W.2d 817 (1996).
"[A]n accused who has not
received reasonably effective assistance of counsel in deciding
to plead guilty cannot be bound by his plea."
United States v.
Fairchild, 803 F.2d 1121, 1123 (11th Cir. 1986)(quoting Wofford
v. Wainwright, 748 F.2d 1505, 1508 (11th Cir. 1984)).
A guilty
plea influenced by ineffective assistance of counsel is not
entered voluntarily.
Fields v. Attorney General of State of
Maryland, 956 F.2d 1290, 1296-97 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 506
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U.S. 885, 113 S. Ct. 243, 121 L. Ed. 2d 176 (1992); United States
v. Carr, 80 F.3d 413, 416-17 (10th Cir. 1996).
In order to establish ineffective assistance of
counsel, a person must satisfy a two-part test showing that
counsel's performance was deficient and the deficiency resulted
in actual prejudice affecting the outcome.
Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674
(1984); accord Gall v. Commonwealth, Ky., 702 S.W.2d 37 (1985),
cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1010, 106 S. Ct. 3311, 92 L. Ed. 2d 724
(1986).
Prejudice focuses on whether counsel's deficient
performance renders the result of the proceeding unreliable or
fundamentally unfair.
Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 372,
113 S.Ct. 838, 844, 122 L. Ed. 2d 180 (1993).
Where an appellant
challenges a guilty plea based on ineffective counsel, he must
show both that counsel made serious errors outside the wide range
of professionally competent assistance, McMann v. Richardson, 397
U.S. 759, 771, 90 S. Ct. 1441, 1449, 25 L. Ed. 2d 763 (1970), and
that the deficient performance so seriously affected the outcome
of the plea process that, but for the errors of counsel, there is
a reasonable probability that the defendant would not have
pleaded guilty, but would have insisted on going to trial.
v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. at 58, 106 S. Ct. at 370;
Hill
accord Sparks v.
Commonwealth, Ky. App., 721 S.W.2d 726, 727-28 (1986).
A
"reasonable probability" is a probability sufficient to undermine
confidence in the outcome of the proceeding.
U.S. 694, 104 S. Ct. at 2068.
Strickland, 466
See also Miles v. Dorsey, 61 F.3d
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1459, 1475 (10th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1062, 116 S.
Ct. 743, 133 L. Ed. 2d 692 (1996).
Determining whether there is
a reasonable probability that the defendant would have gone to
trial is based on an objective analysis of the circumstances.
See, e.g., Panuccio v. Kelly, 927 F.2d 106, 109 (2nd Cir. 1991);
Shone v. Purkett, 15 F.3d 785, 790 (8th Cir. 1994).
Payne argues that his guilty plea is invalid because it
was based on ineffective assistance of counsel.
More
specifically, he asserts that defense counsel provided erroneous
advice on his potential parole eligibility.
He states that
counsel told him that he would be eligible for parole
consideration after serving twenty percent (20%) of his sentence,
or four years on the twenty-year sentence.
Payne contends that
counsel failed to properly investigate Kentucky law, which
required persons convicted of sexual offenses such as firstdegree sodomy to serve fifty percent (50%) of his sentence before
becoming eligible for parole.
See KRS 439.3401.
Payne states
that he relied to his detriment on the misadvice of counsel on
parole eligibility and that he would not have pled guilty, but
would have insisted on going to trial, if he had not been
misinformed.
However, a review of the guilty plea hearing presents a
different picture.
During the hearing, the trial judge carefully
reviewed with Payne the various constitutional and statutory
rights he was waiving by pleading guilty.
The judge also
reviewed the possible sentences and the possibility of parole.
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Judge:
And have each of you read these
indictments and discussed them fully
with your attorney to the extent
that you feel that you are fully
informed and understand the nature
of all charges made against you?
Payne.
Yes, sir.
Judge.
Mr. Payne, you understand that you’re charged
with one count of Incest which is a C felony
punishable by not less than five, nor more
than 10 years in prison?
Payne:
Yes, sir.
Judge:
That you’re charged with various counts of
Second-Degree Sodomy which is likewise a C
felony punishable by not less than five, nor
more than 10 years in prison?
Payne:
Yes, sir.
Judge:
That you’re charged with various counts of
First-Degree Sodomy which by the reason of the
age of the child involved makes it an A felony
punishable by not less than 20 years nor more
than life. That you’re charged with one count
of First-Degree Sexual Abuse which is a D
felony punishable by not less than one nor
more than five years in imprisonment. That
you’re charged with two counts of SecondDegree Sexual Abuse which is an A misdemeanor
punishable by not more than 12 months in jail
or more than a $500.00 fine. That you’re
charged with one count of Fourth-Degree
Assault which is likewise an A misdemeanor,
and that you’re charged with two counts of
First-degree Criminal Abuse which is a C
felony punishable by not less than five nor
more than 10 years. You understand that?
Payne:
Yes, sir.
*
*
*
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*
Judge:
And do each1 of you feel that you fully
understand the consequences of entering a
guilty plea here this morning?
Payne:
Yes, sir.
Judge:
Now have there been any promises, any
pressure, any coercion been brought to bear
upon either of you by any person on this earth
to get you to enter a guilty plea against your
voluntary act and deed?
Payne:
No, sir.
Judge:
Now, gentlemen, no one that I know of is in a
position to be able to accurately advise you
as to how much of your sentences you might
have to serve in state prison before you would
be able to make parole from prison in the
event you’re not granted probation or
conditional discharge, nor do I know, for that
matter, that you would ever make parole, that
you might conceivably have to go to state
prison and serve every single day of your
sentence. Are each, and both of you, fully
aware of this?
Payne:
Yes, sir.
Judge:
And I trust that neither of you are relying
upon anything your attorney, or anyone else,
has told you or failed to tell you about when,
if ever, you might be eligible for parole.
You’re not relying on anybody’s promises or
assurances of this nature?
Payne:
No, sir.
Several courts have recognized that gross misadvice on
parole eligibility given a defendant by his attorney may
invalidate a guilty plea because of ineffective assistance of
counsel.
See, e.g., Sparks v. Sowders, 852 F.2d 882 (6th Cir.
1988); O’Tuel v. Osborne, 706 F.2d 498, 500-01 (4th Cir. 1983);
1
The trial judge sometimes uses plural references
because he conducted the guilty plea hearing with two defendants.
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Cepulonis v Ponte, 699 F.2d 573, 577 (1st Cir. 1983); Meyers v.
Gillis, 93 F.3d 1147, 1153-54 (3rd Cir. 1996).
However, a
defendant must still establish that counsel rendered objectively
unreasonable advice and that the erroneous advice was a major
material causative factor in decision to plead guilty, rather
than going to trial.
See Strader v. Garrison, 611 F.2d 61, 63
(4th Cir. 1979)(“though parole eligibility dates are collateral
consequences of a guilty plea of which a defendant need not be
informed if he does not inquire, when he is grossly misinformed
about it by his lawyer, and relies upon that misinformation, he
is deprived of his constitutional right to counsel.”); See also
Hill v. Lockhart, supra (finding defendant did not establish
ineffective assistance of counsel based on erroneous parole
eligibility advice because absence of actual prejudice); Holmes
v. United States, 876 F.2d 1545 (11th Cir. 1989).
Although a defendant is not absolutely bound by every
statement made at the guilty plea hearing, “solemn declarations
in open court carry a strong presumption of verity.”
Blackledge
v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 73, 97 S. Ct. 1621, 1629, 52 L. Ed. 2d
136 (1976).
Any claim that conflicts with the statements made
during the guilty plea hearing faces a formidable barrier in a
collateral proceeding challenging the voluntariness of the plea.
Id.; Lasiter v. Thomas, 89 F.3d 699, 702-03 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, ___ U.S. ___, 117 S. Ct. 493, 136 L. Ed. 2d 386 (1996).
The guilty plea colloquy is designed to uncover hidden promises
or representations about the consequences of a guilty plea.
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Baker v. United States, 781 F.2d 85, 90 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
479 U.S. 1017, 107 S. Ct. 667, 93 L. Ed. 2d 719 (1986).
Absent
extraordinary circumstances, declarations in open court under
oath should not be lightly cast aside.
317, 320 (3rd Cir. 1994).
Zilich v. Reid, 36 F.3d
Moreover, a defendant’s self-serving
statement alone that he would have gone to trial rather than
plead guilty is insufficient to establish actual prejudice.
See
Panuccio v. Kelly, 927 F.2d 106, 109 (2nd Cir. 1991); Parry v.
Rosemeyer, 64 F.3d 110, 118 (3rd Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 516
U.S. 1058, 116 S. Ct. 734, 133 L. Ed. 2d 684 (1996); Armsted v.
Scott, 37 F.3d 202, 210 (5th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S.
1071, 115 S. Ct. 1709, 131 L. 2d. 2d 570 (1995).
The court must
make an independent analysis based on the totality of the
circumstances.
Id.
In the case at bar, the trial judge explicitly
addressed the issue of parole.
range for each offense.
The court reviewed the sentencing
Although the judge did not specifically
inform Payne that he could be eligible for parole after serving
ten years, he did state that no one was in position to tell Payne
when he might be paroled.
Payne indicated that he understood
that he might have to serve the entire sentence.
The trial judge
asked Payne if he was relying on “anything” his attorney had told
him or failed to tell him about parole eligibility.
Payne
indicated that he was not relying on any promises or assurances
about parole eligibility by his attorney.
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Payne has presented no reason why his statements under
oath at the guilty plea hearing should be discounted in favor of
his claims made several years later in the RCr 11.42 motion.
Payne not only did not inform the trial court at the guilty plea
hearing that he was relying on any statements by his attorney
that he would be eligible for parole in four years; he indicated
just the opposite, that he was not relying on any representations
by his attorney about parole eligibility.
The trial judge
specifically told Payne that he could not rely on any such
statements by his attorney in deciding whether to plead guilty.
Where misadvice by an attorney is corrected by the
trial court during the guilty plea hearing, the defendant cannot
establish prejudice for purposes of ineffective assistance of
counsel.
For example, in Worthen v. Meachum, 842 F.2d 1179, 1184
(10th Cir. 1988), overruled on other grounds by Coleman v.
Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 111 S. Ct. 2546, 115 L. Ed. 2d 640
(1991), the defendant challenged his guilty plea because his
attorney told him that he would be paroled in five or six years.
The court held that even if the attorney’s advice was erroneous,
Worthen could not demonstrate prejudice because the trial court
had told him during the guilty plea hearing that neither the
attorney nor the court had any authority over the Parole Board.
Similarly, in United States v. Storey, 990 F.2d 1094 (8th Cir.
1993), the court held that the defendant had not established
ineffective assistance of counsel where defendant’s claim of
reliance on attorney’s alleged erroneous parole eligibility
-11-
advice conflicted with information about parole given the
defendant at the guilty plea proceeding.
See also United States
v. Rice, 116 F.3d 267 (7th Cir. 1997) (defendant failed to show
prejudice where trial court told defendant he could not rely on
counsel’s advice on sentence); United States v. Carr, 80 F.3d 413
(10th Cir. 1996)(defendant failed to establish prejudice because
defendant was aware that attorney gave erroneous information on
mandatory life sentence given defendant before plea entered).
Payne has failed to show that he relied on any
misadvice from counsel.
He has not challenged the fact that he
committed the offenses in the indictment.
Had he gone to trial,
Payne was facing a potential sentence of twenty years to life on
each of the six counts of first-degree sodomy (Class A felony),
five to ten years on each of five counts of second-degree sodomy
(Class C felony), five to ten years on the one count of incest
(Class C felony), one to five years on the first-degree sexual
abuse (Class D felony), and the various misdemeanor offenses.
Under the plea agreement, Payne received the minimum sentence for
just one count of first-degree sodomy with the remainder of the
sentences running concurrently.
Given the extent and nature of
the offenses, Payne very likely could have received a much
greater sentence after a jury trial.
Where the defendant does
not challenge the inevitability of conviction on the substantive
offenses, he must explicitly explain how the collateral parole
information influenced his decision.
v. Lockhart,
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As the Court stated in Hill
[Hill] alleged no special circumstances that
might support the conclusion that he placed
particular emphasis on his parole eligibility
in deciding whether or not to plead guilty.
Indeed, petitioner’s mistaken belief that he
would become eligible for parole after
serving one-third of his sentence would seem
to have affected not only his calculation of
the time he likely would serve if sentenced
pursuant to the proposed plea agreement, but
also his calculation of the time he likely
would serve if he went to trial and were
convicted.
474 U.S. at 60, 106 S. Ct. at 371.
If Payne had been aware that he would have to serve 50%
of his sentence before becoming eligible for parole, rather than
20%, the risk of going to trial would have appeared even greater.
Given the relatively minimal sentence he received under the plea
agreement compared with the ultimate potential sentence he could
have received at trial and the absence of any challenge to the
substantive charges, the correct information on parole
eligibility would not have been a determinative factor in the
choice between accepting the plea agreement and going to trial.
As a result, even assuming that counsel provided erroneous parole
eligibility information, Payne has not established that but for
the misadvice of counsel, there is a reasonable probability he
would have gone to trial rather than plead guilty or that the
guilty plea proceeding was fundamentally unfair.
Payne’s second argument involves the constitutional
validity of the violent offender statute, KRS 439.3401.
He
contends that this statute violates due process because it is
arbitrary and capricious and because the trial court made no
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written findings of aggravating circumstances.
Payne attempts to
analogize KRS 439.3401 with the death penalty statute, KRS
532.025, in maintaining that an evidentiary sentencing hearing on
mitigating and aggravating circumstances is required before the
enhanced parole ineligibility provisions for violent offenders
can be imposed.
Payne also suggests that the Department of
Corrections was usurping the power of the trial court by imposing
the 50% minimum parole eligibility standard without a specific
order by the court.
Payne’s position has been rejected in earlier court
opinions. First, there is no separation of powers problem.
In
Rudolph v. Commonwealth, Ky. App., 710 S.W.2d 235, 236 (1986),
the court stated that “the classification of crimes and the
length of stay in a state penitentiary is purely a matter of the
prerogative of the legislature.”
In Mullins v. Commonwealth, Ky.
App., 956 S.W.2d 222 (1997), the court stated that parole for
felonies was purely a function of the executive branch of
government, and the Department of Corrections has authority to
carry out the statutory provisions of KRS 439.3401.
Moreover, in
Belcher v. Kentucky Parole Bd., Ky. App., 917 S.W.2d 584 (1996),
the court held that neither Kentucky statutes nor prison
regulations created a protected constitutional due process
liberty interest in parole.
Thus, the trial court has no role in
determining parole eligibility.
Similarly, there is no statutory
requirement that a trial court make written findings relevant to
a defendant’s “violent offender” status under KRS 439.3401.
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Payne’s attempt to import the procedures in death penalty cases
under KRS 532.025 and raise a procedural due process challenge to
KRS 439.3401 is wholly without merit.
Second, in Huff v. Commonwealth, Ky., 763 S.W.2d 106
(1989), the Kentucky Supreme Court held that KRS 439.3401 did not
violate the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment nor
Section 2 of the Kentucky Constitution.
The court also held that
the statute did not violate equal protection and was not
unconstitutionally vague.
Although in Sanders v. Commonwealth,
Ky., 844 S.W.2d 391 (1992), the Supreme Court later modified the
interpretation of KRS 439.3401(3) to place a twelve-year cap on
parole ineligibility for non-capital offense violent offenders,
the court reaffirmed the constitutionality of the statue for
purposes of due process and equal protection.
Therefore, Payne’s
substantive due process challenge based on the statute being
arbitrary is without merit.
In conclusion, the issues raised by Payne in his RCr
11.42 motion are clearly refuted on the current record.
evidentiary hearing on the motion was not necessary.
An
The trial
court properly denied the motion without a hearing and without
appointing counsel.
See Maggard v. Commonwealth, supra; Hopewell
v. Commonwealth, supra.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the order of the
Henderson Circuit Court.
ALL CONCUR.
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BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Mark Wettle
Louisville, Kentucky
A. B. Chandler III
Attorney General
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