SHARON SKAGGS (now Pride) v. GREG SKAGGS
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RENDERED:
December 30, 1998; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO. 1997-CA-003081-MR
SHARON SKAGGS (now Pride)
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM ALLEN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE WILLIAM R. HARRIS, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 97-CI-000100
v.
GREG SKAGGS
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
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BEFORE:
HUDDLESTON, McANULTY, AND SCHRODER, JUDGES.
SCHRODER, JUDGE:
Sharon Darlene Pride (Sharon) appeals from an
order of the Allen Circuit Court changing joint custody of a
five-year-old male child to sole custody to the father, Gregory
Skaggs (Gregory).
After reviewing the record, considering the
parties arguments and the applicable law, we affirm.
The parties herein were married for about two and onehalf years when Gregory initiated divorce proceedings.
A divorce
decree was entered August 5, 1994, which granted the parties
joint custody with Sharon designated primary custodian.
On
September 24, 1997, Gregory filed a motion for a change in
custody.
The Domestic Relations Commissioner (DRC) conducted a
two-day hearing wherein she heard sworn testimony from Sharon;
Gregory; Gloria Hennion, a family friend of Gregory’s; Tara
Faulk, the child’s former daycare provider; Barry Skaggs,
Gregory’s father; Faye Skaggs, Gregory’s mother; Billy Grant
Pride, Sharon’s current husband’s father; Gregory Grant Pride,
Sharon’s current husband; and Darla Erwin, social worker,
Kentucky Cabinet for Families and Children/Department of Social
Services (CFC/DSS).
The DRC admitted into evidence certain
exhibits, including a videotape made by Billy Grant of Sharon’s
residence on or about July 31, 1996, and home study
investigations performed by CFC/DSS.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the DRC discussed the
evidence, made findings, and recommended sole custody to Gregory
with reasonable visitation to Sharon.
Sharon filed exceptions to
the DRC’s report and on October 29, 1997, the circuit court
confirmed the DRC’s report, overruled the exceptions, and
approved the change in custody.
On appeal, Sharon argues that the DRC erred in
admitting the videotape; erred in allowing the cross-examination
of Sharon’s medical records; erred in separating the infant,
David, from his half-brother, Michael; erred in the findings of
fact; and erred in recommending a change in joint custody.
In the case sub judice, we agree with the trial court
that the July 31, 1996 video was not that important to the DRC’s
findings as that was after Sharon moved out.
Sharon’s argument
is that the video should not have been admitted into evidence
because it was not authenticated under KRE 901.
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The trial court
heard testimony from Billy Pride, who testified at the hearing on
exceptions that he did indeed take a video of the house on that
date, that the tape the court had him review did contain his
voice and had his reflection in the mirror, but that he didn’t
believe it was the same and must have been altered.
court disagreed and admitted the tape.
The trial
Even if we believed the
videotape was not admissible, the error would be harmless because
the trial court reviewed the tape and findings of the DRC and
decided the tape was not that valuable because Sharon had moved
out before July 31, 1996.
Thus the tape was not that relevant to
the living conditions when Sharon lived there.
Even though the
DRC may have given the tape more weight, under Squires v.
Squires, Ky., 854 S.W.2d 770, 765 (1993), the call is the trial
court’s.
Sharon argued that it was error to allow crossexamination of her regarding medical records relating to her
medical malpractice case against a doctor, her former employer.
In the malpractice action, Sharon alleged she became addicted to
Stadol nasal spray, a narcotic, and was suing the doctor for
prescribing such.
Sharon argues that, “While Darlene Pride has
clearly put her medical condition at issue in a medical
malpractice case . . . , she has not clearly placed her medical
condition in issue at this custody proceeding.”
We disagree.
Sharon’s medical condition is a relevant factor to consider in
arriving at the best interest of the child.
Squires, 854 S.W.2d
at 768; KRE 611(a); Atwood v. Atwood, Ky., 550 S.W.2d 465 (1976);
KRS 403.270(1).
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Sharon states, but provides no authority for the
proposition, that it would be error to separate David, the child
in question, from his half-brother, Michael.
Without specific
authority for such a proposition, we believe under KRS
403.2270(1), the “best interest” principle, that the
interrelationship of David and Michael is a relevant factor, but
not a controlling one.
As to Sharon’s argument that the DRC made errors in the
findings of fact, we disagree.
Under Squires, 854 S.W.2d at 770,
the trial court reviews the DRC’s findings and recommendations
and draws its own conclusions.
The DRC prepared her report with
recommendations to the court, but the trial court has the
broadest possible discretion with respect to its use.
Basham v. Wilkins, Ky. App., 851 S.W.2d 491 (1993).
CR 53.06;
This Court
will not overturn the trial court unless it is clearly erroneous.
CR 52.01; Alvey v. Union Inv., Inc., Ky. App., 697 S.W.2d 145
(1985).
In order to modify joint custody, the trial court must make
the two-part analysis set out in Mennemeyer v. Mennemeyer, Ky.
App., 887 S.W.2d 555, 558 (1994):
[T]he trial court may intervene to modify a
previous joint custody award only if the
court first finds that there has been an
inability or bad faith refusal of one or both
parties to cooperate. Any court-ordered
modification must then be made in light of
the best interest of the children and based
upon the factors which are enumerated in KRS
403.270.
The issue of “inability or bad faith refusal” to cooperate is
evaluated in terms of the definition of “cooperation” as a
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“‘willingness to rationally participate in decisions affecting
the upbringing of the child.’”
Stinnett v. Stinnett, Ky. App.,
915 S.W.2d 323, 324 (1996) (quoting Squires, 854 S.W.2d at 769).
The inability or bad-faith-refusal-to-cooperatedetermination is merely a threshold procedural issue that must be
met before a trial court may proceed to the best interest
analysis on questions of physical possession or custody.
v. Edelstein, Ky. App., 959 S.W.2d 781 (1998).
Jacobs
After making a
threshold determination on the cooperation issue, the trial court
may make a de novo determination of custody, including physical
possession or physical residence, according to the factors set
out in KRS 403.270(1).
Jacobs, 959 S.W.2d at 784.
As a general rule, the trial court has broad discretion
in determining the best interests of children when awarding child
custody.
Krug v. Krug, Ky., 647 S.W.2d 790, 793 (1983); see
generally, Squires, supra.
In reviewing a child custody
determination, the appellate Court reviews the trial court’s
factual findings for clear error.
Reichle v. Reichle, Ky., 719
S.W.2d 442, 444 (1986); Basham v. Wilkins, 851 S.W.2d at 493.
A
trial court’s decision on an award or modification of custody or
the type of custody is a legal conclusion that should not be
disturbed absent an abuse of discretion.
Squires, 854 S.W.2d at
770 (stating issue of whether joint custody was appropriate in
the circumstances was a legal conclusion); Cherry v. Cherry, Ky.,
634 S.W.2d 423, 425 (1982); Dudgeon v. Dudgeon, Ky., 458 S.W.2d
159, 160 (1970).
The trial court is in the best position to
evaluate the testimony and weigh the evidence, so an appellate
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Court should not substitute its own opinion for that of the trial
court.
See Reichle, 719 S.W.2d at 444; Bickel v. Bickel, Ky.,
442 S.W.2d 575, 576 (1969).
Given all of the evidence, we cannot
say that the trial court’s decision to modify the joint custody
arrangement was not in the best interest of the child.
The
evidence was sufficient to support the decision and the trial
court did not abuse its discretion.
The order of the Allen Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Pamela C. Bratcher
Bowling Green, Kentucky
B. Alan Simpson
Bowling Green, Kentucky
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