COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY v. BILLY A. JETT
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RENDERED: May 8, 1998; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
NO. 97-CA-2790-MR
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM HARRISON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE ROBERT W. McGINNIS, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 97-CR-057
v.
BILLY A. JETT
APPELLEE
OPINION
REVERSING AND REMANDING
* * *
BEFORE: GARDNER, JOHNSON, AND MILLER, JUDGES.
JOHNSON, JUDGE:
This is an appeal by the Commonwealth of
Kentucky from an order of the Harrison Circuit Court that granted
the motion of Billy A. Jett (Jett) to dismiss a charge of
trafficking in a controlled substance within 1,000 yards of a
school on double jeopardy grounds.
We reverse and remand.
In May 1997, in conjunction with a state police
investigation, Jett sold a confidential informant 30 pills of
diazepam, a Schedule IV substance, and 16 pills of phenobarbital,
a Schedule III substance.
follows:
The grand jury indicted Jett as
Count I - trafficking in a controlled substance
(diazepam) within 1,000 yards of a school in violation of
Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 218A.1411; and Count II - seconddegree trafficking in a controlled substance (phenobarbital) in
violation of KRS 218A.1413.
Prior to trial, Jett filed two
motions to dismiss Count II on double jeopardy grounds.
motions were denied and the case proceeded to trial.
Both
Following
the swearing of the jury and the presentation of the
Commonwealth's case, the trial court, upon renewal of Jett's
motion, dismissed Count I.1
Jett was convicted on Count II and
received a one-year prison sentence.
The Commonwealth challenges
the dismissal of Count I and argues that if its appeal is
successful it is entitled to retry Jett.
Jett argues that this appeal is not properly before
this Court and that jurisdiction resides before the Supreme
Court.
We are aware that the Commonwealth may not appeal from a
judgment of acquittal in a criminal case other than for the
purpose of securing a certification of law, Ky. Const. § 115, and
Commonwealth appeals for a certification of law must be made
directly to the Supreme Court.
S.W.2d 78 (1983).
Thompson v Commonwealth, Ky., 652
However, the dismissal of Count I was not a
judgment of acquittal.
The issue before the trial court was a
motion to dismiss on double jeopardy grounds, not a motion for a
directed verdict of acquittal, and the trial court did not
1
Though Jett sought dismissal of Count II and both charges
were Class D felonies, the trial court instead dismissed Count I
because it was the "less serious" of the two charges. See Jones
v. Commonwealth, Ky., 756 S.W.2d 462, 463 (1988).
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purport to enter a judgment of acquittal.
In fact, the trial
court expressed its doubts about the state of the law and
encouraged the Commonwealth to appeal the issue.
Jett has failed
to cite any authority to support his position that a dismissal of
an indictment at mid-trial on erroneous double jeopardy grounds
constitutes a judgment of acquittal.
This appeal is properly
before this Court.
The Commonwealth argues that the trial court committed
error in dismissing Count I of the indictment.
The issue of
double jeopardy in a single drug transaction involving two
separate drug schedules was addressed in Kroth v. Commonwealth,
Ky., 737 S.W.2d 680 (1987).
In Kroth, the defendant was
convicted of, inter alia, one count of possession with intent to
sell a Schedule III substance and one count of possession with
intent to sell a Schedule IV substance.
The Supreme Court held
that the multiple convictions did not violate double jeopardy
principles.
The Court reasoned that the two counts violated
separate and distinct statutory provisions, namely, those
statutory provisions which stated the differences between
Schedule III (KRS 218A.080) and Schedule IV (218A.100) types of
controlled substances.
Kroth at 681.
Kroth established the
principle that even if only one transaction is involved, it is
proper to convict a defendant of multiple offenses if the drugs
involved are comprised of distinct schedule types.
directly in point with this case.
-3-
Kroth is
As in Kroth, Jett, though
engaged in a single transaction, was charged with multiple
offenses because the drugs were scheduled differently.
Jett concedes that Kroth has never been overruled, but
argues that its authority has been severely limited and perhaps
de facto overruled by subsequent decisions.
This view has some
merit considering that Ingram v. Commonwealth, Ky., 801 S.W.2d
321 (1990), overruled by Commonwealth v. Burge, Ky., 947 S.W.2d
805 (1996), adopted a single transaction/compound consequences
test for double jeopardy analysis.
However, the impact of Ingram
and its progeny on Kroth is academic.
The decision in Burge was
final on June 16, 1997, well before Jett's August 28, 1997 trial
date.
Burge overruled Ingram and readopted the test established
in Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304, 52 S.Ct. 180,
182, 76 L.Ed. 306, 309 (1932).
Under the Blockburger test,
double jeopardy does not occur when a person is charged with two
crimes arising from the same course of conduct as long as each
statute requires proof of an additional fact which the other does
not.
Alternatively stated, for there not to be double jeopardy a
charged offense cannot be a lesser-included offense of another
charged offense.
Count I, trafficking in a controlled substance
in or near a school, is codified in KRS 218A.1411.
This statute
provides in pertinent part as follows:
Any person who unlawfully traffics in a
controlled substance classified in
Schedule[]2 . . . IV . . . in any building
2
KRS 218A.1411 also prohibits the selling of Schedules I,
II, III, and V within 1000 yards of a school.
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used primarily for classroom instruction in a
school or on any premises located within one
thousand (1,000) yards of any school building
used primarily for classroom instruction
shall be guilty of a Class D felony.
Count II, trafficking in a controlled substance in the second
degree, is codified in KRS 218A.1413.
This statute provides in
pertinent part:
(1) A person is guilty of trafficking in a
controlled substance in the second degree
when:
(a) He knowingly and unlawfully traffics
in a . . . controlled substance classified in
Schedule III; . . .
(2) Any person who violates the provisions
of subsection (1) of this section shall:
(a) For the first offense be guilty of a
Class D felony.
Count I contains the additional element, not included
in Count II, of selling a Schedule IV controlled substance.3
Similarly, Count II contains the element of trafficking in a
Schedule III substance, an element not contained in Count I.
The
Blockburger rule does not proscribe convicting a defendant under
both KRS 218A.1411 and KRS 218A.1413 for two drugs classified
under distinct schedules.
To the contrary,
Kroth, supra,
enunciates this interpretation and permits the Commonwealth to
bring multiple charges if the drugs fall under separate
schedules.
Jett was not charged in violation of multiple
punishment double jeopardy principles and the trial court erred
3
Count I also includes, of course, the additional element
of selling within 1000 yards of a school building.
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when it dismissed Count I following the presentation of the
Commonwealth's case.
The final issue is whether, on remand, the Commonwealth
is entitled to retry Jett on Count I.
tried twice for the same offense.
amend. V.
A defendant cannot be
Ky. Const. § 13; U.S. Const.
A successful claim of double jeopardy will bar a
retrial on the charge.
See Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1,
98 S.Ct. 2141, 57 L.Ed.2d 1 (1978).
jury is sworn.
Jeopardy attaches once a
Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28, 98 S.Ct. 2156, 57
L.Ed.2d 24 (1978).
However, where a defendant successfully seeks
to avoid trial prior to its conclusion by a motion to dismiss,
the double jeopardy clause is not offended by a second
prosecution; such a motion is deemed to be a deliberate election
by the defendant to forego his valued right to have his guilt or
innocence determined before the first trier of fact.
United
States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 98 S.Ct. 2187, 57 L.Ed.2d 65
(1978).
The double jeopardy clause does not relieve a defendant
from the consequences of his voluntary choice.
Id.
If the trial
fails other than on the merits, and the accused does not
seasonably object to the dismissal, a second trial for the same
offense does not constitute double jeopardy.
Armine v. Tines,
131 F.2d 827 (10th Cir. 1942); C.J.S. Criminal Law § 227.
A
subsequent prosecution is not barred by a former prosecution if
the defendant expressly consents to the termination.
505.030(4)(a).
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KRS
In the case at bar, the dismissal was upon the motion
of Jett and was not on the merits of his guilt or innocence by
the trier of fact.
Rather, the dismissal was based upon the
trial court’s misapplication of the multiple prosecution double
jeopardy rules and the dismissal was expressly consented to by
Jett.
Under these circumstances the double jeopardy rules do not
prevent the Commonwealth from retrying Jett on Count I.
We reverse the dismissal of Count I of the indictment
against Jett and remand the case to the trial court for further
proceedings consistent with this Opinion.
GARDNER, JUDGE, CONCURS.
MILLER, JUDGE, DISSENTS AND FILES A SEPARATE OPINION.
MILLER, JUDGE, DISSENTING.
I respectfully dissent.
am of the opinion that double jeopardy prohibits fracturing a
single course of conduct into multiple crimes.
I deem my
position to be no offense to Blockburger v. United States, 284
U.S. 299, 52 S.Ct. 180, 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932).
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Hon. A. B. Chandler III
Attorney General
Hon. James Paul Brannon
Paris, Kentucky
Hon. R. Evelyn Freer
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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