COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY, NATURAL RESOURCES AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION CABINET v. E & C COAL COMPANY and DENZIL COLEMAN COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY, NATURAL RESOURCES AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION CABINET V. R & H MINERAL ENTERPRISES OF WESTERN KENTUCKY, INC. and DENZIL COLEMAN
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RENDERED: December 18, 1998; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
1997-CA-002105-MR
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY,
NATURAL RESOURCES AND ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION CABINET
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FRANKLIN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE WILLIAM L. GRAHAM, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 95-CI-000960
E & C COAL COMPANY and DENZIL COLEMAN
APPELLEES
consolidated with
NO.
1997-CA-002106-MR
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY,
NATURAL RESOURCES AND ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION CABINET
V.
APPEAL FROM FRANKLIN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE WILLIAM L. GRAHAM, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 95-CI-001021
R & H MINERAL ENTERPRISES OF
WESTERN KENTUCKY, INC. and
DENZIL COLEMAN
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
APPELLANT
COMBS, DYCHE, and GUIDUGLI, Judges.
APPELLEES
COMBS, JUDGE: The Natural Resources and Environmental Protection
Cabinet (the Cabinet) appeals from an order of the Franklin
Circuit Court holding that the Secretary of the Cabinet erred in
imposing individual liability upon the appellee, Denzil Coleman.
After a careful review of the record and pertinent authorities,
we affirm.
Between 1981-1986, the Cabinet issued nine surface
mining permits to E&C Coal Company, Inc., (E&C); the sole officer
and shareholder of E&C was Denzil Coleman.
As required by KRS
350.060, E&C posted a performance bond with the Cabinet to secure
its mining permits.
Union Indemnity Insurance Company (Union)
acted as surety for the performance bonds.
In 1986, Union was
deemed to be insolvent; that insolvency resulted in E&C’s losing
its bond coverage as the performance bonds were no longer valid.
Shortly thereafter, the Cabinet issued notices of
noncompliance to E&C for nine violations of KRS 350.060 for
failing to maintain bond coverage on the nine surface mining
permits.
The noncompliance notices ordered E&C to take remedial
measures to abate the violations.
In June 1987, the Cabinet
issued cessation and immediate compliance orders to E&C for
failure to abate the violations.
The Cabinet also issued Coleman
notices of individual liability pursuant to KRS 350.990(9) for
violations by E&C.
Subsequently, the Cabinet filed an
administrative complaint in which it sought civil penalties
against both Coleman and E&C for the unabated violations.
In addition to owning E&C, Coleman was the sole
shareholder of R&H Mineral Enterprises of Western Kentucky, Inc.,
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(R&H).
R&H had been issued three mining permits, which were
secured by performance bonds for which American Druggists
Insurance Company (American) had acted as surety.
However, in
1986, American — like Union — was deemed to be insolvent,
rendering R&H’s performance bonds invalid.
R&H subsequently
received notices of noncompliance from the Cabinet for failure to
maintain bond coverage pursuant to KRS 350.060.
By June 1987,
R&H had not abated the violations, and the Cabinet issued orders
of cessation and immediate compliance to R&H.
Coleman also
received notices of individual liability for the cited
violations.
Thereafter, the Cabinet filed an administrative
complaint against Coleman and R&H, seeking civil penalties for
the violations.
The hearing officer conducted a combined hearing on
both of the administrative complaints.
In his report, the
hearing officer recommended that in both actions, civil penalties
should not be imposed on Coleman.
Nonetheless, on June 1995, the
Secretary entered an order in the action against E&C and Coleman.
He found both E&C and Coleman liable for the violations and
remanded the action to the hearing officer for a calculation of
civil penalties to be assessed against each of them.
Coleman appealed to the Franklin Circuit Court.
E&C and
On August 11,
1997, the circuit court entered an order affirming in part and
vacating in part the Secretary’s order.
The circuit court
affirmed the imposition of liability on E&C but vacated that
portion of the Secretary’s order as to Coleman’s liability,
reasoning that “individual liability may only be assessed at the
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‘enforcement stage’...”
The Cabinet filed an appeal, challenging
the court’s decision regarding Coleman. (Case No. 97-CA-002105).
On June 22, 1995, the Secretary entered an order with
respect to the complaint against R&H and Coleman.
The Secretary
held both R&H and Coleman liable for the violations cited in the
noncompliance notices and cessation orders and remanded the case
to a hearing officer for an assessment of civil penalties.
R&H
and Coleman appealed the order to the Franklin Circuit Court.
On
August 11, 1997, the circuit court entered its order affirming in
part and vacating in part the Secretary’s order as to R&H and
Coleman.
As had occurred in the E&C and Coleman case, the court
affirmed the Secretary’s imposition of liability on R&H but
vacated the portion of the order imposing liability on Coleman.
The court adopted and reiterated the reasoning set forth in its
order in the E&C and Coleman case regarding the imposition of the
individual liability under KRS 350.990(9).
The Cabinet appealed
the circuit court’s order denying the imposition of individual
liability on Coleman.
(Case No. 97-CA-002106).
By order of this
Court, Case Nos. 97-CA-002105 and 97-CA-002106 were consolidated
on January 20, 1998.
The Cabinet argues that the circuit court erred in not
finding that individual liability could be imposed on Coleman at
the administrative level; i.e., the assessment stage as opposed
to the enforcement stage.
It contends that the Secretary found
Coleman liable for E&C’s and R&H’s violation based upon his
actions in authorizing, ordering, or carrying out the violations.
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Therefore, pursuant to KRS 350.990(9), it contends that the
Secretary is authorized to impose liability on Coleman.
KRS 350.990(9) provides:
When a corporate permittee violates any
provision of this chapter or administrative
regulation issued pursuant thereto or fails
or refuses to comply with any final order
issued by the secretary, any director,
officer or agent of the corporation who
willfully and knowingly authorized, ordered,
or carried out the violation, failure, or
refusal shall be subject to the same civil
penalties, fines, and imprisonment as may be
imposed upon a person pursuant to this
section. (Emphasis added).
The clear language of this statute sets out two situations in
which individual liability may be imposed upon a director,
officer, or agent of a corporate permittee.
An agent can be held
liable for his willful and knowing actions which result in a
violation of KRS Chapter 350 or the administrative regulations
issued pursuant to that chapter.
The agent may be also be held
liable if he willfully and knowingly fails or refuses to comply
with a final order of the Secretary.
The critical issue before
us is when does personal liability of the corporate director,
officer, or agent arise.
It is essential to analyze the language and the
grammatical structure of the statute in order to determine its
meaning as to this issue of timing of liability.
The
introductory adverbial clause commencing with [w]hen sets forth
two alternate grounds for liability as to the “corporate
permittee” (the corporation):
violation of any portion of the
statute and/or regulations or failure or refusal to comply with a
final order of the secretary.
A comma follows, and the principal
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clause commences to spell out the individual liability of “any
director, officer or agent of the corporation.”
That individual
liability arises subsequent to — and is not chronologically
commensurate with — a finding of liability as to the corporation
under the two criteria (violation of (1) statute/regulation or
(2) final order) stated in the introductory (“when”) clause.
The Cabinet argues erroneously that individual
liability is to be construed according to the same two criteria
that apply to the liability of the corporation.
We disagree.
Individual liability of a corporate officer, director, or agent
can arise only after the liability of a corporation has been
determined.
A corporation thus may be liable either at the
assessment stage (violation of portion of the statute or of a
regulation) or at the enforcement stage (refusal or failure to
obey a final order of the Secretary).
An individual, however,
can only face imposition of liability at the enforcement stage
(i.e., violation of a final order of the Secretary).
The
heightened standard for individual liability also requires an
element of scienter not required for corporate culpability —
utilizing the adverbs “willfully and knowingly.”
This technical, grammatical analysis comports with and
is substantial by the holding in Natural Resources and
Environmental Protection Cabinet v. Williams, Ky., 768 S.W.2d 47
(1989), where the Supreme Court of Kentucky addressed the
imposition of individual liability based upon a corporation’s
failure or refusal to comply with a final order of the Secretary.
The Court explained as follows:
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The language of subsection nine (9) of KRS
350.990 which covers Williams’ [sic]
liability in the event the “corporate
permittee . . . fails or refuses to comply
with any final order issued by the
secretary,” necessarily implies that the
enforcement procedure provided for therein
against the corporate officer “who willfully
and knowingly authorized, ordered, or carried
out such . . . failure or refusal” shall be
in Franklin Circuit Court because liability
is predicated on failure by the corporate
permitted to comply with the secretary’s
“final order.” Chronologically, such failure
can only occur after the administrative
procedure against the corporation has
culminated in an order that has been
disobeyed.
Id. at 49.
The Williams case presented the specific issue of when
individual liability may be imposed upon a corporate officer for
failure or refusal to comply with a final order of the Secretary.
The Supreme Court clearly enunciated the temporal sequence of
events, holding that the procedure against the corporation must
be completed and must “have culminated in an order that has been
disobeyed” before individual liability comes into consideration.
Thus, Williams arrives by way of legal analysis at the
same conclusion compelled by our grammatical analysis: that
individual liability of a corporate officer can be found only at
the enforcement stage — chronologically subsequent to a
determination of corporate liability.
In the case before us, the Cabinet attempts to hold a
corporate officer individually liable commensurate with and in
the same order as its determination of liability as to the
corporation.
In so doing, it errs.
The Cabinet must allow an
individual — be it corporate officer, director, or agent — the
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opportunity to comply with a final order.
Failure to comply
with that order must then be found to have occurred
deliberately.
Again, the Williams Court found that the statute
envisioned and intended such heightened degree of culpability in
order to impose individual liability:
The purpose of this subsection is to impose
an additional liability upon the corporate
officer upon proof of willful and knowing
complicity in the failure by the corporate
permittee to respond to the secretary’s
order.
Id. at 49.
The Franklin Circuit Court reasoned its way carefully
and correctly to its conclusion in vacating the Secretary’s order
as to the imposition of individual liability.
Accordingly, we
affirm.
GUIDUGLI, JUDGE, CONCURS.
DYCHE, JUDGE, CONCURS IN RESULT.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEES:
Scott Jones
Frankfort, KY
Donald Duff
Frankfort, KY
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