HELEN COOPER v. TIMOTHY L. WHEELER
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
RENDERED: November 25, 1998; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO. 1997-CA-001949-MR
HELEN COOPER
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM BARREN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE BENJAMIN L. DICKINSON, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 87-CI-0440
TIMOTHY L. WHEELER
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
* * *
BEFORE:
GUIDUGLI, JOHNSON, AND SCHRODER, JUDGES.
SCHRODER, JUDGE:
Helen Cooper appeals an order of the Barren
Circuit Court denying her relief under Kentucky Rule of Civil
Procedure (CR) 60.02 in a custody dispute with her former
husband, Timothy Wheeler.
Cooper argues that the circuit court
erred because she had proof that Wheeler was not the natural
father of her son and that Wheeler committed fraud and perjury
concerning his living arrangements.
After reviewing the record,
the applicable law, and the arguments of counsel, we affirm.
Cooper and Wheeler married in 1981.
to a son, Jeremy, on July 10, 1986.
Cooper gave birth
Cooper petitioned for
dissolution of the marriage in December 1987.
dissolved in March 1988.
The marriage was
By agreement of the parties, Cooper
received sole custody of Jeremy, and Wheeler was granted
reasonable visitation.
In December 1996, Wheeler moved for
modification of custody and for temporary custody.
He alleged
that Cooper had physically and mentally abused Jeremy.
The court
granted Wheeler’s motion for temporary custody and scheduled a
hearing on permanent custody for February 1997.
After the
hearing, the court ordered that custody be granted to Wheeler.
Cooper filed a “Motion to Reconsider/CR 60.02 Motion”
and a “Motion for DNA Testing” with affidavits.
The court heard
arguments on the motions and permitted the parties to file
additional affidavits.
By orders entered July 8 and July 9,
1997, the court denied Cooper’s motions.
additional findings of fact.
Cooper moved for
The court made additional findings
in an order entered July 22, 1997.
This appeal followed.
Cooper raises three arguments on appeal:
(1) the court
should have decided custody according to the parent/non-parent
standard because Wheeler is not the natural father of Jeremy; (2)
the court erred by denying her CR 60.02 motion because of a need
for DNA testing to determine paternity;1 and (3) the court erred
1
Cooper states in her brief that this point is moot
because of evidence presented to the Barren District Court. In
an order entered after Cooper filed her brief, this Court denied
Cooper’s motion to supplement the record with this evidence
-2-
by denying her CR 60.02 motion because Wheeler committed fraud
and perjury when he testified that he was not living with a woman
outside of marriage.
Since the first argument depends upon the
second, we address them in reverse order.
Cooper argues that the paternity question was a reason
of extraordinary nature justifying relief under CR 60.02(f).
The
standard of review for denial of relief under CR 60.02(f) is
abuse of discretion.
Bethlehem Minerals Company v. Church and
Mullins Corp., Ky., 887 S.W.2d 327, 329 (1994).
"Relief under CR
60.02(f) is available where a clear showing of extraordinary and
compelling equities is made.”
823, 826 (1985).
Bishir v. Bishir, Ky., 698 S.W.2d
The two factors to be considered by the trial
court in exercising its discretion are “(1) whether the moving
party had a fair opportunity to present his claim at the trial on
the merits and (2) whether the granting of CR 60.02(f) relief
would be inequitable to other parties.”
Bethlehem, supra; see
also Fortney v. Mahan, Ky., 302 S.W.2d 842 (1957).
The circuit court held that a DNA test would serve no
purpose and would not be in the best interest of the child.
It
noted the statutory presumption that Wheeler was the father of
Jeremy, KRS 406.011, and Wheeler’s affidavit statement that his
desire to be a father to Jeremy would not be affected by a DNA
test.
because there was no proof it was ever considered by the circuit
court. Accordingly, we will address this issue in light of the
circuit court record.
-3-
The circuit court did not abuse its discretion when it
denied Cooper’s CR 60.02 motion.
Cooper had a full and fair
opportunity to present evidence of Jeremy’s paternity at the
custody hearing.
In an affidavit, she stated that she did not
raise the issue until after the hearing because she did not
believe the court would change custody and because she did not
want Jeremy to know Wheeler was not his father.
She also
asserted that Wheeler knew he was not the father, and she filed
an affidavit by a man who swore he is Jeremy’s father.
Cooper’s
strategic choice not to raise this issue until after she lost
custody did not entitle her to CR 60.02 relief.
The granting of CR 60.02(f) relief to Cooper would be
inequitable to Wheeler.
He has acknowledged Jeremy as his son
since birth and exercised his visitation rights.
A DNA test
result excluding Wheeler as the natural father could only be
harmful to Wheeler’s relationship with Jeremy.
Neither party cited the three reported Kentucky cases
approving reopening under CR 60.02 because of a paternity
question.
The cases do not create a per se rule for reopening
all judgments involving paternity and are distinguishable on
their facts.
In Crowder v. Commonwealth ex rel. Gregory, Ky. App.,
745 S.W.2d 149 (1988), this Court held that the circuit court
lacked discretion to deny a motion to reopen once a blood test
established that the movant was not the father.
supported reopening.
Other facts
First, the movant was seeking relief from a
-4-
default judgment, meaning he never had the opportunity to
challenge the paternity issue.
the child out as his own.
Second, the movant did not hold
In Cain v. Cain, Ky. App., 777 S.W.2d
238 (1989), this Court held that the "reasonable time"
requirement for motions under CR 60.02(d) and (f) was met where
the father filed the motion twelve years after the dissolution
but within two years of learning that a child born during the
marriage was possibly not his child.
Finally, in Spears v.
Spears, Ky. App., 784 S.W.2d 605 (1990), this Court held that res
judicata did not bar relief under CR 60.02 where:
(1) the child
was born after the parents separated; (2) Mr. Spears never held
the child out as his own; (3) no demand for support was made
until after the dissolution; and (4) blood tests had already been
conducted showing Mr. Spears was not the father.
This case is different from Crowder, Cain, and Spears
in one obvious respect:
here it is the mother, not the father,
who attempted to reopen the case for a paternity test.
Unlike
the fathers in the above cases, Cooper presented no truly new
evidence.
Not only did she fail to raise this issue before, she
affirmatively declared that Jeremy was Wheeler’s son in previous
dissolution proceedings.
Under these circumstances, the court
did not abuse its discretion when it refused to order a DNA test
under CR 60.02.
Bethlehem, supra.
In a related argument, Cooper maintains that the court
should have used the parent/non-parent custody standard because
Wheeler is not Jeremy’s biological father.
-5-
The court had no
reason to question Jeremy’s paternity at the time of the custody
hearing, and we have upheld the court’s denial of the DNA test.
The court used the correct standard.
Cooper also argues that the court should have granted
her “Motion to Reconsider/CR 60.02 Motion” because Wheeler
misrepresented his living arrangements.
She claims that Wheeler
intentionally hid the fact that he was planning to live with his
girlfriend.
In its order changing custody to Wheeler, the court
found that the circumstances surrounding the child had changed
for the worse, that his “present home and expanded family has
seriously endangered his emotional health,” and that the harm
likely to be caused by a change was far outweighed by its
advantages to him.
KRS 403.340(2)(c).
In support of her CR
60.02 motion, Cooper filed affidavits suggesting that Wheeler’s
girlfriend lived with him except during custody hearings.
Wheeler submitted his own affidavit, as well as those of his
girlfriend and the child, indicating that the girlfriend and
child got along well.
In its additional findings of fact, the
court found that the relationship between Wheeler and his
girlfriend was not harmful to the child.
The record does not include the videotape of the
February 1997 custody hearing.
her brief are not accurate.
The references Cooper supplies in
Therefore, we cannot compare
Wheeler’s testimony at the hearing to the charges Cooper
presented to decide if Wheeler committed fraud or perjury.
-6-
However, it is clear that the court’s final decision
rested on permissible grounds.
Once the court determined that
the child was seriously endangered by custody with Cooper, a
finding Cooper did not appeal, the question was whether the harm
likely to be caused by a change of environment would be
outweighed by its advantages.
KRS 403.340(2)(c).
The court
specifically found that Wheeler’s relationship with his
girlfriend was not harmful to the child.
We find no clear error
in the court’s factual findings.
CR 52.01; Reichle v. Reichle,
Ky., 719 S.W.2d 442, 444 (1986).
The court did not abuse its
discretion by denying Cooper CR 60.02 relief on this issue.
For the foregoing reasons, the order of the circuit
court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
William Thomas Klapheke II
Glasgow, Kentucky
Thomas W. Davis
Glasgow, Kentucky
-7-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.