JERRY MILLER FARROW V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: May 22, 1998; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
NO. 97-CA-1689-MR
JERRY MILLER FARROW
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM BOYD CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE C. DAVID HAGERMAN, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 96-CR-54
V.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
REVERSING AND REMANDING
* * * * * * * * * *
BEFORE:
GUIDUGLI, KNOX, and MILLER, JUDGES.
KNOX, JUDGE.
Jerry Farrow (Farrow) appeals from an order of the
Boyd Circuit Court entered on June 19, 1997, denying his motion
to modify the judgment brought pursuant to Kentucky Rules of
Civil Procedure (CR) 60.02(f) and CR 60.03.
After a review of
the record, the arguments of counsel and the applicable law, we
reverse and remand.
In June 1996, the Boyd County Grand Jury indicted
Farrow on four felony counts of First-Degree Trafficking in a
Controlled Substance, Second Offense (KRS 218A.1412), related to
the sale of cocaine to a confidential informant on four separate
occasions in January 1996.
The indictment also included a fifth
count charging Farrow with being a Persistent Felony Offender in
the Second Degree (PFO II)(KRS 532.080).
On November 27, 1996,
Farrow entered a guilty plea to all five counts of the indictment
pursuant to a plea agreement with Commonwealth.
As part of the
plea agreement, the Commonwealth recommended the minimum sentence
of ten years on each of the four counts of first-degree
trafficking in a controlled substance, second offense, with
enhancement to twenty years based on the PFO II count.
On
December 16, 1996, the circuit court sentenced Farrow consistent
with the Commonwealth's recommendation to ten years on each of
the four counts of first-degree trafficking in cocaine and
enhanced each count to twenty years for being a PFO II under
count five, all to run concurrently for a total sentence of
twenty years in prison.
On June 10, 1997, Farrow, acting pro se, filed a motion
for modification pursuant to CR 60.02(f), CR 60.03 and KRS
23A.010.
Farrow sought a modification of the judgment and
sentence alleging that the conviction improperly subjected him to
double enhancement in violation of constitutional due process.
Farrow alleged that he could not be subjected to sentences under
both KRS Chapter 218A, the drug trafficking statutes, and KRS
532.080, the persistent felony offender statute.
Farrow
requested that the trial court modify the sentence by reducing it
to ten years, the minimum sentence for the offense of firstdegree trafficking in a controlled substance, second offense, and
delete the sentence for the PFO II charge.
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After the
Commonwealth filed a response, the trial court summarily denied
the motion to modify.
On June 25, 1997, Farrow filed a motion to
reconsider and for findings of fact pursuant to CR 52.02 and CR
52.04.
The circuit court denied the motion for reconsideration.
This appeal followed.
Farrow argues that imposing a sentence under both KRS
218A.1412(b), as a subsequent drug offender, and KRS 532.080, as
a PFO II, constitutes double enhancement in violation of state
law and due process.
The Commonwealth argues that Kentucky case
law clearly permits a defendant's conviction and sentence
pursuant to KRS Chapter 218A to be further enhanced by virtue of
his status as a persistent felony offender under KRS 532.080.
See, e.g., Peyton v. Commonwealth, Ky., 931 S.W.2d 451 (1996);
Brooks v. Commonwealth, Ky., 905 S.W.2d 861 (1995); Dawson v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 756 S.W.2d 935 (1988); and Harrison v.
Commonwealth, Ky. App., 842 S.W.2d 531 (1992).
A review of the
case law compels us to conclude that Farrow's convictions
constituted impermissible double enhancement, and the judgment
must be vacated and remanded.
In Heady v. Commonwealth, Ky., 597 S.W.2d 613 (1980),
the defendant was charged with a felony offense of carrying a
concealed deadly weapon (CCDW), which alone constituted a
misdemeanor, but the offense was enhanced to a felony based on
the defendant's prior felony conviction for armed robbery.
The
Commonwealth also charged Heady with being a PFO I based in part
on the same armed robbery conviction used to elevate the CCDW
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offense to a felony.
The Supreme Court held that the
Commonwealth could not use a prior conviction to enhance what
would ordinarily be a misdemeanor weapons charge to a felony "and
then use the conviction of that felony to 'trigger' further
enhanced punishment via the persistent felony offender statute."
Id. at 613.
See also Boulder v. Commonwealth, Ky., 610 S.W.2d
615 (1980), overruled in part on other grounds by Dale v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 715 S.W.2d 227 (1986).
The Heady decision created some confusion in the area
of drug offenses given the earlier decision in Rudolph v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 564 S.W.2d 1 (1978), wherein the Court noted
the potential for abuse through additional enhancement under
Chapter 218A and the PFO statutes, but failed to find any error
on that ground given the defendant's numerous prior drug
convictions.
In Eary v. Commonwealth, Ky., 659 S.W.2d 198
(1983), involving a prosecution for possession of a handgun by a
convicted felon and PFO I, the Court limited the application of
Heady, supra, and Boulder, supra, and held that where a defendant
has several existing felony convictions, different individual
prior felonies could be used as the basis for creating an offense
such as possession of a handgun by a convicted felon and as the
predicate offenses for a PFO charge.
"Where a defendant is
convicted at his trial for possession of a handgun by a convicted
felon and has been previously convicted of more than one prior
felony, those convictions in excess of that for a single felony
may be utilized for the purpose of persistent felony offender
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sentencing pursuant to KRS 532.080." Id. at 200 (emphasis added).
See also Jackson v. Commonwealth, Ky., 650 S.W.2d 250 (1983).
Finally, in Commonwealth v. Grimes, Ky., 698 S.W.2d 836
(1985), the Court attempted to clarify the issue of double
enhancement with respect to subsequent offender drug offenses and
PFO offenses.
In Grimes, the defendant was convicted of
trafficking in a controlled substance, second offense, and of
being a PFO II, based on a prior conviction on three counts of
uttering a forged instrument1.
The Court held that the
conviction for trafficking in a controlled substance could be
enhanced by the PFO conviction pursuant to KRS 532.080(2).
However, the Court also stated the underlying predicate felony
offenses for the drug offense and the PFO conviction must be
different.
As succinctly stated in Eary, supra, this
is the type of case spawned by the previous
holdings of this Court in Boulder and Heady,
supra. It is yet another problem arising
from the unfortunate use of the word
"status." This Court has clearly stated its
position in Eary as to the holding of Boulder
in Jackson v. Commonwealth, supra. When a
single prior felony is used to create an
offense or enhance a punishment of the second
crime so created or enhanced, it may not be
used again at that trial to prosecute the
defendant under the PFO statute . . . .
It is the holding of this Court that a
conviction of a second offense of trafficking
in a Schedule III controlled substance under
1
For purposes of determining the number of prior felony
convictions under the persistant felony offender statute, two or
more felony convictions for which a defendant serves concurrent
or uninterrupted consecutive terms of imprisonment are deemed to
be only one conviction. KRS 532.080(4).
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KRS 218A.990(2), may be further enhanced by a
persistent felony offender second degree
charge pursuant to the general PFO statute,
KRS 532.080, where the PFO charge is grounded
on a prior, unrelated conviction.
698 S.W.2d at 837 (emphasis added); Cf. Peyton v. Commonwealth,
Ky., 931 S.W.2d 451, 455 (1996)(court noted that defendant had
several prior felony convictions that could serve as basis for
subsequent offense trafficking charge and PFO charge).
As the
court stated in Corman v. Commonwealth, Ky. App., 908 S.W.2d 122,
123 (1995):
The rule is now established that when a single prior felony is
utilized to create an offense or enhance a punishment at the
trial of the second crime, that same prior felony cannot be used
at that trial to prosecute the defendant as a persistent felony
offender. Eary, supra; Jackson, supra; Boulder, supra. If
however, the prior felony used to underlie PFO conviction is a
separate prior felony from the one used to create the offense or
enhance its punishment, the offense can be further enhanced under
the PFO statute.
In the case at bar, Farrow was convicted of trafficking
in a controlled substance (cocaine) on September 26, 1988.
The
June 1996 indictment cited the previous convictions for firstdegree trafficking in a controlled substance on September 26,
1988, as the underlying prior offense in charging Farrow with
both four counts of first-degree trafficking in a controlled
substance, second offense, and with being a PFO II.
The
Commonwealth utilized the same prior convictions to create the
second offense trafficking offenses and as an element of the PFO
II charge.
Under KRS 218A.1412, first-degree trafficking in a
controlled substance, second offense, is a Class B felony with a
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potential sentence of ten to twenty years in prison; whereas,
first-degree trafficking in a controlled substance, first
offense, is a Class C felony subject to punishment of five to ten
years in prison.
In addition, under the PFO statute, the
potential penalty for a person found to be a PFO II and convicted
of a Class C felony is ten to twenty years, while the penalty for
a PFO II convicted of a Class B felony is twenty years to life in
prison.
Farrow's conviction for first-degree trafficking in a
controlled substance, second offense, and being a PFO II based on
the same underlying predicate felony conviction in the same
prosecution subjected him to additional penalties in
contravention of the double enhancement principle established in
Heady, supra, Eary, supra, and Grimes, supra.
Consequently,
Farrow could not have been convicted as both a subsequent offense
drug trafficker under KRS 218A.1412 and as a persistent felony
offender under KRS 532.080 under the facts stated in the
indictment.
The Commonwealth contends that Farrow is not entitled
to relief because he waived any double enhancement violation by
entering a guilty plea.
In general, a knowing and voluntary
guilty plea waives all defenses to the original charges other
than the defense that the indictment failed to charge an offense.
Corbett v. Commonwealth, Ky., 717 S.W.2d 831, 832 (1986); Quarles
v. Commonwealth, Ky., 456 S.W.2d 693 (1970).
some exceptions to this general rule.
However, there are
For instance, in Hughes v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 875 S.W.2d 99 (1994), the Supreme Court held
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that a defendant who has unconditionally pled guilty may still
raise a challenge to his sentence because sentencing is
considered a "jurisdictional" issue.
Id. at 100 (citing Wellman
v. Commonwealth, 694 S.W.2d 696 (1985)).
Similarly, in Sanders
v. Commonwealth, Ky. App., 663 S.W.2d 216 (1983), the defendants
appealed the validity of their sentences for drug possession
convictions under KRS Chapter 218A following guilty pleas.
The
Court noted that challenges to the sentence or punishment
represent an exception to the general waiver rule for guilty
pleas.
Id. at 218.
The Commonwealth argues that because Hughes, supra,
involved a direct appeal, the guilty plea waiver principle should
still apply to prevent review of Farrow's complaint.
Both Hughes
and Sanders appear to allow a direct appeal of a sentencing issue
following entry of an unconditional guilty plea despite the fact
that there typically is no direct appeal from a guilty plea.
Nevertheless, neither case suggests that a direct appeal is the
exclusive method for raising the jurisdictional issue of
sentencing.
As the Court stated in Gaither v. Commonwealth, Ky.,
___ S.W.2d ___, 1997 WL 677850 (Oct. 30, 1997):
Initially we note that this appeal is proper,
even though Appellant voluntarily assented to
the terms of the plea agreement and
unconditionally pled guilty to the offenses
charged. See Hughes v. Commonwealth, Ky.,
875 S.W.2d 99, 100 (1994). The basis of
Appellant's argument is that the trial court
did not have the authority to impose the
sentence it did. Sentencing is
jurisdictional. Wellman v. Commonwealth,
Ky., 694 S.W.2d 696, 698 (1985). Subject
matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time
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and cannot be consented to, agreed to or
waived by the parties. See Commonwealth
Health Corporation v. Croslin, Ky., 920
S.W.2d 46, 47 (1996); Thompson v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 99 S.W.2d 705, 706 (1936).
In Commonwealth v. Durham, Ky., 908 S.W.2d 119 (1995), the Court
addressed the issue of maximum sentencing under KRS 532.110(1)(c)
and KRS 532.080 raised initially by the defendant in a motion to
modify the sentence nearly ten years after he had been sentenced
pursuant to a guilty plea.
In McIntosh v. Commonwealth, Ky., 368
S.W.2d 331 (1963), the Court indicated that CR 60.02 could be
used where a defendant is prejudiced by the manner in which a
sentence is adjudged or pronounced.
Cf. Duncan v. Commonwealth,
Ky. App., 614 S.W.2d 701 (1981)(holding CR 60.02 was proper
procedure for challenge to jail credit amount).
We believe that
Farrow can proceed by way of a collateral appeal and that his
appeal should not be dismissed on procedural grounds based on
waiver.
Having decided that the trial court could not sentence
Farrow under the enhancement provisions of both KRS Chapter 218A
and KRS 532.080, the remaining issue is the appropriate relief.
Farrow argues that his sentence should be modified to a term of
ten years.
He asserts that in accepting the plea agreement, he
believed that he was receiving the minimum sentence.
Therefore,
he requests that the sentence be amended to reflect a corrected
minimum sentence of ten years for either first-degree
trafficking, second offense, a Class B felony, or PFO II
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enhancement based on an underlying offense of first-degree
trafficking, first offense, a Class C felony.
Where the prosecution has not breached the agreement
but the defendant has been misled as to a significant aspect of
the plea, the defendant may seek to have the guilty plea
withdrawn and the conviction vacated.
See Haight v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 760 S.W.2d 84 (1988); Commonwealth v. Martin,
Ky. App., 777 S.W.2d 236 (1989).
A guilty plea must be entered
knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily, which includes the
defendant's having an adequate understanding of the consequences
of the plea.
See McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 766, 90 S.
Ct. 1441, 1446, 25 L. Ed. 2d 763 (1970); Centers v. Commonwealth,
Ky. App., 799 S.W.2d 51, 54 (1990).
A guilty plea is valid only
if it represents a voluntary and intelligent choice among the
alternative courses of action open to the defendant.
Kiser v.
Commonwealth, Ky. App., 829 S.W.2d 432, 434 (1992).
While the
trial court need not necessarily inform a defendant as to the
range of possible sentences, Jewell v. Commonwealth, Ky., 725
S.W.2d 593 (1987), where the defendant is given erroneous
information on the maximum possible penalty, the guilty plea may
be rendered invalid because it was not made intelligently with an
accurate appreciation for the available options.
See United
States v. Guerra, 94 F.3d 989, 995 (5th Cir. 1996); United States
v. Colunga, 786 F.2d 655, 658 (5th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484
U.S. 857, 108 S. Ct. 165, 98 L. Ed. 2d 120 (1987).
"A guilty
plea that was not knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily
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entered is invalid and may be withdrawn by the defendant; a
conviction resting upon such a plea must be vacated."
Guerra, 94
F.3d at 995.
Farrow in effect asks that one aspect of the plea
bargain -- a minimum sentence -- be imposed upon a new set of
offenses.
While a defendant has an absolute right to
unconditionally plead guilty to the crime charged in an
indictment, if the guilty plea includes conditions such as the
limit on the sentence, the prosecution typically must be a party
to the agreement.
319, 321 (1992).
See Commonwealth v. Corey, Ky., 826 S.W.2d
We note that this is not a situation where the
plea agreement involved the maximum sentence, or where one or
more offenses may be easily severed from the remaining offenses.
Under those scenarios, a remand for resentencing on a revised
maximum sentence that results in a lesser final sentence or
merely vacating the convictions and sentences on the illegal
charges may be appropriate.
However, the effect of prohibiting
double enhancement in the current situation would not necessarily
preclude prosecution of Farrow for either first-degree
trafficking in cocaine, second offense, alone, or first-degree
trafficking in cocaine, first offense, and PFO II.
We note that
on the four counts of first-degree trafficking, second offense,
the penalty range is ten to twenty years and the potential
maximum sentence is eighty years, if they are run consecutively.
See Commonwealth v. Durham, Ky., 908 S.W.2d 119 (1995); KRS
218A.1412, KRS 532.080(6)(b).
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The Commonwealth would be prejudiced by imposing a
minimum ten-year sentence despite the fact that the initial
bargained for twenty-year sentence is still available on the
remaining offenses without an improper double enhancement.
Generally, a plea agreement stands or falls as a unit, and a
defendant may not be relieved of his part of the plea bargain
without giving up the benefits he received in the bargain.
See
State v. Gibson, 96 N.M. 742, 743, 634 P.2d 1294, 1295 (Ct. App.
1981).
bargain.
A defendant does not have a constitutional right to plea
Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 97 S. Ct. 837, 51
L. Ed. 2d 30 (1977); Commonwealth v. Corey, 826 S.W.2d at 321.
A
plea agreement has many characteristics of a contract.
Commonwealth v. Reyes, Ky., 764 S.W.2d 64 (1989); United States
v. Yemitan, 70 F.3d 746, 747 (2nd Cir. 1995).
In the instant case, Farrow felt he was bargaining for
the minimum sentence, while the prosecution could argue it was
bargaining for a twenty-year sentence.
Taking into consideration
the interests of both parties, we believe the parties should be
returned to their pre-plea agreement positions.
The Commonwealth
should be allowed the option of prosecuting Farrow on an amended
indictment for either first-degree trafficking in a controlled
substance, second offense, or first-degree trafficking in a
controlled substance, first offense, and PFO II, without the
double enhancement involving the same underlying felony.
The
parties may renegotiate a plea bargain, and if they cannot reach
agreement, the Commonwealth may proceed to trial.
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See, e.g.,
United States v. Maybeck, 23 F.3d 888 (4th Cir. 1994), aff'd
after remand 76 F.3d 376 (4th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, ___ U.S.
___, 116 S. Ct. 1555, 134 L. Ed. 2d 657 (1996).
We note that
this procedure raises no double jeopardy violation upon
conviction based on either a new guilty plea or a jury trial.
See Haight v. Commonwealth, Ky., 938 S.W.2d 243, 250-53 (1996);
Hawk v. Berkemer, 610 F.2d 445 (6th Cir. 1979); United States v.
Podde, 105 F.3d 813 (2nd Cir. 1997).
For the above-stated reasons, we vacate the judgment of
the Boyd Circuit Court and remand for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
ALL CONCUR.
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BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Kathleen Kallaher Schmidt
Shepherdsville, Kentucky
A. B. Chandler III
Attorney General
Vickie L. Wise
Asst. Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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