ANGELA COMBS v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: December 4, 1998; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
1997-CA-001143-MR
ANGELA COMBS
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE REBECCA OVERSTREET, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 97-CR-000235
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
ABRAMSON, GARDNER, and KNOX, Judges.
ABRAMSON, JUDGE1: Angela Combs appeals from her conviction for
two counts of trafficking in a controlled substance in the first
degree and the resulting consecutive five-year sentences on each
count.
Combs claims on appeal that the trial court erred when it
refused to allow an alibi witness to testify in her defense.
Having reviewed the record at the trial and the applicable law,
we affirm the trial court's judgment.
On October 31, 1996 (at about 12:30 p.m.) and again on
November 5, 1996 (at 4:25 p.m.), Detective Pete Ford of the
1
This opinion was prepared and concurred in prior to the
departure of Judge Abramson from the Court on November 22, 1998.
Lexington-Fayette Urban County Police Department “wired” a paid
informant with an audio monitoring device.
Each time Ford
supplied the informant with money to purchase illegal drugs at
Combs’s residence on Shropshire Avenue.
On each occasion, the
informant entered Combs’s residence and returned to Ford with a
substance which a state forensic laboratory employee later
determined was crack cocaine.
Ford testified that on each
occasion he saw Combs as she walked the informant to the door of
her Shropshire Avenue residence.
The defense presented testimony from a K-Mart Loss
Control Manager who testified about a form which had been
prepared by a trainee about two African-American women who had
been detained for suspected shoplifting on October 31, 1996 at
the K-Mart on New Circle Road in Lexington.
One of the detainees
had signed the form “Teresa Lewis” after first starting to sign
her name with the initial letter “A.”
Combs offered evidence of
the October 31, 1996, shoplifting incident to establish that she
was not even at home when the first alleged drug buy occurred.
As for the November 5, 1996 drug buy, Yvette Leigh testified that
she had “done” Combs’s hair for years and had been doing her hair
at the time of the second cocaine purchase.
Leigh specifically
remembered the day because it was Election Day, 1996.
Other
testimony, not relevant to the issue before us, was also offered
in Combs’s defense.
Combs’s counsel began his defense by announcing his
intent to call Tracy Williams, an alibi witness who would testify
that she and Combs were shoplifting at K-Mart at the time of the
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informant’s October 31, 1996 drug purchase.
Out of the presence
of the jury, the trial court placed Williams under oath and
advised her about her constitutional rights.
Although she
initially stated that she had no need for an attorney, Williams
then asked for an attorney and a Department of Public Advocacy
lawyer was summoned to advise her.
Again, out of the hearing of
the jury, Williams stated that she and Combs had been shopping
together at the K-Mart, but this time she invoked her Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination when
asked if she
had been an accomplice to Combs in any shoplifting.
Williams
remained willing to testify, however, that she saw Combs being
detained by K-Mart security personnel on October 31, 1996. The
trial court granted the Commonwealth’s motion to strike Williams
as a witness because the prosecution could not effectively crossexamine her.
Combs contends that the trial court committed
reversible error when it refused to allow Williams to testify in
her defense after Williams invoked her privilege against selfincrimination.
Combs maintains that Commonwealth v. Gettys, Ky.
App., 610 S.W.2d 899 (1980) governs her appeal.
In Gettys, the
defendant was charged with accepting a bribe from a person who
was a Commonwealth’s witness and who had already pled guilty to a
related offense.
The witness asserted his privilege against
self-incrimination because other parts of the grand jury
testimony he had given could be the basis for additional charges
against him.
This Court held that a trial court first should
“endeavor to make thorough examination of the questions to be
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asked to determine whether or not responsive answers would be
incriminating.”
610 S.W.2d at 901.
The trial court must also
determine “what crimes might reasonably be anticipated to be
elicited by responsive answers on the part of the witness
claiming the privilege.”
Id.
In Gettys, the Commonwealth, which called the witness
to testify, stated that it would ask only about Gettys’s case and
not about other matters during its direct examination.
For the
prosecution, then, it was “remote” and speculative that the
witness would be asked incriminating questions.
Defense
counsel’s cross-examination strategy, however, was quite
different.
The defense approach was to attempt impeachment of
the witness with evidence of collateral criminal activity.
Because the trial court condoned that tactic, it approved of the
Fifth Amendment claim and the witness did not testify, resulting
in an acquittal and then a certification of the question of law
to the Court of Appeals.
This Court stated that if the questions
for the witness were collateral to Gettys’s case, they could not
be the subject of impeachment and the witness’s claim of
privilege therefore would be forbidden.
The Gettys decision is
significant because it emphasizes the need for judicial
assessment of the validity of the assertion by a witness of a
testimonial privilege.
The Commonwealth counters that Combs’s appeal is
governed by the more recent case of Clayton v. Commonwealth, Ky.,
786 S.W.2d 866 (1990).
In Clayton, the defense tried to call a
witness whom the defendant, Clayton, claimed was the actual drug
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dealer.
Clayton insisted that he had been merely acting as an
intermediary.
When the witness invoked the Fifth Amendment
privilege, the trial court inquired about the validity of that
claim.
The trial court determined that the witness had a pending
indictment, that a videotape existed which showed the witness’s
involvement, that the witness had been advised by an attorney,
and that the defendant would attempt to shift the blame for the
crime to the witness.
The trial court used its discretion to
exclude the defense witness’s testimony.
Our Supreme Court held
that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it
excluded the witness.
Equally important, the Court stated that
[i]n Kentucky, the prosecution may not call a
witness knowing that the witness will invoke
the Fifth Amendment immunity. There is no
Kentucky case which applies the same
standards to a defendant. Clayton has failed
to demonstrate why a different standard
should be applied to the defendant.
786 S.W.2d at 867.
In this case, defense counsel announced the intent to
call Williams as a witness who would corroborate Combs’s alibi.
Indeed, defense counsel stated that Williams would say more than
that Combs was not at her residence at the time of the cocaine
purchase by the informant, i.e., Williams would testify that she
and Combs were merely shoplifting at K-Mart instead of selling
crack cocaine.
Out of the hearing of the jury, Williams refused
to confirm defense counsel’s claim about what they were doing at
the K-Mart.
She was willing to confirm only that they were at
the K-Mart, claiming the Fifth Amendment privilege and refusing
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to testify about whether she was an accomplice to Combs’s
shoplifting.
The trial court followed Gettys, implicitly finding
that Williams’s claim of privilege was valid.
Based upon defense
counsel’s initial claim about what Williams and Combs were doing
at the time of the cocaine purchase, the trial court advised
Williams of her constitutional rights.
requested to consult counsel.
Thereafter, Williams
Finally, the close connection
between what Williams was willing to admit she and Combs were
doing and the nature of the shoplifting crime she refused to
discuss convinced the trial court that Williams’s answers to the
Commonwealth’s questions would be incriminating.
Having
confirmed the incriminating nature of Williams’s complete
answers, the nature of the crime to be elicited by responsive
answers was obvious.
The trial court’s treatment of the validity
of Williams’s assertion of the privilege against selfincrimination was correct.
Having validated Williams’s claim of testimonial
privilege, the lesson of Clayton was clear: neither the
Commonwealth nor the defense has the right to call a witness
knowing that the witness intends to answer some questions and not
answer others.
Here, as a result of defense counsel’s bold claim
at the beginning of the defendant’s case-in-chief, the trial
court was wary about allowing Williams to testify before the jury
until the court was persuaded that she indeed was willing to
admit commission of a crime.
Williams’s Fifth Amendment claim
confirmed the trial court’s initial reluctance.
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The trial court
thereafter followed Clayton and refused to allow the witness to
testify when it was known that she would claim a testimonial
privilege.
For the reasons stated, we affirm the May 6, 1997
Judgment of Fayette Circuit Court.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
John Kevin West
Charles E. Beal, II
Lexington, KY
A.B. Chandler III
Attorney General
Perry T. Ryan
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, KY
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