BUDDY WADE FARMER v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: October 16, 1998; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
1997-CA-001122-MR
BUDDY WADE FARMER
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE THOMAS J. KNOPF, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 92-CR-2698
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
HUDDLESTON, JOHNSON AND MILLER, JUDGES.
JOHNSON, JUDGE:
Buddy Wade Farmer (Farmer), currently an inmate
at Luther Luckett Correctional Complex, brings this pro se appeal
from an order of the Jefferson Circuit Court entered on April 21,
1997, denying his motion to vacate, set aside or correct judgment
brought pursuant to Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure (RCr)
11.42.
After reviewing the record, the arguments of the parties,
and the applicable law, we affirm.
In March 1992, Ruby Farmer (Ruby) discovered Farmer,
who was her husband, performing oral sex on her ten-year old
daughter, who was the appellant's step-daughter.
After Ruby
began yelling at Farmer, he ran out of the house and went to a
police station.
At the police station, Farmer told the police
that he had done something wrong, and approximately 1 ½ hours
later he gave a tape-recorded statement confessing to having had
oral sex with his step-daughter on two occasions.
During the
statement, Farmer expressed remorse for his conduct.
Based on
this information, the police arrested Farmer on two charges of
sodomy in the first degree.
Meanwhile, Ruby had called the police and the victim
was taken to the hospital.
The victim told the police and
hospital personnel that Farmer had performed various sexual acts
with and on her for several years.
She told police that Farmer
made her watch pornographic movies and dress in her mother's
lingerie.
She also stated to police that Farmer told her not to
tell her mother about these activities because he would have to
go to prison and that he would kill himself there.
In March 1992, the Jefferson County Grand Jury first
indicted Farmer on three counts of sodomy in the first degree
(Sodomy I) (Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 510.070) and one
count of sexual abuse in the first degree (Sexual Abuse I) (KRS
510.110), involving conduct with his step-daughter between
October 1988 and March 1992.
Due to a procedural irregularity
associated with grand jury selection in Jefferson County, Farmer
was re-indicted by a new grand jury in October 1992 on the same
four offenses.
After a two-day trial in May 1993, a jury
convicted Farmer on all four counts.
The jury recommended
sentences of thirty-five years on each of the three convictions
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of Sodomy I and five years on the one conviction of Sexual Abuse
I, with all the sentences running concurrently.
In July 1993,
the trial court sentenced Farmer consistently with the jury's
recommendation and ordered him to serve a total of thirty-five
years in prison.
Farmer appealed directly to the Kentucky
Supreme Court, which affirmed the convictions in an unpublished
opinion.
Farmer v. Commonwealth, 93-SC-548-MR (rendered Dec. 22,
1994).
In January 1997, Farmer filed an extensive pro se RCr
11.42 motion raising nine issues with various sub-issues and
requesting a hearing.
The Commonwealth filed a response to the
motion, and Farmer filed a reply to the response.
In April 1997,
the trial court entered a twelve-page opinion and order
comprehensively addressing the major issues raised in the motion,
and denying it without a hearing.
This appeal followed.
RCr 11.42 allows persons in custody under sentence to
raise a collateral attack on the judgment entered against them.
RCr 11.42(5) authorizes the trial judge to dismiss the motion
without a hearing if there is no material issue of fact that can
be determined on the face of the record.
See also Trice v.
Commonwealth, Ky. App., 632 S.W.2d 458 (1982).
Our review is
limited to a determination of “whether the motion on its face
states grounds that are not conclusively refuted by the record
and which, if true, would invalidate the conviction.”
Lewis v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 411 S.W.2d 321, 322 (1967); Skaggs v.
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Commonwealth, Ky., 803 S.W.2d 573, 576 (1990), cert. denied, 502
U.S. 844, 112 S.Ct. 140, 116 L.Ed.2d 106 (1991).
Farmer raises four issues on appeal:
(1) whether there
was sufficient evidence to support the conviction; (2) whether
the trial court allowed a "constructive" amendment of the
indictment; (3) whether defense counsel was constitutionally
ineffective for failing to object to the amended indictment; and
(4) whether the convictions for multiple offenses were improper
because his actions constituted a continuous course of conduct.
In the original RCr 11.42 motion before the circuit court, Farmer
raised several additional complaints that he appears to have
abandoned on appeal.
A reviewing court generally will confine
itself to errors pointed out in the briefs and will not search
the record for errors.
Ballard v. King, Ky., 373 S.W.2d 591, 593
(1964); Milby v. Mears, Ky. App., 580 S.W.2d 724, 727 (1979).
An
appellant's failure to discuss particular errors in his brief is
the same as if no brief at all had been filed on those issues.
R. E. Gaddie, Inc. v. Price, Ky., 528 S.W.2d 708, 710 (1975).
The trial court's determination on those issues not briefed on
appeal ordinarily is affirmed.
Stansbury v. Smith, Ky., 424
S.W.2d 571, 572 (1968); Hall v. Kolb, Ky., 374 S.W.2d 854, 856
(1964).
Thus, we will address only those issues presented in
Farmer’s appellate briefs.
Farmer's first argument involves the sufficiency of the
evidence.
He contends there was no evidence that he committed
multiple acts of sodomy and that the prosecution failed to carry
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its burden of proving every element of the crimes beyond a
reasonable doubt.
Farmer states that Dr. Carol Greece, an
examining physician called by the Commonwealth, indicated there
was no physical evidence proving that the victim had been
sexually molested.
While Dr. Greece did tesify that there was no
evidence of vaginal penetration or scaring, Farmer contends that
this case is an example of an overzealous prosecutor relying on
nothing but gossip and hearsay.
First, a claim of sufficiency of the evidence is not
cognizable by collateral attack in an RCr 11.42 motion.
RCr
11.42 provides an avenue of relief conferring post-judgment
jurisdiction for constitutional errors not otherwise subject to
review on direct appeal.
S.W.2d 853, 857 (1983).
See Gross v. Commonwealth, Ky., 648
RCr 11.42 was not intended to provide an
appellant an opportunity to raise issues that could or should
have been raised upon direct appeal.
Ky. App., 770 S.W.2d 231, 237 (1989).
Commonwealth v. Basnight,
RCr 11.42 is not a
substitute for a frustrated direct appeal.
Commonwealth v. Wine,
Ky., 694 S.W.2d 689, 695 (1985); Cinnamon v. Commonwealth, Ky.,
455 S.W.2d 583 (1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 941, 91 S.Ct. 942,
28 L.Ed.2d 221 (1971).
See also Cleaver v. Commonwealth, Ky.,
569 S.W.2d 166 (1978) (RCr 11.42 does not confer jurisdiction to
reinstate a right of appeal).
Sufficiency of the evidence is not
an issue that can be properly raised in a post-conviction
proceeding under RCr 11.42.
Nickell v. Commonwealth, Ky., 451
S.W.2d 651, 652 (1970); Henry v. Commonwealth, Ky., 391 S.W.2d
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355 (1965).
Therefore, Farmer's claim of insufficient evidence
at the trial was cognizable only on direct appeal and not in this
post-judgment motion.
In any event, there was enough evidence to support the
convictions on each offense.
The victim testified that on
several occasions, Farmer licked her vagina, tried to insert his
penis into her anus, placed his penis into her mouth, placed his
finger into her vagina, fondled her vagina, and had her rub his
penis with her hands.
Although there was a lack of direct
physical evidence, her testimony was consistent and included
details that supported her credibility.
Moreover, Farmer
admitted to having molested the victim on two occasions, and his
wife witnessed one of the incidents.
Contrary to Farmer's
assertion, the Commonwealth was not required to present direct
physical evidence of the offenses.
Indeed, direct physical
evidence is often unavailable in these type of cases.
The
testimony of the victim was sufficient to establish the offenses
in this type of case.
See Stoker v. Commonwealth, Ky., 828
S.W.2d 619, 624 (1992); Robinson v. Commonwealth, Ky., 459 S.W.2d
147, 150 (1970).
Accordingly, Farmer is not entitled to relief
under RCr 11.42 based on insufficient evidence on both procedural
and substantive grounds.
Farmer's second argument involves an alleged amendment
of the indictment.
In fact, the indictment was not amended and
he was convicted only of the offenses listed in the indictment.
Farmer refers to the time period when he was arrested and
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compares the difference between the number of offenses appearing
in the indictment and the number of offenses on which his arrest
was based.
He erroneously asserts that the Fifth Amendment
protects a person from being indicted and tried on offenses that
are different from those used to establish probable cause for an
arrest.
Farmer correctly states that his arrest was predicated
primarily on the two incidents he confessed to in the police
interview.
However, by the time the case was heard by the grand
jury, the police had additional information, especially from the
victim, of other incidents which were presented to the grand
jury.
Farmer claims that the indictment was "constructively
amended" by adding offenses that occurred prior to March 10,
1992, when he was arrested, but he misperceives the legal
principle of constructive amendment.
The Fifth Amendment
guarantees that an accused be tried only on those offenses
presented in an indictment and returned by a grand jury.
Stirone
v. United States, 361 U.S. 212, 217-219, 80 S.Ct. 270, 273, 4
L.Ed.2d 252, 256-258 (1960).
Constructive amendment of an
indictment involves alteration of the indictment by the
presentation of evidence at trial or the giving of jury
instructions that modify the essential terms of the indictment.
See United States v. Hathaway, 798 F.2d 902, 910 (6th Cir. 1986);
United States v. Ford, 872 F.2d 1231 (6th Cir. 1989), cert.
denied, 498 U.S. 843, 111 S.Ct. 124, 112 L.Ed.2d 93 (1990).
A
variance with the indictment occurs when the charging terms are
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unchanged, but the evidence at trial proves facts materially
different from those alleged in the indictment.
F.2d at 910.
Hathaway, 798
A construtive amendment is considered prejudicial
per se, while a variance is prejudicial only if the defendant's
substantial rights are affected.
See United States v. Kelley,
849 F.2d 999, 1002 (6th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 982,
109 S.Ct. 532, 102 L.Ed.2d 564 (1988).
A variance crosses the
construtive amendment line only when the variance creates
a
"substantial likelihood" that a defendant may have been convicted
of an offense other than that charged by the grand jury.
Id.
"Thus, to rise to the level of a constructive amendment [as
opposed to a variance], the change must effectively alter the
substance of the indictment."
Martin v. Kassulke, 970 F.2d 1539,
1543 (6th Cir. 1992), citing Hunter v. New Mexico, 916 F.2d 595,
599 (10th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 500 U.S. 909, 111 S.Ct. 1693,
114 L.Ed.2d 87 (1991).
See also United States v. Auerbach, 913
F.2d 407 (7th Cir. 1990).
The evidence presented by the
Commonwealth in the case at bar did not alter the substantive
terms of the indictment and did not involve facts materially
different from those in the indictment.
Therefore, Farmer has
not established either a constructive amendment or an improper
variance.
The charges related to Farmer's arrest are irrelevant
to determining whether there was a constructive amendment of or
variance with the indictment.
In addition, Farmer's allegation that the indictment
did not present fair notice of the charges is without merit.
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The
Commonwealth provided a bill of particulars describing the
offenses and the indictment was sufficiently specific for this
type of case.
See e.g., Violett v. Commonwealth, Ky., 907 S.W.2d
773, 776 (1995), cert. denied, ____ U.S. ____, 118 S.Ct. 1172,
140 L.Ed.2d 181 (1998); and Hampton v. Commonwealth, Ky., 666
S.W.2d 737, 740 (1984).
Finally, to the extent Farmer's
complaint is construed as a challenge based on a defect in the
indictment, this issue also is not cognizable in a postconviction motion.
See Thomas v. Commonwealth, Ky., 931 S.W.2d
446, 450 (1996).
Farmer's third argument is a variant of his second
argument in that he alleges ineffective assistance because of
counsel's failure to discover the constructive amendment of the
indictment.
He contends that had defense counsel adequately
investigated the case, he would have found that the indictment
had been constructively amended after his initial arrest.
The Sixth Amendment right to counsel exists in order to
protect the fundamental right to a fair trial, so this right
focuses on whether the proceeding at issue was fundamentally
unfair or unreliable.
Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 372,
113 S.Ct. 838, 842, 122 L.Ed.2d 180, 190-191 (1993).
In order to
establish ineffective assistance of counsel, a person must
satisfy a two-part test showing both that counsel's performance
was deficient and that the deficiency resulted in actual
prejudice affecting the outcome.
Strickland v. Washington, 466
U.S. 688, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984); accord Gall v.
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Commonwealth, Ky., 702 S.W.2d 37 (1985), cert. denied, 478 U.S.
1010, 106 S.Ct. 3311, 92 L.Ed.2d 724 (1986).
In evaluating
counsel's performance, the standard is whether the alleged acts
or omissions were outside the wide range of prevailing
professional norms based on an objective standard of
reasonableness.
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688-689, 104 S.Ct. at
2064-2065, 80 L.Ed.2d at 693-694; Wilson v. Commonwealth, Ky.,
836 S.W.2d 872, 878 (1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1034, 113
S.Ct. 1857, 123 L.Ed.2d 479 (1993).
Judicial scrutiny of
counsel's performance must be highly deferential; therefore, a
court must indulge in a strong presumption that counsel's conduct
falls within the wide range of reasonable professional
assistance.
Id.; Wilson, supra.
The defendant bears the burden
of identifying specific acts or omissions alleged to constitute
deficient performance.
2066, 80 L.Ed.2d at 695.
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690, 104 S.Ct. at
See also Dever v. Kansas State
Penitentiary, 36 F.3d 1531, 1537 (10th Cir. 1994).
In measuring
prejudice, the relevant inquiry is whether "there is a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the
result of the proceeding would have been different.
A reasonable
probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence
in the outcome."
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. at 2068,
80 L.Ed.2d at 698.
See also Miles v. Dorsey, 61 F.3d 1459, 1475
(10th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1062, 116 S.Ct. 743, 133
L.Ed.2d 692 (1996).
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As explained above, there was no constructive amendment
of the indictment.
Farmer erroneously asserts the variance
between the two charges for which he was initially arrested and
the four charges of the indictment constituted an amendment of
the indictment.
Thus, Farmer has not demonstrated deficient
performance by his attorney for failing to challenge the
nonexistent amendment.
Similarly, because there was no
constructive amendment of the indictment, there was no actual
prejudice related to an error by defense counsel.
Farmer was
convicted of the four offenses for which he was indicted.
Farmer
has failed to establish that the outcome of the trial would have
been different because of counsel's deficient performance.
conclusion, Farmer has not demonstrated either prong of the
Strickland test, deficient performance or actual prejudice.
Farmer's fourth argument involves whether his
conviction for multiple sexual offenses constituted double
jeopardy.
Farmer refers to KRS 505.020(1), which provides:
When a single course of conduct of a
defendant may establish the commission of
more than one (1) offense, he may be
prosecuted for each such offense. He may
not, however, be convicted of more than one
(1) offense when:
(a) One offense is included in the
other, as defined in subsection
(2); or
(b) Inconsistent findings of fact
are required to establish the
commission of the offenses; or
(c) The offense is designed to
prohibit a continuing course of
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In
conduct and the defendant's course
of conduct was uninterrupted by
legal process, unless the law
expressly provides that specific
periods of such conduct constitute
separate offenses.
Farmer also asserts in support of his position that in each of
the four counts of the indictment, it states that Farmer
committed each offense between 1988 and 1992, "in a continuous
course of conduct."
In Commonwealth v. Burge, Ky., 947 S.W.2d 805 (1997),
cert. denied sub nom Effinger v. Kentucky, ___ U.S. ___, 118
S.Ct. 422, 139 L.Ed.2d 323 (1997), the Supreme Court abandoned
the "single act or impulse" test for double jeopardy adopted in
Ingram v. Commonwealth, Ky., 801 S.W.2d 321 (1990), in favor of
the "same elements" test established in Blockburger v. United
States, 284 U.S. 299, 52 S.Ct. 180, 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932).
The
Blockburger test applies to prosecutions involving separate
statutes or separate parts of a statute.
See e.g., United States
v. Bendis, 681 F.2d 561, 564-565 (9th Cir. 1981) cert. denied 459
U.S. 973, 103 S.Ct. 306, 74 L.Ed.2d 286 (1982).
Another passage
in Blockburger relevant to situations involving a continuing
course of conduct prosecuted under the same statute states as
follows:
"The test is whether the individual acts are
prohibited, or the course of action which they constitute.
the former, then each act is punishable separately. . . .
latter, there can be but one penalty."
If
If the
284 U.S. at 302, 52 S.Ct.
at 181 (quoting Wharton's Criminal Law, § 34 (11th Ed. 1912).
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This is the "second and less used prong of the Blockburger test
and the source for KRS 505.020(1)(c), which defines when a course
of conduct constitutes but one offense."
810.
Burge, 947 S.W.2d at
Consequently, the course of conduct analysis is relevant in
determining whether certain acts can be prosecuted as multiple
offenses of the same statute or as a single offense.
As the
Court stated in Stark v. Commonwealth, Ky., 828 S.W.2d 603, 607
(1991), overruled on other grounds by Thomas v. Commonwealth,
Ky., 931 S.W.2d 446 (1997), the Commonwealth is prohibited "from
carving out of one act or transaction two or more offenses."
In Commonwealth v. Bass, Ky., 777 S.W.2d 916 (1989),
which involved a prosecution on sixteen counts of the same
medicare fraud statute, the Court adopted the Blockburger
analysis for determining whether a statute allows separate
prosecutions for similar acts over a period of time.
The Court
indicated that KRS 505.020 was a codification of Blockburger, and
"[t]hat case sets out that the test is whether individual acts
are prohibited or the course of action and conduct which they
constitute."
Id. at 918.
Similarly, the Court stated in Jordan
v. Commonwealth, Ky., 703 S.W.2d 870, 873 (1986), "Blockburger
clearly contemplates that a continuing course of conduct may
constitute separate statutory offenses, and does not impose
restriction on the legislature to authorize cumulative punishment
for such offenses."
See also KRS 505.020(1)(c).
In the case of
a conviction for multiple counts involving the violation of the
same statute, where separate and distinct instances of criminal
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conduct prohibited by the statute are proved, the imposition of
separate sentences for each instance of criminal conduct does not
violate the double jeopardy clause's prohibition on multiple
punishments for the same offense.
See e.g., United States v.
Gonzalez, 933 F.2d 417, 423-424 (7th Cir. 1991) (involving two
counts of possession of drugs); United States v. Gallardo, 915
F.2d 149, 150-151 (5th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1038,
111 S.Ct. 707, 112 L.Ed.2d 696 (1991) (involving three counts of
mailing photographs of minors engaged in sexually explicit
conduct); United States v. Jordan, 890 F.2d 247, 251-252 (10th
Cir. 1989) (involving four counts of knowingly making a false
statement to an insured savings and loan for the purpose of
obtaining a loan); Van Dyke v. Commonwealth, Ky., 581 S.W.2d 563,
564 (1979) (involving two counts of rape).
In determining whether certain acts constitute a single
offense involving a course of conduct or separate individual
offenses, a court must examine the elements of the statute to
ascertain legislative intent.
See Commonwealth v. Lewis, Ky.,
903 S.W.2d 524 (1995); Commonwealth v. Bass, supra.
An activity
can create multiple offenses when each count requires proof of
different facts or evidence.
See United States v. Martin, 933
F.2d 609, 611-612 (8th Cir. 1991) (finding two counts for money
laundering were not multiplicitous because they involved
different dates and locations).
Therefore, in assessing whether
conduct constitutes a single offense or multiple offenses, a
court must compare the facts of each individual case with the
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conduct prescribed by the statute and the interests intended to
be protected.
In the case at bar, each count of the indictment and
subsequent conviction involved acts occurring on separate dates,
albeit within the four-year time frame identified in the
indictment.
Although each incident involved the same victim and
similar acts, they constituted separate offenses under the
respective statutes.
KRS 510.070(1) provides:
A person is guilty of sodomy in the first
degree when:
(a) He engages in deviate sexual
intercourse[1] with another person by
forcible compulsion; or
(b) He engages in deviate sexual intercourse
with another person who is incapable of
consent because he:
1.
Is physically helpless; or
2.
Is less than twelve (12) years old.
KRS 510.110(1) provides:
A person is guilty of sexual abuse in the
first degree when:
(a) He subjects another person to sexual
contact[2] by forcible compulsion; or
1
"Deviate sexual intercourse" is defined as “any act of
sexual gratification involving the sex organs of one person and
the mouth or anus of another.” KRS 510.010(1).
2
"Sexual contact" is defined as “any touching of the sexual
or other intimate parts of a person done for the purpose of
gratifying the sexual desire of either party.” KRS 510.010(7).
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(b) He subjects another person to sexual
contact who is incapable of consent because
he:
1.
Is physically helpless; or
2.
Is less than twelve (12) years old.
The language of these statutes indicates that they were
intended to prohibit individual acts of improper sexual conduct
rather than a course of conduct.
For instance, in Johnson v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 864 S.W.2d 266 (1993), the defendant was
charged with, inter alia, rape in the first degree, sodomy in the
first degree and sexual abuse in the first degree stemming from
several acts occurring on one night.
The trial court instructed
on each offense and differentiated them based on specific types
of acts.
While the Supreme Court reversed the conviction because
the instructions failed to properly define the requisite sexual
acts necessary for each offense, the Court indicated that the
defendant could be convicted of each offense based on the
separate instances of sexual contact.
Id. at 277.
In addition, in Hampton v. Commonwealth, Ky., 666
S.W.2d 737 (1984), the defendant was indicted on twelve counts of
sexual misconduct with three young boys over a three-month
period.
The first nine counts involved one boy and included two
occasions or "transactions" for which the defendant was charged
with one count of sodomy in the first degree and one count of
sexual abuse in the first degree related to each transaction.
The other five counts of sexual abuse in the first degree
involving this same victim were based on acts committed on
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various dates over a two-month period.
The Court held that
Hampton could be convicted of both sodomy and sexual abuse
occurring during the same sexual transaction where the defendant
performed fellatio on the boy and then had the boy perform the
same act on him.
The Court held that the defendant could be
convicted of separate offenses because separate sexual acts took
place.
"Nevertheless, here the separate charge of sexual abuse
is based not on incidental contact, but on a separate act of
sexual gratification.
The fact that the two sexual acts occurred
either simultaneously or nearly so is irrelevant."
Id. at 739.
See also Van Dyke, supra, 581 S.W.2d at 564 (affirming conviction
for two counts of rape and one count of sodomy involving single
victim and acts occurring over fifteen minute period).
The Court
affirmed the conviction on all the offenses.
Similarly, in Salyer v. State, 761 P.2d 890, 893 (Okla.
Crim. App. 1988), the Court held that the defendant could be
convicted of multiple counts of sodomy for acts occurring during
a single night.
The Court rejected the defendant's argument that
conviction for a multiple offense of the same statute constituted
double jeopardy because his acts constituted a single, continuing
offense.
The Court said, "[T]he Double Jeopardy Clause is not
carte blanche for an accused to commit as many offenses as
desired within the same transaction or episode.
To hold that a
man may repeatedly sodomize a boy yet only be punished for one
offense would provide him with an invitation to engage in
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multiple criminal conduct at the expense of the victim.
decision would be unthinkable."
Such a
Id. at 893 (citations omitted).
In the present case, Farmer engaged in separate,
distinct acts of sexual gratification over a period of several
years.
His contention that these repeated acts constituted a
single offense is without merit.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the order of the
Jefferson Circuit Court.
ALL CONCUR.
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BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Buddy Wade Farmer, Pro Se
LaGrange, KY
Hon. A. B. Chandler, III
Attorney General
Hon. Rickie L. Pearson
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, KY
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