JOHN MICHAEL TRUSTY V. WALT CHAPLEAU, WARDEN
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RENDERED:
March 27, 1998; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
NO. 97-CA-1098-MR
JOHN MICHAEL TRUSTY
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM OLDHAM CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE DENNIS A. FRITZ, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 97-CI-121
V.
WALT CHAPLEAU, WARDEN
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
* * * * * * * *
BEFORE:
DYCHE, MILLER, and SCHRODER, Judges.
DYCHE, JUDGE.
John Michael Trusty (Trusty), acting pro se,
appeals from an order of the Oldham Circuit Court entered on
April 23, 1997, denying his petition for declaratory judgment
brought pursuant to KRS 418.040.
We affirm.
Trusty is an inmate at the Kentucky State Reformatory
(KSR).
In April 1996, prison officials received information from
an informant that Trusty was planning to assault Don Green, the
director of the prison unit in which Trusty was housed.
Trusty
was placed in administrative segregation and an investigation was
conducted.
After the initial investigation, a disciplinary
report was filed on May 17, 1996, charging Trusty with violation
of Corrections Policies and Procedures (CPP) Category VII 1.A.,
attempt to commit assault on an employee.
On May 22, 1996, the
Adjustment Committee conducted a hearing at which Trusty
testified and denied the charge.
Trusty's request to call two
witnesses was denied based on relevancy.
The Adjustment
Committee found Trusty guilty and imposed penalties of 180 days
disciplinary segregation and forfeiture of two years
nonrestorable good time.
Upon internal appeal, Walt Chapleau,
the prison warden, affirmed the Adjustment Committee's decision.
On March 17, 1997, Trusty filed a petition for
declaratory judgment alleging the disciplinary committee violated
due process.
On April 14, 1997, Chapleau filed a response to the
petition, accompanied by confidential information received during
the initial investigation, and a motion to have the confidential
documents kept under seal subject to in camera review by the
court.
On April 23, 1997, based in part on its review of the
confidential information, the circuit court denied the motion for
declaratory judgment effectively dismissing the action.
This
appeal followed.
Trusty contends that the disciplinary action violated
procedural due process on the following grounds:
1) he was
denied ample access to a legal aide to prepare for the
disciplinary hearing; 2) he was refused the right to present two
witnesses before the Adjustment Committee at the disciplinary
hearing; 3) he was not allowed to personally confront and
question the confidential informants; 4) the Adjustment Committee
failed to make findings on the reliability of the confidential
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informants; and 5) the Adjustment Committee's decision was not
based on sufficient reliable evidence.
Trusty alleges the
disciplinary action was retaliation for a grievance he filed
challenging the denial of his request for a transfer from KSR.
He alleges the confidential information relied on by the
Adjustment Committee was uncorroborated hearsay.
A petition for declaratory judgment pursuant to KRS
418.040 has become the vehicle whereby inmates may seek review of
their disputes with the Corrections Department, whenever habeas
corpus proceedings are inappropriate.
Polsgrove v. Kentucky
Bureau of Corrections, Ky., 559 S.W.2d 736 (1977); Graham v.
O'Dea, Ky. App., 876 S.W.2d 621 (1994).
While technically
original actions, inmate declaratory judgment petitions share
many of the attributes of appeals.
They invoke the circuit
court's authority to act as a court of review utilizing the
administrative record.
The circuit court's role is not to form
its own judgment, but to insure that the administrative body's
judgment comports with due process and the legal restrictions
applicable to it.
American Beauty Homes Corp. v. Louisville &
Jefferson County Planning and Zoning Comm'n., Ky., 379 S.W.2d 450
(1964); Smith v. O'Dea, Ky. App., 939 S.W.2d 353 (1997).
Thus,
the circuit court's determinations in these cases are usually
strictly matters of law, as in the case at bar, which we review
de novo.
City of Louisville v. Allen, Ky., 385 S.W.2d 179
(1964).
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In Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U. S. 539, 94 S. Ct. 2963,
41 L. Ed. 2d 935 (1974), the Supreme Court held that the due
process clause protects an inmate's liberty interest in good-time
credits.
While not subject to a full range of procedural
safeguards, inmates are entitled to certain minimum requirements
of procedural due process including advanced written notice of
the disciplinary charges, a written statement by the fact finders
of the evidence relied upon and the reasons for the disciplinary
actions, and an impartial decision-making tribunal.
Wolff, 418
U.S. at 563-567, 94 S. Ct. at 2978-2982; see also Hewit v. Helms,
459 U. S. 460, 465 n.3, 103 S. Ct. 864, 868 n.3, 41 L. Ed. 2d 935
(1983).
The Court also held that an inmate should be allowed the
opportunity to call witnesses and to present documentary
evidence, subject to restrictions within the prison officials'
discretion based on institutional safety and correctional goals.
Wolff, 418 U.S. at 566, 94 S. Ct. at 2979.
Prison officials are
allowed even greater discretion in not permitting confrontation
and cross-examination of persons furnishing evidence against the
inmate.
Id. at 566, 94 S. Ct. at 2979-80.
While the Court in Wolff outlined certain minimal
procedures required by due process before revocation of an
inmate's good time credit, in Superintendent, Massachusetts
Correctional Institution, Walpole v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 105 S.
Ct. 2768, 86 L. Ed. 2d 356 (1985), the Supreme Court articulated
the quantum of evidence required to support a decision in a
prison disciplinary proceeding.
The Court held that the
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revocation of good-time credits must be supported by "some
evidence in the record" in order to comport with the minimum
requirements of due process.
Id. at 454, 105 S. Ct. at 2773.
Accord Smith v. O'Dea, supra.
Trusty's first argument involves the lack of access to
a legal aide.
In Wolff, the Court recognized that the procedural
due process protections are necessarily more limited in the
context of the prison setting.
418 U.S. at 556, 94 S. Ct. at
2974 ("[p]rison disciplinary proceedings are not part of a
criminal prosecution, and the full panoply of rights due a
defendant in such proceedings does not apply").
It noted that
disciplinary hearings involve confrontation between inmates and
prison authorities, and often also involve other inmates who
furnish evidence of offenses.
2978.
418 U.S. at 562, 94 S. Ct. at
Thus, disciplinary procedures must balance the rights of
inmates against the prison official's need to advance
rehabilitative goals and internal security.
The Court in Wolff
indicated that an inmate is not entitled to aid from prison
authorities or assistance from a legal aide unless the inmate is
illiterate or the disciplinary issue is so complex "it is
unlikely the inmate will be able to collect and present the
evidence necessary for an adequate comprehension of the case."
418 U.S. at 570, 94 S. Ct. at 2982.
The numerous filings in the
record attest to Trusty's literacy, and the issues involved were
not so complex that Trusty's alleged restricted access to legal
assistance amounted to a constitutional violation.
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Trusty's
reliance on Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 314, 96 S. Ct. 1551,
47 L. Ed. 2d 810 (1976) is misplaced because the Court in that
case in fact relied on the ruling in Wolff that inmates are not
entitled to representation by counsel in disciplinary hearings.
See also Freitas v. Auger, 837 F.2d 806, 812 n.13 (8th Cir.
1988)(holding that inmate was not entitled to have a lawyer or
legal aide present his case to the disciplinary committee).
Trusty's second argument concerns the denial of his
request to call inmates Mike Taylor and John Thompson as
witnesses at the disciplinary hearing.
During the disciplinary
hearing, Trusty described the testimony he intended to elicit
from the prospective witnesses.
He stated that Mike Taylor was a
good friend who would testify about Trusty's character.
Trusty
indicated that John Thompson could testify to receiving the
grievance appellant filed against Don Green on April 15, 1996.
The Adjustment Committee denied the request based on relevancy.
In Ponte v. Real, 471 U.S. 496, 105 S. Ct. 2192, 85 L.
Ed. 2d 553 (1985), the Supreme Court held that due process did
not require the disciplinary committee to state in writing at the
time of the hearing its reasons for refusing to allow the inmate
to call a witness.
The Court reiterated the holding in Wolff
that prison officials may limit an inmate's right to call
witnesses when it would otherwise be unduly hazardous to
institutional safety or correctional goals.
471 U.S. at 499, 105
S. Ct. at 2197 (citing Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 566, 94
S. Ct. 2963, 2979, 41 L. Ed. 2d 935 (1974)).
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In addition, the
Court stated that "[p]rison officials must have the necessary
discretion to keep the hearing within reasonable limits and to
refuse to call witnesses that may create a risk of reprisal or
undermine authority. . . ."
566, 94 S. Ct. at 2979).
Id. (quoting Wolff, 418 U. S. at
Prison officials may exclude witnesses
because of irrelevance, lack of necessity or the hazards
presented in a particular case.
Wolff, 418 U.S. at 566, 94 S.
Ct. at 2980.
In the case at bar, the Adjustment Committee provided a
contemporaneous record at the hearing for its reasons for denying
Trusty's witnesses.
The committee chairman indicated that
Trusty's request to call Taylor was denied because he was only a
character witness, and the request to call Johnson was denied
because he had no relevant information on the charges. At the
hearing, Trusty was allowed to describe the substance of and
purpose for these witnesses' testimony.
The Adjustment Committee
did not abuse its discretion or violate due process in denying
Trusty's request to call these witnesses.
Trusty's next three arguments, which involve the
Adjustment Committee's use of confidential information and
Trusty's inability to question the informants, are closely
intertwined.
Generally, the Court in Wolff stated that an
inmate's right to confront his accuser and cross-examine
witnesses may be circumscribed within the sound discretion of
prison officials.
418 U.S. at 568-69, 94 S. Ct. at 2981.
Subsequent cases have clearly recognized the legitimate use of
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confidential information and limited access to the identity of
confidential informants in prison disciplinary actions.
See,
e.g., Stanford v. Parker, Ky. App., 949 S.W.2d 616 (1996).
For
instance, in Hensley v. Wilson, 850 F.2d 269 (6th Cir. 1988), the
court stated that inmates have no absolute due process right to
information possibly exposing the identity of a confidential
informant because of the legitimate need to prevent retaliation.
Id. at 278-79.
808, 810 (1987).
See also Gilhaus v. Wilson, Ky. App., 734 S.W.2d
However, the court recognized a need for the
disciplinary committee to make an independent assessment of the
reliability of the confidential informant.
But see Russell v.
Scully, 15 F.3d 219, 223 (2d Cir. 1993)(stating there is no
clearly established due process right to independent assessment
of informant's credibility by hearing officer).
The court in
Hensley stated:
We hold that prison disciplinary committees
are obligated to assess the reliability of
inmate informants upon whose testimony they
rely to deprive inmates of good time credits.
A contemporaneous written record must be made
of the evidence relied upon. If, because of
efforts to protect informant anonymity, the
evidence in support of disciplinary action
supplied to the inmate fails to meet the
constitutional minimum of "some evidence,"
more detailed evidence, sufficient to meet
constitutional standards, must be placed in a
non-public record.
850 F.2d at 283.
See also Freitas v. Auger, 837 F.2d 806 (8th
Cir. 1988)(subsequent in camera review of confidential
information before disciplinary committee revealing indicia of
reliability of informants was sufficient for due process).
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The
court in Hensley indicated that although the disciplinary
committee need not make contemporaneous explicit written findings
on the reliability of informants with accompanying reasons, this
would be beneficial.
In Gilhaus, supra at 810, the court held
that the disciplinary committee "need only include some reference
to verification" of the trustworthiness of confidential
informants.
In the instant case, the Adjustment Committee found
Trusty guilty based primarily on confidential information
evidenced by documents accompanying the report of an
investigative officer.
The Adjustment Committee also noted in
the disciplinary hearing report that Trusty's testimony contained
a factual inconsistency.
The circuit court conducted an in
camera review of the confidential information considered by the
Adjustment Committee.
The trial court found no due process
violation and held the findings of the Adjustment Committee were
supported by sufficient evidence.
This Court also has reviewed
the confidential information filed under seal and we believe it
contains adequate indicia of reliability.
Our review of the
disciplinary committee's determination of the reliability of
informants is deferential.
Taylor v. Wallace, 931 F.2d 698, 701
(10th Cir. 1991); Mendoza v. Miller, 779 F.2d 1287, 1293 (7th
Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1142, 106 S. Ct. 2251, 90 L.
Ed. 2d 697 (1986).
The confidential information includes
statements from several individuals containing internal
consistencies and factual details about the plan to assault Don
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Green on which the disciplinary charges were based.
In addition,
the disciplinary hearing report states that the Adjustment
Committee considered confidential information received from no
less than two and no more than seven witnesses deemed reliable
during the investigation of the incident.
Although abbreviated,
this statement is sufficient reference to verification under
Gilhaus.
In conclusion, the record contains sufficient reliable
evidence to support the "some evidence" standard of
Superintendent v. Hill, supra.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the order of the
Oldham Circuit Court.
ALL CONCUR.
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BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
John Michael Trusty - Pro Se
Eddyville, Kentucky
Boyce A. Crocker
Department of Corrections
Frankfort, Kentucky
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