J. GREGG CLENDENIN, JR. v. DORIS C. EDWARDS
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
RENDERED: November 13, 1998; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
Nos.
1997-CA-000319-MR and 1997-CA-000880-MR
J. GREGG CLENDENIN, JR.
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FRANKLIN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE WILLIAM W. TRUDE, JR., SPECIAL JUDGE
ACTION NO. 94-CI-000125
DORIS C. EDWARDS
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
BEFORE:
BUCKINGHAM, KNOX, and SCHRODER, Judges.
BUCKINGHAM, JUDGE.
J. Gregg Clendenin, Jr. (Clendenin), appeals
pro se from an order of the Franklin Circuit Court granting
summary judgment to Doris C. Edwards (Edwards).
Clendenin also
appeals from an order of the Franklin Circuit Court denying his
motion to vacate the summary judgment order.
have been consolidated.
The two appeals
Edwards filed a complaint in the trial court against
Clendenin in 1994 seeking to recover money which she had loaned
to him.
The loan was represented by a promissory note signed by
Clendenin in June 1993 in the amount of $48,034.72.
Edwards
alleged that Clendenin had defaulted in making the payments set
forth in the note.
In his answer to Edwards’ complaint,
Clendenin admitted that he had signed the June 1993 promissory
note, but he claimed as a defense that he was under duress when
he signed it.1
Edwards’ initial motion for summary judgment was filed
in July 1994.
That motion was never heard by the trial court,
although it was scheduled and rescheduled several times.
In
November 1996, Edwards filed a renewed motion for summary
judgment which contained an affidavit outlining the particulars
of Clendenin’s alleged default on the note and which stated that
Clendenin had failed to object or answer a request for admissions
served on him by Edwards within the thirty-day window provided in
CR 36.01(2).2
This renewed motion for summary judgment stated in
1
Clendenin also filed a counterclaim alleging outrageous
conduct by Edwards and alleging money due for professional
services rendered in an unspecified amount. The summary judgment
order did not address the counterclaim, and it is not subject to
this appeal. Although the summary judgment order did not dispose
of “all the rights of all the parties” (see CR 54.01), the
judgment was nonetheless a final judgment due to the finality
language included therein. See CR 54.02(1).
2
CR 36.01(2) provides in pertinent
of which an admission is requested shall
The matter is admitted unless, within 30
the request, . . . the party to whom the
-2-
part that “[e]ach matter
be separately set forth.
days after service of
request is directed
(continued...)
its certificate of service that it was mailed to Clendenin on
November 6, 1996, and that it would be heard by the court on
December 6, 1996.
The renewed motion was apparently not heard on December
6, 1996, because the next document in the record is a renotice of
the motion filed by Edwards.
That renotice states that it was
mailed on December 6, 1996, and that the motion would be heard on
December 13, 1996.
Clendenin filed a response to the renewed
motion for summary judgment on December 13, 1996.
That response
reiterates his earlier defense (duress) and further alleges that
he agreed to answer the request for admissions “provided the
Plaintiff [Edwards] appear at a scheduled deposition, which she
has failed or refused to do for almost two (2) years.”
Clendenin’s response to the motion did not contain a statement
either denying that he had failed to answer or objecting to the
request for admissions.
The renewed motion for summary judgment was submitted
to the trial court for a decision on December 13, 1996.
In
January 1997, the trial court entered an order granting Edwards’
motion.
The order granting summary judgment explicitly stated
that the trial court had considered “the Requests for Admission
to which the defendant [Clendenin] failed to respond . . . .”
2
(...continued)
serves upon the party requesting the admission a written answer
or objection . . . .”
-3-
Clendenin now appeals from that order and from the order denying
his motion to vacate the summary judgment.
Clendenin’s first argument is that the trial court
erred when it deemed Edwards’ request for admissions to have been
admitted because he [Clendenin] objected to the request in
writing and served a signed objection on Edwards within thirty
days of receipt of the request.
The record does not contain any
response made by Clendenin to Edwards’ request for admissions,
however.
Clendenin claims that his written objection to the
request for admissions was timely filed and stated as its grounds
that Edwards had not given her deposition.
CR 5.06(1) provides that requests for admission do not
have to be filed with the court.
Although the rule does not
specifically provide that responses to those requests would also
be exempt, we will assume for the sake of argument that the
responses are also exempt.
However, CR 5.06(2) requires that any
document exempted from the filing requirement of CR 5.06(1)
“shall” be filed with the court if it is “to be used at trial or
is necessary to a pre-trial motion . . . .”
Thus, Clendenin’s
response should have been filed in the court record.
We do not
believe that the record supports Clendenin’s argument that he
complied with CR 36.01(2) by serving on Edwards a written
objection to the request for admission.3
3
Edwards acknowledges that she received a letter from
Clendenin stating, among other things, that he thought it fair
and reasonable for Edwards’ deposition to be taken prior to his
(continued...)
-4-
Clendenin’s second argument is that the trial court
erred because there were material issues of fact remaining to be
resolved, even if Edwards’ requests for admission were deemed
admitted.
Clendenin does not, however, state what he perceives
those issues to be.
In responding to Edwards’ summary judgment motion,
Clendenin filed a supporting affidavit which stated:
The date the note was signed, the Affiant was
under great and disabling distress due to
telephone harassment of the Affiant’s wife by
the Plaintiff, and other factors. . . . The
Plaintiff’s harassment put the Affiant’s wife
in fear of the safety of herself, her
children, and the Affiant. . . . But for
the duress, the Affiant would not have signed
the note.
It is generally true that an agreement obtained by duress is
invalid.
See 25 Am. Jur. 2d Duress and Undue Influence § 21 at
534 (1996).
However, Clendenin’s allegation of duress due to
“other factors” is insufficient to overcome Edwards’ summary
judgment motion, as general allegations of duress are
insufficient.
See 25 Am. Jur. 2d, supra, § 26 at 540-41.
3
(...continued)
responding to further discovery. We question whether such a
broad response by Clendenin would constitute an objection under
CR 36.01(2), and we resolve this issue in Edwards’ favor, as
Clendenin did not make a copy of the letter a part of the record
for our review. Also, we have no transcript or tape of the
hearings on the summary judgment motion before the trial court,
and we are unaware of the specific facts upon which the trial
court relied in determining that Clendenin failed to respond to
the request for admission. Thus, “we must presume that the
judgment of the trial court was supported by the evidence.”
Miller v. Commonwealth, Dept. of Highways, Ky., 487 S.W.2d 931,
933 (1972).
-5-
Also, although alleged duress due to telephone
harassment of Clendenin’s wife does specify particular facts,
that allegation is likewise insufficient to defeat Edwards’
motion.
The June 1993 promissory note was a replacement note for
six earlier notes, with a total value of $43,200.00 and interest
through the date of that note in the sum of $4,834.72.
Clendenin
admitted this fact when he failed to answer or respond pursuant
to CR 36.01(2) to the request for admission.4
Since each of the
notes was signed by Clendenin prior to his marriage, there could
have been no duress directed toward
his wife at the time those
notes were executed.
Clendenin argues that the earlier notes were not
mentioned in Edwards’ complaint and “are therefore irrelevant and
immaterial.”
We disagree.
The fact that the June 1993 note did
not represent a new obligation, but only served as a replacement
note for obligations already in place, is relevant to whether
Clendenin was under duress when he signed it.
In short, we
conclude that the trial court properly granted summary judgment
in favor of Edwards, as there was no genuine issue of material
fact concerning the duress defense.
Hubble v. Johnson, Ky., 841
S.W.2d 169, 171 (1992).
Clendenin’s final argument is that the summary judgment
order should be vacated because the motion was filed and served
less than ten days prior to the time fixed for the hearing.
4
Clendenin likewise does not deny this fact on appeal.
-6-
See
CR 56.03.
This argument is without merit for two reasons.
First, the renewed motion for summary judgment was served on
Clendenin on November 6, 1996, was noticed to be heard on
December 6, 1996, and was actually submitted to the trial court
for ruling on December 13, 1996.
It was the renoticing of a
hearing on the renewed motion for December 13, 1996, that was
served within ten days of the hearing and not the summary
judgment motion itself.
Thus, Edwards complied with CR 56.03 by
serving the renewed motion for summary judgment at least ten days
before the time fixed for the hearing.
Furthermore, Clendenin
does not state how he has preserved any error in this regard as
required by CR 76.12(c)(iv), and it appears that he waived any
insufficient notice of the hearing by not objecting.
See
Equitable Coal Sales, Inc. v. Duncan Machinery Movers, Inc., Ky.
App., 649 S.W.2d 415, 416 (1983).
The judgment of the Franklin Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
J. Gregg Clendenin, Jr.
Pro Se
Frankfort, KY
Charles G. Wylie
Lexington, KY
-7-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.