SHAWN D. THORNTON v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: August 14, 1998; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
No.
97-CA-0047-MR
SHAWN D. THORNTON
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM OWEN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE RAY CORNS, SPECIAL JUDGE
ACTION NO. 96-CR-0023
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING IN PART, REVERSING IN PART, AND REMANDING
* * * * * * *
BEFORE:
ABRAMSON, DYCHE, and HUDDLESTON, Judges.
ABRAMSON, JUDGE:
Shawn D. Thornton appeals from his conviction
of facilitation to theft by unlawful taking over $300 and the
resulting five-year sentence and $1,000 fine.
On appeal,
Thornton claims that the trial court committed reversible error
when it (1) permitted prejudicial rebuttal evidence to be
admitted against him; (2) imposed a fine of $1,000 against him;
and (3) assessed court costs against him.
Having reviewed the
record and the applicable law, we affirm in part, reverse in part
and remand for re-sentencing.
In 1994, in return for immunity from prosecution,
Patrick Goins and Mark Harley admitted to Shelby County
authorities that they had committed numerous burglaries and
thefts, including the theft of two Ford farm tractors in 1992
from an Owen County farm.
After both men implicated Thornton in
the tractor thefts, he was indicted and tried in November 1996.
At trial, the tractors’ owners testified that the tractors
disappeared in 1992 and that Thornton was not authorized to take
them.
Goins and Harley further testified that Thornton
approached them to assist in the theft of the tractors for the
benefit of Thornton’s cousin, Anthony Wentworth.
Through the
testimony of a Shelby County deputy sheriff, the Commonwealth
established that one of the tractors was found on Wentworth’s
farm in April 1996.
Thornton testified, maintaining his innocence of the
tractor thefts.
He also stated that Goins was lying about
Thornton’s participation in the thefts because he and Goins had
“fallen out” after Goins had stolen a gun from Thornton’s home.
Thornton claimed that he had first learned about the theft of his
gun when he saw an acquaintance named Jimmy Dean with the gun.
Thornton’s trial counsel had obtained the trial court’s
permission to pursue this line of questioning in order to
demonstrate that Goins had a reason to lie about Thornton’s
participation in the thefts.
In rebuttal, Goins not only denied
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stealing the gun, but he further claimed that he had brokered the
sale of the gun to Dean for Thornton in return for a small amount
of marijuana which was for Thornton.
Thornton’s trial counsel
did not object to Goins’s testimony.
Thornton’s first claim is that, even though the issue
of admissibility of evidence regarding the alleged sale of the
gun to Dean was unpreserved for appellate review, it was palpable
error under RCr 10.26 for the trial court to permit the jury to
hear Goins’s rebuttal testimony.
Thornton concedes that his
trial counsel failed to object to Goins’s testimony.
In Partin
v. Commonwealth, Ky., 918 S.W.2d 219, 224 (1996), the Kentucky
Supreme Court defined palpable error as
one which affects the substantial rights of a
party and relief may be granted for palpable
error only upon a determination that a
manifest injustice has resulted from the
error. This means, upon consideration of the
whole case, the reviewing court must conclude
that a substantial possibility exists that
the result would have been different in order
to grant relief.
We find no error or resulting manifest injustice to Thornton from
Goins’s rebuttal testimony.
A trial court has wide latitude in determining the
admissibility of rebuttal evidence.
854 S.W.2d 748 (1993).
Copley v. Commonwealth, Ky.,
The Commonwealth correctly argues that
Thornton’s counsel “opened the door” for Goins’s testimony by
asking his client questions about Goins’s motive in accusing
Thornton of the tractor thefts.
After Thornton testified that
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Goins had burglarized his house and had stolen his gun which then
found its way into Jimmy Dean’s possession, the trial court
properly permitted Goins to testify on rebuttal that Dean had
obtained the gun when Goins had brokered a deal for the gun
between Thornton and Dean, with marijuana as the purchase price.
Thornton suggests on appeal that Goins’s rebuttal should have
been limited to a denial that he burglarized Thornton’s home and
a denial that the two had a “falling-out.”
This carefully
circumscribed testimony would obviously preclude any explanation
of how Thornton’s gun came into the possession of Jimmy Dean.
We
find no basis for so limiting the rebuttal.
In Copley our Supreme Court found no abuse of
discretion in admitting rebuttal evidence after the defendant
“opened the door.”
In that case Copley was convicted of first-
degree manslaughter in the shooting death of his former
girlfriend’s current boyfriend.
During Copley’s case-in-chief he
testified in great detail as to earlier incidents involving the
girlfriend, the victim and himself.
Significantly, Copley denied
that on an earlier occasion he had shot a gun through the open
window of a car occupied by the victim, the girlfriend and her
son.
Our Supreme Court held that it was proper for the
Commonwealth to present rebuttal evidence after “Copley opened
the door” on this particular incident.
854 S.W.2d at 752.
The Copley case is noteworthy because the victim died
when Copley shot him through the open window of a parked car in
which the girlfriend was a passenger, a deadly repeat of the
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earlier incident which Copley had expressly denied.
Clearly the
rebuttal evidence in Copley was far more prejudicial than that
involved in this case.
Thornton’s argument is that the jury
would think that a defendant who caused a third party to sell a
gun in exchange for marijuana would most likely also be willing
to steal two farm tractors.
This connection is tenuous at best.
Moreover, the evidence admitted does not approach the level of
potential prejudice present in cases where admission of rebuttal
evidence was deemed reversible error because its prejudicial
effect outweighed its probativeness.
See Sanborn v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 754 S.W.2d 534 (1988) (highly inflammatory
rebuttal evidence improper even though defense had opened the
door).
“Having opened the book on the subject,” Thornton was not
in a position to complain when his adversary “sought to read
other verses from the same chapter and page."
Thompson, Ky., 497 S.W.2d 422, 430 (1973).
Harris v.
See, Howard v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 447 S.W.2d 611 (1969).
In short, Thornton’s testimony about Goins’s reasons
for accusing him of complicity in the thefts as well as Goins’s
testimony denying Thornton’s allegations were both relevant to
the existence or nonexistence of an ulterior motive by Goins in
accusing Thornton.
See KRE 401.
Having allowed Thornton to
offer his explanation for Goins’s accusations against him, the
Commonwealth was entitled to present its point-by-point rebuttal
of Thornton’s claim and to offer its witness’s version of how the
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gun came into Dean’s possession.
The trial court did not abuse
its discretion when it allowed Goins’s rebuttal testimony.
Thornton’s second claim is that the trial court erred
when it included a $1,000 fine along with his five-year sentence.
We disagree.
KRS 534.040(4) provides that a fine “shall not be
imposed upon any person determined by the court to be indigent
pursuant to KRS Chapter 31."
A “needy” or “indigent person” is
defined in relevant part in KRS 31.100(3)(a) as “a person,
eighteen (18) years of age or older . . . who at the time his
need is determined is unable to provide for the payment of an
attorney and all other necessary expenses of representation.”
In
the typical case, when counsel is appointed for an indigent
defendant, the same counsel represents the defendant through
sentencing.
In that circumstance, a fine would violate the
explicit language of KRS 534.040.
Here, on September 25, 1996, the trial court ordered
the appointment of trial counsel for Thornton after reviewing his
affidavit of indigency.
Following his conviction on November 25,
1996, though, the trial judge excused the attorney who had been
appointed for trial and granted Thornton’s motion to substitute
counsel.
Retained counsel appeared with Thornton for sentencing
on December 17, 1996, when the sentence of five years and a fine
of $1,000 was imposed.
At the time the sentence was imposed on
Thornton, the trial court no longer regarded him as an indigent
pursuant to KRS Chapter 31 and therefore Thornton was subject to
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being fined by the trial court.
Notably, the trial court imposed
the minimum fine set by statute.
KRS 534.030(1).
Thornton’s third claim is that the court illegally
assessed court costs of $65.50 against him.
We agree.
KRS
31.110(1)(b) provides that the court “in which the [needy]
defendant is tried shall waive all costs.”
The costs were
incurred for the proceedings leading up to and including the
trial, during which Thornton had previously been deemed a needy
person under KRS Chapter 31 and was always represented by
appointed counsel.
We believe that imposition of court costs
against Thornton under these circumstances violated KRS
31.110(1)(b).
For the reasons stated, we affirm in part, reverse in
part, and remand this case to Owen Circuit Court for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
HUDDLESTON, JUDGE, CONCURS.
DYCHE, JUDGE, CONCURS IN PART AND DISSENTS IN PART.
would affirm in entirety the trial court’s judgment.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Don H. Major
J. Bart McMahon
Louisville, KY
A. B. Chandler III
Attorney General
Dana M. Todd
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, KY
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