ROBERT JOHN BURCKARDT v. SUSIE KOCH BURCKARDT and CYNTHIA C. STONE
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RENDERED: October 23, 1998; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
1996-CA-003410-MR (Direct Appeal)
ROBERT JOHN BURCKARDT
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JOHN WOODS POTTER, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 95-CI-002110
SUSIE KOCH BURCKARDT and
CYNTHIA C. STONE
APPELLEES
AND
No. 1996-CA-003428-MR (Cross-Appeal)
SUSIE KOCH BURCKARDT
v.
CROSS-APPELLANT
CROSS-APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JOHN WOODS POTTER, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 95-CI-002110
ROBERT JOHN BURCKARDT
CROSS-APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING IN PART, REVERSING IN PART AND REMANDING
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
BEFORE:
BUCKINGHAM, GUIDUGLI, and HUDDLESTON, Judges.
BUCKINGHAM, JUDGE.
Robert John Burckardt (Robert) appeals and
Susie Koch Burckardt (Susie) cross-appeals from the findings of
fact, conclusions of law, and decree of dissolution of marriage
entered by the Jefferson Circuit Court.
Having considered the
record, the arguments of counsel, and the applicable law, we
affirm in part, reverse in part and remand.
Robert and Susie were married in 1974.
They have four
children, two of whom were still minors when the trial court
entered its decree in 1996.
Robert is an anesthesiologist and
was one of eleven shareholders in Anesthesiology Associates,
P.S.C. (the P.S.C.), as of the date of the valuation of his
interest in that P.S.C.
Susie holds a master’s degree in social
work and a master’s degree in business administration.
Robert’s
annual income exceeds $400,000, and Susie has not worked outside
the home since the birth of their first child in 1976.
Robert has appealed on the issues of the proper
valuation of his interest in the P.S.C., the level of his income,
the maintenance award to Susie, and his child support obligation.
Susie has cross-appealed on the issues of the failure of the
trial court to award interest on marital property equalization
payments ordered to be made to her by Robert, and on the issue of
the manner in which the trial court handled the parties’ Clifford
trust.
We will examine each issue separately herein.
One of the main issues before the trial court was the
proper valuation of Robert’s interest in the P.S.C.
Robert’s
expert witness testified that the fair market value of Robert’s
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interest in the P.S.C. was $183,000, based upon recent arm’slength stock transactions in the P.S.C. as well as an adjusted
net assets method of valuation.
The witness’s valuation conforms
to a prescribed formula used by the P.S.C. when a new physician
is made a partner in the P.S.C. or when a physician decides to
sell his interest in the P.S.C.
goodwill into account.
That valuation did not take
Susie’s expert witness valued Robert’s
interest in the P.S.C. at $522,154.
The witness arrived at that
figure by taking the average value of five methods of valuation:
the book value method, the straight capitalization method, the
capitalization of earnings method, the years purchase method, and
the professional corporation method.
The witness considered
goodwill in valuing the P.S.C.
The trial court declined to adopt the valuation of
either party’s expert witness and valued Robert’s interest in the
P.S.C. at $380,000.
The court stated that it arrived at its
valuation by taking the salary differential between an
anesthesiologist employee of the P.S.C. and a shareholder of the
P.S.C., reducing that amount by one-third to account for taxes,
and then adding the accounts receivable.
The court compared the
salary of a shareholder of $450,000 to the salary of an
anesthesiologist employee who had not yet been made a shareholder
of $150,000, arriving at a difference of $300,000 which was
reduced by $100,000 to account for taxes.
It then added the
accounts receivable amount of $180,000 to the $200,000 figure to
arrive at a total of $380,000 for Robert’s interest in the P.S.C.
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A trial court’s valuation of property in a divorce
action “will not be disturbed on appeal unless it is clearly
contrary to the weight of the evidence . . . .”
Underwood v.
Underwood, Ky.App., 836 S.W.2d 439, 444 (1992).
See also Clark
v. Clark, Ky.App., 782 S.W.2d 56, 58 (1990).
In order to make a
determination as to whether the trial court’s valuation is
clearly contrary to the weight of the evidence, this court is
under the duty to “examine the methods utilized by the trial
court to see if it clearly erred in valuing the corporation’s
assets” keeping in mind that there is no “single best method” for
such a valuation.
Clark, supra, at 58-59.
No mathematical
precision is necessary in arriving at a valuation figure as
“[t]he task of the appellate court is to determine whether the
trial court’s approach reasonably approximated the net value of
the partnership interest.”
Id. at 59.
Robert’s main contention on this issue is that the
trial court erred by adding any value to the P.S.C. for goodwill.
He notes that goodwill has been found to exist when a
professional practice can be sold for more than the value of its
fixtures and accounts receivable.
Id.
He argues that since his
interest could not be sold for more than the $180,000 valuation
which was based on the accounts receivable prescribed formula
used by the P.S.C., then the P.S.C. had no goodwill for valuation
purposes and the trial court erred in valuing the P.S.C. in
excess of $180,000.
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Other definitions of goodwill, however, include “the
expectation that patrons or patients will return because of the
reputation of the business or firm” and “the excess of return in
a given business over the average or norm that could be expected
for that business.”
Id.
Furthermore “[t]here is no definitive
rule or best method for valuing goodwill” as “[t]he determination
of goodwill is a question of fact rather than law, and each case
must be determined on its own facts and circumstances.”
Id. at
60.
Robert’s limited view of goodwill is without merit.
There was testimony that an anesthesiologist in this area would
have an average income for 1993-95 of $238,200.
Robert’s annual
income during that same period, however, was approximately
$450,000.
This income level clearly constitutes an “excess of
return in a given business over the average or norm that could be
expected for that business.”
Id.
Furthermore, the P.S.C.’s
relationship with the hospitals, particularly Jewish Hospital,
indicated “the expectation that patrons [i.e., the hospitals and
their staff] . . . will return because of the reputation of the
business or firm.”
Id.
We determine that the trial court did
not err in refusing to value Robert’s interest in the P.S.C. in
accordance with the P.S.C.’s rigid formula which placed no value
on goodwill.
The next question is whether the trial court’s approach
in determining Robert’s interest in the P.S.C. “reasonably
approximated” the net value of that interest.
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Id.
The trial
court took into account the fact that a physician wishing to
become a partner in the P.S.C. was obligated to work as an
employee at a lesser rate of income for a period of approximately
three years until that physician was permitted to become a
shareholder.
This method of working for a reduced income for a
period of time was used by the P.S.C. rather than requiring a
prospective shareholder to pay a fixed amount to buy into the
P.S.C.
While the methodology used by the trial court may have
been unique, there is no “definitive” method for valuing a
corporation similar to the P.S.C.
Id. at 59-60.
The trial
court’s valuation appears to be reasonable, and we will not
disturb it on appeal.
Robert’s second argument is that the trial court failed
to take into account the tax consequences which accompany its
valuation of the P.S.C.
According to Robert, he has a zero basis
in his shares of the P.S.C.
This means that if he sold those
shares, the entire amount he received from that sale would be
taxable at a rate of 32.4 percent (combined federal and state).
Thus, Robert asserts that the true value of his interest in the
P.S.C. was $123,708 ($183,000 [his valuation of his shares in the
P.S.C.] x 67.6 percent [taking into account the 32.4 percent tax
rate] = $123,708).
Robert’s argument in this regard is without merit for
several reasons.
First, the trial court specifically took taxes
into account when arriving at its valuation of the P.S.C.
Second, Robert cites to no authority which conclusively mandates
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that a trial court must consider all of the possible tax
consequences when dividing marital property.1
Finally, Robert
will not suffer any tax consequences unless he sells his interest
in the P.S.C., which would occur after the dissolution of the
parties’ marriage.2
Robert next alleges that the trial court erred in
finding that he had an annual income of $450,000 to $500,000
despite the fact that he testified that his estimated earnings
for 1996 would be approximately $400,000.
Susie accurately
responds to that argument by noting that any figure regarding
Robert’s 1996 income would have been pure speculation by the
trial court since the trial of this action was held in June 1996,
well before the year ended.
As Robert’s 1995 W-2 wage and tax
statement from the P.S.C. shows that Robert had an income of
$454,244.85, we cannot say that the trial court’s finding
regarding Robert’s income was clearly erroneous.
See Johnson v.
1
Robert cites Owens v. Owens, Ky.App., 672 S.W.2d 67
(1984), but that case merely requires a trial court to take into
account “severe economic circumstances” which would accompany an
order to sell an asset. Id. at 69. This scenario is obviously
distinguishable from the case sub judice.
2
“Courts have generally found that consideration of tax
consequences is either required or at least appropriate where the
consequences are immediate and specific and/or arise directly
from the court’s decree, but find they are not an appropriate
consideration where speculation as to a party’s future dealings
with property awarded to him or her would be required.” Tracy A.
Bateman, Annot., Divorce and Separation: Consideration of Tax
Consequences in Distribution of Marital Property, 9 ALR 5th 568
(1993). Also, KRS 403.190(1)(d) requires a trial court to
consider the “[e]conomic circumstances of each spouse when the
division of property is to become effective . . . .” (Emphasis
added.)
-7-
Johnson, Ky.App., 564 S.W.2d 221, 222 (1978), which holds that an
appellate court “may not disturb the findings of the trial court
in a case involving dissolution of marriage unless those findings
are clearly erroneous.”
Robert’s fourth argument is that the trial court’s
award of maintenance was clearly erroneous and an abuse of
discretion, both as to amount and duration.
The trial court
ordered Robert to pay Susie $6,000 per month for five years and
$3,000 per month for the three years immediately thereafter.
As
we review this issue, we note that “maintenance determinations
are within the sound discretion of the trial court” and will not
be disturbed “unless absolute abuse is shown . . . .”
supra, at 60.
Clark,
See also Russell v. Russell, Ky.App., 878 S.W.2d
24, 26 (1994), holding that “[t]he amount and duration of
maintenance is within the sound discretion of the trial court.”
Although Robert does not argue that Susie is not
entitled to some amount of maintenance, he contends that the
amount and duration are excessive.
He asserts that Susie is well
educated but simply does not desire to work.
According to
Robert, Susie wants to stay home and be involved with the
children even though they are now older and have no specialized
needs.
According to KRS 403.200(2), a trial court is to
consider “all relevant factors” in deciding the amount and
duration of a maintenance award.
trial court is to consider are:
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Among the enumerated factors a
(a) The financial resources of the party
seeking maintenance, including marital
property apportioned to him . . . ;
(b) The time necessary to acquire
sufficient education or training to enable
the party seeking maintenance to find
appropriate employment;
(c) The standard of living established
during the marriage;
(d) The duration of the marriage;
(e) The age, and the physical and
emotional condition of the spouse seeking
maintenance; and
(f) The ability of the spouse from whom
maintenance is sought to meet his needs while
meeting those of the spouse seeking
maintenance.
Considering the duration of the marriage, the standard of living
established during the marriage, and the ability of Robert to
meet his needs while meeting those of Susie, we conclude that the
trial court’s maintenance award was neither clearly erroneous nor
an abuse of discretion either as to duration or amount.
Finally, Robert argues that the trial court clearly
abused its discretion in awarding child support.
The trial court
found, for child support purposes, that Robert’s income was
$350,000 (his income from the P.S.C. less maintenance and other
payments made to Susie).
The trial court further imputed an
income of $100,000 to Susie (the $72,000 she receives in
maintenance plus an imputed income due to her education level
plus income she derived from her share of the marital assets).
After using those incomes and extrapolating from the child
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support guidelines, the trial court ordered Robert to pay $2,500
per month in child support.
The trial court explained that it
also took into account the fact that it had ordered Susie to pay
all of the children’s expenses other than food and entertainment
expenses which occur when the children are with Robert.
Robert argues that since the joint custody order of the
trial court results in the parties’ sharing possession of the
children on a roughly equal basis, the trial court should have
reduced his child support obligation by one-half.
He cites
Downey v. Rogers, Ky.App., 847 S.W.2d 63 (1993), as authority.
He also again reiterates his argument that the trial court should
have found his income to have been only $400,000 per year before
deductions for maintenance, etc., are taken.
This court noted in Downey that “the trial court could
take into consideration the period of time the children reside
with each parent in fixing support, and could deviate from the
guidelines . . . if convinced their application would be unjust.”
Id. at 65.
(Emphasis added.)
However, there is nothing in
Downey which would mandate a reduction in child support based
upon the parties’ sharing physical possession of the children on
an equal basis.
In fact, the Downey court noted that the trial
court did not abuse its discretion when it did not deviate from
the guidelines, despite the parties’ sharing of physical
possession of the children.
Id.
Also, the Downey court noted
that although some expenses (such as food) are reduced for the
parent without possession of the children “[m]any, if not most,
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expenses necessary to provide a home continue throughout the
month regardless of where the children reside.”
Id. at 64.
We also note that the statutory child support
guidelines are not applicable in this case and that “courts have
the flexibility to fashion appropriate orders” in such cases.
Brown v. Brown, Ky.App., 952 S.W.2d 707, 708 (1997).
Using the
income figures assigned to the parties by the trial court, their
combined monthly income is $37,500.
The highest combined monthly
income on the child support guidelines is $15,000.
Extrapolating
the figures in the child support guidelines by 2.5 ($37,500 is
2.5 times greater than $15,000), Robert’s child support
obligation would have been $3,595.80 per month.3
Since the trial
court ordered Robert to pay only $2,500 per month, we will not
say that its determination was an abuse of discretion, especially
given the fact that a trial court is under no obligation to
adjust a child support order due to the parents’ splitting
physical possession of the children.4
The final portion of Robert’s argument concerns the
portion of the decree which required Robert and Susie to equally
divide the equestrian expenses of their daughter, Jennifer.
We
do not consider horseback riding expenses to be “extraordinary
needs” as set forth in KRS 403.211, which allows courts to adjust
3
This does not include any deductions for health care costs
for the children.
4
The trial court did state that it gave Robert a “slight”
credit due to the amount of time the children spent with him.
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the child support guidelines for situations constituting
extraordinary circumstances.
See Smith v. Smith, Ky.App., 845
S.W.2d 25, 26 (1992), where this court deemed private music
lessons to not constitute extraordinary needs under the statute.
While the case sub judice is somewhat distinguishable in that it
does not involve the application of child support guidelines, we
nonetheless agree with Robert that the payment for Jennifer’s
riding expenses should be voluntary, not court-mandated, even
given the wide discretion afforded to the trial court by Johnson,
supra, and KRS 403.211(4).
We therefore reverse the trial court
on this issue.
Susie’s first argument on her cross-appeal is that the
trial court erred in not ordering that Robert pay interest to her
on the amount of $194,242 that he was ordered to pay her to
equalize the division of the marital assets.
The trial court
merely ordered that Robert be allowed to pay Susie the amount of
$5,000 per month without interest until the full amount is paid.
Hardin v. Hardin, Ky.App., 711 S.W.2d 863 (1986), holds
that in cases like the one sub judice, interest should be ordered
on the deferred payments of the fixed amount.
Id. at 865.
The
Hardin court also stated that “if factors are present which would
make an interest award inequitable, it may be disallowed.”
Id.
See also Young v. Young, Ky., 479 S.W.2d 20, 22 (1972), and KRS
360.040, which states that “[a] judgment shall bear twelve
percent (12%) interest compounded annually from its date.”
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The trial court noted in its order on motions to
reconsider filed by the parties that “[i]t was probably error for
this Court to allow Dr. Burckardt to discharge the judgment at
$5,000 per month without interest.”
Even though the trial court
raised the issue sua sponte and Susie apparently never
specifically requested interest on the judgment, Susie was
nevertheless entitled to such interest unless an interest award
was inequitable.
Hardin, supra.
As the trial court noted that
it probably erred and failed to give specific reasons why it did
not award interest to Susie on the amount to be paid to her, we
are unable to properly review this matter to determine whether
the trial court abused its discretion in denying interest.
We
thus remand this issue to the trial court for a determination of
whether certain factors exist which would make an award of
interest inequitable in this case.
Susie’s other contention is that the trial court did
not deal properly with the parties’ Clifford trust.
In 1981, the
parties established a Clifford trust for their children’s benefit
with Robert as grantor and Susie as trustee.
The trial court
directed that Susie could expend funds she received from the
trust “as agreed by the parties or on the four children’s post
high school education.”
The court also ordered that any
withdrawals from the trust by Robert must be divided equally with
Susie.
Susie argues that the dissolution of the trust and the
division of its corpus between the parties would be “the most
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effective way to assure full compliance with the stated purpose
of the trust and minimize disagreement over use of the funds.”
However, Susie cites to no authority which would authorize the
trial court to terminate the trust.
In addition, she does not
cite to any authority which would demonstrate that the trial
court’s actions in regard to the trust were clearly erroneous or
an abuse of discretion.
We will not disturb the trial court’s
decree in this regard.
The judgment of the Jefferson Circuit Court is affirmed
in part, is reversed as to the equestrian expenses of Jennifer,
and is remanded for further determinations on whether interest
should be paid by Robert to Susie on the deferred equalization
payments.
All CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
B. Mark Mulloy
Louisville, KY
Cynthia Compton Stone
Douglas S. Haynes
Louisville, KY
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