LOIS DEVASIER, as Administratrix of the Estate of KENNEITHA CRADY v. GALEN OF VIRGINIA, INC. d/b/a UNIVERSITY OF LOUISVILLE HOSPITAL; DR. WILLIAM JAMES; INPSYCH KY., INC.; DR. GERALD CHAMBERS; and CINDY DUNCAN, L.C.S.W.
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RENDERED: June 12, 1998; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
NO. 96-CA-3354-MR
LOIS DEVASIER, as Administratrix of
the Estate of KENNEITHA CRADY
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE EDWIN A. SCHROERING, JR., JUDGE
ACTION NO. 96-CI-003734
v.
GALEN OF VIRGINIA, INC. d/b/a
UNIVERSITY OF LOUISVILLE HOSPITAL;
DR. WILLIAM JAMES; INPSYCH KY., INC.;
DR. GERALD CHAMBERS; and CINDY
DUNCAN, L.C.S.W.
APPELLEES
OPINION
REVERSING AND REMANDING
* * *
BEFORE:
BUCKINGHAM, KNOX, AND MILLER, JUDGES.
KNOX, JUDGE:
This is a wrongful death action in which the
administratrix of the estate of Kenneitha Crady appeals from an
order of the Jefferson Circuit Court dismissing her complaint for
failure to state a claim.
Because we believe that appellant's
complaint does, in fact, state a cause of action, and because the
trial court's summary dismissal was premature in light of CR
12.02 and CR 12.03, we reverse and remand.
In July 1995, the eight-year relationship between
Kenneitha Crady (Crady) and her boyfriend, Rene Cissell
(Cissell), was coming to an end.
to end the relationship.
Cissell, however, did not want
In mid-July, Cissell apparently rammed
his car into a parked car in which Crady was sitting, evidently
with her new boyfriend, causing Crady minor injuries.
A few days
later, on the morning of July 18, 1995, Cissell put a knife to
Crady's throat in anger, leaving a superficial flesh wound.
Later that day, he presented himself at the emergency psychiatric
unit of the University of Louisville Hospital (University
Hospital), accompanied by Crady and his sister, Georgia Yount,
where he apparently expressed his need for help in light of his
recent violence toward Crady.
He was referred to social worker
Cynthia Duncan, at Inpsych Kentucky, Inc., and met with Ms.
Duncan that afternoon.
Over the next two days (July 18th and 19th), Cissell
met with, and was evaluated by, several mental health care
providers, including appellees William James (a psychiatrist),
Gerald Chambers (a psychologist), and Cynthia Duncan (a licensed
clinical social worker).
Crady accompanied Cissell to most, if
not all, of these evaluations, and Cissell's sister, Ms. Yount,
participated in at least two sessions.
More than once, Cissell
asked to be hospitalized at University Hospital to address his
mounting emotions concerning Crady's break-up with him, and in
fact was placed on security detention by an emergency room
psychiatrist the day before Crady's murder, for being
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"homicidal," according to the doctor's records.
Later that day,
however, Cissell was evaluated by Dr. James and released from
detention.
The next day, July 20th, Cissell attacked and killed
Crady, stabbing her with a knife over forty times.
Cissell later
pled guilty to manslaughter and is now serving a sentence of
thirteen years.
In June 1996, appellant, in her capacity as
administratrix of Crady's estate, filed this wrongful death
action against appellees, alleging breach of their duty to Crady
to warn her of the seriousness of Cissell's mental condition and
of the danger Cissell posed to her, and breach of their duty to
treat and hospitalize Cissell when he was in need of emergency
psychiatric care.
Appellant believes that had appellees
fulfilled their duty to Crady, the target of Cissell's violence,
Cissell would not have had access to Crady on July 20, 1995, and
would not have killed her.
Appellant's action arises under KRS 202A.400 (duty of
qualified mental health professional to warn intended victim of
patient's threat of violence), which addresses the liability of a
mental health professional to a third party against whom a
patient has made an actual threat of physical violence.
Specifically, the statute precludes liability against a qualified
mental health professional "for failing to predict, warn of or
take precautions to provide protection from a patient's violent
behavior, unless":
[T]he patient has communicated to the
qualified mental health professional an
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actual threat of physical violence against a
clearly identified or reasonably identifiable
victim, or unless the patient has
communicated to the qualified mental health
professional an actual threat of some
specific violent act.
KRS 202A.400(1).
The statute goes on to identify those ways in
which the duties arising thereunder, if any, are discharged:
The duty to warn a clearly or reasonably
identifiable victim shall be discharged by
the qualified mental health professional if
reasonable efforts are made to communicate
the threat to the victim, and to notify the
police department closest to the patient's
and the victim's residence of the threat of
violence. . . . The duty to take reasonable
precaution to provide protection from violent
behavior shall be satisfied if reasonable
efforts are made to seek civil commitment of
the patient under this chapter.
KRS 202A.400(2).
Appellant alleges these violations of the
statute: (1)- Appellees failed to apprise Crady of the danger she
was in, and failed to notify the police of Cissell's potential
for violent behavior; and (2)- Appellees exposed Crady to
Cissell's continuing violent behavior as a result of their
failure to treat and ultimately hospitalize Cissell upon his
voluntary application.
Appellant filed her complaint on June 28, 1996,
supplementing it by way of two amendments, the latter of which
was filed on July 30, 1996.
One week later, on August 6th,
appellee Inpsych, and its employees, Dr.Chambers and Ms. Duncan,
filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a
cause of action.
Appellees University Hospital and Dr. James
followed suit, filing their motions to dismiss in mid-September.
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In support of their position, appellees pointed to appellant's
failure to allege anywhere in her complaint that Cissell had
communicated to appellees an "actual threat of physical violence"
toward Crady.
Appellees took the position that KRS 202A.400
requires that such an allegation appear in the complaint, and
that appellant's failure to include it therein was fatal to her
cause of action.
Further, the motions to dismiss included affidavits
from Dr. Chambers, Ms. Duncan, and Dr. James, all of whom stated
that Cissell did not at any time communicate to any of them any
actual threats of future physical violence toward Crady.
Thus,
appellees argued, regardless of whether appellant's complaint is
facially deficient, the action is nonetheless prohibited under
KRS 202A.400, which precludes liability in the absence of any
"communication" of an actual threat of physical violence.
In
addition to relying upon appellees' affidavits, University
Hospital attached copies of Cissell's psychological records
covering events and evaluations which occurred over the course of
July 18 and 19, 1995.
A hearing in the matter was held on October 14, 1996,
one day after which the trial court issued its order dismissing
the complaint.
The court determined that appellant's failure to
allege a specific incident in which Cissell communicated to
appellees an actual threat of physical violence, was fatal to
appellant's cause of action.
Additionally, the court concluded
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that appellant would be unable to produce any evidence of a
threat, and apparently dismissed the complaint on its merits:
Nowhere within the petition is there
any allegation that any of the defendants, in
the performance of their health care duties,
received any information or specific threats
as far as the deceased was concerned. In
fact, the Affidavits filed with the Motion to
Dismiss, specifically allege that there were
no specific threats of violence to the
deceased within the meaning of the statute.
The Affidavits are undenied. In addition, at
the argument of this matter, the plaintiff
advised the Court that they would be willing
to amend their petition to add the allegation
of a specific threat, once they were able to
discover such information, but that they had
none to support any claim against the
defendants at the time of the hearing on this
motion.
The motion before the Court is as much
one on the pleadings as anything else. The
plaintiff has simply failed to allege in the
pleadings, any specific threat which is
required under KRS 202A.400.
. . . In
allegations in
this Court has
the motions to
the absence of any specific
conformity with the statute
no alternative but to sustain
dismiss.
Trial court's order of October 15, 1996.
On appeal, appellant argues that: (1)- Her complaint
gave fair notice to appellees of her claim, which is all it was
required to do under Kentucky law, and should not have been
dismissed; (2)- Appellant presented the trial court with facts
sufficient to overcome the motions to dismiss; (3)- At this
stage, prior to appellant's having had any opportunity whatsoever
to conduct discovery on pertinent issues raised by appellees,
summary dismissal of appellant's claim was premature; and, (4)-6-
The trial court's representation in its order that appellant
advised the court at hearing that she had no information
concerning actual threats of physical violence made by Cissell,
is not an accurate representation of what occurred at the
hearing, and is contradicted by the evidence in the record.
We
agree with appellant on these points.
We do not believe that the language of KRS 202A.400
sets out mandatory pleading requirements.
Certainly, it makes no
attempt to delineate the type of information which must be
included in the complaint, as does, e.g., KRS 403.150, which
recites very detailed information which must be included in a
petition for divorce and also requires a specific allegation,
i.e. that the marriage is "irretrievably broken," to be included
in the petition.
Conspicuously absent from KRS 202A.400 is any
such language concerning mandatory allegations.
Absent such
mandates, appellant's complaint was subject only to review under
CR 8.01, interpreted to require the following:
The purpose of this Rule [8.01] is to
assign to pleadings the function of giving
notice and formulating true issues without
the requirement that they detail every fact
which in the past may have been necessary to
constitute a formal "cause of action" or a
defense.
The true objective of a pleading
stating a claim is to give the opposing party
fair notice of its essential nature, the
basis of the claimant's right, the adverse
party's wrong, and the type of relief to
which the claimant deems himself entitled.
Wells v. Morton, Ky., 388 S.W.2d 607, 609 (1965) (citation
omitted).
Wells involved an allegation of libel concerning
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statements made in a newspaper and broadcast over a radio
station.
Plaintiff's complaint, however, failed to allege that
the statements were made with actual malice, and was dismissed by
the trial court on that basis.
The appellate court held that,
while actual malice is an element of libel and must eventually be
proven, it was not necessary for the plaintiff to allege in his
complaint that the statements were made with actual malice.
It
was enough that the complaint "gave the appellee more than
adequate notice of the fact that he has been charged with falsely
and maliciously publishing . . . a number of statements which are
claimed to have been libelous on their face, and that appellant
seeks to recover damages from him by reason thereof."
Id. at
609-10.
In the present case, appellees were well aware that
appellant's cause of action arose under KRS 202A.400, having
based their motions to dismiss on that very statute.
Admittedly,
appellant's complaint was not precisely drafted, but it certainly
did not mislead the appellees, who clearly understood the basis
of appellant's claim.
As such, appellees were on notice that an
element of appellant's cause of action, as is clear from the
language in the statute, is "an actual threat of physical
violence" communicated to the mental health professional.
We do
not believe, however, that appellant's failure to allege the
communication in her complaint was fatal to her cause of action.
Appellees had fair notice of appellant's cause of action, and all
elements thereof.
Further, they were apprised in the complaint
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of the "wrongs" they had allegedly committed and the relief to
which appellant believes herself entitled.
Kentucky law requires.
That is all that
The complaint should not have been
dismissed for its failure to allege a specific incident involving
the element of communication.
We briefly touch upon the other aspects of this appeal.
The trial court clearly placed great weight on the affidavits of
appellees, characterizing the statements therein, i.e. that
Cissell made no actual threats of physical violence toward Crady,
as "undenied," noting that appellant herself had admitted at the
hearing that she had no information concerning any actual
threats.
Further, the court concluded that there would be no
such proof forthcoming.
This Court has reviewed the evidence
before the trial court and the videotape of the hearing, and
notes as follows:
(1)- There has been no opportunity for appellant to
take discovery from individuals who, appellant asserts, may have
knowledge of statements Cissell made to appellees over the course
of July 18 and 19, 1995, including: (a)- Cissell himself, as well
as his sister (both of whom are expected to contradict appellees'
testimony); (b)- an emergency room social worker who conferred
with Dr. James concerning Cissell's mental condition on the
afternoon of July 19th, just prior to Dr. James's removal of
Cissell from security detention; (c)- a neighbor who would have
overheard Cissell during an emergency telephone conversation
Cissell had with Dr. Chambers on the evening of July 19th, just
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after Cissell had tried to choke Crady; and, (d)- a "crisis"
social worker with whom Dr. Chambers spoke immediately following
that phone conversation.
(2)- At the hearing, the trial court asked counsel for
appellant whether she could stipulate to this: "As the case
stands right now, plaintiff has neither pled nor are you aware of
an actual threat."
that."
Counsel answered, "No, I can't stipulate to
Moments later, counsel stated that appellant is aware of
"threats," citing to specific testimony by Cissell's sister
during Cissell's sentencing hearing.
As such, we believe that
appellant adequately challenged appellees' affidavits to the
extent she could, given the very early stage of the proceedings.
Appellant informed the court that, because appellees moved to
dismiss her complaint just four weeks after she filed it, she had
not yet had an opportunity to conduct comprehensive discovery
supporting her position.
Appellant's complaint was not deficient on its face,
and should not have been dismissed on that basis.
Further,
having reviewed the videotape, the records submitted by the
parties, and the pleadings, we believe that the trial court's
attempt to dismiss the complaint on its merits was premature.
We
do not believe at this early stage of the proceedings, absent an
opportunity on appellant's part to conduct discovery, that it was
within the province of the trial court to consider whether
appellant could prove her allegations or ultimately prevail.
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The order of the Jefferson Circuit Court dismissing
appellant's complaint is reversed, and the case remanded for
further proceedings.
ALL CONCUR.
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BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR GALEN OF VIRGINIA,
INC. d/b/a UNIVERSITY OF
LOUISVILLE HOSPITAL:
Maury D. Kommor
Vicki L. Buba
Louisville, Kentucky
Frank P. Doheny, Jr.
Matthew W. Breetz
Louisville, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR DR. WILLIAM JAMES:
W. Gregory King
Louisville, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR INPSYCH KY., INC.,
DR. GERALD CHAMBERS, and CINDY
DUNCAN, L.C.S.W.:
John W. Phillips
William P. Swain
Michael S. Maloney
Louisville, Kentucky
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