WILLIAM WAYNE HIBBARD and PAMELA HIBBARD v. BENCO MINING, INC.; EAST MANUFACTURING COMPANY; ROY OSBORNE, d/b/a ROY OSBORNE TRUCK PARTS and R & T TRUCKING
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RENDERED: November 20, 1998; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
MODIFIED: April 23, 1999; 10:00 a.m.
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
1996-CA-002173-MR
WILLIAM WAYNE HIBBARD and
PAMELA HIBBARD
v.
APPELLANTS
APPEAL FROM PERRY CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE DOUGLAS C. COMBS, JR., JUDGE
ACTION NO. 91-CI-000346
BENCO MINING, INC.; EAST
MANUFACTURING COMPANY; ROY
OSBORNE, d/b/a ROY OSBORNE
TRUCK PARTS and R & T TRUCKING
AND
NO. 1996-CA-002284-MR
EAST MANUFACTURING COMPANY
v.
APPELLEES
CROSS-APPELLANT
CROSS-APPEAL FROM PERRY CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE DOUGLAS C. COMBS, JR., JUDGE
ACTION NO. 91-CI-000346
MOUNTAIN TARP & AWNING, INC.
AND
BENCO MINING, INC.
CROSS-APPELLEE
NO. 1996-CA-002285-MR
CROSS-APPELLANT
v.
CROSS-APPEAL FROM PERRY CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE DOUGLAS C. COMBS, JR., JUDGE
ACTION NO. 91-CI-000346
ROY OSBORNE, d/b/a ROY OSBORNE
TRUCK PARTS and R & T TRUCKING;
MOUNTAIN TARP & AWNING, INC.;
WILLIAM WAYNE HIBBARD and
PAMELA HIBBARD; and EAST
MANUFACTURING COMPANY
CROSS-APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: BUCKINGHAM, DYCHE, and GARDNER, Judges.
DYCHE, JUDGE.
Following a fifteen-day trial, a Perry Circuit
Court jury returned a verdict finding that East Manufacturing
Company (East) and Benco Mining, Inc. (Benco) were not
responsible for the devastating injuries suffered by William
Hibbard when he fell from his coal-hauling trailer on April 21,
1991.
Mr. Hibbard and his wife now appeal from a judgment
entered in accordance with that jury verdict, and the denial of
their motion for a new trial.
We affirm.
Hibbard was a truck driver who picked up loads of coal
at the Benco loading facility in Perry County and delivered the
coal to a buyer in Nashville, Tennessee.
On the day in question,
Hibbard’s trailer was loaded by Benco employees in the manner
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which Hibbard directed; that is, the coal was piled on the
trailer higher than the sideboards, necessitating the use of a
tarp to keep the coal from spilling from the trailer, and thereby
violating Kentucky Revised Statute (KRS) 189.150.1
Benco did not
allow truckers to apply tarps at the loading facility, and did
not furnish a “tarping rack” for use by the truckers.
Hibbard’s trailer, designed to his specifications and
assembled from various parts attached to a wrecked remainder of a
trailer originally manufactured by East, had no ground-operated
tarping system.
As above mentioned, the trailer was designed to
be loaded (or overloaded) so that the coal had a mound in the
middle of the load higher than the sideboards.
The use of “bows”
to hold the tarp up off the load was required by the design of
the trailer and the method of its loading, and prevented the use
of a ground-operated system.
After Hibbard’s trailer was loaded, he left the Benco
facility and drove a short distance before pulling off the road
to apply the tarp by hand.
While on top of the trailer, roughly
12-16 feet off the ground, Hibbard lost his balance, fell to the
ground, and was rendered a quadriplegic by his injuries.
1
Escaping contents - Shifting or spilling loads.
(1) No vehicle shall be operated upon any highway unless it
is so constructed as to prevent its contents from escaping.
(2) No vehicle shall be operated upon any public highway for
a distance of over one (1) mile whose load is susceptible to
shifting or spillage unless said load is covered with a device
suitable for prevention of spillage.
-3-
Hibbard and his wife initially brought this action
against Benco alone, alleging a failure to provide him with a
safe place or opportunity to apply the tarp, and creation of an
unsafe condition by overloading the trailer and then spraying the
coal with diesel fuel (as the contract required).
East was later
added by amended complaint; it was alleged to have defectively
designed or constructed the trailer, causing an unsafe condition
of which, Hibbard alleged, it was required to warn.
Both defendants denied the allegations and the
existence of any duties toward Hibbard.
The issues thus joined,
the action ran its course, concluding with the hard-fought trial.
This appeal followed.
East urges us to find that any error which occurred
below was harmless (Ky. R. Civ. Pro. 61.01) because the
defendants should have been granted directed verdicts.
East
maintains that the claims of Hibbard were patently meritless, and
should never have been presented to the jury.
While we might be
inclined to agree, we will nevertheless examine the errors
alleged by appellants.
The Hibbards find fault with the conduct of juror Edgar
Collins, who failed to acknowledge his attorney-client
relationship with one of the lawyers for the Hibbards.
The
attorney was representing Collins as a member of a class in a
class action suit which was “bumped” from the trial docket by the
length of the trial of the present case.
Collins is further
alleged to have made improper statements, in violation of the
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court’s admonition (Ky. Rev. Stat. 29A.310), relating to the
merits of the present case, or collateral results from a jury
verdict one way or the other.
Juror Collins was not finally
selected as a member of the panel which rendered the verdict
herein.
While we certainly do not condone juror Collins’s
conduct, we find no error in the action of the trial court.
Neither Collins nor the juror to which his remarks were addressed
took part in the decision of the case.
We are presented with no
evidence that his remarks were heard by any juror who actually
did decide the case.
Conspicuously absent is an affidavit of any
juror who sat on the case, and who heard Collins’s remarks.
First, juror misconduct only results in a new
trial when the misconduct so prejudices a
party that a fair trial was not obtained.
Second, it is the role of the trial judge,
entrusted with broad discretion, to determine
the prejudicial effect of juror misconduct-including the impact of extra-judicial
information.
. . . .
The trial court’s decision[] to overrule
the motion[] for . . . a new trial cannot be
disturbed on appeal absent a[n] . . . abuse
of discretion.
Gould v. Charlton Company, Inc., Ky., 929 S.W.2d 734, 740-1
(1996)(citation omitted).
We find no such abuse of discretion.
Appellants next claim that counsel for East prejudiced
the jury during his voir dire, intimating, they say, that his
client lacked insurance to cover any judgment which might be
rendered against it.
Appellants argue that they were entitled to
-5-
retaliate for this comment.
We simply say that such an
interpretation strains credulity.
There was nothing improper in
the statement of counsel for East, and no retaliation was
necessary or permissible.
The trial court’s allowing East to read several pages
of the Hibbards’ expert’s deposition into the record after the
witness had been subjected to thorough cross-examination and
finally discharged is the next ground raised by appellants.
We
find no prejudice, even if this were found to be error.
The Hibbards allege that they were prejudiced by the
failure of the trial court to give an instruction concerning
Benco’s duty to provide a safe means of, or place to, tarp his
trailer if it was reasonably foreseeable that he would need to
perform that act after being loaded at Benco.
We have carefully
examined the instructions given in this case, and find no error.
The instructions followed the law and the facts as presented.
The final error alleged pertains to an admonition given
by the trial court for the jury not to consider certain testimony
concerning the vehicle identification number of the trailer.
The
admonition was given at the time of the testimony of Mrs.
Hibbard, and withdrawn at the end of the Hibbards’ case in chief.
We find no abuse of discretion and no other error in this action
of the trial court.
Counsel had ample opportunity and time to
bring the evidence to the jury’s attention.
The trial court
withdrew the admonition, and the jury was permitted to consider
the evidence.
-6-
Having ruled thus, it is unnecessary to reach the
cross-appeals.
The judgment of the Perry Circuit Court is
affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT/
CROSS-APPELLEE:
BRIEF AND ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLEE MOUNTAIN TARP &
AWNING, INC.:
William R. Weinberg
Hindman, Kentucky
Rodney E. Buttermore, Jr.
Harlan, Kentucky
Marcia Milby Ridings
London, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE/
CROSS-APPELLANT
BENCO MINING, INC.:
ORAL ARGUMENT FOR APPELLANT/
CROSS-APPELLEE:
Scott M. Webster
London, Kentucky
William R. Weinberg
Hindman, Kentucky
ORAL ARGUMENT FOR APPELLEE/
CROSS-APPELLANT
BENCO MINING, INC.:
John F. Kelley
London, Kentucky
BRIEF AND ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLEE/CROSS-APPELLANT
EAST MANUFACTURING COMPANY:
Max D. Picklesimer
Lexington, Kentucky
BRIEF AND ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLEE/CROSS-APPELLANT
ROY OSBORNE d/b/a ROY OSBORNE
TRUCK PARTS AND R & T
TRUCKING:
Randall S. May
Hazard, Kentucky
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