WILLIAM ROSS v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: June 26, 1998; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
NO. 96-CA-2005-MR
WILLIAM ROSS
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM PULASKI CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE WILLIAM T. CAIN, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 96-CR-0058
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
* * * * * * *
BEFORE:
ABRAMSON, KNOPF, and MILLER, Judges.
ABRAMSON, JUDGE:
William Ross appeals from a July 16, 1996,
judgment of Pulaski Circuit Court convicting him, in accordance
with a jury verdict, of manslaughter in the first-degree (KRS
507.030) and sentencing him to ten years in prison.
Ross claims
that four errors by the trial court entitle him to relief from
this judgment.
The trial court failed, he alleges, to excuse for
cause two potential jurors likely to have prejudged him; it
unfairly limited the scope of voir dire; it incorrectly excluded
evidence of his state of mind; and it permitted the Commonwealth
to introduce during rebuttal evidence which it should have
introduced during its case-in-chief.
Having examined the record
and finding no reversible error, we affirm.
In November 1993, the Rockcastle Grand Jury indicted
Ross for murder in the shooting death of Charles Hopkins.
Trial
commenced in Rockcastle County in April 1996, but when a jury
could not be seated, the trial court transferred venue to Pulaski
County.
Trial was convened there in May 1996.
Charles Hopkins, the victim, was married to Ross's
niece Shirley.
Charles and Shirley lived on Water Tank Hill in
the Brodhead area of Rockcastle County.
lived nearby on Kentucky Highway 3245.
Ross's brother Jerry
For several months prior
to the shooting Ross also lived in the area.
He had come to
Kentucky from his mother's home in Indiana to stay with Shirley
following a quarrel between her and Charles.
When Shirley and
Charles reconciled, Ross moved in with Jerry.
At trial, the Commonwealth presented evidence tending
to show that Ross and Hopkins had, on the day of the shooting,
been together smoking marijuana and drinking beer.
The shooting,
the Commonwealth claimed, had been the culmination of a day-long,
off-and-on argument over a marijuana plant which Ross accused
Hopkins of having stolen.
Ross admitted having shot Hopkins, but claimed to have
done so in self-defense.
He alleged that Hopkins had grown
progressively belligerent that day as he had become increasingly
intoxicated, until he had finally attacked Ross and threatened to
beat him.
Ross maintained that he had been terrified by Hopkins'
aggression because of a prior head injury that had left him
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partially paralyzed and unable to defend himself with his hands.
That injury, he asserted (the result of a 1991 automobile
accident), had also left him susceptible to further neurological
damage and for that reason greatly increased his fear of Hopkins
and made him quick to believe that forcible self-defense was
necessary.
The jury was instructed on murder, on manslaughter in
the first and the second-degree, and on reckless homicide.
The
jury was also instructed concerning self-defense, including the
distinction under KRS 503.120 between reasonable exercises of
that privilege and wanton or reckless ones.
After nearly seven
hours of deliberation, the jury requested further guidance on the
difference between first and second-degree manslaughter.
Encouraged by the court to do as well as it could with the
instructions it had been given, the jury then deliberated another
hour before finding Ross guilty of manslaughter in the firstdegree.
Ross received the minimum authorized penalty of ten
years in prison.
Ross first claims that the trial court erred by failing
to dismiss for cause two prospective jurors who admitted during
voir dire that the indictment seemed to them strong evidence of
Ross's guilt.
Their voir dire proceeded in part as follows:
James Cox [attorney for Ross]
Does anybody believe that because somebody
is indicted . . . How many people have heard that
term "indictment?" . . .
Prospective Juror Eaton
I feel like the grand jury thought he was guilty
or there wouldn't have been an indictment returned.
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Cox
Okay. I think Judge Cain would tell you and I
think everybody would agree that just because somebody
has got an indictment returned that that's not
evidence of guilt at all.
Eaton
I understand.
Cox
What do you feel? And there's no wrong answer.
That's why we ask these questions.
Eaton
I stated how I felt. . . . I feel like the grand
jury thought he was guilty or they wouldn't have
returned an indictment. . . . I think that's just
common sense. . . .
Cox
Okay. Mr. Eaton, . . . if the judge told you,
Judge Cain told you, said, "Sir, you cannot hold that
indictment. It's basically just an accusation. You
can't hold that against him as any evidence of guilt,"
could you follow that?
Eaton
Yes, sir.
Cox
And you
Mr. Ross and
against you,
any evidence
could absolutely . . . Could you look at
say, "I know you've got an indictment
but I'm not holding that against you as
of guilt"? . . .
Eaton
I'm not sure it wouldn't have some effect on my
decision. . . .
Cox [after explaining grand jury procedure]
Would that be fair, . . . if you just heard one
side of the story and believed it? "I just think
they're guilty"? Doesn't sound too fair, does it?
. . . If you just heard one side, you don't think
that would be fair, would it?
Prospective Juror Hansford
No, but I think if all of the rest of them heard
that he was guilty, maybe he is guilty.
Cox
But you understand that they didn't say he was
guilty. Nobody said that. That's not the way we work.
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Hansford
They wouldn't have brought him up in court if
they hadn't showed that. . . . If a man was out there
drinking all day and they get into it and one kills
the other one, it don't sound too good to me.
Cox
I see what you're saying. Well. . . . How can you
say you could presume somebody not guilty but then say,
"Well, if he's indicted, I think he's guilty"? That
don't square, does it?
Hansford
No, not really.
Cox
Can you presume that he's right now not guilty of
murder?
Hansford
I don't know.
I've not heard all the facts. . . .
Cox
. . . What about it, Mr. Hansford? Do you think
right now if the judge told you, "You have to presume
that he's not guilty of this offense of murder," could
you do that?
Hansford
I suppose I'd have to because that's . . .
Cox
All right. and you wouldn't worry about that
indictment and what those people may or may not have
heard?
Hansford
I don't know.
I don't know.
The trial court denied Ross's motions to remove for
cause prospective jurors Eaton and Hansford.
Ross used
peremptory strikes to remove both men and exhausted his remaining
peremptory strikes against other prospective jurors.
If either
Eaton or Hansford should have been removed for cause, then Ross's
right under RCr 9.40 to eight peremptory strikes was violated by
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this procedure, and the violation is presumed to have been
prejudicial.
Thomas v. Commonwealth, Ky., 864 S.W.2d 252 (1993).
RCr 9.36(1), addressing when it is appropriate to
remove a prospective juror for cause, provides that "[w]hen there
is reasonable ground to believe that a prospective juror cannot
render a fair and impartial verdict on the evidence, he shall be
excused as not qualified."
Application of this rule, which
furthers a defendant's fair trial rights under the federal and
state constitutions, is addressed to the trial court's
discretion.
Absent an abuse of that discretion, this Court will
not disturb the trial court's decision.
Mabe v. Commonwealth,
Ky., 884 S.W.2d 668 (1994).
Under RCr 9.36(1), then, in a ruling on a challenge for
cause, it is the likelihood of bias or prejudice that is
determinative.
(1993).
Thompson v. Commonwealth, Ky., 862 S.W.2d 871
That likelihood is to be assessed not from the
prospective juror's response to a "magic question"--one
permitting him or her merely to disavow any partiality--but
instead from the surrounding circumstances, such as the juror's
exposure to pre-trial publicity, his or her relationship to the
parties or other participants, and the juror's knowledge,
attitudes, and beliefs as revealed during the course of voir
dire.
Thomas v. Commonwealth, supra, 864 S.W.2d at 258 (citing
Montgomery v. Commonwealth, Ky., 819 S.W.2d 713 (1992)).
A
criminal defendant's right to an impartial tribunal is
fundamental.
If a prospective juror indicates any inability to
adhere to the proper evidentiary presumptions and burdens, his or
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her qualification becomes suspect, and a thorough examination of
the juror's potential bias is called for.
Bowling v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 942 S.W.2d 293 (1997).
On the other hand,
allowance may be made for a prospective juror's lack of
familiarity with technical requirements of the law.
A juror's
initial uneasiness with those requirements is not necessarily
disqualifying as long as it appears that the juror will be able
to abide by them once they have been sufficiently explained.
Mabe v. Commonwealth, supra.
Applying these principles to this case, we note that
prospective jurors Eaton and Hansford each acknowledged serious
reservations about his ability to presume Ross's innocence and
not to think of the indictment as evidence against Ross.
Even
after counsel's explanation of the grand jury system, each man
continued to doubt his ability to disregard the indictment.
In
someone familiar with the grand jury system, this attitude would
amount to a rejection of the rule that the state bears the burden
of proof and would tend to shift that burden to the defendant.
Here, however, Eaton and Hansford were not familiar with the
grand jury system.
As their presumptions about that system were
drawn out and corrected, each stated that he understood and
could, however reluctantly, base his judgment on the evidence
presented at trial.
thorough.
Counsel's examination of these men was
It revealed not their inability to be indifferent or
to adhere to the proper presumptions, but rather their
inexperience with these notions and their gradual coming to terms
with them.
Being mindful of the trial court's opportunity to
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assess Eaton's and Hansford's demeanor, we are not persuaded that
the court abused its discretion by refusing to strike either of
these potential jurors for cause.
Ross's other allegations of error are similarly
unavailing.
Ross claims that soon after his 1991 automobile
accident he began to carry an unconcealed gun for protection.
was this gun that he used to shoot Hopkins.
It
During voir dire,
Ross sought to canvass the prospective jurors' attitudes about
people who carry guns.
He introduced this topic, however, by
referring to legislation subsequent to the shooting which related
to concealed weapons.
The trial court, correctly wanting to
avoid the extraneous concealed-weapon issue, disallowed Ross's
question.
Ross neither objected nor sought to rephrase the
inquiry.
His claim on appeal that the trial court erred by
foreclosing this line of questioning is thus not preserved.
RCr
9.22; Byrd v. Commonwealth, Ky., 825 S.W.2d 272 (1992).
Ross also claims that the trial court erred by
excluding his brother Jerry's testimony concerning a physician's
explanation of Ross's auto accident injuries.
By avowal Jerry
Ross testified that his brother was hospitalized following the
1991 accident for approximately a month.
During that time, Jerry
said, a doctor performed a Magnetic Resonance Imaging (MRI)
examination of his brother's head and discussed the results of
that exam with the two of them.
Jerry claimed that the doctor, a
Dr. Stewart, pointed out to them on the MRI injured portions of
Ross's brain and warned them that any further trauma to Ross's
head could prove debilitating or even fatal.
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The trial court excluded this testimony as inadmissible
hearsay.
Ross contends that it was not hearsay because it was
offered to prove, not the truth or accuracy of the doctor's
diagnosis, but only that the diagnosis was made and gave rise to
Ross's strong desire to protect himself against blows to the
head.
As Ross points out, KRE 801 defines "hearsay" as
encompassing only out of court statements "offered in evidence to
prove the truth of the matter asserted."
Arguably, then, the
doctor's explanation of the MRI would not be hearsay if offered
into evidence only on the narrow issue of whether the doctor had
made the explanation and Ross had heard it or been apprised of
it.
Norton v. Commonwealth, Ky. App., 890 S.W.2d 632 (1994).
This is Ross's contention, and as far as it goes we agree.
Nevertheless, we are not persuaded that the trial court abused
its discretion by excluding this testimony.
KRE 403 provides for
the exclusion of otherwise admissible evidence "if its probative
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of undue
prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury . . ."
Although theoretically Jerry Ross's testimony can be
distinguished from hearsay, the distinction is a fine one.
There
is a clear danger that a jury would misunderstand Jerry's
testimony as asserting the accuracy of the purported diagnosis.
Such a misunderstanding would substantially prejudice the
Commonwealth, for claims of self-defense raise issues concerning
the reasonableness as well as the genuineness of the defendant's
belief in the need for self-defense.
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KRS 503.120.
This
testimony is inadmissible hearsay on the issue of the
reasonableness of Ross's belief, but the jury is very likely to
consider it in that regard.
The exclusion of this testimony,
moreover, did not deny Ross a meaningful opportunity to present
to the jury his claim that a brain injury left him with a
heightened sense of the need for self protection.
The trial
court did not clearly err, therefore, by excluding Jerry Ross's
testimony concerning Dr. Stewart's alleged explanation of the
MRI.
Finally, Ross claims that the Commonwealth relied upon
improper rebuttal testimony.
During the presentation of his
defense, Ross testified at some length concerning the effects of
his automobile accident.
He claimed that his left side had been
significantly paralyzed, making it difficult for him to walk, to
steady his hand, and to defend himself.
On rebuttal, Hopkins's
sister Jenny Bishop testified that in 1993, not long before the
shooting, she had seen Ross use both arms to pick up a 19-inch
television set and that he had done so without seeming to favor
his left side.
Ross maintains that this testimony should have
been included in the Commonwealth's case-in-chief and that its
presentation at the end of trial was unduly prejudicial.
In Wager v. Commonwealth, Ky., 751 S.W.2d 28 (1988),
our Supreme Court, addressing rebuttal evidence, noted that the
admission of rebuttal evidence is largely a
matter of judicial discretion, RCr 9.42(e)[:]
"[t]he Commonwealth should not be permitted
to take undue advantage of the defendant and
withhold important evidence until near the
close of the trial, and then introduce it in
the guise of rebuttal evidence.
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. . . [A]ny out-of-court statement . . . that
may reasonably be interpreted as being in the
nature of an admission of guilt is admissible
in chief as affirmative evidence of guilt,
and should not be introduced in rebuttal
under the guise of contradicting or
impeaching the defendant in his capacity as a
witness."
Wager, supra, 751 S.W.2d at 29 (quoting Gilbert v. Commonwealth,
Ky., 633 S.W.2d 69, 71 (1982)).
We are not persuaded that Jenny Bishop's rebuttal
testimony violated these precepts.
Her testimony, bearing not at
all on the alleged events of the day of the shooting, would not
have contributed to the Commonwealth's case-in-chief.
Nor did it
concern what could be construed as an "admission of guilt" by
Ross.
His alleged lifting of a television in no way suggested
his participation in a crime.
It did not serve to disguise
criminal acts or to help Ross elude police apprehension.
Gilbert
v. Commonwealth, Ky., 633 S.W.2d 69 (1982) (discussing when
nonverbal behaviors might be deemed "admissions" of guilt).
Bishop's testimony did nothing except challenge Ross's claim that
he suffered from so severe a disability as to give rise to a
heightened sense of the need for self-defense.
The trial court
did not clearly err by admitting it for that purpose after Ross's
proof.
For these reasons, we affirm the July 16, 1996,
judgment of Pulaski Circuit Court.
KNOPF, JUDGE, CONCURS.
MILLER, JUDGE, DISSENTS.
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MILLER, JUDGE, DISSENTING.
I dissent.
I would reverse
and remand this matter for a new trial based upon the court's
refusal to excuse the two jurors for cause.
I am of the opinion
that the appellant was adjudged by a constitutionally deficient
panel.
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BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Susan J. Balliet
Prospect, Kentucky
A. B. Chandler, III
Attorney General
Karen Quinn
Asst. Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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