SCOTT McFALL, Individually and SCOTT McFALL, As Administrator of the Estate of JUDITH ANN McFALL V. PEACE, INC., /d/b/a OUR LADY OF PEACE HOSPITAL and MOHAMMAD A. MIAN, M.D.
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RENDERED: May 22, 1998; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
NO. 96-CA-1259-MR
SCOTT McFALL, Individually and
SCOTT McFALL, As Administrator
of the Estate of JUDITH ANN McFALL
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE THOMAS WINE, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 92-CI-005780
PEACE, INC., d/b/a OUR LADY
OF PEACE HOSPITAL and
MOHAMMAD A. MIAN, M.D.
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
* * *
BEFORE:
BUCKINGHAM, GARDNER, AND SCHRODER, JUDGES.
SCHRODER, JUDGE:
This is an appeal from a judgment entered
pursuant to a jury verdict in favor of a hospital and
psychiatrist in a hospital negligence, medical malpractice, and
wrongful death action brought by the estate of a decedent who
committed suicide while a patient in the hospital.
Upon
reviewing appellant's arguments in light of the record herein and
the applicable law, we affirm.
On September 14, 1991, Judith McFall committed suicide
by hanging herself from a pant leg tied to a closet door handle
in a room on a locked ward at appellee hospital, Our Lady of
Peace ("OLOP"), where she had been admitted approximately twelve
hours earlier.
At the time of her suicide, Mrs. McFall was a
patient on moderate suicide precautions at OLOP.
Appellee
psychiatrist, Dr. Mohammad Mian, was Mrs. McFall's designated
treating physician after she was admitted, although Dr. Mian had
not yet personally examined Mrs. McFall before her suicide.
On September 11, 1992, appellant, Scott McFall,
individually and as administrator of the estate of Judith McFall,
brought a wrongful death action against appellees, OLOP and Dr.
Mian, alleging hospital negligence and medical malpractice.
A
ten-day jury trial commenced on March 12, 1996, which produced a
voluminous record.
Mr. McFall presented twenty-two witnesses,
including one expert, and sixty-six exhibits; OLOP offered no
witnesses, but introduced eleven exhibits; and Dr. Mian presented
four witnesses, including one expert, and introduced eleven
exhibits.
Mian.
The jury returned a verdict in favor of OLOP and Dr.
This appeal by Mr. McFall followed.
The first issue raised by appellant is with regard to a
Quality Assurance Review ("QAR") form completed by OLOP relating
to Mrs. McFall's case, which appellant sought in discovery.
According to appellees, the QAR form at issue was a routine form
filled out by OLOP's nursing coordinator who reviewed and
critiqued OLOP's response to the Code 300 called in Mrs. McFall's
2
case.
Such forms are then reviewed by the nursing coordinator
manager and, when appropriate, reviewed by OLOP's safety
committee as part of the Hospital's comprehensive peer review
program to monitor and improve the quality of patient care.
On July 13, 1994, appellant filed a discovery motion
requesting that OLOP produce:
Any and all originals and/or copies of
documents regarding Judith McFall's
admission, evaluation, stay, and/or discharge
from Our Lady of Peace Hospital in September
1991 (including but not limited to any postdischarge documents prepared to date).
OLOP did not produce the QAR form, which appellant first learned
about during a pretrial evidentiary hearing, and did not make any
objection to discovery of said form in its first two responses to
the original discovery motion filed on August 12, 1994 and
March 8, 1995.
After appellant specifically requested discovery
of the QAR form, OLOP filed a third response on March 17, 1995,
stating:
Plaintiffs next ask this Court to compel the
production of the 'Quality Assurance Review
form regarding Ms. McFall which the defendant
hospital's corporate representative JoAnn
Jordan testified at the February 3, 1995
hearing was completed by Ms. Patsy Fusenager
of the defendant hospital's Quality Assurance
Department.' This document was never
requested in any request for production of
documents and is not now properly the subject
of a motion to compel. Had plaintiffs
requested this document within the discovery
period, this defendant would have objected to
its production on the basis of the peer
review privilege set forth in KRS 311.377.
Thereafter, on July 6, 1995, OLOP filed a separate motion
specifically seeking a protective order as to the QAR form
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pursuant to the peer review privilege in KRS 311.377.
The court
held an in camera hearing on August 2, 1995, regarding the
discovery of the QAR form and other hospital documents which we
shall discuss later.
On September 6, 1995, the court entered a
protective order as to the QAR form pursuant to the peer review
privilege in KRS 311.377.
Appellant first maintains that OLOP waived its right to
assert the peer review privilege when it failed to timely object
to the discovery of, or move for a protective order regarding,
the QAR form.
Appellant claims that OLOP's motion for protective
order was untimely because it was filed after the various
responses to the motion for production were filed.
Appellant
cites to various cases holding that a motion for protective order
must be filed before the date the response to the request for
production of the document at issue is due.
However, said cases
are not from our jurisdiction and, thus, they are not
controlling.
Under the Kentucky civil rules, the trial court has
broad power to control the use of the discovery process and to
prevent its abuse.
332 (1967).
Hoffman v. Dow Chemical Co., Ky., 413 S.W.2d
The trial court has wide discretion in protecting
persons from discovery abuses by issuing protective orders.
Gevedon v. Grigsby, Ky., 303 S.W.2d 282 (1957).
While OLOP did
not raise the issue of the peer review privilege or even mention
the existence of the QAR form until its response of March 17,
1995, which was after the court's February 16, 1995 order closing
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discovery, we cannot say the trial court abused its discretion in
entering the protective order in this case.
Appellant had notice
of the existence of the QAR form and OLOP's assertion of the peer
review privilege well before trial, which began on March 12,
1996.
We would also note that CR 26.05(c) provides that a party
with a duty to supplement a discovery response may do so "at any
time prior to trial through new requests for supplementation of
prior responses."
Appellant also cites Shobe v. EPI Corp., Ky., 815
S.W.2d 395 (1991) as authority for his position.
The Court in
Shobe, supra, held that absent a motion for a protective order or
an in camera review, a trial court is not required to sua sponte
conduct an in camera review of a document to determine the
applicability of a privilege regarding the document's discovery.
The Court reasoned that a party seeking to protect the
confidentiality of a document from discovery is required to
assert and prove the applicable privilege.
Id.
Shobe is easily
distinguishable from the present case by the fact that in the
present case, OLOP did eventually file a motion for protective
order and for an in camera review of the document at issue.
Further, there was no mention in Shobe, supra, as to when such
motions must be made.
Finally, we must address OLOP's argument that the QAR
form was not within the original discovery request of July 13,
1994.
This argument is not well taken.
We do not see how OLOP
can seriously contend that the QAR form was not a document
5
relating to Mrs. McFall's "admission, evaluation, stay and/or
discharge from Our Lady of Peace Hospital in September 1991
(including but not limited to any post-discharge documents
prepared to date)."
Certainly, appellant could not have been
expected to request a specific document of which he was not yet
aware.
Even though the document was privileged, it clearly
related to Mrs. McFall's stay at OLOP.
Appellant next argues that even if OLOP's motion for
protective order was timely, OLOP failed to establish that the
QAR form was within the peer review privilege of KRS 311.377.
KRS 311.377(1) and (2) provide:
(1) Any person who applies for, or is
granted staff privileges after June 17, 1978,
by any health services organization subject
to licensing under the certificate of need
and licensure provisions of KRS Chapter 216B,
shall be deemed to have waived as a condition
of such application or grant, any claim for
damages for any good faith action taken by
any person who is a member, participant in or
employee of or who furnishes information,
professional counsel, or services to any
committee, board, commission, or other entity
which is duly constituted by any licensed
hospital, licensed hospice, licensed home
health agency, health insurer, health
maintenance organization, health services
corporation, organized medical staff, medical
society, or association affiliated with the
American Medical Association, American
Podiatry Association, American Dental
Association, American Osteopathic
Association, or the American Hospital
Association, or a medical care foundation
affiliated with such a medical society or
association, or governmental or
quasigovernmental agency when such entity is
performing the designated function of review
of credentials or retrospective review and
evaluation of the competency of professional
acts or conduct of other health care
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personnel. This subsection shall have equal
application to, and the waiver be effective
for, those persons who, subsequent to
June 17, 1978, continue to exercise staff
privileges previously granted by any such
health services organization.
(2) At all times in performing a designated
professional review function, the
proceedings, records, opinions, conclusions,
and recommendations of any committee, board,
commission, medical staff, professional
standards review organization, or other
entity, as referred to in subsection (1) of
this section shall be confidential and
privileged and shall not be subject to
discovery, subpoena, or introduction into
evidence, in any civil action in any court or
in any administrative proceeding before any
board, body, or committee, whether federal,
state, county, or city, except as
specifically provided with regard to the
board in KRS 311.605(2). This subsection
shall not apply to any proceedings or matters
governed exclusively by federal law or
federal regulation.
In reviewing the sealed records, we see that the QAR
form, which was submitted to the trial court in camera, was
actually two forms, a Code 300 Monitoring Form and a Critical
Incident Review Report.
From our review of those forms, we
believe the trial court properly found that they fell within the
peer review privilege of KRS 311.377.
They were not otherwise
discoverable records simply placed in a peer review file.
See
Leanhart v. Humana, Inc., Ky., 933 S.W.2d 820 (1996).
Appellant next argues that the trial court improperly
prohibited him from discovering certain documents relating to
other suicides by hanging at OLOP prior to Mrs. McFall's suicide.
Just as appellant argued with regard to the QAR form, appellant
argues that OLOP filed their objection to the discoverability of
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the documents pertaining to the prior suicides by hanging in an
untimely manner.
OLOP first raised an objection to the discoverability
of the prior suicide documents on August 12, 1994, although it
was not a formal motion for protective order.
On March 20, 1995,
the court entered an order requiring OLOP to produce the prior
suicide documents.
Thereafter, OLOP apparently did not comply
with said order and filed a motion for in camera review of the
prior suicide documents on July 6, 1995.
The court held the in
camera review of the prior suicide documents at the same time it
reviewed the QAR form.
In the September 6, 1995 order entering
the protective order as to the QAR form, the court also granted a
protective order "for records pertaining to patients who
committed suicide at Our Lady of Peace Hospital prior to 1991 as
the Court has conducted an in camera review of same and believes
they have no probative value and discovery of same will embarrass
nonparties."
As we stated earlier, the trial court has wide
discretion in issuing protective orders.
Gevedon, supra.
Thus,
we cannot say the trial court was prohibited from entering the
protective order as to the prior suicide documents simply because
the motion for in camera review was filed after the earlier order
requiring production of such documents.
Appellant also complains that OLOP never made a motion
for protective order regarding the prior suicide documents as
required by CR 26.03(1) and, thus, the court improperly acted sua
8
sponte in entering the protective order in question.
argument is devoid of merit.
This
OLOP's July 6, 1995 motion for in
camera review plainly states OLOP's objection to the discovery of
the prior suicide documents on grounds of patient confidentiality
and lack of relevance.
Although OLOP did not explicitly state it
was seeking a protective order in the motion, appellant had
written notice of OLOP's opposition to the discovery of the
documents at issue and of OLOP's desire for the court to decide
whether said documents were discoverable.
Why else would OLOP
make such a motion, if not for a protective order?
In any event,
in Shobe v. EPI Corp., supra, the Court stated that a motion for
protective order or a motion for an in camera review would be
sufficient to raise the issue before the trial court such that
the court would not be acting sua sponte.
Appellant also contends that OLOP did not make a
showing of good cause for the protective order regarding the
prior suicide documents as required by CR 26.03(1).
From our
review of the documents regarding prior suicides by hanging at
OLOP, which are sealed in the record, we believe OLOP made a
sufficient showing of good cause for the protective order to be
issued.
In balancing the prior patients' rights to
confidentiality against the value of the records to appellant's
case, the court properly found that the prior records lacked
sufficient probative value to be discoverable, given their
remoteness in time and lack of factual similarity to the facts in
the present case.
9
Appellant's next assignment of error is that the trial
court erred in precluding him from presenting evidence regarding
OLOP's negligence in having an open loop closet door handle in
Mrs. McFall's room within a locked ward at a psychiatric hospital
where persons with known suicidal tendencies are routinely
hospitalized.
At a pretrial hearing in the case, OLOP made a
motion in limine to exclude evidence on this issue because
appellant was not going to present the evidence through an expert
witness.
OLOP maintained an expert witness was necessary because
the evidence fell outside the range of common experience and
observation.
Appellant argued that the nature of the evidence
was within the comprehension of the average juror.
However, the
actual evidence sought to be admitted by appellant was not
admitted by avowal during the hearing.
The court ruled pursuant
to the motion in limine that the evidence was not admissible
unless it was through an expert witness.
OLOP maintains the issue was unpreserved because the
evidence appellant sought to admit was not offered by avowal
either at the hearing on the motion in limine or during trial.
Appellant counters that an avowal was not necessary since the
matter was ruled on pursuant to a motion in limine, citing KRE
103(d).
We agree with OLOP that the issue was not preserved for
review.
It has long been the rule in Kentucky that a party must
offer excluded evidence by avowal in order to preserve the issue
of its exclusion for appeal.
Partin v. Commonwealth, Ky., 918
10
S.W.2d 219 (1996); Freeman v. Oliver M. Elam, Jr. Co., Ky., 372
S.W.2d 796 (1963).
While KRE 103(d) does state that "[a] motion
in limine resolved by order of record is sufficient to preserve
error for appellate review," we believe the rule was intended to
eliminate the requirement that the error be raised again during
trial.
Therefore, in our view, where the court has excluded
certain evidence, the party opposing its exclusion is still
required to offer the excluded evidence by avowal either during
the motion in limine or during trial in order to preserve the
error.
Whether the issue is presented to the court during a
motion in limine or during trial, the appellate court must have
the benefit of the actual evidence at issue in order to adjudge
whether it was properly excluded.
O'Bryan v. Hedgespeth, Ky., 892 S.W.2d 571 (1995),
cited by appellant as to this issue, is distinguishable from the
case at hand by the fact that in O'Bryan, supra, the trial court
did not exclude evidence, but rather ruled certain evidence
admissible.
Thus, an avowal was not necessary and was not at
issue in that case.
The remaining issue before us is whether the trial
court erred in allowing an expert witness called by Dr. Mian to
testify on behalf of OLOP when OLOP had not given appellant
notice prior to trial that it intended to call said expert on its
behalf.
During the trial, Dr. Randolph Schrodt was called by Dr.
Mian as an expert witness to testify as to Dr. Mian's adherence
to the standard of care he owed Mrs. McFall.
11
Dr. Schrodt had
been identified as an expert witness for Dr. Mian and had been
deposed prior to trial by appellant pursuant to the court's
order.
Following the conclusion of his direct examination by
counsel for Dr. Mian, Dr. Schrodt was cross-examined by OLOP.
During this examination of Dr. Schrodt, OLOP elicited testimony
regarding the hospital's standard of care to Mrs. McFall.
Appellant objected to this testimony on grounds that OLOP had not
listed Dr. Schrodt as one of its expert witnesses prior to trial.
The court allowed Dr. Schrodt to testify as to OLOP's meeting the
standard of care it owed Mrs. McFall.
KRE 611(b) provides:
Scope of cross-examination. A witness may be
cross-examined on any matter relevant to any
issue in this case, including credibility.
In the interests of justice, the trial court
may limit cross-examination with respect to
matters not testified to on direct
examination.
Our Supreme Court has held that "KRE 611 embodies the
'wide open' rule of cross-examination by allowing questioning as
to any matter relevant to any issue in the case, subject to
judicial discretion in the control of interrogation of witnesses
and production of evidence."
Derossett v. Commonwealth, Ky., 867
S.W.2d 195, 198 (1993).
Much of Dr. Schrodt's testimony on direct examination
by Dr. Mian focused on the policies and procedures of OLOP and
other local hospitals with regard to potentially suicidal
patients.
Thus, the questions of OLOP's counsel on cross-
examination as to whether the policies and procedures of OLOP met
12
the requisite standard of care of other similarly situated
hospitals was certainly within the scope of direct examination.
We are not aware of any authority in Kentucky for the proposition
that an expert witness cannot give expert testimony on crossexamination which is within the scope of direct examination and
is favorable to the party cross-examining the expert.
In any
event, in reviewing the record, we see that OLOP listed Dr.
Schrodt in two pretrial documents as a potential witness.
Thus,
appellant's claim that he did not have notice that Dr. Schrodt
would testify on OLOP's behalf is without merit.
Accordingly,
the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing Dr.
Schrodt's testimony on cross-examination by OLOP.
For the reasons stated above, the judgment of the
Jefferson Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
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BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE, PEACE,
INC., d/b/a OUR LADY OF PEACE
HOSPITAL:
Harry B. O'Donnell, IV
Guy Jantzen Hibbs
Chris Meinhart
Louisville, Kentucky
B. Todd Thompson
Millicent A. Tanner
Louisville, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE, MOHAMMAD
A. MIAN, M.D.:
Byron N. Miller
Martha J. Hasselbacher
Louisville, Kentucky
14
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