EAGLE CAPITAL MORTGAGE, LTD. V. VERNON FARMER; and ALEFAIR FARMER
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RENDERED:
September 19, 1997; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
NO. 96-CA-2214-MR
EAGLE CAPITAL MORTGAGE, LTD.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM HARLAN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE RON JOHNSON, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 96-CI-82
V.
VERNON FARMER; and ALEFAIR FARMER
APPELLEES
OPINION AFFIRMING
* * * * * * * *
BEFORE:
GUDGEL, KNOPF, and SCHRODER, Judges.
GUDGEL, JUDGE:
This is an appeal from a default judgment granted
by the Harlan Circuit Court in favor of appellees Vernon and
Alefair Farmer against appellant Eagle Capital Mortgage, Ltd.
(Eagle) in an action seeking damages stemming from defective home
improvement work which was financed by Eagle.
Eagle contends
that the court erred by granting the default judgment.
disagree.
We
Hence, we affirm.
On February 9, 1996, the Farmers filed an action
against Eagle, a Texas limited partnership, and certain
codefendants in Harlan Circuit Court alleging inter alia that
Eagle's codefendants had performed defective home improvement
work at their home and had promised to help the Farmers obtain
financing for the work through a low interest FHA loan, but
instead had induced them to enter into a retail installment loan
contract and security agreement with Eagle at a much higher
interest rate after the defective work had been completed.
Eagle
failed to file a timely answer to the complaint, but on April 9,
1996, Eagle's Texas counsel Chris Carrie requested and received
from appellees' counsel an extension of time until April 19,
1996, in which to file an answer.
On April 18 Carrie's office
contacted appellees' counsel and requested and received a second
extension of time until May 15, 1996.
However, Eagle failed to
file an answer until May 23, and did not file a motion seeking an
extension of time in which to file the untimely answer.
The
trial court granted appellees' subsequent motion to strike
Eagle's answer and granted them a default judgment as to
liability.
This appeal followed.
On appeal, Eagle contends that the court erred by
granting appellees a default judgment.
We disagree.
CR 55.02 states that a court may set aside a default
judgment in accordance with CR 60.02 for good cause shown.
The
factors which must be considered in deciding whether to set a
default judgment aside are: (1) is there is valid excuse for the
default, (2) is there a meritorious defense to the action, and
(3) will the other party be prejudiced.
Perry v. Central Bank &
Trust Co., Ky. App., 812 S.W.2d 166 (1991).
Appellant Eagle
argues that it satisfied all three of the above factors and,
thus, that the trial court should have granted it relief.
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Its
argument is based entirely upon an affidavit of its counsel,
Chris Carrie, which was filed in response to appellees' motion
for a default judgment.
In his affidavit Carrie states that after obtaining the
first extension of time he was out of the country between April
19 and May 5, 1996, and that after his return he learned of the
second extension obtained by an associate in his office.
The
affidavit further states that on May 23, 1996, he contacted local
Kentucky counsel regarding the filing of an answer on behalf of
Eagle.
However, Carrie offered no explanation for the failure to
meet the second extension deadline of May 15 or the failure to
timely seek a third extension.
As the court noted, even
accounting for the fact that counsel was out of the country until
May 5, the affidavit offered no valid explanation as to why the
answer was not filed prior to the agreed deadline of May 15 or
why no motion for an extension of time to file the answer was
filed.
Mere carelessness by a party or his attorney is not
reason enough to set a default judgment aside.
Perry, supra.
While it is true that courts do not favor default
judgments and that it is preferable to decide cases on the
merits, Dressler v. Barlow, Ky. App., 729 S.W.2d 464 (1987),
trial courts possess broad discretion in considering motions to
set default judgments aside and this court will not interfere
absent an abuse of that discretion.
App., 749 S.W.2d 690 (1988).
Howard v. Fountain, Ky.
Further, in the absence of a waiver
by the adverse party, a litigant whose time to plead has expired
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cannot be allowed to do so except upon a motion and a showing of
excusable neglect.
Hawes v. Cumberland Contracting Co., Ky., 422
S.W.2d 713 (1967).
Here, no excusable neglect was shown for
appellant's failure to timely file an answer.
Hence, we cannot
say that the trial court erred by failing to set the default
judgment against Eagle aside.
The court's judgment is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
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BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEES:
V. Katie Gilliam Scott
Harlan, KY
Robert M. Melvin
Harlan, KY
Lois Renfro Morris
Barbourville, KY
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