CURTIS RUSSELL V. C P & G COAL COMPANY, SPECIAL FUND, DONNA TERRY/ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE and WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
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RENDERED:
October 3, 1997; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
NO. 96-CA-2185-WC
CURTIS RUSSELL
APPELLANT
PETITION FOR REVIEW OF A DECISION
OF THE WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
ACTION NO. 93-34354
V.
C P & G COAL COMPANY,
SPECIAL FUND, DONNA
TERRY/ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW JUDGE and WORKERS'
COMPENSATION BOARD
APPELLEES
OPINION
VACATING AND REMANDING
* * * * * * * *
BEFORE:
COMBS, EMBERTON and GARDNER, Judges.
GARDNER, JUDGE:
for
review
Curtis Russell (Russell) has brought a petition
from
an
order
of
the
Workers'
Compensation
Board
dismissing his appeal. After reviewing the record in this case, we
vacate and remand.
Russell filed an occupational disease claim in August
1993.
Following this filing, the Special Fund filed a notice of
resistance and had Russell examined by a physician.
In December
1993, counsel for Russell filed a motion to dismiss his claim,
because counsel contended that he had just learned that Russell had
filed a previous occupational disease claim.
The Special Fund
apparently contested the dismissal unless reimbursement was ordered
for the evaluation of Russell by a physician and related costs.1
On March 11, 1994, Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Lloyd
Edens stated that the filing of the second occupational disease
claim was not an attempt to defraud but was a mistake, so the
objection by the Special Fund was denied.
The Special Fund on
March 28, 1994, filed a renewed motion for costs.
No action was
apparently taken so the Special Fund filed a second renewed motion
for costs on October 3, 1995.
motions.
Russell did not respond to these
In an order of November 11, 1995, Chief ALJ Donna Terry
found that Russell did file an unreasonable proceeding pursuant to
Kentucky Revised Statute (KRS) 342.310 and granted the Special
Fund's motion for costs totalling $417.56.
On February 6, 1996, Russell filed a document entitled
"Notice" wherein he argued that because the Special Fund did not
appeal from ALJ Edens' order, the order became final.
ALJ Terry,
on May 13, 1996, construed Russell's "Notice" filing as a petition
for reconsideration and ordered that Russell's petition be denied
as untimely.
Russell on June 10, 1996, filed a notice of appeal
from ALJ Terry's May 13, 1996 order.
The Special Fund moved for
dismissal of Russell's appeal, on grounds that it was untimely. In
an order dated July 12, 1996, the Workers' Compensation Board (the
board) granted the Special Fund's motion and dismissed Russell's
appeal.
Russell has appealed from the board's order.
1
We have been unable to locate a copy of the Special Fund's
response in the record.
-2-
Russell argues that ALJ Edens' March 11, 1994 order
controls in the instant case, because he had ruled that the Special
Fund's request for costs was unwarranted, and the Special Fund
failed to file a petition for reconsideration within the required
fourteen
day
period.
The
Special
Fund,
on
the
other
hand,
maintains that ALJ Edens' order did not specifically address the
Special Fund's request for costs and that Russell later did not
file a timely petition for reconsideration following ALJ Terry's
decision or make a timely appeal to the board.
After reviewing the
record, we have concluded that ALJ Edens' order did address the
matter at issue and that the Special Fund failed to file a timely
petition for reconsideration or appeal from ALJ Edens' order.
KRS 342.310(1) provides,
If any administrative law judge, the
board or any court before whom any
proceedings
are
brought
under
this
chapter determines that such proceedings
have
been
brought,
prosecuted,
or
defended without reasonable ground, he or
it may assess the whole cost of the
proceedings which shall include actual
expenses but not be limited to the
following: court costs, travel expenses,
deposition costs, physician expenses for
attendance fees at depositions, attorney
fees,
and
all
other
out-of-pocket
expenses upon the party who has so
brought, prosecuted, or defended them.
In the instant case, ALJ Edens in his March 11, 1994 order
dismissed Russell's claim and noted that the motion to dismiss was
filed timely by Russell's counsel as soon as it became apparent
that the claim was the second filed by Russell.
ALJ Edens
concluded that the filing of the second occupational disease claim
-3-
was not an attempt to defraud but was a mistake, and as a result,
he denied the objection by the Special Fund.
Thus, ALJ Edens'
order while not explicitly stating that he was denying the exact
costs sought by the Special Fund, clearly found that Russell's
action had not been brought without reasonable grounds as required
by KRS 342.310(1) in order to assess costs.
No timely appeal or
petition for reconsideration was brought by the Special Fund.
KRS 342.281 and 342.285.
See
The later motions for costs brought by
the Special Fund were not proper or timely.
Thus, ALJ Edens' order
controlled the case.
Chief ALJ Terry's order finding that Russell had filed an
unreasonable claim directly contradicted ALJ Edens' earlier order
concluding that Russell's claim was a mistake, not an attempt to
defraud.
While Russell's pleading entitled "Notice" and his later
notice of appeal from Chief ALJ Terry's order were untimely and
procedurally flawed, these matters are essentially academic because
ALJ Edens' order controlled the case as there was no timely
petition for reconsideration or appeal taken from it.
Thus, we
must vacate the board's order of dismissal. The board's order did
not provide specific reasons for dismissing; however, based upon
the Special Fund's motion, it appears that the appeal was dismissed
as untimely.
We believe the issue of timeliness of the appeal was
at that point academic, because ALJ Edens' earlier order was the
law of the case and must control since a timely appeal or petition
for reconsideration had not been taken from it.
vacate the board's order and remand this case.
-4-
Therefore, we
Upon remand, we
direct the board to enter an order vacating ALJ Terry's order of
November 11, 1995, which awarded costs to the Special Fund.
For the foregoing reasons, this Court vacates the order
of the Workers' Compensation Board and remands for proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
ALL CONCUR.
-5-
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF
FUND:
J. Drew Anderson
Prestonsburg, Kentucky
FOR
APPELLEE
SPECIAL
Joel D. Zakem
Louisville, Kentucky
NO BRIEF FOR APPELLEE C P & G
COAL COMPANY
-6-
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