MARSHALL WILLOUGHBY v. MICHAEL J. O'DEA, WARDEN; COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED:
October 3, 1997; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
NO. 96-CA-1611-MR
MARSHALL WILLOUGHBY
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM MORGAN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE SAMUEL C. LONG, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 96-CI-107
v.
MICHAEL J. O'DEA, WARDEN;
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
* * * * * * *
BEFORE:
GUDGEL, KNOPF, and SCHRODER, Judges.
KNOPF, JUDGE:
The appellant, Marshall Willoughby, is
incarcerated at Eastern Kentucky Correctional Complex in West
Liberty, Kentucky.
On March 25, 1996, he was issued a
disciplinary report based after he tested positive on a urine
test for use of tranquilizers.
However, the adjustment committee
dismissed the disciplinary report on March 28, 1996 based upon an
unspecified due process violation.
No further action was taken
on the report.
Nonetheless, on March 24 Willoughby received a letter
from Captain Donnie Brown informing him that his visiting
privileges were being restricted.
This letter was followed up by
a memorandum on April 1 from Senior Captain Ernest D. Smith,
stating that:
Due to documentation received by this office
involving an incident of which you used
drugs, intoxicants, or other unauthorized
substance, your visits are being
administratively restricted to controlled
visits for six months. This restriction is
from March 28, 1996 until September 28, 1996.
Willoughby responded to the memorandum, noting that the
disciplinary charges against him had been dismissed.
Warden
Michael O'Dea responded that "the restricted visits were placed
on you as a security measure, not a punishment."
original).
(Emphasis in
Willoughby then filed a declaratory judgment action
in Morgan Circuit Court, seeking reversal of the prison
administration's action.
The trial court dismissed the petition
on the Correction Department's motion.
Willoughby now brings
this appeal.
The Corrections Department insists that its action
restricting Willoughby's visitation privileges was not a
punishment, but only a security measure.
The Department also
argues that Willoughby has no protected liberty interest in
visitation.
As a result, the Department contends that Willoughby
has no due process interest in this matter.
In the context of prison disciplinary proceedings, the
requirements of due process are much more limited than in a
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criminal trial.
Superintendent, Massachusetts Correctional
Institution v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 454, 86 L.Ed.2d 356, 374, 105
S.Ct. 2768 (1985).
The prisoner's due process interests must be
accommodated in the distinctive setting of a prison, where
disciplinary proceedings "take place in a closed, tightly
controlled environment peopled by those who have chosen to
violate the criminal law and have been lawfully incarcerated for
doing so."
Id. (quoting, Wolff v. McDonald, 418 U.S. 539, 561,
41 L.Ed.2d 935, 954, 94 S.Ct. 2963 (1974)).
Therefore, the
requirements of due process are satisfied if "some evidence"
supports the decision by the prison disciplinary board to revoke
good time credits.
Hill, 472 U.S. at 455, 86 L.Ed.2d at 365.
In
light of the exceptional difficulties confronting prison
administrators, a highly deferential standard of judicial review
is constitutionally appropriate with respect to both the
factfinding that underlies prison disciplinary decisions and the
construction of prison regulations.
Smith v. O'Dea, Ky. App.,
939 S.W.2d 353, 357 (1996).
Nonetheless, this minimal due process standard does not
authorize punishment without any due process considerations.
The
Corrections Department argues that Willoughby's due process
protections are not required where that administrative action
does not involve a protected liberty interest.
The Department
cites to the United States Supreme Court decision in Kentucky
Department of Corrections v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 104 L.Ed.2d
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506, 109 S.Ct. 1904 (1989), as holding that prisoners have no
protected liberty interest in visitation privileges.
Therefore,
they argue that Willoughby has no due process rights in
administrative actions restricting his visitation privileges.
However, Thompson is limited to the liberty interest
created by the specific regulations at issue in that case.
Stated simply, "a State creates a
protected liberty interest by placing
substantive limitations on official
discretion." Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S.,
at 249, 75 L.Ed.2d 813, 103 S.Ct. 1741. A
State may do this in a number of ways.
Neither the drafting of regulations nor their
interpretation can be reduced to an exact
science. Our past decisions suggest,
however, that the most common manner in which
a State creates a liberty interest is by
establishing "substantive predicates" to
govern official decisionmaking, Hewitt v.
Helms, 459 U.S., at 472, 74 L.Ed.2d 675, 103
S.Ct. 864, and, further, by mandating the
outcome to be reached upon a finding that the
relevant criteria have been met.
Thompson, 490 U.S. at 462, 104 L.Ed.2d at 516.
After analyzing the visitation regulations at issue,
the United States Supreme Court found that the regulations do not
contain the "substantive predicates" which would compel a certain
result in any given situation.
Consequently, the Court found
that the "overall effect of the regulations is not such that an
inmate can reasonably form an objective expectation that a visit
would necessarily be allowed absent the occurrence of one of the
listed conditions.
Or, to state it differently, the regulations
are not worded in such a way that an inmate could reasonably
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expect to enforce them against the prison officials."
Id. at
465, 104 L.Ed.2d at 518.
In this case, the prison administration was not
enforcing a discretionary regulation.
Rather, the administration
punished Willoughby for violation of disciplinary regulations by
restricting his visitation privileges.
The warden admitted that
it was a punishment by stating that his visitation privileges
were being restricted as a result of the positive drug test.
The
quid pro quo nature of the prison administration's action is
obvious.
The alleged misconduct and the prison response are
directly connected.
It is ludicrous to suggest that the
administration's action was not a punishment.
We certainly agree
that prison officials have wide latitude in determining what
security measures are appropriate.
Courts must balance the
prison administration's profound interest in maintaining order
against the inmate's minor interest in unrestricted visitation.
Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. at 562, 41 L.Ed.2d at 954.
However,
while a prisoner's due process rights are minimal, the prison
administration is not authorized to arbitrarily punish an inmate
without a hearing or evidence.
Considering the ease with which
the administration can punish an inmate for violation of prison
disciplinary regulations, there is no excuse for dispensing with
due process altogether.
Yet while we have misgivings about the prison's action,
we can find no remedy which the trial court or this court could
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give Willoughby.
was minimal.
The restriction on his visitation privileges
He was not actually denied visitation, but only
limited to "controlled" or "non-contact" visits for six (6)
months.
This restriction has since expired.
Furthermore, since
the action was taken administratively, there is no evidence that
Willoughby has suffered any permanent, compensable consequences,
such as loss of good time credits or a record of the action in
his file.1
Consequently, we can only conclude that this issue
has become moot.
For this reason, we will affirm the circuit
court's dismissal of the declaratory judgment action.
Accordingly, the judgment of the Morgan Circuit Court
is affirmed.
SCHRODER, JUDGE, CONCURS IN RESULT.
GUDGEL, JUDGE, CONCURS IN RESULT.
1
Indeed, under the Corrections Policies and Procedures, the
disciplinary report must be removed from the inmate's file after
the dismissal of the report by the adjustment committee. No
further action may be taken on the report.
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BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
NO BRIEF FOR APPELLEE
Marshall Willoughby, Pro Se
Eastern Kentucky Correctional
Complex
West Liberty, Ky.
ENTRY OF APPEARANCE FOR
APPELLEE MICHAEL J. O'DEA:
Boyce A. Crocker
Justice Cabinet
Department of Corrections
Frankfort, Ky.
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