IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF JEFFREY LEE ARMSTRONG AND CHRISTINA ELIZABETH ADAMS Upon the Petition of JEFFREY LEE ARMSTRONG, Petitioner-Appellee, And Concerning CHRISTINA ELIZABETH ADAMS, Respondent-Appellant.
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 9-949 / 09-0910
Filed December 30, 2009
IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF JEFFREY LEE ARMSTRONG AND CHRISTINA
ELIZABETH ADAMS
Upon the Petition of
JEFFREY LEE ARMSTRONG,
Petitioner-Appellee,
And Concerning
CHRISTINA ELIZABETH ADAMS,
Respondent-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Black Hawk County, Jon Fister,
Judge.
Wife appeals economic provisions of dissolution decree. AFFIRMED AS
MODIFIED.
Gary J. Boveia and Beau D. Buchholz of Boveia Law Firm, Waverly, for
appellant.
John J. Rausch of Rausch Law Firm, Waterloo, for appellee.
Considered by Eisenhauer, P.J., Potterfield, J., and Mahan, S.J.*
*Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206 (2009).
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EISENHAUER, P.J.
Christina Adams appeals several economic provisions in the April 2009
decree dissolving her marriage to Jeffrey Armstrong. Christina objects to the trial
court’s allocation of debt and appreciation on two houses. Christina also appeals
the decree’s pension plans award. We modify the debt allocation and affirm.
As an equitable action, we review dissolution proceedings de novo. Iowa
R. App. P. 6.907 (2009). We examine the entire record and decide anew the
legal and factual issues properly presented and preserved for our review. In re
Marriage of Reinhart, 704 N.W.2d 677, 680 (Iowa 2005). We accordingly need
not separately consider assignments of error in the trial court’s findings of fact
and conclusions of law but make such findings and conclusions from our de novo
review as we deem appropriate. Lessenger v. Lessenger, 261 Iowa 1076, 1078,
156 N.W.2d 845, 846 (1968).
We, however, give weight to the trial court’s
findings of fact, especially when considering the credibility of witnesses, but we
are not bound by them. Iowa R. App. P. 6.904(3)(g).
Jeffrey Armstrong and Christina Adams were married in August 2000.
While no children were born of the marriage, Christina’s children from a previous
marriage were nineteen, sixteen, fourteen and twelve when Jeffrey became their
stepfather. The children’s father died in 1995. Prior to the marriage, Christina
owned a house on Larrabee Street in Denver, Iowa. The parties resided in the
Larrabee house during the marriage.
In 2002, the children’s paternal grandmother died. She left her estate to
the four Adams children. The estate included real estate in Oran, Iowa, subject
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to a Title XIX medical assistance lien. Christina obtained a home equity loan on
the Larrabee property to pay the lien and keep the Oran home in the family. The
original loan to pay the lien was for $16,000. In 2003, the loan was expanded to
$41,100 to pay for the children’s college expenses.
The trial court determined appreciation during the marriage was $44,190
for the Larrabee residence and $5810 for the Oran house. Finding both parties
made tangible contributions to the marital relationship; the court ruled the
appreciation should be divided as a marital asset. The court ruled one-third of
the appreciation is attributable to “inflation in housing prices during the term of
the parties’ marriage” and awarded this appreciation to Christina.
The court
determined two-thirds of the appreciation was attributable to the joint efforts of
the parties and awarded one-third to Jeffrey and one-third to Christina. Christina
asks us to award all appreciation to her. However, we agree with the trial court’s
findings regarding appreciation and relative contributions to the increase in value
of the homes. Based on our de novo review of the record, we find this division of
appreciation equitable.
We disagree, however, with the trial court’s treatment of the debt owed on
the Larabee residence. The court stated:
The $44,190 appreciation in the Larrabee Avenue residence should
be reduced by the $6505 GMAC mortgage and $4921 of the
$29,921 Veridian home equity loan, because $25,000 of that loan
was nonmarital debt used by [Christina] to defray college education
expenses for her adult children. These adjustments reduce the net
appreciation to $32,764.
Christina argues the Larrabee appreciation should be reduced by the total
debt owed. We agree. Rather than simply charging a debt to the party incurring
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the obligation, a court should look to see whether “payment of the obligation was
a reasonable and expected aspect of the particular marriage.” In re Marriage of
Burgess, 568 N.W.2d 827, 829 (Iowa Ct. App. 1997). Where a spouse knows
payment of the obligation will be a part of the marriage and acquiesces to the
payments during the marriage, a specific setoff for that debt as part of the
property distribution is inappropriate. See id.
While Christina alone signed the September 2003 note, Jeffrey signed the
September 2003 mortgage thereby acquiescing in mortgaging their homestead to
finance the college education of his stepchildren. During the marriage the home
equity loan balance was reduced from $41,100 to $29,921, making the loan
payments “a reasonable and expected aspect” of the marriage.
There is no
evidence Jeffrey ever objected to this encumbrance of the Larrabee equity.
Consequently, the $44,190 appreciation of Larrabee should be reduced by
both the $6505 GMAC mortgage and the $29,921 home equity loan. These
adjustments reduce the net appreciation to $7764.
Two-thirds of $7764 is
attributable to the joint efforts of the parties ($5176) and Jeffrey is awarded
$2588.
Finally, upon our de novo review of the record, we find no inequities in the
court’s treatment of the pension plans.
We affirm the decree as modified. As provided in the original decree,
Christina shall pay Jeffrey $12,690 to balance the division of the property and
$1940 for the Oran house appreciation. We modify the decree to have Christina
pay Jeffrey $2588 for the Larrabee residence appreciation.
The result is to
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reduce the judgment against Christina from $25,530 to $17,218.
provisions of the decree are affirmed.
Each party will pay his or her own
appellate attorney fees. Costs are taxed to Jeffrey.
AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED.
All other
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