IN THE MATTER OF THE TRUST UNDER THE LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT OF MARY E. WEITZEL MARY ANN STRICKER, MICHAEL H. STRICKER, and KENT D. STRICKER, Petitioners-Appellants, vs. FIRST CITIZENS TRUST COMPANY, Respondent-Appellee.
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 9-929 / 09-0447
Filed December 17, 2009
IN THE MATTER OF THE TRUST UNDER THE LAST WILL AND
TESTAMENT OF MARY E. WEITZEL
MARY ANN STRICKER, MICHAEL H.
STRICKER, and KENT D. STRICKER,
Petitioners-Appellants,
vs.
FIRST CITIZENS TRUST COMPANY,
Respondent-Appellee.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Mitchell County, Bryan H.
McKinley, Judge.
Three beneficiaries of a trust appeal from a district court order refusing to
terminate the trust and awarding the trustee compensation. AFFIRMED.
Roger L. Sutton of Sutton Law Office, Charles City, for appellants.
Scott D. Brown of Brown, Kinsey, Funkhouser & Lander, P.L.C., Mason
City, for appellee.
Considered by Vogel, P.J., and Doyle and Mansfield, JJ.
2
DOYLE, J.
Mary Ann Stricker, Michael Stricker, and Kent Stricker, the beneficiaries of
a trust created by Mary Weitzel, appeal from a district court order refusing to
terminate the trust and awarding compensation to the trustee, First Citizens Trust
Company. The primary issue presented in this appeal is whether a discretionary
support trust that contains a spendthrift clause may be terminated with the
consent of all the beneficiaries. We think not based upon the facts of this case
and affirm the judgment of the district court.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
In 1994, Mary Weitzel executed a will leaving all her assets to her
husband, Adam Weitzel, provided he survived her.
In the event Adam
predeceased Mary, the assets were to pass to their daughter, Mary Ann Stricker,
in trust for her lifetime. After Mary Ann‟s death, the assets were to pass to the
Weitzels‟ grandsons, Michael Stricker and Kent Stricker. Mary appointed a local
bank as trustee for her testamentary trust.
The relevant provisions of Mary‟s will creating the trust for Mary Ann
provided:
1.
My trustee shall, from time to time, pay to my said
daughter or to her guardian, or apply for her benefit the income of
this trust. My trustee in the exercise of its discretion, as it deems
necessary or advisable, may pay sums from the principal to provide
for her proper care, support, and maintenance.
2.
Upon the death of my said daughter, my trustee shall
distribute the remainder of the trust, as then constituted, to my
grandsons, Kent David Stricker and Michael Harold Stricker, share
and share alike.
3.
No title in the trust created in this Article or in any
property at any time becoming a part of any such trust, or in the
income therefrom shall vest in the beneficiary and neither the
principal nor the income of any such trust estate shall be liable to
3
be reached in any manner by the creditors of said beneficiary, and
the beneficiary shall have no power to sell, assign, transfer,
encumber, or in any other manner to anticipate or dispose of his
interest therein.
4.
It is my wish that my farm land not be sold.
Adam died in 1996, and Mary died in 2005. First Citizens Trust Company
assumed its role as trustee in August 2006. The trust assets, which consisted of
a 312-acre farm and house valued together at $872,000, were conveyed to First
Citizens in January 2007. Mary Ann and her husband, Harold Stricker, had lived
in the house located on the farm for fifty-two years. With the consent of all the
beneficiaries, the trustee transferred the house and approximately four acres to
Harold and Mary Ann. It then rented the farmland to Stricker Farms, Ltd., which
was owned by Mary Ann, Harold, and their sons, Michael and Kent, for $26,250
per year.
First Citizens filed an annual report in May 2008, requesting the court to
approve fees for its services as trustee from the inception of the trust as well as
fees for the services of the trustee‟s attorney, John Reuber.
Statements
itemizing the services of the trustee and attorney were attached to the annual
report. First Citizens requested compensation in the amount of $2375.43, and
Reuber requested compensation in the amount of $2918.75.
In July 2008, Mary Ann, Michael, and Kent filed a petition to terminate the
trust under Iowa Code section 633A.2203 (2007). They alleged the trust was
created
due to financial problems that existed for Mary Ann Stricker and her
husband, Harold Stricker.
There were concerns that the
inheritance to Mary Ann Stricker would be involved in financial debt
and other debt associated with businesses operated by Harold and
4
Mary Ann Stricker. These debt concerns have been resolved and
there is no purpose in having the Trust.
Several months later, the Strickers filed an objection to the annual report filed by
First Citizens in May 2008, contesting the fees sought by both the trustee and the
trustee‟s attorney.
A hearing was held on the petition and objection in January 2009. At the
beginning of the hearing, the Strickers withdrew their objection to the fees sought
by the trustee‟s attorney but maintained their objection to the fees sought by the
trustee. Following the hearing, the district court entered a ruling determining the
fees requested by First Citizens were reasonable. It denied the Strickers‟ petition
to terminate the trust, finding that a material purpose of the trust remained to be
accomplished based upon the trust‟s spendthrift clause.
The Strickers appeal. They assert the district court erred in determining
the fees charged by the trustee were reasonable and in failing to terminate the
trust.
II. Scope of Review.
The parties disagree as to the applicable scope of review. The Strickers
contend our review is for correction of errors at law, while First Citizens contends
we must review the record de novo. This case was tried by the probate court in
equity. See Iowa Code § 633.33; In re Barkema Trust, 690 N.W.2d 50, 53 (Iowa
2004) (noting a hearing on objections to a fiduciary‟s final report is an equitable
proceeding); Bass v. Bass, 196 N.W.2d 433, 435 (Iowa 1972) (stating a hearing
on allowance of fiduciaries‟ compensation for services rendered in administration
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of an estate “stands in equity”). Thus, this court‟s scope of review is de novo.
Iowa R. App. P. 6.907 (2009).
III. Discussion.
A. Trustee Compensation.
Iowa Code section 633A.4109 governs compensation for trustees,
although “considerable discretion is left to [the] trial court in the allowance or
nonallowance” of such fees.
Bass, 196 N.W.2d at 435; see also In re
Woltersdorf, 255 Iowa 914, 916, 124 N.W.2d 510, 511 (1963) (“The matter of
fees for executors and trustees rests within the sound discretion of the trial
court.”); Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 38 cmt. c(1), at 150 (2003) (stating trial
courts have discretion in determining a trustee‟s reasonable compensation).
That statute provides that where, as here, “the terms of the trust do not specify
the trustee‟s compensation, a trustee or cotrustee is entitled to compensation
that is reasonable under the circumstances.” Iowa Code § 633A.4109(1). The
district court determined the fees requested by First Citizens were reasonable.
We agree.
Gregory Nicholas, an attorney with twenty-five years‟ experience as a trust
officer, testified on behalf of First Citizens. He explained the standard annual fee
charged by First Citizens for administering trusts involving farms such as this is
one-tenth of one percent of the value of the farm plus five percent of the income.
Nicholas testified that standard rate resulted in First Citizens‟ requested fee of
$2375.43 for its services in 2006 and 2007.
The Strickers argue the
compensation requested by the trustee is unreasonable because it is based on a
6
fixed fee schedule and “[n]o itemization of time spent was provided.”
This
argument lacks merit for several reasons.
First, section 633A.4109 does not require trustees to submit an itemized
statement in order to receive compensation.
Cf. Iowa Code § 633.200
(authorizing compensation for other fiduciaries and their attorneys “for such
services as they shall render as shown by an itemized claim or report made and
filed setting forth what such services consist of”). Second, First Citizens did
attach a document to its annual report that detailed its activities in the
administration of the trust.
Those activities included account setup, asset
management, accounting, review of annual report to the court, correspondence
with attorney, collection of farm rent, and preparation of tax information. Third, in
Woltersdorf, our supreme court approved a trustee fee in the absence of an
itemized statement, reasoning, “While no itemized statement was made as to
each day by day work done in connection with the trust, it appears that whatever
was necessary was done . . . .” 255 Iowa at 916, 124 N.W.2d at 511 (finding no
abuse of discretion in trustee fee of $1000 for trust estate valued at $15,000).
The same can be said here.
Nicholas testified “there were substantial services that were rendered”
since the inception of the trust, including the transfer of real estate from the trust
to Harold and Mary Ann and the discretionary distributions made to Mary Ann.
He believed the fees requested were reasonable based upon his experience in
administering other trusts. The district court agreed, finding in relevant part that
[t]he $100 per acre rental value [charged by the trust to Stricker
Farms] is a considerable reduction from the fair market rent that the
fiduciary could have received, and by allowing the rent to be
7
reduced to accommodate the request of the beneficiaries, First
Citizens Trust Company by the formula used had their fees
reduced. By such action, the Court finds that the trustee . . . placed
greater emphasis upon the beneficiaries‟ request for
accommodation as to rent as opposed to First Citizens Trust
Company‟s right to secure fees based upon the higher level of
reasonable income.
We find no abuse of discretion in the court‟s decision. In so concluding,
we have considered the factors set forth in the Restatement (Third) of Trusts in
determining whether the compensation requested by a trustee is reasonable.
See Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 38 cmt. c(1), at 150 (stating factors that may
be considered include local custom, trustee‟s skill and experience, time devoted
to trust duties, amount and character of trust property, degree of difficulty,
responsibility, and risk assumed in administering the trust, including making
discretionary distributions, nature and costs of services rendered by others, and
quality of the trustee‟s performance).
This brings us to the parties‟ primary contention on appeal: whether the
district court erred in denying the Strickers‟ request to terminate the trust.
B. Termination of Trust.
We again begin our analysis with a provision of the Iowa Trust Code,
namely section 633A.2203(1), which provides: “An irrevocable trust may be
terminated . . . by the court with the consent of all of the beneficiaries if
continuance of the trust on the same or different terms is not necessary to carry
out a material purpose.”
Because all of the beneficiaries consented to the
termination of the trust in this case, the question before the district court was
whether a material purpose of the trust remained to be completed. The court
answered this question in the affirmative based upon the spendthrift clause of the
8
trust.
The Strickers claim this conclusion was in error, arguing the court‟s
assumption that a trust with a spendthrift clause “is per se a material purpose is
contrary to the Iowa Trust Code.”
For guidance in answering this question, we look to a law review article
written by Professor Martin D. Begleiter, who was involved in the drafting of the
Iowa Trust Code, entitled In the Code We Trust—Some Trust Law for Iowa at
Last, 49 Drake L. Rev. 165 (2001) (hereinafter Begleiter).
In that article,
Professor Begleiter explained section 663A.2203 is “basically the Trust Code‟s
version of the Claflin doctrine.” Begleiter, 49 Drake L. Rev. at 196. The Claflin
doctrine provides, as does our statute, “that an irrevocable trust can be
terminated or modified only if all the beneficiaries consent and no material
purpose of the trust remains to be completed.” Id.; see also Claflin v. Claflin, 20
N.E. 454, 455 (Mass. 1889). Iowa accepted this doctrine in the case of Hopp v.
Rain, in which our supreme court noted the corollary rules that
if one of the purposes of the trust is to deprive the beneficiary
entitled to income of the management of the trust property for the
period during which he is entitled to the income, the trust will not be
terminated during the period, although both of the beneficiaries are
of full capacity and desire to terminate it. Similarly, if by the terms
of the trust it is provided that the trustee shall make payments out
of income or principal to a beneficiary if the beneficiary should be in
need, the trust will not be terminated although that beneficiary and
all the other beneficiaries are of full capacity and desire to terminate
it.
249 Iowa 891, 900-02, 88 N.W.2d 39, 44-45 (1958); accord Sawyer v. Sawyer,
261 Iowa 112, 122, 152 N.W.2d 605, 611 (1967); Windsor v. Barnett, 201 Iowa
1226, 1231, 207 N.W. 362, 365 (1926); Olsen v. Youngerman, 136 Iowa 404,
411, 113 N.W. 938, 941 (1907).
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Along those same lines, comments l and m to section 337 of the
Restatement (Second) of Trusts, at 165 (1959), provide a trust created for the
support of a beneficiary and a trust with a spendthrift clause are examples of
trusts with a material purpose yet to be completed. See Begleiter, 49 Drake L.
Rev. at 198. These comments, along with the court‟s decision in Hopp, suggest
the district court correctly determined a material purpose of the discretionary
support trust1 in this case remained due to the trust‟s spendthrift clause. See
Iowa Code § 633A.1104 (“Except to the extent that this chapter modifies the
common law governing trusts, the common law of trusts shall supplement this
trust code.”); see also Begleiter, 49 Drake L. Rev. at 197, n.181 (observing that
“Iowa courts have been quite receptive to arguments that a material purpose
remains to be completed”). However, as noted by Professor Begleiter, there has
been a trend away from such a presumptive rule in recent years. See Begleiter,
49 Drake L. Rev. at 198.
This is reflected in the new rule adopted in the Restatement (Third) of
Trusts, which now provides:
[S]pendthrift restrictions are not sufficient in and of themselves to
establish, or to create a presumption of, a material purpose that
would prevent termination by consent of all of the beneficiaries.
This is also true, in many contexts, of discretionary provisions.
Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 65 cmt. e at 479. The comment explains,
1
In In re Estate of Gist, the court noted the Restatement (Third) of Trusts now
classifies a discretionary support trust as a discretionary trust with standards but stated,
“Regardless of whether we refer to a trust as a discretionary support trust or a
discretionary trust with standards, they are the same animals.” 763 N.W.2d 561, 565
(Iowa 2009). The court then explained a settlor creates a discretionary trust with
standards if, as here, the “„stated purpose of the trust is to furnish the beneficiary with
support, and the trustee is directed to pay to the beneficiary whatever amount of trust
income [or principal] the trustee deems necessary for his support.‟” Id. (citations
omitted).
10
A spendthrift clause may be included as a routine or
incidental provision of a trust (unimportant or even unknown to the
settlor). . . . Thus, for example, the fact that a lawyer had explained
the effect and advised the inclusion of a spendthrift provision is not
alone sufficient to establish that it represents more than an
advantage that the beneficiaries are free to relinquish by
consenting to termination of the trust.
Similarly, discretionary provisions, like other provisions
involving successive enjoyment, may represent nothing more than
a settlor‟s plan for allocating the benefits of his or her property
flexibly among various beneficiaries rather than revealing some
significant concerns or protective purposes that would prevent the
beneficiaries from joining together to terminate a trust and divide or
distribute the property as they wish under the rule of this Section.
This is particularly so when the trust is created to provide, as
needed, for the life beneficiary‟s support and care, with remainder
to others.
Id. at 479-80.
Professor Begleiter criticizes the reasoning of this provision and notes the
drafters of the revised Iowa Trust Code “wisely rejected this change.” 2 Begleiter,
49 Drake L. Rev. at 199 n.190. In any event, regardless of whether a spendthrift
clause presumptively establishes a material purpose, we conclude based on the
facts of this case that such a purpose remained to be completed. See Eldred v.
Merch. Nat’l Bank, 468 N.W.2d 221, 223 (Iowa 1991) (“The purpose of the trust
is determined by examining the language of the instrument which creates the
trust and the surrounding circumstances.”); see also Restatement (Third) of
Trusts § 65 cmt. d at 477 (“[A] court may look for some circumstantial or other
evidence indicating that the trust arrangement represented to the settlor more
2
He notes a preliminary draft of section 410 of the Uniform Trust Code (UTC)
(2000 Annual Meeting Draft) that was reviewed by the individuals involved in drafting the
Iowa Trust Code included a provision stating, “A spendthrift provision in the terms of the
trust is not presumed to constitute a material purpose of the trust.” Begleiter, 49 Drake
L. Rev. at 198 n.189.
11
than a method of allocating the benefits of property among multiple intended
beneficiaries. . . .”).
The final provision of the article in Mary‟s will that created the trust
expressly provided, “It is my wish that my farm land not be sold.” That provision
comes immediately after the spendthrift clause, which follows the provision
providing for discretionary payments to Mary Ann as necessary for her support.
When these provisions are read together, we believe it is clear that Mary‟s intent
in creating the trust was to protect her farmland from the creditors of Mary Ann.
See Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 65 cmt. d at 477 (“A finding of . . . a
[material] purpose generally requires some showing of a particular concern or
objective on the part of the settlor, such as concern with regard to a beneficiary‟s
management skills, judgment, or level of maturity.”).
The Strickers nevertheless argue that Mary Ann and Harold‟s “financial
problems occurred in 1979 and 1980” and have since been resolved. 3 However,
Mary‟s will was executed in 1994, and she did not die until 2005. We thus find
this argument unavailing. It is clear from the circumstances presented in this
case that the trust arrangement created by Mary represented “more than a
method of allocating the benefits of property among multiple intended
beneficiaries.” Id. As evidenced by the text of the will itself, Mary wanted to
preserve her farmland for her grandsons.
3
Mary Ann‟s supposed improved
In making this argument, the Strickers refer to extrinsic evidence that was
introduced at trial (over opposing counsel‟s objection) regarding Mary‟s intent in
executing her will and creating the trust. While the evidence was appropriately admitted
subject to the objection, as the case was tried in equity, we refuse to consider such
evidence in our review of this case. See In re Estate of Roberts, 240 Iowa 160, 164, 35
N.W.2d 756, 758 (1949) (“Evidence to show the testatorial intention as an independent
fact divorced from the words of the will is clearly inadmissible.”).
12
financial circumstances, which Mary was aware of before her death, do not
obviate this purpose. See Roberts, 240 Iowa at 164, 35 N.W.2d at 758 (rejecting
beneficiary‟s argument that a spendthrift trust created in his mother‟s will to
supposedly protect her property from beneficiary‟s wife no longer served a
purpose after his divorce). We therefore find a material purpose of the trust
remains thereby necessitating its continuation. See Iowa Code § 633A.2203(1).
In reaching this conclusion, we echo the court‟s observation in Hopp, 249
Iowa at 902, 88 N.W.2d at 45, that
trusts are usually created for the purpose of withholding from the
beneficiaries or other interested parties the control and disposition
of the principal of the fund for reasons which appear sufficient to
the trustor, and they are not usually regarded with satisfaction by
the persons who are deprived of the possession of the estate.
This, however, furnishes no ground for disregarding the conditions
on which the bounty is to be bestowed, nor for refusing to carry out
the expressed design of the party creating the trust.
We accordingly affirm the district court‟s decision denying the Strickers‟ petition
to terminate the trust.
IV. Appellate Attorney Fees.
The Strickers request an award of appellate attorney fees, but they have
cited no authority in support of such a request.
See Iowa R. App. P.
6.903(2)(g)(3) (“Failure to cite authority in support of an issue may be deemed
waiver of that issue.”).
We therefore deem this issue waived and deny the
Strickers‟ request.4
4
We note several common violations of our rules of appellate procedure. The
name of each witness was not placed at the top of each page where the witness‟s
testimony appears in the parties‟ appendix as required by Iowa Rule of Appellate
Procedure 6.905(7)(c). In addition, rules 6.905(7)(d) and (e) were not followed. We
recognize that the transcript testimony of the five witnesses included in the parties‟
13
V. Conclusion.
In conclusion, we find no abuse of discretion in the district court‟s
determination that the compensation requested by the trustee was reasonable.
We also find, like the district court, that a material purpose of the trust remained
to be completed.
The judgment of the district court awarding the trustee
compensation and denying the beneficiaries‟ petition to terminate the trust is
therefore affirmed. The Strickers‟ request for appellate attorney fees is denied.
AFFIRMED.
appendix covers only twenty-eight pages, and therefore the noncompliance we point out
may seem trivial. Nonetheless, compliance with the rules facilitates efficient navigation
of an appendix, thus promoting our duty to achieve maximum productivity in deciding a
high volume of cases. See Iowa Ct. R. 21.30(1).
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