STATE OF IOWA, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. ARNOLD KEITH TIEGEN, Defendant-Appellant.
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 9-768 / 09-0465
Filed October 21, 2009
STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
ARNOLD KEITH TIEGEN,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Story County, Steven P. VanMarel,
District Associate Judge.
Arnold Keith Tiegen appeals his convictions, following guilty pleas, for
interference with official acts causing bodily injury and third-offense public
intoxication. AFFIRMED.
Mark C. Smith, State Appellate Defender, and Nan Jennisch, Assistant
State Appellate Defender, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Cristen Douglass, Assistant Attorney
General, Stephen Holmes, County Attorney, and Stephen Owen, Assistant
County Attorney, for appellee.
Considered by Vogel, P.J., and Potterfield, J., and Miller, S.J.*
*Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206 (2009).
2
MILLER, S.J.
Arnold Keith Tiegen, at all relevant times represented by counsel, entered
written pleas of guilty to interference with official acts causing bodily injury, in
violation of Iowa Code section 719.1(1) (2007), and third-offense public
intoxication, in violation of sections 123.46(2) and 123.91(2), both aggravated
misdemeanors. The guilty pleas were entered pursuant to a plea agreement
under which the State would recommend specified sentences and dismissal of
other related charges. At the time he entered the pleas of guilty, Tiegen was
fifty-one years of age and had a lengthy criminal history. He had earlier been
sentenced to both concurrent and consecutive terms of incarceration.
The
district court reviewed the guilty pleas and entered orders accepting them, finding
they were voluntarily and intelligently made, with an understanding and waiver of
rights.
As relevant to the issue presented on appeal, at the subsequent
sentencing hearing the State recommended, in relevant part, a ninety-day jail
sentence on each of the two convictions, with the two sentences to run
consecutively. Tiegen requested, in relevant part, jail terms of forty-five days on
each conviction, with the two sentences to run consecutively. The district court
sentenced Tiegen, in relevant part, to a two-year indeterminate term of
incarceration on each conviction, with the terms to be served consecutively.
3
Tiegen appeals.
He claims his guilty pleas were not knowing and
voluntary, asserting the record does not show he was informed of the possibility
of consecutive sentences.1
A plea of guilty waives a variety of constitutional rights. State v. Meron,
675 N.W.2d 537, 542 (Iowa 2004). Tiegen‟s claim that his guilty pleas were not
knowing and voluntary implicates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United State Constitution, and our review is thus de novo.
State v. Loye, 670 N.W.2d 141, 150 (Iowa 2003). The State has the burden to
show that a defendant‟s pleas of guilty are made voluntarily and intelligently.
See, e.g., State v. Reaves, 254 N.W.2d 488, 493 (Iowa 1977) (holding it is the
State‟s burden to show an accused‟s awareness of the rights being waived by a
plea of guilty). The State must make the required showing by a preponderance
of the evidence. See, e.g., State v. Bowers, 656 N.W.2d 349, 353 (Iowa 2002)
(holding that the State has the burden to prove by a preponderance of the
evidence that a defendant voluntarily waived constitutional rights).
Due Process requires that a guilty plea be entered voluntarily and
intelligently. State v. Philo, 697 N.W.2d 481, 488 (Iowa 2005). The accused
1
Tiegen did not file a motion in arrest of judgment. This would ordinarily preclude his
right to challenge the adequacy of his guilty pleas by way of appeal. Iowa R. Crim. P.
2.24(3)(a). Tiegen‟s written pleas of guilty acknowledged he was required to file a timely
motion in arrest of judgment in order to contest the adequacy of his guilty pleas.
However, neither of those written guilty pleas nor any colloquy with the court informed
him, as required by Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.8(2)(d), that a failure to do so
would preclude his right to assert on appeal any challenges to his pleas of guilty based
on alleged defects in the plea proceedings. The State agrees that Tiegen was not
adequately informed of the consequences of not filing a motion in arrest of judgment.
We conclude that Tiegen‟s claim is thus properly before us. See State v. Oldham, 515
N.W.2d 44, 46 (Iowa 1994) (holding that failure to fully comply with the requirements of
rule 2.8(2)(d) reinstates a defendant‟s right to appeal the legality of a guilty plea).
4
must be fully aware of the direct consequences of a guilty plea. State v. White,
587 N.W.2d 240, 242 (Iowa 1998).
The purpose of Iowa Rule of Criminal
Procedure 2.8(2)(b) is to “ensure that guilty pleas are made voluntarily,
intelligently, and with a factual basis.” State v. Kirchoff, 452 N.W.2d 801, 804
(Iowa 1990). Tiegen claims the district court did not inform him of the maximum
possible punishment upon convictions for the offenses to which he was pleading
guilty, as required by rule 2.8(2)(b)(2). More specifically, he claims the court
failed to inform him that by pleading guilty to both charges he was subject to the
possibility of being sentenced to consecutive terms of incarceration. Sentences
to be served consecutively are a direct consequence of guilty pleas, and in order
to make an intelligent decision regarding the advantages and disadvantages of
tendering guilty pleas a defendant facing several charges must be aware of the
possibility that the court may order multiple sentences to run consecutively.
White, 587 N.W.2d at 243-46.
Our supreme court has indicated that whether a defendant understood the
maximum possible penalty may be determined from examining the whole record.
See id. at 243 (“Nor does the result here depend on whether it is the judge‟s
responsibility to advise the defendant that „maximum possible punishment‟
means consecutive sentences are possible or whether defendant‟s knowledge
and understanding can be gleaned from other indicia in the record.”); see also
State v. Hook, 623 N.W.2d 865, 871 (Iowa 2001) (Carter, J., dissenting) (“In
State v. Kirchoff, 452 N.W.2d 801, 805 (Iowa 1990), we recognized that, if
information concerning the rights listed in rule [2.8(2)(b)] are conveyed to the
5
defendant in the form of a written guilty plea, and it does not appear that
defendant misunderstood the resulting loss of those rights, there is no
entitlement to withdraw the plea.”).2
In White, the court did not inform the
defendant of the possibility of consecutive sentences. White, 587 N.W.2d at 243.
Additionally, “the record [was] silent as to any advice to defendant by his attorney
or from any other source that consecutive sentences were possible if he pled
guilty.” Id. Tiegen‟s case differs substantially.
Here the written pleas of guilty signed by Tiegen each acknowledged not
only that “the maximum sentence is imprisonment for not more than two years”
and that “the court may sentence me up to the maximum provided by the law,”
but also that as to each charge the State would recommend “90 days in the Story
County Jail . . . to run consecutive.” (Emphasis added.) We conclude the written
pleas of guilty show Tiegen was aware that any terms of incarceration might be
imposed to run consecutively, and that his claim his pleas were not knowing and
voluntary is thus without merit.3
AFFIRMED.
2
Kirchoff involved aggravated misdemeanors, as does this case. Kirchoff stands for
the proposition that the requirements of rule 2.8(2)(b) can be satisfied in written form in
cases involving aggravated and serious misdemeanors. See State v. Yarborough, 536
N.W.2d 493, 494-96 (Iowa Ct. App. 1995).
3
Although not necessary to our decision, we note four additional facts that support our
conclusion that at the time of his guilty pleas Tiegen was well aware of the potential for
consecutive sentences. First, as previously noted, Tiegen had earlier incurred both
concurrent and consecutive sentences. Second, Tiegen was represented by counsel in
this case. Third, although the sentencing hearing occurred two days after the written
guilty pleas were filed, in compliance with the plea agreement as noted in the written
guilty pleas and consistent with the plea agreement the State recommended consecutive
sentences. Fourth, at the sentencing hearing Tiegen himself, through counsel, argued
for consecutive (but shorter) sentences.
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.
