STATE OF IOWA, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. KYLE RYAN BYRNE, Defendant-Appellant.
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 9-761 / 09-0254
Filed October 21, 2009
STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
KYLE RYAN BYRNE,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Muscatine County, Gary P.
Strausser, District Associate Judge.
Kyle Byrne appeals from his conviction and sentence for operating while
intoxicated, second offense, following the district court’s denial of his motion to
suppress evidence obtained following a traffic stop. AFFIRMED.
David Scieszinski, Wilton, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Mary Tabor, Assistant Attorney
General, Scott Wadding, Student Legal Intern, Gary Allison, County Attorney,
and Korie Shippee, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee.
Considered by Vaitheswaran, P.J., Mansfield, J., and Mahan, S.J.*
*Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206 (2009).
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MAHAN, S.J.
Kyle Byrne appeals following his conviction and sentence for operating
while intoxicated, second offense, in violation of Iowa Code section 321J.2
(2009). He contends the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress
because the arresting officer did not have reasonable suspicion to stop his
vehicle. We affirm.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
On July 27, 2008, at approximately 12:46 a.m., Muscatine deputy Dustin
Brooks observed Byrne travelling on Park Avenue, a four-lane road with two
northbound lanes and two southbound lanes. Deputy Brooks was on routine
patrol travelling in the left northbound lane of Park Avenue when he first
observed Byrne travelling ahead of him in the right northbound lane. Byrnes was
not speeding. Deputy Brooks noticed, however, that Byrne’s “vehicle seemed to
be having problems staying within its lane,” and activated the video camera in his
patrol car to record Byrne’s driving.
As shown by the video recording, Deputy Brooks observed Byrne’s left
tires touch the center white line dividing the left and right northbound lanes
several times, and then completely cross the center white line. Deputy Brooks
then saw Byrne swerve back into the right lane and nearly hit the curb on the
right side of the road. Just before Deputy Brooks activated his emergency lights,
Byrne again crossed the center white line and was straddling both lanes as he
entered an intersection. All this occurred within the time span of a minute and
within the distance of approximately one-half mile.
3
Deputy Brooks stopped Byrne and approached his vehicle.
Byrne
admitted he had been drinking and failed field sobriety testing. Byrne refused to
take a breath test. Deputy Brooks arrested Byrne for operating while intoxicated
and transported him to the Muscatine County Jail. On August 7, 2008, the State
filed a trial information charging Byrne with operating while intoxicated, second
offense. Byrne pled not guilty. On September 23, 2008, Byrne filed a motion to
suppress all evidence obtained as a result of the stop. Following a hearing, the
district court entered an order denying Byrne’s motion to suppress, finding in
part:
The Court finds Deputy Dustin Brooks credible.
His
description of the operation of the defendant’s vehicle is generally
consistent with what can be observed when viewing the recording.
This Court concludes a reasonable suspicion existed for an
investigatory stop. This case can be distinguished from State v.
Tague, 676 N.W.2d 197 (Iowa 2004). In Tague the left tires of
Tague’s vehicle momentarily crossed over the left edge line. The
Court in Tague recognized that individuals are not required to drive
a perfect vector on the highway and that momentarily crossing an
edge line does not support a reasonable suspicion that an
individual is intoxicated or fatigued. In this case, the left side tires
of the vehicle operated by the defendant cross the white lines
dividing the northbound lanes of traffic on two separate occasions.
In addition, the left side tires of the vehicle operated by the
defendant touch the white lines dividing the two northbound lanes
of traffic on two occasions. These occasions are separated by both
time and distance. Thus, this is not an isolated incident of
momentarily crossing a line upon a roadway. The totality of the
above-described conduct causes the Court to conclude that a
reasonable suspicion existed justifying a stop of the vehicle driven
by the defendant; therefore, the defendant’s Motion to Suppress is
denied.
Byrne waived his right to a jury trial. On December 15, 2008, following a
trial on the minutes of testimony, the court found Byrne guilty of operating while
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intoxicated, second offense, and imposed sentence.
Byrne now appeals,
alleging the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress.
II. Scope and Standard of Review.
Because Byrne contends his constitutional rights under the Fourth
Amendment of the United States Constitution (and the comparable provision of
the Iowa Constitution) were violated, our review is de novo. State v. Naujoks,
637 N.W.2d 101, 106 (Iowa 2001). Our task is to independently evaluate Byrne’s
claim under the totality of the circumstances as shown by the entire record.
State v. Tague, 676 N.W.2d 197, 201 (Iowa 2004).
“We give considerable
deference to the trial court’s findings regarding the credibility of the witnesses,
but are not bound by them.” Id.
III. Merits.
Byrne contends the district court erred in overruling his motion to suppress
because the record does not show Deputy Brooks had reasonable suspicion to
stop his vehicle.
Upon a defendant’s challenge to a stop on the basis that
reasonable suspicion for an investigatory stop did not exist, the State must show
by a preponderance of the evidence that the stopping officer had specific and
articulable facts, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, to
reasonably believe criminal activity had occurred or was occurring. See id. at
204; State v. Kinkead, 570 N.W.2d 97, 100 (Iowa 1997). Any evidence obtained
through an unjustified investigatory stop must be suppressed. State v. Jones,
586 N.W.2d 379, 382 (Iowa 1998).
Whether reasonable suspicion existed must be determined under the
totality of the circumstances confronting the officer at the time of the stop. State
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v. Kreps, 650 N.W.2d 636, 641-42 (Iowa 2002). In this case, therefore, we are to
gauge the reasonableness of Deputy Brooks’s stop based on whether or not the
facts available to Deputy Brooks at the moment of the stop would cause a
reasonably cautious individual to deem the action taken by the officer
appropriate. See Tague, 676 N.W.2d at 204; Kreps, 650 N.W.2d at 641-42. The
State argues the stop was permissible because Byrne’s abrupt weaving gave
Deputy Brooks reasonable suspicion (1) that Byrne was operating the motor
vehicle while intoxicated, (2) that Byrne had violated Iowa Code section
321.306,1 and (3) to stop Byrne’s vehicle out of concern for the public safety
under the community caretaking function.
Iowa appellate courts have had numerous opportunities in recent years to
evaluate whether an officer’s observations of a vehicle being driven dangerously
or erratically were indeed sufficient to give rise to a reasonable suspicion that the
driver was intoxicated or fatigued.
See, e.g., Tague, 676 N.W.2d at 204-05
(concluding officer lacked reasonable suspicion to stop defendant’s vehicle when
officer observed the vehicle’s left tires cross briefly over the left edge line of
divided highway and return to its lane); State v. Otto, 566 N.W.2d 509, 510-11
(Iowa 1997) (determining officer had reasonable suspicion to stop defendant who
was changing speed erratically, veering left and right at sharp angles, and
constantly going back and forth from left to right over a distance of more than
three miles); State v. Tompkins, 507 N.W.2d 736, 740 (Iowa Ct. App. 1993)
1
A person violates this section of chapter 321 if the person changes lanes without first
ascertaining that the movement can be done safely.
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(finding officer had reasonable suspicion after observing defendant’s car weaving
from the center line to the right side boundary several times).2
Upon our de novo review, we conclude the facts and circumstances in this
case gave rise to Deputy Brooks’s reasonable suspicion that criminal activity had
occurred or was occurring, and therefore justified the investigatory stop. See
Kinkead, 570 N.W.2d at 100.
Deputy Brooks first noticed Byrne’s vehicle
because it “seemed to be having problems staying within its lane.”
Deputy
Brooks became concerned about the vehicle and activated the video camera in
his patrol car to record Byrne’s driving. Within the next minute or so, Deputy
Brooks observed Byrne’s left tires touch the center white line dividing the left and
right northbound lanes several times, swerve back into the right lane and nearly
hit the curb on the right side of the road, and completely cross the center white
line two times.3
Byrne was driving at nearly 1:00 a.m., a time an officer could reasonably
expect that people would be driving home from bars. See Kreps, 650 N.W.2d at
647 (noting that late-night activity, when combined with other specific and
articulable facts, may be a factor giving rise to reasonable suspicion that criminal
activity was afoot).
Furthermore, Byrne was travelling at a moderate in-city
speed, and no precipitation or noticeably windy weather conditions were present
2
Our supreme court discussed the Tompkins holding in Otto, 566 N.W.2d at 511, and
indicated that Tompkins should not be read to hold that observation of a vehicle weaving
within one’s own lane of traffic will always give rise to reasonable suspicion justifying a
stop of the vehicle. The court went on to state that the facts and circumstances of each
case should dictate whether or not reasonable suspicion exists for police to execute an
investigative stop. Id.
3
We defer to the district court’s findings with regard to Deputy Brooks’s credibility, see
Tague, 676 N.W.2d at 201, as we have viewed the video recording and it verifies the
observations Deputy Brooks testified to.
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that may have otherwise caused his driving to be erratic. When Deputy Brooks
activated his emergency lights, Byrne’s vehicle was straddling both lanes as he
entered an intersection.
Based on an “objective appraisal” of the circumstances in this case, we
would be critical of Deputy Brooks if he had not stopped Byrne’s vehicle to
investigate the cause of the erratic driving he observed and recorded. See id. at
642-43. Because we conclude the investigatory stop of Byrne was reasonable,
we affirm the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress. See Otto, 565
N.W.2d at 511; Tompkins, 507 N.W.2d at 738. We affirm Byrne’s conviction and
sentence for operating while intoxicated, second offense.
AFFIRMED.
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