IN THE INTEREST OF J.A.P. and A.A.P., Minor Children, M.A.M., Mother, Petitioner, A.E.P., Father, Appellant.
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 9-666 / 09-0486
Filed November 25, 2009
IN THE INTEREST OF J.A.P. and A.A.P.,
Minor Children,
M.A.M., Mother,
Petitioner,
A.E.P., Father,
Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Eliza J. Ovrom,
Judge.
A father appeals from the decision terminating his parental rights.
AFFIRMED.
Thomas P. Graves of Graves Law Firm, P.C., West Des Moines, for
appellant father.
Todd E. Babich and Kodi A. Petersen of Babich, Goldman, Cashatt &
Renzo, P.C., Des Moines, for appellee mother.
Lora McCollom-Sinclair, West Des Moines, for minor children.
Heard by Vaitheswaran, P.J., and Doyle and Danilson, JJ. Sackett, C.J.,
takes no part.
2
DOYLE, J.
A.E.P., the father of two children born in 2002 and 2004, appeals a ruling
terminating his parental rights. A.E.P. contends that District Court Judge Eliza J.
Ovrom should have recused herself from the proceedings and that he received
ineffective assistance of trial counsel. We affirm.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
This action was brought by A.E.P.‟s former wife, the mother of his two
children. Her marriage to A.E.P. was dissolved by decree in December 2005.
The decree, signed by District Court Judge D.J. Stovall, incorporated the parties‟
agreement, which provided that sole legal custody and primary physical care1 of
the children was placed with their mother. A.E.P. was given supervised visits
and ordered to pay child support of $341.33 a month. Judge Stovall also entered
an order of protection for the mother and the two children ordering, among other
things, that A.E.P. stay away from them. A.E.P. did not pay all the child support
he was ordered to pay, and he had limited contact with the children.
There is evidence that in the early morning hours of May 9, 2006, A.E.P.
broke into the home of his former wife and hit and detained her when the children
were present. There is evidence that he also made threats to kill his former wife
and her parents.
As a result of the incident, A.E.P. was charged by trial
information with burglary in the second degree, false imprisonment, domestic
abuse assault with intent to inflict serious injury, and harassment in the first
degree.
Although the term “primary physical care” is not used in Iowa Code chapter 598,
we nevertheless use the term in this opinion because it was used by the parties and the
district court.
1
3
On June 7, 2006, as a result of the events above, the Iowa Department of
Human Services (Department) found A.E.P. had committed child abuse in that he
denied his two children critical care and failed to provide them proper
supervision.
The Department found the incident was not minor, isolated, or
unlikely to reoccur, and A.E.P.‟s name was placed on the child abuse registry.
On February 13, 2007, A.E.P. with his attorney appeared before District
Court Judge Eliza J. Ovrom and entered an Alford plea2 to all counts. Judge
Ovrom found:
By direct conversation with [the] defendant on the record, the court
finds the defendant understands the charge and its penal
consequences, the rights being waived, and that there is a factual
basis of the plea and that the plea is voluntary. The court further
finds that the defendant has acknowledged 1) that it is in his/her
best interest to enter this plea, 2) he/she has nothing to gain at trial
and will gain much more by pleading, 3) that there is strong
evidence of actual guilt, and 4) that he/she wishes to take
advantage of the plea bargain.
Judge Ovrom then accepted A.E.P.‟s Alford plea.
She found he was
advised of and waived his rights to file a motion in arrest of judgment and that he
asked for immediate sentencing. Judge Ovrom then sentenced A.E.P. on all the
counts finding the sentences should run consecutively for a period not to exceed
fifteen years.
On June 22, 2008, A.E.P.‟s former wife filed a petition to terminate
A.E.P.‟s parental rights.
The petition alleged that A.E.P. had not had any
significant contact with the children since May 2006 and that he did not contribute
to their support.
2
She sought termination pursuant to Iowa Code section
North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 91 S. Ct. 160, 27 L. Ed. 2d 162 (1970);
State v. Buhr, 243 N.W.2d 546 (Iowa 1976).
4
600A.8(3)(b), 3(c), (4), and (9) (2007). She also requested that a guardian ad
litem be appointed to represent the children.
A guardian ad litem was then
appointed.
On March 5, 2009, a hearing was held on the petition. The parents were
each represented by counsel, and a guardian ad litem appeared for the children.
The record shows that Judge Stovall had recused himself from this case.3 The
mother‟s second witness was testifying when A.E.P.‟s trial counsel noted it had
come to his attention that Judge Ovrom was the judge who accepted A.E.P.‟s
Alford plea and sentenced him. On that basis, he requested that Judge Ovrom
recuse herself from the proceedings.
The attorney for the mother and the
guardian ad litem for the children were satisfied to allow Judge Ovrom to
continue hearing the case.
Judge Ovrom responded to the motion noting she noticed when exhibits
were admitted that she was the judge who had accepted A.E.P.‟s Alford plea and
sentenced him. She said she had no independent recollection of doing so, that
she believed she could be fair, and she did not have any predisposition for or
against either party.
She determined taking the plea was not an automatic
ground for recusal and she believed she could be fair. Judge Ovrom denied the
request and heard the evidence.
On March 13, 2009, Judge Ovrom filed the ruling that led to this appeal.
The factual findings addressed, among other things, the facts leading to the
charges that formed the basis of A.E.P.‟s Alford plea. The court found that on
3
There is no record as to why he did so.
5
May 9, 2006, A.E.P. went to his former wife‟s house, kicked in the door, went
inside, grabbed her, and yelled he would kill her and her father. The court further
found A.E.P. pounded his former wife‟s head into the floor while the two children
were in nearby bedroom. The court found the police were called, and A.E.P. was
charged with burglary in the second degree, false imprisonment, domestic abuse
assault with intent to inflict serious injury, and harassment in the first degree.
The court found that A.E.P. pled guilty to the charges, was sentenced to fifteen
years of prison pursuant to a plea agreement, and was currently serving the
sentence.
The court also found the children were about seven months and two years
old at the time the dissolution petition was filed and that A.E.P. had not been
around the children for about three years. The court further found that A.E.P.
was not capable of caring for the children and that there was a no-contact order
preventing him from seeing the children. The court terminated A.E.P.‟s parental
rights under Iowa Code section 600A.8(3).4
4
Section 600A.8(3) provides that the juvenile court may termination parental
rights if the parent has abandoned the child. A parent is deemed to have abandoned the
child pursuant to subsection 600A.8(3)(b) if:
[T]he child is six months of age or older when the termination
hearing is held, . . . unless the parent maintains substantial and
continuous or repeated contact with the child as demonstrated by
contribution toward support of the child of a reasonable amount,
according to the parent‟s means, and demonstrated by any of the
following:
(1) Visiting the child at least monthly when physically and
financially able to do so and not prevented from doing so by the person
having lawful custody of the child.
(2) Regular communication with the child or with the person
having the care and custody of the child, when physically and financially
unable to visit the child or when presented from visiting the child by the
person having lawful custody of the child.
6
The court found that A.E.P. was ordered to make payments of child
support of $341.33 beginning December 1, 2005, and had only made one
payment, which was in the amount of $244.83 on April 10, 2006. The court also
found that although he gave some additional money to his former wife through
his attorney, A.E.P. did not pay the amount ordered and he paid no support while
in prison though he had a job at the prison.
The court terminated A.E.P.‟s
parental rights under section 600A.8(4).5
A.E.P. appeals.
II. Discussion.
A. Recusal.
A.E.P. contends that because Judge Ovrom accepted his Alford plea and
sentenced him to incarceration, she should have recused herself from hearing
the chapter 600A termination of parental rights case against him. He advances
that we should accept a broad perspective when considering the fairness of
chapter 600A proceedings.
A.E.P.‟s appellate attorney, in appellant‟s brief,
makes the following statement:
“I could not adequately express the
overpowering sense of unfairness communicated to me by [A.E.P.] and his family
over the simple fact that the [j]udge who sentenced him also ruled on an
application to terminate his parental rights.” A.E.P. asks that we adopt a rule that
any judge who presides over the plea and sentencing of an individual should not
preside over the same individual‟s termination of parental rights proceeding.
5
Section 600A.8(4) provides that the juvenile court may terminate parental rights
if “[a] parent has been ordered to contribute to the support of the child . . . and has failed
to do so without good cause.”
7
A.E.P. acknowledges that he is unaware of any jurisdiction that has adopted
such a rule. For the reasons that follow, we decline to adopt such a broad rule.
“We review a court‟s decision to recuse or not to recuse itself for an abuse
of discretion.” Taylor v. State, 632 N.W.2d 891, 893-94 (Iowa 2001) (citing State
v. Mann, 512 N.W.2d 528, 532 (Iowa 1994); State v. Farni, 325 N.W.2d 107, 110
(Iowa 1982)). The court abuses its discretion when its decision is based on
untenable grounds or it has acted unreasonably. Id. at 894. “A ground or reason
is untenable when it is not supported by substantial evidence or when it is based
on an erroneous application of the law.” State v. Millsap, 704 N.W.2d 426, 432
(Iowa 2005) (citing Bousman v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 630 N.W.2d 789, 796 (Iowa
2001)). “Actual prejudice must be shown before a recusal is necessary.” In re
C.W., 522 N.W.2d 113, 117 (Iowa Ct. App. 1994). When a judge does not
recuse herself, the burden is on the party seeking recusal to prove that she
should have. Millsap, 704 N.W.2d at 432; Taylor, 632 N.W.2d at 894. This
burden is substantial. Farni, 325 N.W.2d at 110.
“A fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due process.
Fairness of course requires an absence of actual bias in the trial of cases.” In re
Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136, 75 S. Ct. 623, 625, 99 L. Ed. 942, 946 (1955).
Parties have a right to a neutral and detached judicial officer. McKinley v. Iowa
Dist. Ct., 542 N.W.2d 822, 827 (Iowa 1996); Mann, 512 N.W.2d at 532; see also
In re Marriage of Ricklefs, 726 N.W.2d 359, 362 (Iowa 2007).
We look to the Iowa Code and the Iowa Code of Judicial Conduct for
pertinent rules concerning recusal. Iowa Code section 602.1606 provides, in
applicable part:
8
A judicial officer is disqualified from acting in a proceeding,
except upon the consent of all the parties, if any of the following
circumstances exists:
1. The judicial officer has a personal bias or prejudice
concerning a party, or personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary
facts concerning the proceeding.
Canon 3(C)(1) of the Iowa Code of Judicial Conduct provides:
A judge should disqualify himself or herself in a proceeding
in which the judge‟s impartiality might reasonably be question,
including but not limited to the following instances:
a. The judge has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a
party, or personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts
concerning the proceeding . . . .
“If a judge‟s impartiality might reasonably be questioned because of such
bias or extrajudicial knowledge, the judge should recuse himself or herself.”
State v. Haskins, 573 N.W.2d 39, 44 (Iowa Ct. App. 1997).
We apply a
“reasonable person” test, which inquires whether reasonable persons with
knowledge of all facts would conclude that the judge‟s impartiality might
reasonably be questioned. Id.
Even a judge who is unaware of disqualifying factors may
nevertheless be expected to recuse if the “reasonable person” test
is met. The reason “is that people who have not served on the
bench are often all too willing to indulge suspicions and doubts
concerning the integrity of judges.”
Mann, 512 N.W.2d at 532 (citing Liljeberg v. Health Servs. Acquisition Corp., 486
U.S. 847, 864-65, 108 S. Ct. 2194, 2205, 100 L. Ed. 2d 855, 875 (1988)). “The
appearance of impropriety is not sufficient to merit recusal.” C.W., 522 N.W.2d at
117. Only personal bias or prejudice stemming from an extrajudicial 6 source that
results in an opinion on the merits on some basis other than what the judge
“Outside court; outside the functioning of the court system.”
Dictionary 606 (7th ed. 1999).
6
Black‟s Law
9
learned in the case stands as a disqualifying factor per se. See State v. Jacobs,
644 N.W.2d 695, 699 (Iowa 2001); State v. Smith, 282 N.W.2d 138, 142 (Iowa
1979); Haskins, 573 N.W.2d at 45-46. Generally, prior judicial encounters with
the trial court will not provide a basis for prejudice requiring a different judge.
See Smith, 282 N.W.2d at 142.
A.E.P. does not dispute that Judge Ovrom did not remember his plea and
sentencing.7 Upon our review of the record, we find A.E.P. failed to demonstrate
any personal bias stemming from an extrajudicial source, and he failed to show
the judge abused her discretion in not recusing herself. We therefore conclude
the trial judge did not abuse her discretion in refusing to recuse herself from this
case.
B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel.
Our review of a termination of parental rights case is de novo. In re S.R.,
600 N.W.2d 63, 64 (Iowa Ct. App. 1999). When the court terminates parental
rights on more than one ground, we only need to find grounds to terminate under
one of the sections cited by the court in order to affirm the court‟s ruling. In re
A.S., 743 N.W.2d 865, 867 (Iowa Ct. App. 2007). “The grounds for termination
must be proven by clear and convincing evidence.” S.R., 600 N.W.2d at 64.
Even if the statutory requirements for termination of parental rights are met, the
decision to terminate must be in the children‟s best interests. In re M.S., 519
N.W.2d 398, 400 (Iowa 1994); A.S., 743 N.W.2d at 867. Our primary concern is
the best interests of the children. S.R., 600 N.W.2d at 64.
His appellate brief states: “It is clear that the trial court did not remember the
plea and sentence in question.”
7
10
A.E.P. contends his trial counsel was ineffective in failing to obtain and
admit evidence, call the appropriate witnesses, and sequester certain witnesses.
There is no procedural equivalent to postconviction relief following proceedings
to terminate parental rights. In re J.P.B., 419 N.W.2d 387, 390 (Iowa 1988).
Direct appeal is the only way for a parent to raise an ineffective assistance of
counsel claim in a termination case. Id. Such a claim is reviewed de novo.
State v. Horness, 600 N.W.2d 294, 297 (Iowa 1999). As no Sixth Amendment
protections are implicated, there is no constitutional right to effective assistance
of counsel. In re D.W., 385 N.W.2d 570, 579 (Iowa 1986). Nevertheless, due
process requires that counsel appointed pursuant to a statute provide effective
assistance. Id. at 579-80; see also In re Voeltz, 271 N.W.2d 719, 722 (Iowa
1978). Although the Sixth Amendment is not implicated here, we apply the same
standards adopted for counsel appointed in a criminal proceeding. See, e.g.,
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-98, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064-70, 80 L.
Ed. 2d 674, 693-700 (1984); State v. Losee, 354 N.W.2d 239, 243-44 (Iowa
1984); State v. Neal, 353 N.W.2d 83, 86-87 (Iowa 1984).
The Strickland principles require the party claiming ineffective assistance
of counsel to show (1) that counsel‟s performance was deficient and (2) that
actual prejudice resulted. Unless both showings are made, the claim must fail.
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S. Ct. at 2064, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 693. Our scrutiny
of the counsel‟s performance must “be highly deferential,” id. at 689, 104 S. Ct. at
2065, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 694, and must “indulge a strong presumption that counsel‟s
conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance; that is,
appellant must overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the
11
challenged action „might be considered sound trial strategy.‟” Id. at 689, 104 S.
Ct. at 2066, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 694-95 (quoting Michel v. Louisiana, 350 U.S. 91,
101, 76 S. Ct. 158, 164, 100 L. Ed. 83, 93 (1955)); see also State v. Ondayog,
722 N.W.2d 778, 785 (Iowa 2006). Therefore A.E.P., as an unsuccessful litigant
in a termination of parental of rights proceeding, must prove both a deficiency in
counsel‟s performance and actual prejudice. In re T.P., 757 N.W.2d 267, 274
(Iowa Ct. App. 2008).
In its findings of fact, the court stated:
Child support records show that he made one payment of
$244.83 on April 10, 2006. In addition, [A.E.P.] paid some monies
to [his former wife] through his attorney, although this fell far short
of the amount ordered under the decree. While in prison, [A.E.P.]
has paid no child support. [A.E.P.] has had a job while he has been
incarcerated, and he receives money from family members.
In its discussion terminating A.E.P.‟s parental rights under section 600A.8(4), the
court stated:
[A.E.P.] has failed to pay child support. He has made one official
(partial) payment since entry of the decree in December 2005.
After he was sentenced to prison in February 2007, he has not
made any payments at all. He has had money available to him
during this time. There is no good cause for [A.E.P.‟s] failure to pay
child support under these circumstances.
As one ground for termination, the court terminated A.E.P.‟s rights under section
600A.8(4).
A.E.P. testified that he made more than one payment and the total was
probably $2500 to $3000. A.E.P.‟s appellate attorney represents that he found
evidence that more payments were made and that evidence should have been
found before trial and admitted. He points to copies of documents, included in
the appendix, that he claims show: (1) one check on January 16, 2006, from
12
A.E.P.‟s employer to A.E.P.‟s former wife, for $244.83 (returned by the Collection
Services Center); (2) A.E.P.‟s pay slips from February 28, 2006, to March 31,
2006, showing garnishment for child support and a year to date garnishment of
$1940.39; and (3) six garnishment checks to A.E.P.‟s former wife, each in the
amount of $244.83 covering the period February 15, 2006, to March 31, 2006.
A.E.P. also argues the documents raise a question as to his former wife‟s
credibility. These documents are not a part of the record, and we do not consider
issues based on information outside the record.
Rasmussen v. Yates, 522
N.W.2d 844, 846 (Iowa Ct. App. 1994). Nevertheless, upon a careful reading of
the trial transcript, this information is not inconsistent with the former wife‟s
testimony, nor is it inconsistent with the district court‟s findings.
A.E.P. has
shown no actual prejudice in his counsel‟s failure to present this information to
the district court.
A.E.P. also contends that his counsel was ineffective in not calling his
mother and other witnesses, alleging they would have testified A.E.P. had
provided care to the children before the divorce and that there was a strong bond
between A.E.P. and his daughters that should have been maintained. Again, we
do not consider issues based on information outside the record.
Id. at 846.
Nevertheless, the clear and convincing evidence in the record overwhelmingly
supports termination of A.E.P.‟s parental rights. There is no likelihood that the
results would have been any different had the additional witnesses testified.
A.E.P. has not shown actual prejudice in his counsel‟s failure to call additional
witnesses.
13
A.E.P. also argues his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to make a
timely request to sequester witnesses. He makes no cognizable argument as to
how such failure caused him prejudice.
A.E.P. makes no showing of actual
prejudice for his counsel‟s failure to request sequestration of witnesses.
We find the district court‟s well-reasoned ruling terminating A.E.P.‟s
parental rights under sections 600A.8(3) and 600A.8(4) to be supported by clear
and convincing evidence. We will not disturb it.
III. Postscript.
Although the parties‟ appendix is not lengthy, we note the names of the
witnesses were not inserted at the top of each page where witnesses‟ testimony
appeared. This violation of Iowa Rule of Appellate Procedure 6.905(7)(c) may
seem inconsequential, but having the witness‟s name at the top of each page
makes our job navigating an appendix much easier. Additionally, the exhibits
included in the appendix were not properly identified or described in the table of
contents as required by rule 6.905(4). Compliance with the rules facilitates our
duty to achieve maximum productivity in deciding a high volume of cases. See
Iowa Ct. R. 21.30(1).
AFFIRMED.
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