STATE OF IOWA, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. DOUGLAS RAY KNAPP, Defendant-Appellant.
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 9-642 / 08-1918
Filed December 17, 2009
STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
DOUGLAS RAY KNAPP,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Black Hawk County, Kellyann
Lekar (motion to suppress) and George Stigler (trial), Judges.
Douglas Ray Knapp appeals from the judgment and sentence entered
following several drug-related convictions. AFFIRMED.
Mark C. Smith, State Appellate Defender, and David Adams, Assistant
Appellate Defender, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Kyle Hanson, Assistant Attorney
General, Thomas J. Ferguson, County Attorney, and Brad Walz, Assistant
County Attorney, for appellee.
Considered by Vaitheswaran, P.J., Mansfield, J., and Zimmer, S.J.*
*Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206 (2009).
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ZIMMER, S.J.
Douglas Ray Knapp appeals from the judgment and sentence entered
following his convictions of possession of methamphetamine, conspiracy to
manufacture more than five grams of methamphetamine, and possession of
pseudoephedrine with intent to manufacture methamphetamine. He contends
the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress the evidence discovered
as a result of a traffic stop. He further contends the court erred in failing to grant
his motion for judgment of acquittal. We affirm.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
Shortly after midnight on
January 26, 2008, Officer Albert Bovy of the Waterloo Police Department was
driving south along Eighteenth Street when he met a truck that was driving north.
It was the officer’s practice when on patrol at night to check his rearview mirror to
make sure the license plate of any vehicle he passed was illuminated. As Officer
Bovy looked in his rearview mirror that night, he noticed that the truck’s rear
license plate was not illuminated. At the time he made his observation, Officer
Bovy estimates he was one to two vehicle lengths away from the truck.1 Bovy
estimates a vehicle to be seventeen feet in length.
The officer turned his patrol car around so he could follow the truck to
confirm that the tag light was out. When he first turned around, Officer Bovy was
approximately one-half block behind the truck. Bovy caught up to the truck and
continued to follow it.
After pulling up behind the truck, he turned off his
headlights for a second to see if the license plate lamp was functioning and
1
Because the area was dark and the weather conditions were good, Officer Bovy had a
clear view of the unilluminated license plate.
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confirmed the light was not working. While following the truck, Bovy observed
that the truck’s license plate was bent in at the bottom, which obscured his view
of the numbers and letters on the plate. The bottom part of the plate was also
obscured by the truck’s bumper and a trailer hitch ball. Officer Bovy was unable
to make out the numbers or letters on the license plate. After following the truck
for a distance of approximately three and one-half blocks, Officer Bovy initiated a
traffic stop. At the time he activated his emergency lights, Bovy was only a half
car length, or about nine feet, behind the truck.
The driver of the truck identified himself as Douglas Knapp. Officer Bovy
checked with the Department of Transportation and learned Knapp’s license was
suspended. The officer then placed Knapp under arrest. A search of Knapp’s
person yielded a baggie containing white powder. Knapp identified the powder
as crushed “pseudo,” short for pseudoephedrine, an ingredient commonly used
to manufacture methamphetamine.
A search of the vehicle and Knapp’s
passenger yielded a small amount of methamphetamine and additional items
typically used to manufacture methamphetamine. Knapp admitted to delivering
the items to others who made methamphetamine.
The white powder discovered on Knapp’s person was tested and
confirmed to be pseudoephedrine.
The bag contained 16.8 grams of pure
pseudoephedrine, which has a theoretical yield of 15.4 grams of pure
methamphetamine.
A
criminologist
from
the
Department
of
Criminal
Investigations estimated that amount of pseudoephedrine would actually produce
between six and seven grams of pure methamphetamine.
Because
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methamphetamine is mixed with other chemicals, the criminologist determined it
would produce between 6.5 and 10 grams of final product.
Knapp was charged with possession of methamphetamine with intent to
deliver, conspiracy to manufacture methamphetamine with intent to deliver, and
possession of pseudoephedrine with intent to manufacture. Knapp filed a motion
to suppress the evidence discovered after the traffic stop on the grounds Officer
Bovy did not have reasonable cause to stop his vehicle. Following a hearing, the
district court found the stop was justified and denied Knapp’s motion.
The case proceeded to a jury trial. The charges were amended to simple
possession of methamphetamine, conspiracy to manufacture more than five
grams of methamphetamine, and possession of pseudoephedrine with intent to
manufacture methamphetamine. Knapp moved for judgment of acquittal on the
grounds the State failed to prove he had the necessary intent to manufacture
more than five grams of methamphetamine. The court denied the motion and the
jury found Knapp guilty of all three counts. Knapp appeals.
II. Motion to Suppress. Knapp first contends the court erred in denying
his motion to suppress because Officer Bovy did not have reasonable grounds to
stop his vehicle. Because his claim implicates his constitutional right to be free
from unreasonable searches and seizures, we review this claim de novo. State
v. Turner, 630 N.W.2d 601, 606 (Iowa 2001). “We give deference to the district
court’s fact findings due to its opportunity to assess the credibility of witnesses,
but we are not bound by those findings.” Id.
An officer may stop a vehicle for investigatory purposes when there is a
reasonable suspicion that a criminal act has occurred or is occurring. State v.
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Kreps, 650 N.W.2d 636, 641 (Iowa 2002). The purpose of such a stop is to allow
the officer to confirm or dispel suspicions of criminal activity through reasonable
questioning. Id. A traffic violation, however minor, gives an officer probable
cause to stop a motorist. State v. Aderholdt, 545 N.W.2d 559, 563 (Iowa 1996).
Here, the State contends Knapp was in violation of Iowa’s traffic laws in
two ways.
First, the State asserts that Knapp’s rear license plate was not
illuminated as required by Iowa Code section 321.388 (2007). Second, the State
asserts the plate was obstructed or bent under and therefore not in readable
condition as required by section 321.38. Knapp claims he did not commit either
of those traffic offenses. Knapp concedes that the State need only prove one
such violation occurred in order to prevail.
Because we find the issue dispositive, we first address the State’s claim
that Officer Bovy had reasonable grounds to stop Knapp’s truck for a violation of
section 321.388. This section reads in part, “Either the rear lamp or a separate
lamp shall be so constructed and placed as to illuminate with a white light the
rear registration plate and render it clearly legible from a distance of fifty feet to
the rear.” Iowa Code § 321.388. For the reasons that follow, we conclude the
evidence presented at the suppression hearing is sufficient to show Knapp
violated section 321.388.
Knapp argues the stop was not reasonable, citing State v. Reisetter, 747
N.W.2d 792 (Iowa Ct. App. 2008). In that case, this court found a motion to
suppress the evidence gathered after a vehicle stop should have been
suppressed where the stop was made for a violation of section 321.388 and the
officer did not observe the vehicle from a distance closer than one hundred feet.
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Reisetter, 747 N.W.2d at 794-95. The majority in Reisetter concluded that the
officer was not close enough to justify a stop to “resolve the ambiguity” as to
whether “criminal activity [was] afoot.” Id. Reisetter holds that in order to form
even reasonable suspicion, the officer must be within fifty feet or some distance
that “reasonably approximates” fifty feet. Id.
We believe the circumstances of the case before us are quite different
than the circumstances present in Reisetter. Here, Officer Bovy first observed
Knapp’s license plate was not illuminated when he observed Knapp’s truck
through his rear view mirror. When he made his initial observation, Bovy was
just one or two car lengths, or seventeen to thirty-four feet away, from Knapp’s
vehicle. Knapp complains this is insufficient. However, Officer Bovy did not rely
only on this observation. He turned his patrol car around and caught up with the
truck. He followed Knapp’s truck a distance of approximately three-and-one-half
blocks. After pulling up behind Knapp’s truck, he turned his headlights off briefly
to make sure the license plate lamp was not functioning. While Officer Bovy was
approximately 150 feet behind Knapp’s truck when he turned his patrol car
around, at the time he initiated a traffic stop he was only nine feet behind the
truck. The record before the district court supports the conclusion that Officer
Bovy was within fifty feet of Knapp’s truck when he observed that Knapp’s rear
license plate was not illuminated.
Because Officer Bovy had reasonable suspicion to believe a violation of
section 321.388 had occurred, we affirm the district court’s denial of his motion to
suppress. Having reached this result, we find it unnecessary to address Knapp’s
claim that he did not violate section 321.38.
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III. Judgment of Acquittal.
Knapp also contends the court erred in
denying his motion for judgment of acquittal because the State failed to prove he
had
the
necessary
intent
to
manufacture
more
than
five
grams
of
methamphetamine. Our scope of review of sufficiency-of-evidence challenges is
for correction of errors at law. State v. Adney, 639 N.W.2d 246, 250 (Iowa Ct.
App. 2001). We will uphold a trial court’s denial of a motion for judgment of
acquittal if there is substantial evidence to support the defendant’s conviction. Id.
Substantial evidence is such evidence as could convince a rational fact finder
that the defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.
Iowa Code section 124.401 provides that it is unlawful for a person to
conspire to manufacture a controlled substance. It is a class B felony to conspire
to manufacture more than five grams—but less than five kilograms—of
methamphetamine or “any compound, mixture, or preparation” that contains “any
quantity or detectable amount of methamphetamine.”
Iowa Code §
124.401(1)(b)(7).
In order to find Knapp conspired to manufacture methamphetamine, the
State was required to show:
(1) the defendant agreed with one or more persons that one or both
of them would manufacture or attempt to manufacture
methamphetamine, (2) the defendant entered into such an
agreement with the intent to promote or facilitate the manufacture
of methamphetamine, (3) one of the parties to the agreement
committed an overt act to accomplish the manufacturing of
methamphetamine, and (4) the alleged coconspirator(s) was not a
law enforcement agent or assisting law enforcement when the
conspiracy began.
State v. Fintel, 689 N.W.2d 95, 102 (Iowa 2004). The agreement to manufacture
need not be an explicit one; it may be inferred from circumstances. State v.
8
Mapp, 585 N.W.2d 746, 748 (Iowa 1998). It may consist of a tacit understanding
and be inferred from all the circumstances shown and the conduct of the parties
involved. State v. Casady, 597 N.W.2d 801, 805 (Iowa 1999).
Our supreme court has held that when prosecuting conspiracy to
manufacture methamphetamine, the State can rely on evidence of the potential
yield to prove the amount of methamphetamine conspired to be produced. See
State v. Royer, 632 N.W.2d 905, 907 (Iowa 2001) (“[U]nder the conspiracy
alternative to section 124.401(1) a potential rather than actual yield of five grams
of methamphetamine was sufficient to establish guilt.”); Casady, 597 N.W.2d at
804-05 (finding the State proved a conspiracy to manufacture more than five
grams of methamphetamine where the potential yield was 28.35 to 56.70 grams
of methamphetamine).
The amount of crushed pseudoephedrine found on
Knapp’s person had the potential to yield more than five grams of
methamphetamine. That, coupled with the other evidence presented, is sufficient
for a factfinder to infer a conspiracy to manufacture more than five grams of
methamphetamine.
We find no error in the district court’s denial of Knapp’s motion for
judgment of acquittal. Accordingly, we affirm.
AFFIRMED.
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