KENNA RYANN ROTH, Petitioner-Appellant, vs. IOWA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION MOTOR VEHICLE DIVISION, Respondent-Appellee.
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 9-632 / 08-1508
Filed November 12, 2009
KENNA RYANN ROTH,
Petitioner-Appellant,
vs.
IOWA DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION MOTOR
VEHICLE DIVISION,
Respondent-Appellee.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Washington County, Michael R.
Mullins, Judge.
Kenna Roth appeals from a district court ruling on judicial review affirming
the Iowa Department of Transportation’s order revoking her driver’s license for
one year. AFFIRMED.
Eric D. Tindal of Nidey, Peterson, Erdahl & Tindal, Williamsburg, for
appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Mark Hunacek, Assistant
Attorneys General, for appellee.
Heard by Eisenhauer, P.J., Potterfield, J., and Mahan, S.J.*
*Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206 (2009).
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MAHAN, S.J.
Kenna Roth appeals from a district court ruling on judicial review affirming
the Iowa Department of Transportation’s order revoking her driver’s license for
one year. She contends the district court erred because the Iowa Department of
Transportation (IDOT) exceeded its authority, and that the one-year suspension
was unreasonable, arbitrary, and capricious. We affirm.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings. On July 24, 2007, Roth was
involved in a fatal accident at the intersection of 320th Street and Highway 218 in
Washington County. Roth was heading east on 320th Street when she reached
the intersection with the four-lane highway. She came to a complete stop before
attempting to cross Highway 218. Upon proceeding, Roth pulled into the path of
a motorcycle traveling south on Highway 218. The motorcycle struck the driver’s
side of Roth’s vehicle, fatally injuring the motorcycle’s driver and its passenger.
Roth was cited for failure to yield right-of-way from a stop sign. After
making a finding of guilt, the district court imposed a fine. It declined to suspend
Roth’s license as provided by Iowa Code section 321.482A (2007).
Roth received notice the IDOT was suspending her license for a one-year
period for committing a serious violation of the state’s motor vehicle laws,
pursuant to section 321.210(1)(f).
A contested case hearing was held on
October 4, 2007. Roth raised three issues: (1) the IDOT exceeded its statutory
authority by suspending her license under the facts of the case, (2) the IDOT’s
decision is barred by res judicata, and (3) the suspension period is excessive.
She requested the suspension be rescinded or reduced to 120 days.
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On November 1, 2007, the IDOT issued an informal appeal decision,
upholding the one-year suspension. Subsequent appeals to the administrative
law judge and the IDOT reviewing officer sustained the suspension. In March
2008, Roth filed a petition for judicial review. Following a hearing, the district
court issued its August 2008 ruling upholding the suspension. She appeals on
two grounds.
II. Scope and Standard of Review. On appeal from an order revoking a
driver’s license, our scope of review is limited to correction of errors at law.
Zenor v. Iowa Dep’t of Transp., 558 N.W.2d 427, 430 (Iowa Ct. App. 1996). Our
review of a district court’s decision rendered in its appellate capacity is governed
by chapter 17A, Iowa’s Administrative Procedure Act.
Iowa Code § 17A.19;
Pointer v. Iowa Dep’t of Transp., 546 N.W.2d 623, 625 (Iowa 1996).
III. Analysis. Roth first contends the district court erred in sustaining her
license revocation because the IDOT exceeded its statutory authority.
Iowa Code section 321.210(1) states in pertinent part,
The department is authorized to establish rules providing for the
suspension of the license of an operator upon thirty days’ notice
and without preliminary hearing upon a showing by its records or
other sufficient evidence that the licensee . . . [h]as committed a
serious violation of the motor vehicle laws of this state.
The IDOT has defined ―serious violation‖ to mean ―[t]he person was convicted of
a moving violation which contributed to a fatal motor vehicle accident.‖ Iowa
Admin. Code r. 761-615.17.
―Contributed‖ means there is ―evidence in
departmental records that the driver performed an act which resulted in or
contributed to an accident, or failed to perform an act which would have avoided
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or contributed to the avoidance of an accident.‖
Iowa Admin. Code 761-
615.12(1)(b).
The undisputed facts show Roth committed a ―serious violation‖ under the
rules promulgated by the IDOT. She was convicted of failing to yield the right of
way when crossing the highway. Had she done so, the accident would have
been avoided. Her actions contributed to the deaths of two motorists.
We then turn to Roth’s argument that the IDOT has exceeded its authority
in crafting its definition of a ―serious violation.‖
An agency rule is generally
presumed valid unless the party challenging the rule proves a ―rational agency‖
could not conclude the rule was within its delegated authority. Meredith Outdoor
Advertising, Inc. v. Iowa Dep’t of Transp., 648 N.W.2d 109, 117 (Iowa 2002).
Additionally, the rule must not exceed or limit the scope of the authority granted
by the enabling legislation. Id. Although the ultimate decision concerning the
validity of a rule rests with the reviewing court we must accord some respect to
the agency's decision. Id.
The plain language of Iowa Code section 321.210(1) clearly vests the
IDOT with the authority to establish rules providing for the suspension of a
license for serious violations of the state’s motor vehicle laws. However, Roth
argues the IDOT rule exceeds the scope of authority granted because it focuses
on the end result of the traffic violation, and not the violation itself. She notes
section 321.482A grants the court in a criminal prosecution the authority to
suspend a license for violation of section 321.321 in cases that result in serious
injury or death. Roth argues ―the only logical interpretation is that the Legislature
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did not believe the IDOT had administrative authority to suspend a person’s
license under Iowa Code § 321.321.‖ We disagree. Making license suspension
a separate criminal punishment for violation of section 321.321 does nothing to
limit the IDOT’s authority to define serious violations for the purpose of civil
license suspensions.
Nor is it unreasonable for the IDOT to focus on the outcome of a traffic
violation in determining which violations are serious violations. As the district
court stated in rejecting Roth’s argument:
The court understands the argument raised by the appellant,
but likens this situation to an accidental discharge of a firearm. If
no one gets shot by the accidental discharge, then no serious
charges would likely follow. On the other hand, if the accidental
discharge struck and killed a person, it is the result of the death that
could support criminal charges (for example, involuntary
manslaughter). The act of shooting the firearm was the same; it
was the result that elevated the seriousness of the act.
We conclude the IDOT did not exceed the scope of authority granted by section
321.210(1) in defining moving violations that result in fatal accidents as ―serious
violations‖ of the motor vehicle laws.
Roth next contends the district court erred in failing to find the one-year
suspension of her license was unreasonable, arbitrary, and capricious.
She
argues the IDOT’s failure to enunciate its reasoning for suspending her license
for one year—as opposed to 120 days—amounts to an abuse of discretion.
The court may reverse an agency action if it determines that the
substantial rights of the person seeking judicial relief have been prejudiced
because the agency’s action is ―unreasonable, arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse
of discretion.‖ Iowa Code § 17A.19(10)(n). An agency’s action is arbitrary or
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capricious when ―it is taken without regard to the law or facts of the case‖ and
unreasonable when ―it is clearly against reason and evidence.‖ Soo Line R.R. v.
Iowa Dep’t of Transp., 521 N.W.2d 685, 688-89 (Iowa 1994). Unreasonableness
is defined as action in the face of evidence that leaves ―no room for difference of
opinion among reasonable minds, or not based on substantial evidence.‖
Stephenson v. Furnas Elec. Co., 522 N.W.2d 828, 831 (Iowa 1994). ―Abuse of
discretion is synonymous with unreasonableness, and involves lack of rationality,
focusing on whether the agency has made a decision clearly against reason and
evidence.‖ Id.
In the IDOT’s informal appeal decision, the reviewing officer upheld the
one-year suspension, stating as follows:
She was involved in an accident on 07-24-2007 which
resulted in two fatalities. The Investigating Officer’s report shows
contributing circumstances to this driver as #13 – Failed to Yield
Right of Way from Stop Sign. The driver of the motorcycle had the
right of way and there are no contributing circumstances indicated
to this driver on the report. He and a passenger both died as a
result of the accident.
Considering her failure to yield the right of way from a stop
sign and this resulting in a severe accident with two fatalities; a
suspension is appropriate.
The reasons given—the traffic violation, the death of two people, and the other
driver’s lack of contributing circumstances in causing the accident—are a
reasonable basis for determining Roth’s license should be suspended for one
year. Because the IDOT’s decision is not unreasonable, arbitrary, capricious, or
an abuse of discretion, we affirm the one-year suspension of Roth’s license.
AFFIRMED.
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