STATE OF IOWA, Plaintiff - Appellee, vs. KEVIN DEAN EDWARDS , Defendant - Appellant.
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 8-768 / 07-1989
Filed November 26, 2008
STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
KEVIN DEAN EDWARDS,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Woodbury County, John D.
Ackerman, Judge.
Kevin Edwards appeals from his convictions for two counts of forgery.
AFFIRMED.
Mark C. Smith, State Appellate Defender, and Dennis Hendrickson,
Assistant Appellate Defender, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Elisabeth Reynoldson, Assistant
Attorney General, Patrick Jennings, County Attorney, and Drew Bockenstadt,
Assistant County Attorney, for appellee.
Considered by Sackett, C.J., and Miller and Potterfield, JJ.
2
POTTERFIELD, J.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings
On April 24, 2007, Kevin Edwards attempted to purchase clothing from
The Buckle using a stolen credit card.
When the cashier rejected the card,
Edwards proceeded to another store where he stole a different credit card from
Twila Warren. He then returned to The Buckle and completed his previously
failed purchase using the newly stolen card. Twila Warren did not authorize
Edwards’ use of her credit card. Edwards signed the credit card receipt using the
name “Bobby Evers.” Edwards stipulated that he intended for The Buckle to
accept the credit card as payment for the merchandise, knowing that the card
was stolen.
Defendant then went to Scheels All Sports where he again used Twila
Warren’s card to purchase merchandise. He signed the credit card authorization
receipt using the name “Steve Warren.”
Again Edwards stipulated that he
intended for Scheels to accept the credit card as payment for the merchandise,
knowing that the credit card was stolen. The case was tried to the court on
stipulated facts. The district court convicted Edwards of two counts of forgery in
violation of Iowa Code section 715A.2(a)(3) (2007).1
Edwards appeals from
these convictions arguing that there was insufficient evidence to prove forgery
and that credit card fraud legislation supersedes forgery in this case.
1
Edwards was also convicted of credit card fraud, in violation of Iowa Code section
715A.6, and identity theft, in violation of Iowa Code section 715A.8(2). He does not
appeal from these convictions.
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II. Standard of Review
We review the alleged insufficiency of evidence for errors at law. Iowa R.
App. P. 6.4.
The district court’s guilty verdict is binding unless substantial
evidence does not exist in the record to support it. State v. McFarland, 598
N.W.2d 318, 320 (Iowa Ct. App. 1999). Substantial evidence is evidence that
would convince a rational fact finder that the defendant is guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt. Id. We review the evidence in the light most favorable to the
State. Id.
Issues of statutory construction are reviewed for errors of law. State v.
White, 545 N.W.2d 552, 554 (Iowa 1996).
III. Sufficiency of the Evidence
In order to prove Edwards was guilty of forgery, the State was required to
prove the following elements: (1) On April 24, 2007, Edwards completed,
executed, or authenticated a credit card authorization receipt; (2) Without the
authority of the credit card holder or person whose name Edwards signed to the
receipt, Edwards made the credit card authorization receipt appear to be the act
of another; and (3) Edwards specifically intended to defraud or injure the credit
card holder, the merchant, or the issuer of the credit card and/or Edwards knew
the act would facilitate a fraud or injury. See Iowa Code § 715A.2(1).
Edwards argues that the stipulated facts fail to prove that he had the
requisite intent described in the third element.
Intent may be shown by
reasonable inferences drawn from the evidence. State v. Acevedo, 705 N.W.2d
1, 5 (Iowa 2005).
“To deliberately make false statements or give false
information in order to gain some advantage is to act with fraudulent intent in the
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criminal context.” Id. The stipulated facts show that Edwards intended for both
The Buckle and Scheels to accept the credit card as payment, knowing that the
card was stolen. Twila Warren never gave Edwards permission to use her card
or sign an authorization receipt, nor did Bobby Evers or Steve Warren give
Edwards permission to sign his name on the authorization receipt. We find that
the district court properly concluded from this evidence that Edwards intended
that someone else, either the card holder, the store, or the issuer of the card, be
responsible for paying for the merchandise he received.
IV. Supersession of Forgery by Credit Card Fraud Legislation
Iowa Code section 715A.2 states that a person is guilty of forgery if that
person “makes, completes, executes, authenticates, issues, or transfers a
writing” purporting to be the act of another. Iowa Code section 715A.1 defines a
“writing” to include a credit card and also separately defines “credit card.”
Edwards argues that credit card is separately defined because there is a
difference between fraudulently using an authentic credit card and using a
counterfeit credit card. Edwards contends that this statute is ambiguous and
should be construed so that Iowa Code section 715A.6, regarding false use of
credit cards, supersedes the general forgery provisions of Iowa Code section
715A.2 when the defendant uses a genuine credit card.
When the language of a statute is clear, we are not to look beyond its
express meaning. State v. Finders, 743 N.W.2d 546, 548 (Iowa 2008). A statute
is ambiguous if “reasonable persons could disagree as to its meaning.” Wright v.
Iowa Dep’t of Corrections, 747 N.W.2d 213, 215 (Iowa 2008). If a statute is
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ambiguous, the court may interpret the statute to determine the legislative
purpose and avoid absurd results. Finders, 743 N.W.2d at 548.
We cannot find that Iowa Code section 715A.2 is ambiguous when read in
conjunction with Iowa Code section 715A.1. Section 715A.2 clearly establishes
that one element that the State must prove in order to convict an individual of
forgery is that the individual executed or authenticated a writing purporting to be
the act of another.
Section 715A.1 specifically includes credit cards in the
definition of “writing.” The clear and unambiguous language of Sections 715A.1
and 715A.2 defeats Edward’s argument that the legislature did not intend Section
715A.2 to apply to the fraudulent use of a genuine credit card. Accordingly, we
find that the district court did not err in convicting Edwards of forgery.
AFFIRMED.
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