IN THE INTEREST OF B.M.B. and S.A.B., Minor Children, D.B., Father, Appellant, S.B., Mother, Appellant.
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 7-928 / 07-1826
Filed December 12, 2007
IN THE INTEREST OF B.M.B. and S.A.B.,
Minor Children,
D.B., Father,
Appellant,
S.B., Mother,
Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Clarke County, David L.
Christensen, Judge.
A mother and father appeal from the orders terminating their parental
rights to their two children. AFFIRMED.
William Eddy of Eddy Law Firm, Indianola, for appellant father.
Patrick Greenwood, Lamoni, for appellant mother.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Kathrine Miller-Todd, Assistant
Attorney General, and Ronald Wheeler, County Attorney, for appellee State.
Jane Rosien, Winterset, for minor children.
Considered by Huitink, P.J., and Miller and Eisenhauer, JJ.
2
HUITINK, P.J.
A mother and father 1 appeal from the orders terminating their parental
rights in regards to their seven and nine-year-old daughters. We affirm.
I. Background Facts and Prior Proceedings
These children have been involved with the Iowa Department of Human
Services (DHS) since the spring of 2005 for lack of supervision. The mother
agreed to enter a shelter for substance abuse treatment, but left against the
recommendation of staff. When the mother left the children with a friend and did
not return for two days, DHS intervened.
The children were removed on
November 10, 2005, and placed in foster care.
On December 15, 2005, both parents stipulated that they desired to be
relieved of their duty to care for the children, so the children were adjudicated
children in need of assistance (CINA) pursuant to Iowa Code section 232.2(6)(k)
(parent for good cause desires to be relieved of children’s care) (2005).
Over the next sixteen months, the mother sporadically participated in
offered services. Her visitation privileges were suspended for nearly five months
when she tested positive for methamphetamine and did not cooperate with
subsequent requests for drug screens.
The mother never progressed past
supervised visitations.
The father participated in family services and progressed to semisupervised visitations, but he also drifted in and out of homeless shelters and
was unable to maintain a stable residence.
1
The mother and father are married, but separated. The father lives in a different city.
3
The children have remained in foster care since they were removed in
November 2005. DHS attempted to place the children with a relative, but the
relative eventually decided not to take the children.
In April 2007 the district court entered an order directing the State to
institute termination proceedings because neither parent was able to provide a
safe and stable home for the children. Over the next several months, the mother
took positive steps towards reunification and sought treatment for her substance
abuse.
However, by the time of the termination hearing, she still had not
completed her parenting classes, had not had a job for nearly a month, and relied
on a friend for housing. The father was living at the YMCA and testified that he
would not be able to resume custody of the children for at least another three or
four months.
On October 17, 2007, the district court entered orders terminating both
parents’ parental rights under Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(f) (2007).
II. Standard of Review
We review termination of parental rights de novo. In re J.E., 723 N.W.2d
793, 798 (Iowa 2006). Grounds for termination must be proved by clear and
convincing evidence and our primary concern is the children’s best interests. Id.
III. Merits
A. Reasonable Services
On appeal, both parents make vague claims that the State did not make
reasonable efforts to return the children to their care. While the State bears the
obligation to offer reasonable reunification services, a parent has the
responsibility to demand other, different, or additional services prior to the
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termination hearing. In re S.R., 600 N.W.2d 63, 65 (Iowa Ct. App. 1999). When
a parent alleging inadequate services fails to demand services other than those
provided, the issue of whether services were adequate is not preserved for
appellate review. Id.
The termination orders acknowledge that the parents have been offered
services for twenty-eight months.
However, the orders do not address any
demands for additional services, and neither party filed a post-trial motion asking
the court to address this issue. Similarly, there is no evidence either parent has
previously challenged DHS’s efforts towards reunification or requested any
specific services (beyond asking DHS for more visitation) to facilitate the
reunification process. The time to request additional services has passed. We
will not consider this argument now, for the first time, on appeal.
B. Statutory Basis for Termination
Both parents claim the State failed to prove a statutory basis for
termination.
Section 232.116(1)(f) provides that parental rights can be
terminated if the State proves by clear and convincing evidence that the children:
(1) are four years of age or older; (2) have been adjudicated CINA; (3) have been
removed from the physical custody of their parents for the last twelve
consecutive months with any trial period at home lasting less than thirty days;
and (4) cannot be returned to the custody of their parents as provided in section
232.102.
Both parents only dispute whether the children could be returned to their
care. The mother contends the children were no longer in need of supervision
and that the continuation of care or treatment was unjustified and unwarranted.
5
The father concedes the children could not be returned to his care for at least
three months, but argues termination was improper because the children could
have been returned to their mother’s care.
While the mother has had recent success with her substance abuse
treatment, she was still unemployed and depending on a friend for transportation
and housing at the time of the hearing. Because of the instability in her life and
the fact that she had not completed the recommended parenting classes, we
agree with the district court’s conclusion that the children could not be returned to
her care at the time of the hearing. As noted above, the father concedes the
children could not be returned to his care. Accordingly, we find there is clear and
convincing evidence the children cannot be returned to the care of either parent.
C. Best Interests
The mother claims her strong bond with her children means that
termination is not in their best interests. A strong bond between parent and child
is a special circumstance which militates against termination when the statutory
grounds have been satisfied. Iowa Code § 232.116(3)(c). However, this is not
an overriding consideration, but merely a factor to consider. In re N.F., 579
N.W.2d 338, 341 (Iowa Ct. App. 1998).
In determining the children’s best
interests, we look to the children’s long-term and immediate needs. J.E., 723
N.W.2d at 798.
The statutory period set forth in section 232.116(1)(f) directs that twelve
months is the point where the rights and needs of the child surpass the needs of
the parents.
These parents have been given nearly twenty-three months to
prove they are ready to care for their children. To date, they have still not done
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so. The law demands a full measure of patience with troubled parents who
attempt to remedy a lack of parenting skills; however, children need not endlessly
await the maturity of their parents, especially once the statutory period has
elapsed. In re A.C., 415 N.W.2d 609, 613-14 (Iowa 1987); In re J.L.W, 570
N.W.2d 778, 781 (Iowa Ct. App. 1997).
While we realize it may be difficult for these children to sever their
emotional bond with their parents, we also realize that, based on their parents’
prior behaviors, there is a strong possibility neither will ever be able to provide for
the children’s basic needs. See J.E., 723 N.W.2d at 798 (noting a parent’s past
performance is likely indicative of the quality of care the parent will provide in the
future). Safety and the need for a permanent home are the primary concerns
when determining a child’s best interests.
specially).
Id. at 801 (Cady, J., concurring
These children have waited nearly two years for their parents to
establish a safe environment. They should not be forced to wait any longer. See
A.C., 415 N.W.2d at 613 (“The crucial days of childhood cannot be suspended
while parents experiment with ways to face up to their own problems.”). We find
it is in the children’s best interests to terminate their parents’ parental rights so
that they can have permanency and the chance to grow in a stable and secure
environment.
We therefore affirm the orders terminating both parents’ parental rights.
AFFIRMED.
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