EDWARD RALPH ZIEGLER, Applicant-Appellant, vs. STATE OF IOWA, Respondent-Appellee.
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 7-898 / 07-0026
Filed December 28, 2007
EDWARD RALPH ZIEGLER,
Applicant-Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF IOWA,
Respondent-Appellee.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Mahaska County, Daniel P. Wilson,
Judge.
Edward Ziegler appeals from the denial of his postconviction relief
application. AFFIRMED.
Michael Carpenter, Ottumwa, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Kevin Cmelik, Assistant Attorney
General, and Rose Anne Mefford, County Attorney, for appellee State.
Considered by Sackett, C.J., and Vaitheswaran and Baker, JJ.
2
BAKER, J.
Edward
Ziegler
was
convicted
of
conspiracy
to
manufacture
methamphetamine, in violation of Iowa Code section 124.401(1)(c)(6) (2003).
We affirmed his conviction in his direct appeal, rejecting claims that the trial court
erred in denying his motion to suppress and that trial counsel was ineffective in
failing to move for judgment of acquittal on grounds of the insufficiency of the
conspiracy evidence.
State v. Ziegler, No. 03-2037 (Iowa Ct. App. Feb. 24,
2005). Because we adequately set forth the facts of this case in that opinion, we
do not further state them here.
On July 1, 2005, Ziegler filed an application for postconviction relief.
Following a trial on the application, the court denied Ziegler’s claims. Among
other issues, the court rejected the following claims: (1) that counsel
incompetently executed a theory of defense with regard to the conspiracy theory,
and (2) that counsel provided ineffective assistance in failing to move to sever his
trial with that of a co-defendant. Ziegler appeals from this ruling.
We typically review postconviction relief proceedings on error. Ledezma
v. State, 626 N.W.2d 134, 141 (Iowa 2001).
However, when the applicant
asserts a claim of constitutional nature, such as ineffective assistance of counsel,
we evaluate the totality of the circumstances in a de novo review. Id. A person
claiming he or she received ineffective assistance of counsel must prove by the
preponderance of the evidence that (1) counsel failed to perform an essential
duty, and (2) prejudice resulted from the error. State v. Doggett, 687 N.W.2d 97,
100 (Iowa 2004).
3
We first address the claim counsel was ineffective in failing to even
consider moving to sever. Ziegler makes clear and stresses that he believes
counsel’s ineffective assistance lies in his “failure to even consider” moving to
sever, as opposed to simply counsel’s failure to make the motion.
The general rule is that defendants who are indicted together are tried
together. State v. Belieu, 288 N.W.2d 895, 897 (Iowa 1980). Severance may
be warranted by any of the following factors:
(1) if admission of evidence in a joint trial would have been
inadmissible and prejudicial if a defendant was tried alone, (2) if a
joint trial prevents one defendant from presenting exculpatory
testimony of a codefendant, (3) if consolidation will produce a trial
of such complexity and length that the jury will be unable to
effectively compartmentalize the evidence against each defendant,
and (4) if defenses presented by different defendants conflict to the
point of being irreconcilable and mutually exclusive.
State v. Williams, 525 N.W.2d 847, 849 (Iowa 1994).
We conclude the postconviction court properly determined Ziegler could
not have suffered any prejudice by virtue of counsel’s failure to consider moving
to sever. Whether the issue is should Zeigler’s counsel have made a motion to
sever or should he have even considered it, the result is the same. Significantly,
Ziegler presents no evidence or argument that would support any of these four
factors warranting severance. We find the trial was not particularly complex, no
exculpatory evidence was thereby excluded, and the co-defendants’ defenses
were not mutually exclusive or irreconcilable. There is no likelihood the trial court
would have severed Ziegler’s trial from that of his co-defendant’s even if counsel
had considered the issue.
4
We next address the claim trial counsel “incompetently defended Ziegler
from the charges of conspiracy.”
Ziegler admits this is a general claim of
incompetent assistance, which he asserts deprived him of a fair trial.
The
postconviction court rejected this claim, concluding Ziegler’s underlying complaint
is simply that counsel’s strategy “backfired.”
We agree with the postconviction court.
Counsel executed a defense
theory of attacking the State’s evidence in order to cast doubt on the elements of
conspiracy.
Counsel cross-examined the State’s witnesses with the goal of
showing the arresting officers did not know what Ziegler and his accomplice were
doing or thinking prior to their arrest.
“Improvident trial strategy, miscalculated tactics, mistake, carelessness or
inexperience do not necessarily amount to ineffective counsel.” State v. Aldape,
307 N.W.2d 32, 42 (Iowa 1981).
A defendant is not entitled to perfect
representation, but rather only that which is within the range of normal
competency.
State v. Artzer, 609 N.W.2d 526, 531 (Iowa 2000).
When
complaining of the adequacy of an attorney’s representation, it is not enough
simply to claim counsel should have done a better job. Ziegler must demonstrate
the specific ways in which better performance would have changed the outcome.
See Dunbar v. State, 515 N.W.2d 12, 15 (Iowa 1994).
He falls far short of
meeting this burden, and we therefore affirm the denial of his postconviction relief
application.
AFFIRMED.
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.
