MICHAEL LEE SC ARBROUGH, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. IOWA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, Defendant-Appellant.
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 7-835 / 06-1764
Filed December 28, 2007
MICHAEL LEE SCARBROUGH,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
IOWA DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Donna L. Paulsen,
Judge.
The Iowa Department of Transportation appeals from a district court ruling
on judicial review reversing a license revocation order. REVERSED.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Carolyn J. Olson, Assistant
Attorney General, Ames, for appellant.
Robert G. Rehkemper of Gourley, Rehkemper & Lindholm, P.L.C., Des
Moines, for appellee.
Considered by Vogel, P.J., and Mahan and Zimmer, JJ.
2
MAHAN, J.
The Iowa Department of Transportation (DOT) appeals from a district
court ruling on judicial review reversing a DOT order revoking the driver’s license
of Michael Lee Scarbrough.
I. Background Facts and Prior Proceedings
On April 7, 2006, a Polk County deputy arrested Scarbrough for operating
a motor vehicle while intoxicated.
At the Polk County Jail, the deputy read
Scarbrough an implied consent advisory form and requested a breath sample for
chemical testing. Scarbrough checked the “consent” box and signed the form.
The deputy instructed him to blow a long steady breath into the DataMaster
breath analyzer.
Scarbrough’s first attempt to provide a breath sample was
unsuccessful. After repeated instructions from the deputy to “blow harder,” the
second attempt produced an alcohol concentration result of only .043.
The
deputy placed him in a holding cell and went to discuss the situation with a fellow
officer. The deputy returned and said he was going to certify that Scarbrough
had refused to take the test because he refused to properly blow in the analyzer.
Scarbrough asked to perform the test again, but the deputy would not allow him
to do so.
Scarbrough requested a hearing to contest the revocation. Scarbrough
and the deputy testified at the telephonic hearing before the administrative law
judge (ALJ). The deputy testified that Scarbrough purposely tried to sabotage
the test. He claimed Scarbrough tensed up his muscles and made his face flush
so that it appeared he was blowing very hard. However, his lungs did not deflate
and no air moved through the tube. When the deputy told him to “blow harder,”
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Scarbrough responded by letting out a short burst of air. The deputy told him to
blow harder again, and Scarbrough responded with another short burst of air.
This process continued three or four times until the DataMaster printed a result.
The deputy told him that he did not believe he had blown properly into the
machine and put him back in the holding cell.
Scarbrough’s testimony painted a much different picture. He claimed he
followed all of the officer’s instructions. When the officer told him to blow harder,
he did, and the machine produced the slip of paper. He also said the deputy
never accused him of faking the test until forty-five minutes after he had blown
into the analyzer.
The ALJ concluded Scarbrough did not refuse the test and issued a
decision rescinding the revocation of driving privileges.
The DOT filed an
administrative appeal. The reviewing officer reversed the ALJ’s decision and
revoked Scarbrough’s driving privileges.
The reviewing officer adopted the
deputy’s version of events and concluded Scarbrough’s uncooperative actions
constituted a refusal.
Scarbrough filed a petition for judicial review in district court. The district
court reversed the agency’s decision. The court put particular emphasis on the
fact that the DataMaster printed out a result card and concluded there was no
evidence Scarbrough “tricked” the DataMaster machine or that the DataMaster
test was somehow invalid. The court went on to state
[T]here is no substantial evidence to support the [DOT’s] claim that
[Scarbrough] refused to provide a breath sample. The DataMaster
registered a legitimate sample and provided a test result that
[Scarbrough’s] breath alcohol concentration was below the legal
limit. The deputy could have restarted the test or requested a
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second test. These same facts weigh in favor of [Scarbrough’s]
claims. Therefore the decision of the agency must be reversed.
The DOT appeals from this ruling, claiming there was substantial evidence
to support the agency’s decision that Scarbrough deliberately failed to comply
with the deputy’s repeated instructions.
II. Standard of Review
Iowa Code chapter 17A governs review of license revocation decisions
under Iowa Code chapter 321J. See Iowa Code § 321J.14 (2005); Reed v. Iowa
Dep’t of Transp., 478 N.W.2d 844, 845-46 (Iowa 1991). When the district court
exercises its power of judicial review the court acts in an appellate capacity to
correct errors of law on the part of the agency. Heartland Express, Inc. v. Terry,
631 N.W.2d 260, 265 (Iowa 2001). In reviewing the district court’s decision, this
court applies the standards of chapter 17A to determine whether our conclusions
are the same as those of the district court.
Mycogen Seeds v. Sands, 686
N.W.2d 457, 464 (Iowa 2004). If they are the same, we affirm; otherwise we
reverse or grant other appropriate relief. Iowa Code § 17A.19(10).
Our review is not de novo, but is limited to correction of errors at law.
Salis v. Employment Appeal Bd., 437 N.W.2d 895, 896 (Iowa 1989). Our court is
bound by the hearing officer’s findings of fact if those findings are supported by
substantial evidence.
Id. However, we are not bound by an agency’s legal
conclusions and may correct misapplications of the law. Id.
III. Merits
There is some dispute as to whether the alleged refusal is a question of
law or a question of fact. The DOT argues our supreme court’s decision in
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Hoppe v. Iowa Department of Transportation, 402 N.W.2d 392 (Iowa 1987),
establishes that the existence of the alleged refusal is a question of fact properly
resolved by the administrative agency.
Conversely, Ginsberg v. Iowa
Department of Transportation, 508 N.W.2d 663, 664 (Iowa 1993), indicates that
refusal is a legal question, properly resolved by the court.
In Hoppe, a driver was arrested for operating while intoxicated.
402
N.W.2d at 392. He initially agreed to submit to a chemical breath test, but when
it came time to take the test he allegedly became combative and threw the
consent form at the officer. Id. at 393. The officer considered this conduct to be
a refusal and certified that he had refused to submit to chemical testing. Id. The
driver disputed the officer’s testimony at the hearing and testified that he only
became belligerent when the officer refused to give him the test. Id. The agency
adopted the officer’s version of events and found the driver’s uncooperative
conduct constituted a refusal. Id. On appeal, our supreme court stated that
“[w]hether [the driver’s] conduct constituted a de facto refusal is, on the record
made before the agency, a question of fact.” Id. The court went on to affirm the
agency’s decision, noting there was substantial evidence to support the agency’s
decision. Id.
In Ginsberg, a driver arrested for operating while intoxicated asked to
speak with his attorney prior to the chemical breath test. 508 N.W.2d at 664.
After speaking with his attorney, the driver said he also wanted to take a blood or
urine test. Id. The officers asked if he was refusing to take the breath test. Id.
The driver said he was not refusing to take the breath test, but that he wanted a
blood or urine test as well. Id. The officers treated this as a refusal. Id. The
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court stated that the question of whether his conduct constituted a refusal was a
“legal question.” Id. The court went on to conclude the driver was not refusing
the test requested by police; he was only attempting to assert his right to
additional independent testing. Id.
We find Hoppe controls our analysis of the present case. In Ginsberg,
there was no dispute over the facts. The only question was whether a driver who
requested a blood or urine test in conjunction with a breath test had refused to
take the breath test. Because there was no factual dispute between the parties,
the court analyzed the case as a question of law. However, Hoppe, like the
present case, involved a factual dispute about whether the driver did or did not
do what the officer alleged.
Accordingly, we find Scarbrough’s alleged
uncooperative behavior must be analyzed as a question of fact, rather than a
question of law.
It is the role of the agency to determine the credibility of witnesses and the
weight to be given to any evidence. Sherman v. Pella Corp., 576 N.W.2d 312,
321 (Iowa 1998). Such judgment calls are clearly within the province of the
agency and should be left for the agency to make. IBP, Inc. v. Harpole, 621
N.W.2d 410, 420 (Iowa 2001). These factual findings are binding on appeal if
supported by “substantial evidence in the record made before the agency when
the record is viewed as a whole.” Iowa Code § 17A.19(8)(f); accord Reed, 478
N.W.2d at 846. Evidence is substantial when a reasonable person could accept
it as adequate to reach the same findings.
Reed, 478 N.W.2d at 846.
Conversely, evidence is not insubstantial merely because it would have
supported contrary inferences, or because two inconsistent conclusions could be
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drawn from it. Id. Therefore, the ultimate question is not whether the evidence
supports a different finding, but whether the evidence supports the findings
actually made by the agency. Id.
Scarbrough and the deputy presented conflicting testimony. Scarbrough
testified that he blew as hard as he could, while the deputy testified that
Scarbrough first tried to deceive him by pretending to blow into the machine and
then tried to manipulate the test by only blowing small puffs of air into the
mouthpiece. The agency found the deputy’s testimony more credible. We find
the agency’s decision to reject Scarbrough’s testimony and adopt the deputy’s
version of events was supported by substantial evidence in the record.
Our case law firmly establishes that “anything less than an unqualified,
unequivocal consent is a refusal.”
Ferguson v. Iowa Dep’t of Transp., 424
N.W.2d 464, 466 (Iowa 1988)). In light of the fact that Scarbrough made several
attempts to sabotage the results of his chemical breath test, we, like the agency,
find Scarbrough’s actions constituted a de facto refusal.
Scarbrough offers the additional argument that the result card conclusively
proves he provided an adequate sample of air. We disagree. As noted in the
manual for the DataMaster unit, and in the deputy’s instructions at the time of the
test, Scarbrough was to provide “a long and steady breath” into the DataMaster
mouthpiece. Rather than follow the deputy’s instructions, Scarbrough tried, on
two occasions, to manipulate the test by providing a sample that contained only
small puffs of air. In Ludtke v. Iowa Department of Transportation, 646 N.W.2d
62, 67 (Iowa 2002), our supreme court stated that there is no “assumption that an
adequate breath sample is always obtained when the machine locks in and
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produces a hardcopy printout.” We acknowledge that the type of machine used
in this case is different than the type of machine used in Ludtke, but still refuse to
assume a breath sample is adequate merely because the analyzing machine
produced a result. Therefore we find the printed result was not conclusive proof
that Scarbrough provided a proper breath sample. See Ludtke, 646 N.W.2d at
68-69 (noting the relevant distinction between “mouth air” and “deep lung air” in
chemical breath tests).
Scarbrough’s remaining argument that he should have been given a third 1
chance to properly perform the test is meritless.
IV. Conclusion
We hold that when the record is viewed as a whole, there is substantial
evidence to support the decision of the DOT. The ruling of the district court is
reversed and the decision of the DOT is reinstated.
REVERSED.
1
On appeal, Scarbrough contends he should have been given a “second” chance, but
his testimony at the hearing clearly indicates his first attempt produced no result and his
second attempt produced the disputed result.
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