STATE OF IOWA, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. CHRISTOPHER DEANGILO SPATES, Defendant-Appellant.
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 7-812 / 05-0883
Filed December 28, 2007
STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
CHRISTOPHER DEANGILO SPATES,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Black Hawk County, Jon C. Fister,
Judge.
Christopher Spates appeals following his conviction for first-degree
murder. AFFIRMED.
Clemens Erdahl and Sara L. Smith of Nidey Peterson Erdahl & Tindal,
Cedar Rapids, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Richard Bennett, Assistant Attorney
General, Thomas J. Ferguson, County Attorney, and Joel Dalrymple and
Raymond Walton, Assistant County Attorneys, for appellee.
Heard by Sackett, C.J., and Vaitheswaran and Baker, JJ.
2
BAKER, J.
Christopher Spates appeals following his conviction for first-degree
murder. 1 We affirm.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
In State v. Spates, No. 05-0926 (Iowa Ct. App. April 25, 2007), a case
involving
Christopher’s
brother/co-defendant
Ricardious
Matavis
Spates
(hereinafter Carl), we recounted the facts of the incident that led to the charges of
first-degree murder against the brothers. We recount the facts and procedure
relevant to the current appeal here:
At approximately 2:00 a.m. on October 10, 2004, a violent
fight broke out in the parking lot of a Waterloo bar between a group
of men calling themselves “L-Block” and a group of men calling
themselves “the Hood.”
An hour later, the L-Block group
approached the Hood's “afterset” house party bearing multiple
firearms. Someone fired a shot, and a gunfight ensued. Thyanna
Parsons, a young female standing in the kitchen at the afterset
party, was killed when a bullet fired by an SKS assault rifle went
through her arm and pierced her chest.
On October 22, 2004, four people in the L-Block group—
Carl, Christopher Spates, Damean Spates, and Dorondis Cooper—
were charged with first-degree murder on the theory of felony
murder for the death of Thyanna Parsons.
Damean Spates and Dorondis Cooper pled guilty to seconddegree murder in exchange for their testimony against Carl and
Christopher Spates. Paul Ackerman, a person who transported
some of the men to the afterset party, pled guilty to a misdemeanor
in exchange for his agreement to testify at trial.
Prior to trial, the State filed a notice of its intent to use
hearsay and videotape evidence at trial pursuant to Iowa Rule of
Evidence 5.803(24). The State sought to introduce evidence of
videotaped interviews with one witness who spoke with Carl in the
moments after the shooting. The court admitted the videotape
under the residual exception to the hearsay rule.
1
The supreme court has ordered that a motion made by the State to strike certain
portions of Spates’s reply brief should be submitted with the appeal.
Upon
consideration, we grant the State’s motion and strike the portions of the reply brief
referring to State v. Heemstra, 721 N.W.2d 549 (Iowa 2006).
3
The matter proceeded to a joint trial of Carl and Christopher
Spates. Damean and Dorondis both testified Carl was with them
during the gunfight and he carried the SKS assault rifle. In addition
to his testimony placing Carl at the scene of the shooting, Paul
Ackerman testified that he sold the assault weapon to Carl weeks
before the shooting. Carl relied on an alibi defense, claiming he
was at home at the time of the shooting. At the conclusion of the
five-week jury trial, Carl and Christopher were both convicted of
first-degree murder.
State v. Spates, No. 05-0926 (Iowa Ct. App. April 25, 2007).
Christopher moved to sever his trial from that of his co-defendants. After
a hearing, this request was denied. On February 23, 2005, Christopher filed a
notice with the Black Hawk County Clerk of Court essentially noting that he had
fired both of his attorneys. Following a hearing on that motion, the court denied
Christopher’s request for new counsel and gave him the option of continuing with
both of his current counsel or proceeding pro se. Christopher chose to continue
with counsel. At trial, Christopher relied on an alibi that he was at home all night
around the time of the shooting incident.
II. Claims on Appeal.
Now on appeal, Christopher raises five claims. First, he claims the court
erred in refusing to sever his trial from that of Carl. Second, he claims the court
inappropriately denied his request for new counsel. Third, he claims the jury’s
verdict was not supported by substantial evidence and was inconsistent with the
weight of the evidence. Fourth, he claims the court erroneously instructed on the
subjects of “mutual combat” and felony murder, and should have granted his
request for a voluntary manslaughter instruction.
Fifth, he claims the court
erroneously rejected his challenges to certain evidence and his request for jury
instructions on some of that evidence.
4
III. Request for Severance.
We first address Christopher’s claim he was “denied his Fifth and Sixth
Amendment rights when the trial court overruled his requests for severance.” In
particular, he asserts the court was required to sever the trials because: (1) while
Carl’s attorney was ready to proceed to trial, Christopher’s counsel was not
prepared and wished to continue his case; (2) prejudicial evidence in the form of
a videotaped statement from Ashley Scott, which would have been inadmissible
against him, was admitted; and (3) his defense was “completely at odds” with
Carl’s.
The general rule is “defendants who are indicted together are tried
together.” State v. Sauls, 356 N.W.2d 516, 517 (Iowa 1984). Iowa Rule of
Criminal Procedure 2.6(4)(b) provides, in pertinent part:
When an indictment or information jointly charges two or more
defendants, those defendants may be tried jointly if in the discretion
of the court a joint trial will not result in prejudice to one of the
parties. Otherwise, defendants shall be tried separately.
A district court's refusal, in the exercise of its discretion, to grant a severance will
be reversed on appeal “only if the defendant demonstrates an abuse of
discretion.” State v. Belieu, 288 N.W.2d 895, 900 (Iowa 1980). The court will
not be found to have abused its discretion unless the challenging defendant
demonstrates a joint trial prejudiced his or her right to a fair trial. Id.
We conclude the court did not abuse its discretion in failing to sever
Christopher’s trial from Carl’s. The joint trial did not prejudice Christopher. First,
we conclude the court’s apparent concern about the efficient use of judicial
resources was an appropriate, if small, reason to deny severance in this case.
5
Holding a joint, rather than separate, trial clearly served this purpose. Second,
the brothers’ alibis were not mutually exclusive or inconsistent, and were not
“completely at odds,” as Christopher argues on appeal. In fact, their defenses
were in harmony, as both Christopher and his brother maintained they were at
their different residences at the time of the shooting. 2
Finally, the statement
given by Ashley Scott to a police officer was not incriminating against
Christopher. Her statements did not implicate Christopher; in fact she never told
officers she had seen him on the night of the shootings. Thus, her statements
did not impeach Christopher’s alibi and could not have prejudiced Christopher in
a joint trial.
IV. Substantial Evidence.
Christopher next claims the State’s evidence does not support the jury’s
finding of guilt.
Specifically, he asserts the witnesses against him were not
credible, no ballistic or other forensic evidence implicates him, and his alibi
evidence was strong. In ignoring these claims, he believes the district court
“abdicated” its role in considering the motion for directed verdict.
A jury’s finding of guilt is binding on appeal if substantial evidence
supports it. State v. Nitcher, 720 N.W.2d 547, 556 (Iowa 2006). Substantial
evidence is defined as evidence that “could convince a rational trier of fact that
the defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Robinson, 288
N.W.2d 337, 339 (Iowa 1980). We consider all the evidence in the record, not
just evidence supporting the defendant’s guilt. State v. Randle, 555 N.W.2d 666,
2
Christopher presented a defense that he was at 133 Lewis Street in Waterloo at the
time of the shooting, while Carl claimed he was at his home at the time Parsons was
shot and killed.
6
671 (Iowa 1996). We review this claim for the correction of errors at law. State
v. Bower, 725 N.W.2d 435, 440-41 (Iowa 2007).
We conclude substantial evidence supports Christopher’s conviction of
first-degree murder. While the evidence may not support a finding that Spates
fired the shot that killed Thyanna Parsons, it would support a finding that he
aided and abetted the individual that did. State v. Doss, 355 N.W.2d 874, 877
(Iowa 1984).
scene.
Substantial evidence supports Christopher’s presence at the
Damean Spates testified that Christopher fired a shotgun during the
incident. Empty shotgun shell casings were located near the area where the
shooting occurred. A vehicle that Christopher regularly drove was placed at the
scene of the shooting.
Testimony was given that he drove one of the
accomplices, Dorondis Cooper, to the hospital after he was shot during the
melee. This was confirmed by DNA evidence confirming that blood belonging to
Cooper was in the vehicle Christopher drove.
V. Weight of the Evidence.
Christopher claims the court abused its discretion in denying his motion
for new trial because the verdict was against the weight of the evidence. He
argues the State failed to prove he aided and abetted a principal. A trial court
may grant a new trial “[w]hen the verdict is contrary to law or evidence.” Iowa R.
Crim. P. 2.24(2)(b)(6). “Contrary to . . . [the] evidence” means “contrary to the
weight of the evidence.” State v. Ellis, 578 N.W.2d 655, 659 (Iowa 1998). A
verdict is contrary to the weight of the evidence where “a greater amount of the
evidence supports one side of an issue or cause than the other.” Id. at 658.
The weight of the evidence standard is distinguishable from the sufficiency of
7
the evidence standard in that it is broader. State v. Nicther, 720 N.W.2d at 559.
We review the denial of new trial motions for abuse of discretion.
Reeves, 670 N.W.2d 199, 202 (Iowa 2003).
State v.
For similar reasons expressed
above, we affirm the court’s refusal to grant a new trial.
VI. Request for New Counsel.
Because he was charged with the class “A” felony of first-degree murder,
the district court appointed two attorneys to represent Christopher. Prior to trial,
in a pro se pleading, Christopher indicated he had “dismissed” both attorneys
because of “personal differences about the progress of the case . . . .” At a
hearing on the motion, Christopher clarified that he was dissatisfied primarily with
only one of his attorneys, John Standafer.
Christopher claims that “the failure to grant new counsel combined with
the Court’s determination to insist on a joint trial violated his constitutional rights.”
He argues that Standafer was abrasive and that he had lost trust in him. He
desired to proceed with only one of his attorneys.
We find that Christopher has waived any claim of constitutional error on
the failure to replace his counsel. No claim of constitutional error was made in
either the pro se letter or at the hearing on the request. See In re K.C., 660
N.W.2d 29, 38 (Iowa 2003) (“Even issues implicating constitutional rights must be
presented to and ruled upon by the district court in order to preserve error for
appeal.”). Accordingly, we review the court’s denial of the request for substitute
counsel for an abuse of discretion. State v. Lopez, 633 N.W.2d 774, 778 (Iowa
2001). To establish an abuse of discretion, Christopher must show that “the
8
court exercised the discretion on grounds or for reasons clearly untenable or to
an extent clearly unreasonable.” State v. Maghee, 573 N.W.2d 1, 5 (Iowa 1997).
To justify the appointment of substitute counsel, a defendant must show
sufficient cause. State v. Martin, 608 N.W.2d 445, 449 (Iowa 2000). “Sufficient
cause includes ‘a conflict of interest, irreconcilable conflict, or a complete
breakdown in communication between the attorney and the defendant.’”
(quoting State v. Webb, 516 N.W.2d 824, 828 (Iowa 1994)).
Id.
In determining
whether to grant a request for substitute counsel, “the court must balance ‘the
defendant’s right to counsel of his choice and the public’s interest in the prompt
and efficient administration of justice.’” Id. (quoting Webb, 516 N.W.2d at 828).
Ordinarily, a defendant must show prejudice when the court denies a motion for
substitute counsel “unless [the defendant] has been denied counsel or counsel
has a conflict of interest.” State v. Brooks, 540 N.W.2d 270, 272 (Iowa 1995).
Essentially, Christopher complained that he and his trial counsel were not
compatible. Incompatibility is insufficient to support a claim of ineffective counsel
due to a conflict of interest. The Sixth Amendment right to the assistance of
counsel does not “guarantee a ‘meaningful relationship’ between an accused and
his counsel.”’
State v. Tejeda, 677 N.W.2d 744, 749 (Iowa 2004) (citations
omitted).
With respect to his proposition that he had an absolute right to replace one
of his attorneys, Christopher offers no case law or statutory authority for his. On
the contrary, Iowa case law makes clear that a court may deny a request for
substitute counsel based on such considerations as “the prompt and efficient
administration of justice,” and such a request may not be used to delay or disrupt
9
the trial. Lopez, 633 N.W.2d at 779. Moreover, on appeal, Christopher offers no
example of having suffered prejudice.
VII. Jury Instructions.
Christopher claims the court erred in: (1) refusing to instruct on the lesserincluded offense of voluntary manslaughter; (2) instructing the jury on mutual
combat; and (3) by giving a felony murder instruction. We review the district
court’s refusal to give a jury instruction for abuse of discretion. State v. Holtz,
548 N.W.2d 162, 164 (Iowa Ct. App. 1996). Error in giving or refusing to give a
particular instruction does not warrant reversal unless the error is prejudicial to
the party. Thavenet v. Davis, 589 N.W.2d 233, 236 (Iowa 1999).
A. Voluntary Manslaughter. Christopher first contends the district court
committed reversible error by refusing to instruct the jury on voluntary
manslaughter.
“Parties to lawsuits are entitled to have their legal theories
submitted to a jury if they are supported by the pleadings and substantial
evidence in the record.” Sonnek v. Warren, 522 N.W.2d 45, 47 (Iowa 1994).
Generally, a district court commits reversible error by failing to instruct on all
lesser-included offenses. State v. Anderson, 636 N.W.2d 26, 38 (Iowa 2001).
By statute, voluntary manslaughter “is an included offense under an
indictment for murder in the first or second degree.” Iowa Code § 707.4 (2003);
State v. Jefferies, 430 N.W.2d 728, 737 (Iowa 1988).
Because this is a
statutorily-mandated lesser-included offense, the district court must apply the
factual test to determine if substantial evidence supports each element of the
crime of voluntary manslaughter. State v. Inger, 292 N.W.2d 119, 122 (Iowa
1980).
10
We previously dealt with this precise issue in his brother’s companion
case. There, we stated:
At first blush, the voluntary manslaughter instruction appears
appropriate because, by statute, voluntary manslaughter “is an
included offense under an indictment for murder in the first or
second degree.” Iowa Code § 707.4 (2003); State v. Jefferies, 430
N.W.2d 728, 737 (Iowa 1988). However, because this is a
statutorily-mandated lesser-included offense, the district court must
apply the factual test to determine if substantial evidence supports
each element of the crime of voluntary manslaughter. State v.
Inger, 292 N.W.2d 119, 122 (Iowa 1980); State v. LeGrand, 442
N.W.2d 614-15 (Iowa Ct. App. 1989).
Iowa Code section 707.4 (2003) sets forth the definition of
voluntary manslaughter.
....
Our supreme court has held section 707.4 contains both a
subjective requirement and an objective requirement. Inger, 292
N.W.2d at 122. The subjective requirement is that the defendant
must have acted “solely as a result of sudden, violent, and
irresistible passion.” Id. The objective requirement is that the
sudden, violent, and irresistible passion “must result from serious
provocation sufficient to excite such passion in a reasonable
person.” Id.
The objective standard is not disputed in this case. While
there is some question as to which group fired the first shot,
multiple witnesses testified that the first shot came from the afterset
party. A reasonable person could find this sufficient provocation to
excite an irresistible passion to retaliate. However, there is no
evidence in the record which indicates it excited an irresistible
passion in Carl and no evidence that Carl fired his gun solely as a
result of a sudden, violent, and irresistible passion. On the
contrary, Carl asserted an alibi defense and, through the testimony
of other witnesses, claimed he was not present at the murder
scene. Carl did not present evidence outlining his subjective state
of mind at the time of the shooting; instead, he invited the fact
finder to speculate that if he had been there, he would have only
returned fire as a result of sudden, violent, and irresistible passion.
We reject this argument because evidence that only
generates speculation is not substantial evidence.
State v.
Hutchison, 721 N.W.2d 776, 780 (Iowa 2006). Without some type
of evidence indicating Carl’s state of mind at the time of firing the
gun, we cannot infer his decision to fire the gun was solely as a
result of an irresistible passion simply because gunfire could be
11
sufficient provocation to excite an irresistible passion in a
reasonable person.
Because there was no evidence to support the subjective
requirement that Carl acted out of passion resulting from serious
provocation, the court properly refused to submit the manslaughter
instruction to the jury.
State v. Spates, No. 05-0926 (Iowa Ct. App. April 25, 2007)
A similar analysis is applicable here. Christopher did not testify, and there
is simply no evidence in this record from which a fact-finder could determine
Christopher acted in the heat of passion; thus, there is not substantial evidence
of provocation. The roots of the shooting lie in the fight at the Waterloo bar’s
parking lot.
The shooting, which killed Parsons, happened approximately an
hour later in a residential neighborhood. The evidence supports that Christopher,
who was not even present at the time of the initial fight, took the time to arm
himself and only then proceeded to the area where he knew the men who
referred to themselves as The Hood would be. His specific purpose appears to
have been to confront The Hood about the fight. This conduct, with no other
evidence as to Christopher’s state of mind, negates any necessity to instruct the
jury on the crime of voluntary manslaughter. See Iowa Code § 707.4 (defining
voluntary manslaughter as when “the person causing the death acts solely as the
result of sudden, violent, and irresistible passion resulting from serious
provocation”).
Similarly, like his brother, Christopher contends he was not even present
when the shooting occurred. There was no evidence that Christopher acted out
of passion. The trial court properly refused to give this instruction.
B. Mutual Combat Instruction. The court instructed the jury as follows:
12
If you find that either of the defendants, or any person or
persons that either of the defendants was acting together with,
were voluntarily engaged in mutual combat by shooting guns at
each other and that, by exchanging gunfire, they jointly created a
zone of danger likely to result in the death or injury of innocent
bystanders, then you may also find that each of the combatants,
including the defendant, aided and abetted each of the other
combatants and it makes no difference which of the combatants
fired the first shot or which of the combatants fired the shot which
struck and killed Thyanna Parsons.
To constitute “mutual combat” there must exist a mutual
intent and willingness to fight and this intent may be manifested by
the acts and conduct of the parties and the circumstances attending
and leading up to the combat.
Christopher argues this instruction “gave undue prominence to evidentiary
facts to be determined by a jury” and erroneously stated that “any combatant was
equally guilty for any crime that any other combatant committed . . . .” We
conclude this instruction was a proper statement of law in that the court had a
reasonable basis of law from which to form this instruction. See State v. Brown,
589 N.W.2d 69, 74-75 (Iowa 1998), overruled on other grounds by State v.
Reeves, 636 N.W.2d 22 (Iowa 2001) (“In consideration of the mens rea element
of second-degree murder, we hold that if death to an innocent bystander ensues
from gang-style gunplay in a crowded urban area, each participant in the lethal
encounter has exhibited malice.”); 40 Am. Jur. 2d Homicide § 26, at 476-77
(1999) (“If two men engage in shooting at each other in a crowded place, and a
bystander is killed, both are guilty of murder, one as principal and the other as an
aider and abettor.”). The instruction did not give any undue emphasis to certain
facts; it merely correctly states the law of criminal responsibility when two
opposing sides engage in mutual gunplay.
Therefore, we find it was not
improper for the court to instruct the jury on this matter.
13
C.
Felony Murder Instruction.
First-degree murder was submitted
solely on the theory of felony murder. Under the marshaling instruction, the jury
was required to find Parsons was shot while Christopher was participating in the
forcible felony of intimidation with a dangerous weapon or assault causing
serious injury. Christopher asserts the court should not have instructed the jury
on felony murder. He believes “[s]ubstantial evidence of a clearly defined forcible
felony was not presented to the jury in this case.”
Felony murder requires participation in an underlying forcible felony and
that a “murder” was committed during participation.
State v. Ragland, 420
N.W.2d 791, 793 (Iowa 1988). Felony murder may be proved by showing that
one of the persons involved in the underlying felony killed another person with
malice aforethought. Id. It is not necessary for the State to prove Christopher
had malice aforethought, so long as it proved the principal did. Id. at 793-94.
We conclude substantial evidence in the record supports that both assault
causing serious injury and intimidation with a dangerous weapon occurred. A
jury question was presented as to whether Christopher aided and abetted any of
the other participants in both of these crimes.
Thus, no error occurred in
permitting the jury to consider the two forcible felonies under the felony murder
instruction.
VIII. Admission of Evidence.
Christopher makes a variety of attacks on the admission of evidence in
this case. We find most of these claims are not preserved for appellate review
and, thus, will not address the merits of them in this appeal. First, Christopher
argues the testimony of his alleged accomplices was so lacking in credibility that
14
it should have been excluded. Christopher never objected to the admission of
this evidence on this ground. This claim is therefore waived on appeal. Second,
he makes a variety of challenges to the admissibility of Ashley Scott’s pretrial
statement to police and to a jury instruction that discussed this evidence. No
objection was lodged to either this evidence or the instruction, therefore this
challenge is waived.
During its deliberations, the jury was given a laptop
computer to view the Ashley Scott statement.
He claims this was in error.
Christopher did not object contemporaneously, and his motion for new trial,
which appears to raise this topic, is insufficient to preserve error. See Jacobson
v. Benson Motors, Inc., 216 N.W.2d 396, 405 (Iowa 1974) (argument, made for
the first time as part of movant’s after-the-verdict motion for new trial, came too
late for consideration on appeal).
Therefore we proceed to address the remaining evidentiary claims.
Christopher maintains the court improperly allowed Benigna Garcia to testify.
After the State rested, Jennifer Raley testified in support of Christopher’s alibi
defense.
On cross-examination the State asked Raley whether she knew
anybody named “B. Garcia,” whose phone number appeared on a cell phone that
Spates used. She denied any knowledge of a B. Garcia. The State was later
allowed to call Benigna Garcia to testify that she knew Christopher and had
exchanged a number of phone calls with him around the time of the shooting.
Christopher now claims she was not a true rebuttal witness in that the State
asked Raley about her, thereby creating for itself a basis to call Garcia. He also
appears to claim her testimony was improper in that Garcia had been present at
15
earlier portions of the trial even though witnesses had been sequestered from
attending trial.
We first note Christopher has cited no authority for this claim of error, and
we could therefore consider this claim waived.
Iowa R. App. P. 6.14(1)(c)
However, even if properly before us, we would reject the claims. The record
supports the trial court’s finding that the State was unaware Garcia was going to
have to be called to testify and that she had attended an earlier portion of the
trial. See, e.g., Greiman v. State, 471 N.W.2d 811(Iowa 1991). The prosecutor
explained it only became necessary to call Garcia following Raley’s testimony
and that he had no idea what Garcia looked like so he could not have asked her
to leave the courtroom.
We also reject Christopher’s claim he was denied a fair trial by admission
of evidence he believes suggests gang involvement in the incident. In particular,
he believes the terms “L Block” and “The Hood” implied gang affiliation and thus
were highly inflammatory. He also argues the admission of a neoprene mask
that was found in the vehicle he had on the night of the incident. The terms “L
Block” and “The Hood” referred to geographic affiliations of the individuals
involved in the shooting. They told the story of why a fight was started at the bar
and why that fight was continued later by way of the gunfire. The mask was
found by police in a vehicle driven by Christopher after the murder. All of this
evidence was relevant and admissible to show the complete story of the crime.
See State v. Garren, 220 N.W.2d 898, 900 (Iowa 1974) (holding circumstances
that immediately surround an offense may be shown even though they may
incidentally show commission of another crime); see also State v. Nowlin, 244
16
N.W.2d 596, 601 (Iowa 1976) (noting evidence is admissible when it is an
inseparable part of the whole deed).
IX. Conclusion.
We have considered all arguments presented and find no basis for
overturning the defendant's conviction. Accordingly, we affirm the decision of
the district court.
AFFIRMED.
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