SARA E. KUHN, Plaintiff-Appellant, vs. PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD and STATE OF IOWA (COMMISSION ON VE TERANS AFFAIRS), Defendants-Appellees.
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 7-703 / 07-0096
Filed November 29, 2007
SARA E. KUHN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS
BOARD and STATE OF IOWA
(COMMISSION ON VETERANS AFFAIRS),
Defendants-Appellees.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Richard G. Blane II,
Judge.
The plaintiff appeals from the district court order on judicial review
affirming the finding there was just cause for her termination. AFFIRMED.
Rustin T. Davenport of De Vries, Price & Davenport, Mason City, for
appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General and Robert Porter, Assistant Attorney
General, Des Moines, for appellee State of Iowa.
Jan V. Berry, Des Moines, for appellee Public Employment Relations
Board.
Heard by Sackett, C.J., and Vaitheswaran and Baker, JJ.
2
VAITHESWARAN, J.
Sara E. Kuhn was a nurse supervisor at the Iowa Veterans Home. An
employee she supervised complained to Kuhn that another employee exposed
his genitals to her. The Iowa Veterans Home subsequently terminated Kuhn’s
employment for failure to properly investigate this incident.
Kuhn filed administrative appeals of the discharge decision. In a final
agency ruling, the Public Employment Relations Board concluded that her failure
to initiate or conduct an investigation of the sexual harassment complaint
amounted to just cause for the discharge. The district court affirmed the agency
decision and Kuhn sought further judicial review.
Kuhn concedes the facts are essentially undisputed but she argues the
agency’s application of law to fact was erroneous. This argument implicates the
judicial review standard of Iowa Code section 17A.19(10)(m).
Under that
standard, we are to reverse an agency decision if it is “[b]ased upon an irrational,
illogical, or wholly unjustifiable application of law to fact that has clearly been
vested by a provision of law in the discretion of the agency.” See Lakeside
Casino and Zurich Am. Inc. Group v. Blue, __N.W.2d __, __ (Iowa 2007).
The Board’s application of the just cause standard to the facts was clearly
vested in the discretion of the agency. Under Iowa Code chapter 8A, governing
the duties of the agency that houses the Public Employment Relations Board, the
Board has authority to consider appeals of discharge decisions involving merit
system employees. Iowa Code § 8A.415(2) (2005). Specifically, the Board is
authorized to decide whether employment action was taken for “reasons not
constituting just cause.” Id. The agency is to adopt rules to administer this
3
portion of the statute. Id. § 8A.413(16). 1 The agency has done so, setting forth
several grounds for disciplinary action, including “less than competent job
performance,” “failure to perform assigned duties,” “inadequacy in the
performance of assigned duties,” and the catch-all ground “or any other just
cause.”
Iowa Admin. Code r. 11-60.2(8A).
This rule essentially tracks the
grounds set forth in the statute. See Iowa Code § 8A.413(16).
Because chapter 8A clearly vests the agency’s application of law to fact
on this issue within the discretion of the agency, we are obligated to give
“appropriate deference” to the view of the agency on this matter. Iowa Code §
17A.19(11)(c). This is important because there is no all-encompassing definition
of “just cause.” Cf. Briggs v. Bd. of Dirs., 282 N.W.2d 740, 743 (Iowa 1979)
(examining just cause for termination of school administrator’s contract). As the
board noted, application of the just cause standard is fact-specific.
We turn to the Board’s application of that standard to the essentially
undisputed facts of this case. The board stated:
We think it is clear that intentionally exposing one’s genitals
to a co-worker in the workplace constitutes sexual harassment
within the meaning of the State’s policy . . . . We also think the
record makes it clear that Kuhn failed to initiate an investigation
when she received reports that such serious misconduct had
occurred, and also failed to take reasonable steps to call the matter
to the attention of other management representatives, so that they
could investigate without delay. These failures, in our review,
clearly amount to a failure to act on complaints of workplace
harassment within the meaning of the sexual harassment
provisions of the State’s EEO/AA/Anti-Discrimination policy, and
constitutes just cause for discipline on a number of the grounds
specified in IDOP rule 581-11.2.
1
We note that this provision refers to “good cause” for discharge rather than “just
cause.”
4
We defer to this application of law to fact. Additionally, we conclude the agency
did not act irrationally, illogically, or wholly unjustifiably in determining that Kuhn’s
failure to immediately investigate the complaint amounted to just cause for the
discharge.
AFFIRMED.
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