Bridgestone/Firestone v. Aldridge
Annotate this Case
Bridgestone/Firestone v. Aldridge, No. 82375 (10/23/97)
NOTICE: Under Supreme Court Rule 367 a party has 21 days
after the filing of the opinion to request a rehearing.
Also, opinions are subject to modification, correction or
withdrawal at anytime prior to issuance of the mandate by
the Clerk of the Court. Therefore, because the following
slip opinion is being made available prior to the Court's
final action in this matter, it cannot be considered the
final decision of the Court. The official copy of the
following opinion will be published by the Supreme Court's
Reporter of Decisions in the Official Reports advance sheets
following final action by the Court.
Docket No. 82375--Agenda 34--May 1997.
BRIDGESTONE/FIRESTONE, INC., Appellee, v. CECIL
ALDRIDGE et al., Appellants.
Opinion filed October 23, 1997.
CHIEF JUSTICE FREEMAN delivered the opinion of the
court:
Section 604 of the Illinois Unemployment Insurance
Act disqualifies an employee from receiving unemployment
benefits where the employee is voluntarily unemployed
because of a labor strike at the place where he or she
was "last employed." 820 ILCS 405/604 (West 1994). In
Dienes v. Holland, 78 Ill. 2d 8 (1979), this court
interpreted the phrase "last employed" to mean simply
last in time.
This appeal requires us to ascertain whether the
legislature intended to add conditions to section 604 of
the Act by amending other sections of the Act subsequent
to Dienes. We cannot discern such an intent from the Act
as it is written.
BACKGROUND
The record contains the following undisputed
pertinent facts. The 243 claimants in this case were all
employed by Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. (Bridgestone), at
Bridgestone's Decatur plant. On July 12, 1994, claimants
went on strike. Bridgestone has not permanently replaced
or fired claimants, who remain employees of Bridgestone
and who intend to return to work at Bridgestone at the
end of the strike. Since claimants' unemployment was due
to a labor strike at the place where they were last
employed, i.e., Bridgestone, they were ineligible for
unemployment benefits. See 820 ILCS 405/604 (West 1994).
Each claimant obtained interim employment, from
which he or she was fired or laid off. The interim
employment constituted "employment" and the interim
employers constituted "employers" as defined by the Act.
820 ILCS 405/205, 206 (West 1994). In many cases, the
interim employment lasted for as little as a few months
or even a few days.
Each claimant applied to the Illinois Department of
Employment Security for unemployment benefits. The claims
adjudicator, who determines applications for benefits,
awarded unemployment benefits to claimants. Relying on
Dienes v. Holland, 78 Ill. 2d 8 (1979), the adjudicator
determined that claimants' acquisition of interim
employment outside of Bridgestone removed the disqual-
ification of section 604 of the Act.
Bridgestone appealed each of these determinations to
the Director of the Department, who consolidated them for
review. The Director upheld the award of unemployment
benefits. The Director agreed with the claims adjudicator
that claimants' interim employment removed the section
604 disqualification. Relying on Dienes, the Director
rejected as irrelevant the issues of whether: (1)
claimants had taken the interim employment in good faith,
instead of to avoid the section 604 disqualification; and
(2) the interim employment was meant to be permanent.
Bridgestone filed a complaint in the circuit court
of Macon County seeking administrative review of the
Department's award of unemployment benefits to claimants.
The circuit court set aside the Department's decision.
Citing Dienes, the court held that a striking employee's
good faith in obtaining interim employment was a
condition to removing the section 604 disqualification.
The court also held that good faith "does not necessarily
require a belief that the interim employment will be
permanent." The circuit court remanded the cause to the
Department to determine whether each "claimant performed
interim employment in good faith and the claimant is
otherwise free of Section 604 disqualification."
The Department petitioned the appellate court for
leave to appeal. See 155 Ill. 2d R. 306(a). The appellate
court affirmed the circuit court. 284 Ill. App. 3d 360.
However, the appellate court did not base its reasoning
on Dienes, but rather on section 1502.1 of the Act, which
the legislature enacted subsequent to Dienes. Section
1502.1 provides detailed guidelines for determining an
employer's benefit charges. 820 ILCS 405/1502.1 (West
1994). The appellate court held that the definition of
"last employer" in section 1502.1 of the Act applies to
the term "last employed" in section 604. Thus, according
to the appellate court, a striking employee's interim
employment does not remove the section 604 disqualifica-
tion unless the employment meets the conditions of
section 1502.1. 284 Ill. App. 3d at 364-65. The appellate
court remanded the cause to the Department to make this
determination for each claimant.
The claimants petitioned this court for leave to
appeal. 155 Ill. 2d R. 315(a). We allowed the petition
and now reverse the appellate court.
DISCUSSION
Standing
We address at the outset Bridgestone's contention
that claimants lack standing to appeal to this court. The
doctrine of standing requires that a party have a real
interest in the action brought and its outcome. The
purpose of the doctrine is to insure that courts decide
real controversies and not abstract questions or moot
issues. Standing is not a procedural technicality, but
rather is an aspect or component of justiciability. In re
Estate of Wellman, 174 Ill. 2d 335, 344 (1996).
Bridgestone contends that claimants cannot appeal
from the appellate court's decision. Bridgestone observes
that the Department, alone, appealed from the circuit
court to the appellate court. Bridgestone argues that a
party in a circuit court proceeding who does not file a
notice of appeal in the appellate court is no longer a
party in that proceeding and, therefore, cannot petition
this court for leave to appeal pursuant to our Rule
315(a). 155 Ill. 2d R. 315(a). Accordingly, Bridgestone
contends that we should dismiss this appeal.
This contention lacks merit. Bridgestone does not
deny, nor, we surmise, could it deny, that claimants were
proper parties in the circuit court. See Cuny v.
Annunzio, 411 Ill. 613, 617 (1952); 735 ILCS 5/3--107(a)
(West 1994). Further, it is quite settled that an appeal
is not a new proceeding, but rather is a continuation of
the proceedings in the court from which the appeal is
taken. 155 Ill. 2d R. 301; Swain v. Hoberg, 380 Ill. 442,
446 (1942); Taylor v. Taylor, 45 Ill. App. 3d 352, 356
(1977). Since the claimants were proper parties of record
in the circuit court, they remained proper parties in the
appellate court, even though they did not join in the
appeal. See Wm. Aupperle & Sons, Inc. v. American
National Bank & Trust Co., 62 Ill. App. 3d 842, 846
(1978), citing Carpenter v. Young, 280 Ill. App. 116, 118
(1935). We hold that claimants have standing to appeal to
this court.
The Merits
We note our standard of review. The Act provides
that judicial review of unemployment benefit decisions be
in accordance with the Administrative Review Law (735
ILCS 5/3--101 et seq. (West 1994); 820 ILCS 405/1100
(West 1994). The Administrative Review Law provides that
our review extends to all questions of law and fact
presented by the entire record. 735 ILCS 5/3--110 (West
1994). The rule that an administrative agency's findings
of fact should not be disturbed unless they are against
the manifest weight of the evidence does not apply where
the question involved is one of law, such as the proper
interpretation of a statute. In such a case, the Board's
finding is not binding on the court. DiFoggio v.
Retirement Board of the County Employees Annuity &
Benefit Fund, 156 Ill. 2d 377, 380-81 (1993).
"Last Employed"
Section 604 of the Act states in pertinent part:
"Labor Dispute. An individual shall be
ineligible for benefits for any week with
respect to which it is found that his total or
partial unemployment is due to a stoppage of
work which exists because of a labor dispute
at the factory, establishment, or other
premises at which he is or was last employed."
820 ILCS 405/604 (West 1994).
The controlling principles are familiar:
" `It is a primary rule in the interpretation
and construction of statutes that the
intention of the legislature should be
ascertained and given effect. [Citations.]
This is to be done primarily from a
consideration of the legislative language
itself, which affords the best means of its
exposition, and if the legislative intent can
be ascertained therefrom it must prevail and
will be given effect without resorting to
other aids for construction. [Citations.]
There is no rule of construction which
authorizes a court to declare that the
legislature did not mean what the plain
language of the statute imports.' (Western
National Bank v. Village of Kildeer (1960), 19 Ill. 2d 342, 350.)" Illinois Power Co. v.
Mahin, 72 Ill. 2d 189, 194 (1978).
Further:
" `Where the language of the act is certain
and unambiguous the only legitimate function
of the courts is to enforce the law as enacted
by the legislature. [Citations.] It is never
proper for a court to depart from plain
language by reading into a statute exceptions,
limitations or conditions which conflict with
the clearly expressed legislative intent.
[Citations.]' Certain Taxpayers v. Sheahen
(1970), 45 Ill. 2d 75, 84." Harvey Firemen's
Ass'n v. City of Harvey, 75 Ill. 2d 358, 363
(1979).
In Dienes, the appellate court concluded that the
section 604 disqualification refers simply and only to
the establishment where a claimant was last employed.
Thus, the disqualification is removed when a claimant
acquires subsequent employment. Section 604 did not
require such a claimant to show that the interim
employment was bona fide or permanent. Dienes v. Holland,
64 Ill. App. 3d 109, 113-14 (1978).
This court affirmed, holding that "the appellate
court was correct in reading the statute just as it was
enacted." Dienes, 78 Ill. 2d at 14. This court could not
perceive any legislative intent to add any additional
conditions to section 604 to qualify a claimant for
benefits. Thus, this court refused to read into the
section 604 disqualification the additional conditions
that the interim employment be bona fide or permanent.
Dienes, 78 Ill. 2d at 14-15. This court lastly noted that
its decision was based on the facts of that case. This
court expressly stated: "We need not consider here
whether every succeeding or `last' employment, whatever
the circumstances, will qualify a claimant for
unemployment benefits." Dienes, 78 Ill. 2d at 17.
In the present case, the Department and the circuit
court, both relying on Dienes, found two different
interpretations of section 604 of the Act. The Department
relied on Dienes in awarding unemployment benefits to
claimants, whether or not the interim employment was bona
fide or meant to be permanent. The circuit court pointed
to the caveat at the end of Dienes in concluding that a
striking employee's good faith in obtaining interim
employment was a condition to removing the section 604
disqualification, which required a case-by-case
determination.
Examining the entire act (see Castaneda v. Illinois
Human Rights Comm'n, 132 Ill. 2d 304, 318 (1989)), the
appellate court found a third interpretation of section
604. The appellate court relied on section 1502.1 of the
Act, which the legislature enacted subsequently to
Dienes. That section sets out detailed rules governing
whether benefits to a claimant will in turn be charged to
the claimant's former employer. The initial subsections
of section 1502.1 determine the particular employer that
will be charged, which in most cases is the employer for
which the claimant most recently worked for a minimum of
30 days. 820 ILCS 405/1502.1 (West 1994). One year after
adding section 1502.1 to the Act, the legislature added
subsection (E). Pursuant to section 1502.1(E), the
claimant's "last employer" "means the employer that ***
is charged for benefit payments which become benefit
charges under this Section." 820 ILCS 405/1502.1(E) (West
1994); see 284 Ill. App. 3d at 364-65.
According to the appellate court, section 1502.1
links a claimant's eligibility for benefits to an
employer's benefit charges: "Until a claimant becomes
employed to the extent that his new employer becomes
chargeable for benefits (basically 30 days), the claimant
remains `last employed' with (and barred from receiving
benefits from) the employer with whom he was originally
embroiled in a labor dispute." The appellate court con-
cluded that "[s]ection 1502.1 of the Act accordingly now
sets out a required length of employment before disquali-
fication under section 604 is ended." 284 Ill. App. 3d at
365.
We disagree with the appellate court. Section 604 of
the Act was unambiguous in 1979 when this court decided
Dienes and remains so. We conclude that Dienes controls
the outcome of this case.
However, the appellate court looked to section
1502.1 of the Act to read section 604 other than in the
way it was written. This attempt fails. Section 1502.1(E)
plainly states that its definition of "last employer" is
"[f]or the purposes of Sections 302, 409, 701, 1403,
1404, 1405 and 1508.1." 820 ILCS 405/1502.1(E) (West
1994). Further, those sections contain cross-references
to section 1502.1. 820 ILCS 405/302, 409, 701, 1403,
1404, 1405, 1502.1(E), 1508.1 (West 1994).
The appellate court was properly "troubled by the
fact that section 604 of the Act is not listed in section
1502.1(E)." 284 Ill. App. 3d at 365. We repeat that the
statutory language itself gives the best indication of
legislative intent. Where a statute lists the things to
which it refers, there is an inference that all omissions
should be understood as exclusions. Burke v. 12
Rothschild's Liquor Mart, Inc., 148 Ill. 2d 429, 441-42
(1992).
This rule of statutory construction, expressio unius
est exclusio alterius, is based on logic and common
sense. It expresses the learning of common experience
that when people say one thing they do not mean something
else. The maxim is closely related to the plain language
rule in that it emphasizes the statutory language as it
is written. 2A N. Singer, Sutherland on Statutory
Construction sec. 47.24, at 228, sec. 47.25 at 234 (5th
ed. 1992).
The appellate court cited two reasons for reading
the requirements of section 1502.1 of the Act into
section 604, despite the fact that section 1502.1(E) does
not list section 604. First, the appellate court stated
that "[t]here is no indication this list was intended to
be exclusive." 284 Ill. App. 3d at 365.
However, the inference that all omissions should be
understood as exclusions stands despite the lack of any
negative words of limitation. Solich v. George & Anna
Portes Cancer Prevention Center of Chicago, Inc., 158 Ill. 2d 76, 82 (1994); City Savings Ass'n v.
International Guaranty & Insurance Co., 17 Ill. 2d 609,
612 (1959). Thus, the absence of section 604 from section
1502.1(E)'s list infers the legislative intent that
section 1502.1's definition of "last employer" is
exclusive to the sections cited in the list. An explicit
statement of such intent is unnecessary.
Second, the appellate court reasoned that if it did
not apply section 1502.1's definition of "last employer"
to the term "last employed" in section 604, these
substantially same terms would have different meanings in
the same statute. The appellate court invoked the
principle that where the same or substantially the same
words or phrases appear in different parts of a statute,
they should be given a consistent meaning unless a
contrary legislative intent is clearly expressed. 284
Ill. App. 3d at 365; see Moran v. Katsinas, 16 Ill. 2d 169, 174 (1959).
However, the legislature did clearly express a
contrary intent. Sections 604 and 1502.1 address
different subjects. In section 604, the legislature
prohibited an employee from receiving unemployment bene-
fits based on a labor strike at the place where the
employee was last employed. The legislature subsequently
created in section 1502.1 a detailed test to determine an
employer's benefit charges. After enacting section
1502.1, the legislature specifically enacted subsection
(E), which lists the other sections of the Act to which
it refers. The legislature also specifically cross-
referenced those sections to section 1502.1. The
legislature's use of certain language in one instance and
different language in another indicates that the
legislature intended different results. Nelson v. Union
Wire Rope Corp., 31 Ill. 2d 69, 100 (1964).
If the legislature had intended to apply section
1502.1's definition of "last employer" to section 604, it
would have expressly done so, as it did with several
other sections of the Act. The fact that the legislature
did not cannot be deemed to be inadvertent. See, e.g.,
Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 22-23, 78 L. Ed. 2d 17, 23-24, 104 S. Ct. 296, 300 (1983); Peoria Savings
& Loan Ass'n v. Jefferson Trust & Savings Bank, 81 Ill. 2d 461, 469-70 (1980); Siciliano v. Village of
Westchester Firefighters' Pension Fund, 202 Ill. App. 3d
964, 967 (1990).
We recognize that the principle that the expression
of one thing in a statute excludes any other thing is
only a rule of statutory construction, not a rule of law.
It is merely a rule that courts use to help them
ascertain the intent of the legislature where such intent
is not clear from the statute's plain language. The maxim
is applied only when it appears to point to the intent of
the legislature, not to defeat the ascertained
legislative intent. The rule may be overcome by a strong
indication of legislative intent. Illinois Central R.R.
Co. v. Franklin County, 387 Ill. 301, 313-14 (1944);
accord Sulser v. Country Mutual Insurance Co., 147 Ill. 2d 548, 555 (1992). In the present case, however, we find
that section 1502.1(E)'s specific reference to other
sections of the Act, which cross-references to section
1502.1, reveals a clear legislative intent to exclude any
other section of the Act which section 1502.1(E) does not
list. See, e.g., City Savings Ass'n, 17 Ill. 2d at 612.
The appellate court noted that an interpretation of
section 604 that defined "last employed" as not imposing
any durational or good-faith requirement was the minority
view in the country. 284 Ill. App. 3d at 363-64. Further,
after it incorporated section 1502.1 of the Act into
section 604, the appellate court explained that
"[s]ection 1502.1 of the Act provides an objective,
bright-line method of determining whether an individual
has requalified for unemployment benefits and avoids the
subjectivity inherent in any type of `good-faith'
inquiry." 284 Ill. App. 3d at 366.
The appellate court essentially rewrote sections 604
and 1502.1(E) of the Act to remedy perceived shortcomings
in section 604. However, where the language of a statute
is unambiguous, the only legitimate function of the
courts is to enforce the law as enacted by the
legislature. Certain Taxpayers v. Sheahen, 45 Ill. 2d 75,
84 (1970); Belfield v. Coop, 8 Ill. 2d 293, 307 (1956);
see Boaden v. Department of Law Enforcement, 171 Ill. 2d 230, 239 (1996). This cardinal rule applies even though
the statutory language may be considered unwise or as
impairing the statute as a whole. Buckellew v. Board of
Education of Georgetown-Ridge Farm Community Unit School
District No. 4, 215 Ill. App. 3d 506, 511 (1991). A court
may not inject provisions not found in the statute,
however desirable they may appear to be. Western National
Bank v. Village of Kildeer, 19 Ill. 2d 342, 349-50
(1960). We reverse the judgment of the appellate court.
Good Faith
We further conclude that, between the circuit court
and the Department, the circuit court expressed the
better-reasoned view of section 604 of the Act and of
Dienes. The Department found that a striking employee's
interim employment, whatever the circumstances,
automatically removed the section 604 disqualification,
whether or not the interim employment was bona fide or
meant to be permanent. The circuit court concluded that
a striking employee's good faith in obtaining interim
employment was a condition to removing the section 604
disqualification.
The Department's finding cannot stand. This court
concluded Dienes by noting that the decision was based on
the facts of that case. The court expressly declined to
consider whether "every succeeding or `last' employment,
whatever the circumstances, will qualify a claimant for
unemployment benefits." (Emphasis added.) Dienes, 78 Ill. 2d at 17.
The circuit court correctly read Dienes as not
drawing "a bright line for labor dispute cases which
would allow any kind of employment to restore benefit
eligibility." Such a reading of section 604 would violate
the long-settled policy of the Act. The Act "must be
liberally construed so as to provide sustenance to those
who are unemployed through no fault of their own and who
are willing, anxious, and ready to work if given the
opportunity." Shell Oil Co. v. Cummins, 7 Ill. 2d 329,
339 (1955); accord 820 ILCS 405/100, 609 (West 1994).
This policy would be violated if striking employees could
receive unemployment benefits by obtaining sham employ-
ment in bad faith solely to avoid the section 604
disqualification. Thus, a determination of good faith is
required in each case.
The circuit court correctly ruled that a showing of
good faith is based on all the facts and circumstances:
"Obviously good faith is absent if a claimant
is primarily motivated by a desire to remove
the labor dispute disqualification and he or
she does not undertake work expected to
provide a significant support. Good faith is
present if there is a genuine effort to remain
in the active workforce and be regularly
employed. Good faith does not necessarily
require a belief that the interim employment
will be permanent ***."
We uphold the judgment of the circuit court.
We lastly note that all parties who filed briefs in
this appeal, claimants, Bridgestone, the Department, and
the Illinois Manufacturers' Association as amicus curiae,
invoke the public policy underlying section 604 in
support of their respective positions. Section 604
"evinces the legislative determination that the State is
to remain neutral in labor disputes and collective
bargaining, rendering assistance to neither the employer
nor labor." Local 7--641 v. Department of Labor, 96 Ill. 2d 94, 98 (1983).
However, as we concluded in Dienes, a neutrality
policy does not directly apply here. The unemployment for
which claimants are seeking benefits did not result from
the labor dispute at Bridgestone, but rather from their
having been fired or laid off from their interim
employment. "They therefore were within the class of
employees which the Act was designed to assist. That they
may earlier have gone on strike at another place of
employment would not seem to have a necessary bearing on
eligibility under the Act if they later were employed
elsewhere." Dienes, 78 Ill. 2d at 17.
CONCLUSION
The language of section 604 of the Act is certain
and unambiguous. Of course, the legislature can, subject
to constitutional restraints, add any additional require-
ment to section 604 in any way it sees fit, including the
approach envisioned by the appellate court. This is a
task for the legislature--not the courts.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the
appellate court is reversed, and the judgment of the
circuit court of Macon County is affirmed.
Appellate court reversed;
circuit court affirmed.
JUSTICE HEIPLE, dissenting:
I fully agree with the majority that the purposes of
the Unemployment Insurance Act (the Act) (820 ILCS
405/100 (West 1994)) would be frustrated "if striking
employees could receive unemployment benefits by
obtaining sham employment." Slip op. at 10. The task
which confronts this court, however, is to identify and
enforce those safeguards established by the Act to
prevent such abuse. The majority instead imposes a
condition for the receipt of unemployment benefits which
is wholly absent from the Act and, in doing so, neglects
the only interpretation of the Act which plausibly
comports with the legislature's directives. I therefore
respectfully dissent.
In plain language, section 604 of the Act prohibits
an employee from receiving unemployment benefits while he
is on strike from the establishment at which he was "last
employed." 820 ILCS 405/604 (West 1994). In Dienes v.
Holland, 78 Ill. 2d 8 (1979), this court held that, as
used in the statute, "last employed" means simply "last
in time." Dienes, 78 Ill. 2d at 13-14. In so holding,
this court refused "to add any additional conditions to
the statute in order to qualify a claimant for benefits."
Dienes, 78 Ill. 2d at 14.
In direct contravention of this precedent, the
majority adds a judicial gloss to the Act by providing
that striking claimants may qualify for unemployment
benefits if they can show that they accepted interim
employment in "good faith." The majority asserts that
this requirement is consistent with Dienes because that
case was based only on its specific facts. Slip op. at
10. On the contrary, however, one of the conditions which
the Dienes court specifically considered but refused to
add to the statute was a good-faith test. See Dienes, 78 Ill. 2d at 13. In adopting such a test today, the
majority does what Dienes refused to do: that is, provide
a claimant the opportunity to establish something in
addition to what the statute requires in order to qualify
for benefits. Dienes, 78 Ill. 2d at 15.
It is no surprise that the legislature has not
imposed the requirement adopted today by the majority.
The good-faith inquiry will subject both the claimant and
the Department of Employment Security to onerous burdens.
To qualify for benefits, the striking claimant will
henceforth be required to show that, in accepting interim
employment, he was not "primarily motivated by a desire
to remove the labor dispute disqualification." To
withhold benefits, the Department will be required to
establish that the claimant did not make " `a genuine
effort to remain in the active workforce.' " Slip op. at
10. Due to the subjective nature of these inquiries, it
is doubtful whether either of these factors can be
satisfactorily proven. It is certain, however, that
valuable resources will be squandered in the attempt.
In sharp contrast to the majority's approach, the
appellate court correctly based its analysis solely on
the language of the Unemployment Insurance Act (820 ILCS
405/100 (West 1994)). Nine years after this court decided
Dienes, the General Assembly enacted section 1502.1 of
the Act. This section requires that the last employer
from whom an unemployment claimant was separated after
working for at least 30 days pay the benefit charges
arising from that claimant's unemployment. 820 ILCS
405/1502.1 (West 1994). Section 604, however, continued
to prohibit a claimant from receiving benefits while on
strike from the establishment at which he was last
employed. 820 ILCS 405/604 (West 1994). The instant case
requires this court, for the first time, to apply section
1502.1's scheme for assessing benefit charges to section
604's prohibition against employees receiving
unemployment benefits while on strike.
The appellate court reasoned that, to harmonize
these two provisions, section 604 must be interpreted to
withhold benefits from striking workers who obtain
interim employment for less than 30 days. This is because
if benefits are instead granted to a claimant who works
for an interim employer for less than 30 days, section
1502.1 would require the original employer, from whom the
employee is still on strike, to pay the claimant's
benefits, rather than the interim employer, who made the
claimant eligible for benefits by firing him. The
appellate court correctly concluded that this would
violate the policy embodied in section 604 that strikers
are prohibited from collecting unemployment benefits at
the struck employer's expense. Yet this is precisely the
result dictated by the majority's holding: if a claimant
worked for an interim employer for less than 30 days (as
did most of the instant appellants), but nevertheless
were found to have obtained that interim employment in
"good faith," Bridgestone, the very firm the claimant is
striking, will be assessed payment for the claimant's
unemployment benefits. The appellate court's proper
construction of the Act instead assures that unemployment
benefits will not be charged to the employer from whom an
employee is on strike.
A simple, straightforward requirement that striking
workers hold interim employment for at least 30 days
before becoming eligible for unemployment benefits is
thus the only plausible interpretation of the current
version of the Act. The appellate court's opinion is
correct. As opposed to the majority's analysis, it is
based entirely upon the language of the Act. In
erroneously charging that the appellate court "rewrote"
the statute "to remedy perceived shortcomings" (slip op.
at 9), the majority describes only its own gratuitous
behavior. I would affirm the appellate court's faithful
adherence to the statute.
JUSTICES MILLER and NICKELS join in this dissent.
NOTICE: Under Supreme Court Rule 367 a party has 21 days
after the filing of the opinion to request a rehearing.
Also, opinions are subject to modification, correction or
withdrawal at anytime prior to issuance of the mandate by
the Clerk of the Court. Therefore, because the following
slip opinion is being made available prior to the Court's
final action in this matter, it cannot be considered the
final decision of the Court. The official copy of the
following opinion will be published by the Supreme Court's
Reporter of Decisions in the Official Reports advance sheets
following final action by the Court.
Docket No. 82375--Agenda 34--May 1997.
BRIDGESTONE/FIRESTONE, INC., Appellee, v. CECIL
ALDRIDGE et al., Appellants.
Opinion filed October 23, 1997.
CHIEF JUSTICE FREEMAN delivered the opinion of the
court:
Section 604 of the Illinois Unemployment Insurance
Act disqualifies an employee from receiving unemployment
benefits where the employee is voluntarily unemployed
because of a labor strike at the place where he or she
was "last employed." 820 ILCS 405/604 (West 1994). In
Dienes v. Holland, 78 Ill. 2d 8 (1979), this court
interpreted the phrase "last employed" to mean simply
last in time.
This appeal requires us to ascertain whether the
legislature intended to add conditions to section 604 of
the Act by amending other sections of the Act subsequent
to Dienes. We cannot discern such an intent from the Act
as it is written.
BACKGROUND
The record contains the following undisputed
pertinent facts. The 243 claimants in this case were all
employed by Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. (Bridgestone), at
Bridgestone's Decatur plant. On July 12, 1994, claimants
went on strike. Bridgestone has not permanently replaced
or fired claimants, who remain employees of Bridgestone
and who intend to return to work at Bridgestone at the
end of the strike. Since claimants' unemployment was due
to a labor strike at the place where they were last
employed, i.e., Bridgestone, they were ineligible for
unemployment benefits. See 820 ILCS 405/604 (West 1994).
Each claimant obtained interim employment, from
which he or she was fired or laid off. The interim
employment constituted "employment" and the interim
employers constituted "employers" as defined by the Act.
820 ILCS 405/205, 206 (West 1994). In many cases, the
interim employment lasted for as little as a few months
or even a few days.
Each claimant applied to the Illinois Department of
Employment Security for unemployment benefits. The claims
adjudicator, who determines applications for benefits,
awarded unemployment benefits to claimants. Relying on
Dienes v. Holland, 78 Ill. 2d 8 (1979), the adjudicator
determined that claimants' acquisition of interim
employment outside of Bridgestone removed the disqual-
ification of section 604 of the Act.
Bridgestone appealed each of these determinations to
the Director of the Department, who consolidated them for
review. The Director upheld the award of unemployment
benefits. The Director agreed with the claims adjudicator
that claimants' interim employment removed the section
604 disqualification. Relying on Dienes, the Director
rejected as irrelevant the issues of whether: (1)
claimants had taken the interim employment in good faith,
instead of to avoid the section 604 disqualification; and
(2) the interim employment was meant to be permanent.
Bridgestone filed a complaint in the circuit court
of Macon County seeking administrative review of the
Department's award of unemployment benefits to claimants.
The circuit court set aside the Department's decision.
Citing Dienes, the court held that a striking employee's
good faith in obtaining interim employment was a
condition to removing the section 604 disqualification.
The court also held that good faith "does not necessarily
require a belief that the interim employment will be
permanent." The circuit court remanded the cause to the
Department to determine whether each "claimant performed
interim employment in good faith and the claimant is
otherwise free of Section 604 disqualification."
The Department petitioned the appellate court for
leave to appeal. See 155 Ill. 2d R. 306(a). The appellate
court affirmed the circuit court. 284 Ill. App. 3d 360.
However, the appellate court did not base its reasoning
on Dienes, but rather on section 1502.1 of the Act, which
the legislature enacted subsequent to Dienes. Section
1502.1 provides detailed guidelines for determining an
employer's benefit charges. 820 ILCS 405/1502.1 (West
1994). The appellate court held that the definition of
"last employer" in section 1502.1 of the Act applies to
the term "last employed" in section 604. Thus, according
to the appellate court, a striking employee's interim
employment does not remove the section 604 disqualifica-
tion unless the employment meets the conditions of
section 1502.1. 284 Ill. App. 3d at 364-65. The appellate
court remanded the cause to the Department to make this
determination for each claimant.
The claimants petitioned this court for leave to
appeal. 155 Ill. 2d R. 315(a). We allowed the petition
and now reverse the appellate court.
DISCUSSION
Standing
We address at the outset Bridgestone's contention
that claimants lack standing to appeal to this court. The
doctrine of standing requires that a party have a real
interest in the action brought and its outcome. The
purpose of the doctrine is to insure that courts decide
real controversies and not abstract questions or moot
issues. Standing is not a procedural technicality, but
rather is an aspect or component of justiciability. In re
Estate of Wellman, 174 Ill. 2d 335, 344 (1996).
Bridgestone contends that claimants cannot appeal
from the appellate court's decision. Bridgestone observes
that the Department, alone, appealed from the circuit
court to the appellate court. Bridgestone argues that a
party in a circuit court proceeding who does not file a
notice of appeal in the appellate court is no longer a
party in that proceeding and, therefore, cannot petition
this court for leave to appeal pursuant to our Rule
315(a). 155 Ill. 2d R. 315(a). Accordingly, Bridgestone
contends that we should dismiss this appeal.
This contention lacks merit. Bridgestone does not
deny, nor, we surmise, could it deny, that claimants were
proper parties in the circuit court. See Cuny v.
Annunzio, 411 Ill. 613, 617 (1952); 735 ILCS 5/3--107(a)
(West 1994). Further, it is quite settled that an appeal
is not a new proceeding, but rather is a continuation of
the proceedings in the court from which the appeal is
taken. 155 Ill. 2d R. 301; Swain v. Hoberg, 380 Ill. 442,
446 (1942); Taylor v. Taylor, 45 Ill. App. 3d 352, 356
(1977). Since the claimants were proper parties of record
in the circuit court, they remained proper parties in the
appellate court, even though they did not join in the
appeal. See Wm. Aupperle & Sons, Inc. v. American
National Bank & Trust Co., 62 Ill. App. 3d 842, 846
(1978), citing Carpenter v. Young, 280 Ill. App. 116, 118
(1935). We hold that claimants have standing to appeal to
this court.
The Merits
We note our standard of review. The Act provides
that judicial review of unemployment benefit decisions be
in accordance with the Administrative Review Law (735
ILCS 5/3--101 et seq. (West 1994); 820 ILCS 405/1100
(West 1994). The Administrative Review Law provides that
our review extends to all questions of law and fact
presented by the entire record. 735 ILCS 5/3--110 (West
1994). The rule that an administrative agency's findings
of fact should not be disturbed unless they are against
the manifest weight of the evidence does not apply where
the question involved is one of law, such as the proper
interpretation of a statute. In such a case, the Board's
finding is not binding on the court. DiFoggio v.
Retirement Board of the County Employees Annuity &
Benefit Fund, 156 Ill. 2d 377, 380-81 (1993).
"Last Employed"
Section 604 of the Act states in pertinent part:
"Labor Dispute. An individual shall be
ineligible for benefits for any week with
respect to which it is found that his total or
partial unemployment is due to a stoppage of
work which exists because of a labor dispute
at the factory, establishment, or other
premises at which he is or was last employed."
820 ILCS 405/604 (West 1994).
The controlling principles are familiar:
" `It is a primary rule in the interpretation
and construction of statutes that the
intention of the legislature should be
ascertained and given effect. [Citations.]
This is to be done primarily from a
consideration of the legislative language
itself, which affords the best means of its
exposition, and if the legislative intent can
be ascertained therefrom it must prevail and
will be given effect without resorting to
other aids for construction. [Citations.]
There is no rule of construction which
authorizes a court to declare that the
legislature did not mean what the plain
language of the statute imports.' (Western
National Bank v. Village of Kildeer (1960), 19 Ill. 2d 342, 350.)" Illinois Power Co. v.
Mahin, 72 Ill. 2d 189, 194 (1978).
Further:
" `Where the language of the act is certain
and unambiguous the only legitimate function
of the courts is to enforce the law as enacted
by the legislature. [Citations.] It is never
proper for a court to depart from plain
language by reading into a statute exceptions,
limitations or conditions which conflict with
the clearly expressed legislative intent.
[Citations.]' Certain Taxpayers v. Sheahen
(1970), 45 Ill. 2d 75, 84." Harvey Firemen's
Ass'n v. City of Harvey, 75 Ill. 2d 358, 363
(1979).
In Dienes, the appellate court concluded that the
section 604 disqualification refers simply and only to
the establishment where a claimant was last employed.
Thus, the disqualification is removed when a claimant
acquires subsequent employment. Section 604 did not
require such a claimant to show that the interim
employment was bona fide or permanent. Dienes v. Holland,
64 Ill. App. 3d 109, 113-14 (1978).
This court affirmed, holding that "the appellate
court was correct in reading the statute just as it was
enacted." Dienes, 78 Ill. 2d at 14. This court could not
perceive any legislative intent to add any additional
conditions to section 604 to qualify a claimant for
benefits. Thus, this court refused to read into the
section 604 disqualification the additional conditions
that the interim employment be bona fide or permanent.
Dienes, 78 Ill. 2d at 14-15. This court lastly noted that
its decision was based on the facts of that case. This
court expressly stated: "We need not consider here
whether every succeeding or `last' employment, whatever
the circumstances, will qualify a claimant for
unemployment benefits." Dienes, 78 Ill. 2d at 17.
In the present case, the Department and the circuit
court, both relying on Dienes, found two different
interpretations of section 604 of the Act. The Department
relied on Dienes in awarding unemployment benefits to
claimants, whether or not the interim employment was bona
fide or meant to be permanent. The circuit court pointed
to the caveat at the end of Dienes in concluding that a
striking employee's good faith in obtaining interim
employment was a condition to removing the section 604
disqualification, which required a case-by-case
determination.
Examining the entire act (see Castaneda v. Illinois
Human Rights Comm'n, 132 Ill. 2d 304, 318 (1989)), the
appellate court found a third interpretation of section
604. The appellate court relied on section 1502.1 of the
Act, which the legislature enacted subsequently to
Dienes. That section sets out detailed rules governing
whether benefits to a claimant will in turn be charged to
the claimant's former employer. The initial subsections
of section 1502.1 determine the particular employer that
will be charged, which in most cases is the employer for
which the claimant most recently worked for a minimum of
30 days. 820 ILCS 405/1502.1 (West 1994). One year after
adding section 1502.1 to the Act, the legislature added
subsection (E). Pursuant to section 1502.1(E), the
claimant's "last employer" "means the employer that ***
is charged for benefit payments which become benefit
charges under this Section." 820 ILCS 405/1502.1(E) (West
1994); see 284 Ill. App. 3d at 364-65.
According to the appellate court, section 1502.1
links a claimant's eligibility for benefits to an
employer's benefit charges: "Until a claimant becomes
employed to the extent that his new employer becomes
chargeable for benefits (basically 30 days), the claimant
remains `last employed' with (and barred from receiving
benefits from) the employer with whom he was originally
embroiled in a labor dispute." The appellate court con-
cluded that "[s]ection 1502.1 of the Act accordingly now
sets out a required length of employment before disquali-
fication under section 604 is ended." 284 Ill. App. 3d at
365.
We disagree with the appellate court. Section 604 of
the Act was unambiguous in 1979 when this court decided
Dienes and remains so. We conclude that Dienes controls
the outcome of this case.
However, the appellate court looked to section
1502.1 of the Act to read section 604 other than in the
way it was written. This attempt fails. Section 1502.1(E)
plainly states that its definition of "last employer" is
"[f]or the purposes of Sections 302, 409, 701, 1403,
1404, 1405 and 1508.1." 820 ILCS 405/1502.1(E) (West
1994). Further, those sections contain cross-references
to section 1502.1. 820 ILCS 405/302, 409, 701, 1403,
1404, 1405, 1502.1(E), 1508.1 (West 1994).
The appellate court was properly "troubled by the
fact that section 604 of the Act is not listed in section
1502.1(E)." 284 Ill. App. 3d at 365. We repeat that the
statutory language itself gives the best indication of
legislative intent. Where a statute lists the things to
which it refers, there is an inference that all omissions
should be understood as exclusions. Burke v. 12
Rothschild's Liquor Mart, Inc., 148 Ill. 2d 429, 441-42
(1992).
This rule of statutory construction, expressio unius
est exclusio alterius, is based on logic and common
sense. It expresses the learning of common experience
that when people say one thing they do not mean something
else. The maxim is closely related to the plain language
rule in that it emphasizes the statutory language as it
is written. 2A N. Singer, Sutherland on Statutory
Construction sec. 47.24, at 228, sec. 47.25 at 234 (5th
ed. 1992).
The appellate court cited two reasons for reading
the requirements of section 1502.1 of the Act into
section 604, despite the fact that section 1502.1(E) does
not list section 604. First, the appellate court stated
that "[t]here is no indication this list was intended to
be exclusive." 284 Ill. App. 3d at 365.
However, the inference that all omissions should be
understood as exclusions stands despite the lack of any
negative words of limitation. Solich v. George & Anna
Portes Cancer Prevention Center of Chicago, Inc., 158 Ill. 2d 76, 82 (1994); City Savings Ass'n v.
International Guaranty & Insurance Co., 17 Ill. 2d 609,
612 (1959). Thus, the absence of section 604 from section
1502.1(E)'s list infers the legislative intent that
section 1502.1's definition of "last employer" is
exclusive to the sections cited in the list. An explicit
statement of such intent is unnecessary.
Second, the appellate court reasoned that if it did
not apply section 1502.1's definition of "last employer"
to the term "last employed" in section 604, these
substantially same terms would have different meanings in
the same statute. The appellate court invoked the
principle that where the same or substantially the same
words or phrases appear in different parts of a statute,
they should be given a consistent meaning unless a
contrary legislative intent is clearly expressed. 284
Ill. App. 3d at 365; see Moran v. Katsinas, 16 Ill. 2d 169, 174 (1959).
However, the legislature did clearly express a
contrary intent. Sections 604 and 1502.1 address
different subjects. In section 604, the legislature
prohibited an employee from receiving unemployment bene-
fits based on a labor strike at the place where the
employee was last employed. The legislature subsequently
created in section 1502.1 a detailed test to determine an
employer's benefit charges. After enacting section
1502.1, the legislature specifically enacted subsection
(E), which lists the other sections of the Act to which
it refers. The legislature also specifically cross-
referenced those sections to section 1502.1. The
legislature's use of certain language in one instance and
different language in another indicates that the
legislature intended different results. Nelson v. Union
Wire Rope Corp., 31 Ill. 2d 69, 100 (1964).
If the legislature had intended to apply section
1502.1's definition of "last employer" to section 604, it
would have expressly done so, as it did with several
other sections of the Act. The fact that the legislature
did not cannot be deemed to be inadvertent. See, e.g.,
Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 22-23, 78 L. Ed. 2d 17, 23-24, 104 S. Ct. 296, 300 (1983); Peoria Savings
& Loan Ass'n v. Jefferson Trust & Savings Bank, 81 Ill. 2d 461, 469-70 (1980); Siciliano v. Village of
Westchester Firefighters' Pension Fund, 202 Ill. App. 3d
964, 967 (1990).
We recognize that the principle that the expression
of one thing in a statute excludes any other thing is
only a rule of statutory construction, not a rule of law.
It is merely a rule that courts use to help them
ascertain the intent of the legislature where such intent
is not clear from the statute's plain language. The maxim
is applied only when it appears to point to the intent of
the legislature, not to defeat the ascertained
legislative intent. The rule may be overcome by a strong
indication of legislative intent. Illinois Central R.R.
Co. v. Franklin County, 387 Ill. 301, 313-14 (1944);
accord Sulser v. Country Mutual Insurance Co., 147 Ill. 2d 548, 555 (1992). In the present case, however, we find
that section 1502.1(E)'s specific reference to other
sections of the Act, which cross-references to section
1502.1, reveals a clear legislative intent to exclude any
other section of the Act which section 1502.1(E) does not
list. See, e.g., City Savings Ass'n, 17 Ill. 2d at 612.
The appellate court noted that an interpretation of
section 604 that defined "last employed" as not imposing
any durational or good-faith requirement was the minority
view in the country. 284 Ill. App. 3d at 363-64. Further,
after it incorporated section 1502.1 of the Act into
section 604, the appellate court explained that
"[s]ection 1502.1 of the Act provides an objective,
bright-line method of determining whether an individual
has requalified for unemployment benefits and avoids the
subjectivity inherent in any type of `good-faith'
inquiry." 284 Ill. App. 3d at 366.
The appellate court essentially rewrote sections 604
and 1502.1(E) of the Act to remedy perceived shortcomings
in section 604. However, where the language of a statute
is unambiguous, the only legitimate function of the
courts is to enforce the law as enacted by the
legislature. Certain Taxpayers v. Sheahen, 45 Ill. 2d 75,
84 (1970); Belfield v. Coop, 8 Ill. 2d 293, 307 (1956);
see Boaden v. Department of Law Enforcement, 171 Ill. 2d 230, 239 (1996). This cardinal rule applies even though
the statutory language may be considered unwise or as
impairing the statute as a whole. Buckellew v. Board of
Education of Georgetown-Ridge Farm Community Unit School
District No. 4, 215 Ill. App. 3d 506, 511 (1991). A court
may not inject provisions not found in the statute,
however desirable they may appear to be. Western National
Bank v. Village of Kildeer, 19 Ill. 2d 342, 349-50
(1960). We reverse the judgment of the appellate court.
Good Faith
We further conclude that, between the circuit court
and the Department, the circuit court expressed the
better-reasoned view of section 604 of the Act and of
Dienes. The Department found that a striking employee's
interim employment, whatever the circumstances,
automatically removed the section 604 disqualification,
whether or not the interim employment was bona fide or
meant to be permanent. The circuit court concluded that
a striking employee's good faith in obtaining interim
employment was a condition to removing the section 604
disqualification.
The Department's finding cannot stand. This court
concluded Dienes by noting that the decision was based on
the facts of that case. The court expressly declined to
consider whether "every succeeding or `last' employment,
whatever the circumstances, will qualify a claimant for
unemployment benefits." (Emphasis added.) Dienes, 78 Ill. 2d at 17.
The circuit court correctly read Dienes as not
drawing "a bright line for labor dispute cases which
would allow any kind of employment to restore benefit
eligibility." Such a reading of section 604 would violate
the long-settled policy of the Act. The Act "must be
liberally construed so as to provide sustenance to those
who are unemployed through no fault of their own and who
are willing, anxious, and ready to work if given the
opportunity." Shell Oil Co. v. Cummins, 7 Ill. 2d 329,
339 (1955); accord 820 ILCS 405/100, 609 (West 1994).
This policy would be violated if striking employees could
receive unemployment benefits by obtaining sham employ-
ment in bad faith solely to avoid the section 604
disqualification. Thus, a determination of good faith is
required in each case.
The circuit court correctly ruled that a showing of
good faith is based on all the facts and circumstances:
"Obviously good faith is absent if a claimant
is primarily motivated by a desire to remove
the labor dispute disqualification and he or
she does not undertake work expected to
provide a significant support. Good faith is
present if there is a genuine effort to remain
in the active workforce and be regularly
employed. Good faith does not necessarily
require a belief that the interim employment
will be permanent ***."
We uphold the judgment of the circuit court.
We lastly note that all parties who filed briefs in
this appeal, claimants, Bridgestone, the Department, and
the Illinois Manufacturers' Association as amicus curiae,
invoke the public policy underlying section 604 in
support of their respective positions. Section 604
"evinces the legislative determination that the State is
to remain neutral in labor disputes and collective
bargaining, rendering assistance to neither the employer
nor labor." Local 7--641 v. Department of Labor, 96 Ill. 2d 94, 98 (1983).
However, as we concluded in Dienes, a neutrality
policy does not directly apply here. The unemployment for
which claimants are seeking benefits did not result from
the labor dispute at Bridgestone, but rather from their
having been fired or laid off from their interim
employment. "They therefore were within the class of
employees which the Act was designed to assist. That they
may earlier have gone on strike at another place of
employment would not seem to have a necessary bearing on
eligibility under the Act if they later were employed
elsewhere." Dienes, 78 Ill. 2d at 17.
CONCLUSION
The language of section 604 of the Act is certain
and unambiguous. Of course, the legislature can, subject
to constitutional restraints, add any additional require-
ment to section 604 in any way it sees fit, including the
approach envisioned by the appellate court. This is a
task for the legislature--not the courts.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the
appellate court is reversed, and the judgment of the
circuit court of Macon County is affirmed.
Appellate court reversed;
circuit court affirmed.
JUSTICE HEIPLE, dissenting:
I fully agree with the majority that the purposes of
the Unemployment Insurance Act (the Act) (820 ILCS
405/100 (West 1994)) would be frustrated "if striking
employees could receive unemployment benefits by
obtaining sham employment." Slip op. at 10. The task
which confronts this court, however, is to identify and
enforce those safeguards established by the Act to
prevent such abuse. The majority instead imposes a
condition for the receipt of unemployment benefits which
is wholly absent from the Act and, in doing so, neglects
the only interpretation of the Act which plausibly
comports with the legislature's directives. I therefore
respectfully dissent.
In plain language, section 604 of the Act prohibits
an employee from receiving unemployment benefits while he
is on strike from the establishment at which he was "last
employed." 820 ILCS 405/604 (West 1994). In Dienes v.
Holland, 78 Ill. 2d 8 (1979), this court held that, as
used in the statute, "last employed" means simply "last
in time." Dienes, 78 Ill. 2d at 13-14. In so holding,
this court refused "to add any additional conditions to
the statute in order to qualify a claimant for benefits."
Dienes, 78 Ill. 2d at 14.
In direct contravention of this precedent, the
majority adds a judicial gloss to the Act by providing
that striking claimants may qualify for unemployment
benefits if they can show that they accepted interim
employment in "good faith." The majority asserts that
this requirement is consistent with Dienes because that
case was based only on its specific facts. Slip op. at
10. On the contrary, however, one of the conditions which
the Dienes court specifically considered but refused to
add to the statute was a good-faith test. See Dienes, 78 Ill. 2d at 13. In adopting such a test today, the
majority does what Dienes refused to do: that is, provide
a claimant the opportunity to establish something in
addition to what the statute requires in order to qualify
for benefits. Dienes, 78 Ill. 2d at 15.
It is no surprise that the legislature has not
imposed the requirement adopted today by the majority.
The good-faith inquiry will subject both the claimant and
the Department of Employment Security to onerous burdens.
To qualify for benefits, the striking claimant will
henceforth be required to show that, in accepting interim
employment, he was not "primarily motivated by a desire
to remove the labor dispute disqualification." To
withhold benefits, the Department will be required to
establish that the claimant did not make " `a genuine
effort to remain in the active workforce.' " Slip op. at
10. Due to the subjective nature of these inquiries, it
is doubtful whether either of these factors can be
satisfactorily proven. It is certain, however, that
valuable resources will be squandered in the attempt.
In sharp contrast to the majority's approach, the
appellate court correctly based its analysis solely on
the language of the Unemployment Insurance Act (820 ILCS
405/100 (West 1994)). Nine years after this court decided
Dienes, the General Assembly enacted section 1502.1 of
the Act. This section requires that the last employer
from whom an unemployment claimant was separated after
working for at least 30 days pay the benefit charges
arising from that claimant's unemployment. 820 ILCS
405/1502.1 (West 1994). Section 604, however, continued
to prohibit a claimant from receiving benefits while on
strike from the establishment at which he was last
employed. 820 ILCS 405/604 (West 1994). The instant case
requires this court, for the first time, to apply section
1502.1's scheme for assessing benefit charges to section
604's prohibition against employees receiving
unemployment benefits while on strike.
The appellate court reasoned that, to harmonize
these two provisions, section 604 must be interpreted to
withhold benefits from striking workers who obtain
interim employment for less than 30 days. This is because
if benefits are instead granted to a claimant who works
for an interim employer for less than 30 days, section
1502.1 would require the original employer, from whom the
employee is still on strike, to pay the claimant's
benefits, rather than the interim employer, who made the
claimant eligible for benefits by firing him. The
appellate court correctly concluded that this would
violate the policy embodied in section 604 that strikers
are prohibited from collecting unemployment benefits at
the struck employer's expense. Yet this is precisely the
result dictated by the majority's holding: if a claimant
worked for an interim employer for less than 30 days (as
did most of the instant appellants), but nevertheless
were found to have obtained that interim employment in
"good faith," Bridgestone, the very firm the claimant is
striking, will be assessed payment for the claimant's
unemployment benefits. The appellate court's proper
construction of the Act instead assures that unemployment
benefits will not be charged to the employer from whom an
employee is on strike.
A simple, straightforward requirement that striking
workers hold interim employment for at least 30 days
before becoming eligible for unemployment benefits is
thus the only plausible interpretation of the current
version of the Act. The appellate court's opinion is
correct. As opposed to the majority's analysis, it is
based entirely upon the language of the Act. In
erroneously charging that the appellate court "rewrote"
the statute "to remedy perceived shortcomings" (slip op.
at 9), the majority describes only its own gratuitous
behavior. I would affirm the appellate court's faithful
adherence to the statute.
JUSTICES MILLER and NICKELS join in this dissent.
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