In re S.G.

Annotate this Case

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the filing of the opinion to request a rehearing. Also, opinions
are subject to modification, correction or withdrawal at anytime
prior to issuance of the mandate by the Clerk of the Court.
Therefore, because the following slip opinion is being made
available prior to the Court's final action in this matter, it
cannot be considered the final decision of the Court. The
official copy of the following opinion will be published by the
Supreme Court's Reporter of Decisions in the Official Reports
advance sheets following final action by the Court.

Docket No. 80688--Agenda 16--September 1996.
In re S.G. et al., Minors (The People of the State of Illinois,
Appellant, v. Pearlie G., Appellee).
Opinion filed February 20, 1997.

JUSTICE NICKELS delivered the opinion of the court:
In this appeal, we decide whether section 2--14 of the
Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (705 ILCS 405/2--14 (West 1994))
requires that the circuit court dismiss a petition for adjudication
of wardship where the adjudicatory hearing is not completed within
the statutory time period. The State filed petitions for
adjudication of wardship in the circuit court of Cook County
alleging that each of Pearlie G.'s three daughters S.G., W.G. and
C.G., and her son K.G. were abused and neglected. Pearlie filed a
motion to dismiss the petitions, alleging that the statutory time
period for an adjudicatory hearing on those petitions had expired.
The circuit court denied Pearlie's motion to dismiss, finding that
the dismissal of the petitions would not be in the best interest of
the children. The circuit court subsequently adjudicated the four
children wards of the court and Pearlie appealed. The appellate
court reversed the adjudication of wardship. 277 Ill. App. 3d 803.
The appellate court determined that the plain language of section
2--14 requires the dismissal of a petition where the adjudicatory
hearing is not completed within the statutory time period. We
granted the State's petition for leave to appeal. 155 Ill. 2d R.
315. We affirm.

I. BACKGROUND
On February 27, 1991, the Illinois Department of Children and
Family Services (DCFS) investigated a report that Pearlie's
boyfriend had sexually abused her daughter W.G. DCFS found evidence
to support the report, but did not bring the family to the
attention of the juvenile court. W.G. eventually recanted her
allegations against the boyfriend, claiming that she fabricated the
charges because she did not like the boyfriend and wished to
estrange him from her mother.
On April 21, 1992, the Chicago police department began
investigating reports of abuse that Pearlie's son, K.G., made to
the DCFS hot line. In these, K.G. reported that his mother had been
sexually abusing him. S.G. reported that she witnessed one of the
incidents of sexual abuse between K.G. and their mother. Pearlie
was arrested and charged with aggravated criminal sexual assault.
In the following days, both K.G. and S.G. recanted their
allegations against Pearlie.
On April 28, 1992, the State's Attorney's office, on behalf of
DCFS, filed separate petitions for adjudication of wardship for
each of Pearlie's four children. The petitions alleged that there
was sexual abuse in the home and that the children were neglected
in that their environment was injurious to their welfare. Also on
April 28, 1992, the public guardian's office was appointed to
represent the children and the first of two temporary custody
hearings was held. See 705 ILCS 405/2--10 (West 1994).
At the first temporary custody hearing, Donna Hendricks from
DCFS testified concerning both Pearlie's boyfriend's reported abuse
of W.G. and Pearlie's reported abuse of K.G. Pearlie did not attend
the hearing because she was incarcerated at this time on the
charges of sexually abusing K.G. The trial judge found probable
cause for the charges of abuse and neglect and further determined
that it was in the best interest of the children to name a
temporary custodian to place them.
After being released, Pearlie was granted a second custody
hearing where she was represented by the public defender's office.
The second temporary custody hearing was held on June 22 and June
23, 1992. At this hearing, Assistant State's Attorney Adam Grosch
testified that K.G. reported being forced by his mother to engage
in sexual activity on two occasions. Grosch also testified that
S.G. corroborated K.G.'s account of the abuse.
W.G. also testified at the hearing. W.G. testified that she
had fabricated the story of abuse by her mother's boyfriend because
she disliked him and wished to prevent her mother's continued
involvement with him. W.G. further testified that she believed that
her accusation gave K.G. the idea to accuse their mother. K.G.
declined to testify at the hearing. The trial judge declined to
change his finding that there was probable cause for the charges
and upheld his decision to award temporary custody of the children
to DCFS.
At a hearing held on September 1, 1992, the circuit court
entered orders of default against the respondent fathers who had
been served by publication but failed to appear. At a hearing held
on September 3, 1992, the trial judge and the attorneys for the
parties acknowledged that the defaulting of the fathers on
September 1 began the 90-day speedy-trial provision contained in
section 2--14. The trial judge and the parties agreed that the
adjudicatory hearing must therefore be held by November 30, 1992,
and the trial judge set November 10 as the date for the
adjudicatory hearing.
Also at the September 3 hearing, the trial judge granted the
public guardian's motion to withdraw his representation of W.G.
Attorney Mary Bird from the Legal Assistance Foundation then
entered her appearance and was appointed guardian ad litem for W.G.
The public guardian's office continued its representation of the
remaining siblings.
On October 22, 1992, the assistant public guardian
representing the three remaining siblings requested a continuance
because she required surgery and would therefore be unavailable for
the November 10 trial date. The trial judge recognized that the 90-
day term was set to expire at the end of November, but he lamented
that because of his crowded docket there was no other available
court time to hold the hearing prior to the end of that term. The
judge thereupon found that a continuance was in the best interest
of the children and reset the adjudicatory hearing for December 15,
1992. Presumably the court was acting pursuant to section 2--14(c)
of the Juvenile Court Act (705 ILCS 405/2--14(c) (West 1994)),
which allows for one 30-day continuance of the 90-day statutory
period.
On December 15, 1992, the circuit court first held a pretrial
hearing to dispose of several motions. Among them, the court
granted W.G.'s motion to be returned to the custody of her mother
under an order of protection. Thereafter, the court heard opening
statements from all parties and the testimony of one witness,
Robert O'Connor, who is an investigator with DCFS. After this sole
witness, the court adjourned the hearing and sought to schedule the
remaining court time necessary to conclude the adjudicatory
hearing.
In trying to schedule the remaining time necessary for the
adjudicatory hearing, the trial judge was cognizant that the
statutory deadline was approaching. The judge noted that it was
"very unlikely" that the case could be completed by that time
because of the busy court calendar. A discussion concerning
scheduling was then conducted off the record. The trial judge
thereafter offered the parties the choice to either hear the case
on a piecemeal basis after the regular call each day when time was
available, or to schedule the case in a block of time in February.
Pearlie's attorney requested that the case proceed immediately on
a piecemeal basis. The trial judge ordered that the case proceed on
a piecemeal basis starting on December 17, 1996.
On December 17, the court did not have enough time at the end
of the call to take any evidence. However, time was devoted to a
motion filed that day by W.G.'s attorney seeking to disqualify the
public guardian's office from representing the remaining siblings.
The motion alleged that the public guardian's representation of the
remaining siblings presented a conflict of interest with W.G., a
former client. The trial judge ordered a briefing schedule and the
matter was continued for a hearing to be conducted on January 11,
1993.
On January 11, 1993, the court denied the motion to disqualify
the public guardian's office, ruling that any further delays in the
matter would not be in the best interest of the children. The court
then again offered to hear the case on a piecemeal basis or
alternatively to schedule the case in a block at some future time.
A scheduling conference was again held off the record. The court
scheduled the adjudicatory hearing to continue on March 8.
Pearlie's attorney subsequently filed a motion to dismiss the
petitions for adjudication of wardship for all the children. The
motion alleged that the petitions must be dismissed pursuant to the
speedy-trial provisions contained in section 2--14 of the Juvenile
Court Act. Section 2--14 provides that an adjudicatory hearing
shall be held within 90 days of service of process, except that one
30-day continuance may be granted for good cause. 705 ILCS 405/2--
14 (West 1994). Section 2--14 provides that, where the adjudicatory
hearing is not timely held, the petition "shall be dismissed
without prejudice." 705 ILCS 405/2--14(c) (West 1994).
Prior to resuming the adjudicatory hearing on March 8, the
court ruled on the motion to dismiss the petitions. The judge did
not dispute that the statutory time period for an adjudicatory
hearing had expired, but denied the motion because he found that
the dismissal of the petitions would not be in the best interest of
the minors. The adjudicatory hearing was then conducted over the
next several days, concluding on March 12.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the court found that all the
children were neglected because their environment was injurious to
their welfare. The court further found that W.G. had been sexually
abused, but the court ruled that the evidence failed to establish
that K.G. had been sexually abused. At a dispositional hearing held
on April 12, the court adjudged the children wards of the court.
The court found that it was in the best interest of W.G., S.G. and
C.G. to be placed in the custody of their mother under an order of
protection. The court further held that K.G. should remain in the
custody of DCFS.
Pearlie appealed from the adjudication of wardship. The
appellate court reversed. 277 Ill. App. 3d 803. The appellate court
concluded that the plain language of section 2--14 requires the
dismissal without prejudice of any petition in which the
adjudicatory hearing is not completed within the statutory time
period. 277 Ill. App. 3d at 809. The appellate court rejected the
State's argument that section 2--14 merely requires that the
hearing begin, but not finish, prior to the statutory time limit.
277 Ill. App. 3d at 809.
We granted the State's petition for leave to appeal (155 Ill.
2d R. 315). The public guardian's office, representing S.G., C.G.
and K.G., has also filed a brief in opposition to the appellate
court's construction of section 2--14. The public defender's office
represents Pearlie as appellee. W.G. is not a party to this appeal.

II. ANALYSIS
The State first argues that the appellate court's construction
of section 2--14 violates the separation of powers provision of the
Illinois Constitution of 1970 (Ill. Const. 1970, art. II, 1) by
invading the inherent powers of the court to protect children. The
State also argues that the appellate court erred in giving section
2--14 a mandatory construction and in requiring that the
adjudicatory hearing be completed, rather than commenced, within
the statutory time period. The public guardian's office argues that
Pearlie's counsel waived her statutory right to a prompt
adjudicatory hearing by agreeing to the delays. The public
guardian's office also argues that the motion filed by W.G.'s
attorney to disqualify the public guardian's office tolled the
statutory time period.
A court should avoid constitutional questions where the case
may be decided on other grounds. Bonaguro v. County Officers
Electoral Board, , 396 (1994). We therefore find it
appropriate to first address whether as a matter of statutory
construction the legislature intended for section 2--14 to require
the mandatory dismissal of a petition where the adjudicatory
hearing is not timely. We next address whether Pearlie waived her
right to a prompt adjudicatory hearing and whether the motion
seeking to disqualify the public guardian's office tolled the
statutory time period. As we find it necessary, we conclude by
addressing whether the mandatory dismissal of a petition pursuant
to section 2--14 violates the constitutional principle of
separation of powers.

A. Statutory Construction
In interpreting a statute, our objective is to ascertain and
give effect to the intent of the legislature. Hernon v. E.W.
Corrigan Construction Co., , 194 (1992). The most
reliable indicator of legislative intent is the language of the
statute. People v. Bryant, , 455 (1989). Section 2--
14 of the Juvenile Court Act provides:
"(a) Purpose and policy. The legislature recognizes
that serious delay in the adjudication of abuse, neglect,
or dependency cases can cause grave harm to the minor and
the family and that it frustrates the best interests of
the minor and the effort to establish permanent homes for
children in need. The purpose of this Section is to
insure that *** the State of Illinois will act in a just
and speedy manner to determine the best interests of the
minor ***.
(b) When a petition is filed alleging that the minor
is abused, neglected or dependent, an adjudicatory
hearing shall be held within 90 days of the date of
service of process upon the minor, parents, any guardian
and any legal custodian.
(c) Upon written motion of a party filed no later
than 10 days prior to hearing, or upon the court's own
motion and only for good cause shown, the Court may
continue the hearing for a period not to exceed 30 days,
and only if the continuance is in the best interests of
the minor. When the court grants a continuance, it shall
enter specific factual findings to support its order,
including factual findings supporting the court's
determination that the continuance is in the best
interests of the minor. Only one such continuance shall
be granted. A period of continuance for good cause as
described in this Section shall temporarily suspend as to
all parties, for the time of the delay, the period within
which a hearing must be held. On the day of the
expiration of the delay, the period shall continue at the
point at which it was suspended.
The term `good cause' as applied in this Section
shall be strictly construed and be in accordance with
Supreme Court Rule 231(a) through (f). Neither
stipulation by counsel nor the convenience of any party
constitutes good cause. If the adjudicatory hearing is
not heard within the time limits required by subsection
(b) or (c) of this Section, upon motion by any party the
petition shall be dismissed without prejudice.
(d) The time limits of this Section may be waived
only by consent of all parties and approval by the
court." 705 ILCS 405/2--14 (West 1994).
The State notes that in the context of the Juvenile Court Act
this court has interpreted the term "shall" as directory, rather
than mandatory. In In re Armour, (1974), this court
construed a provision requiring that a petition "shall be set for
an adjudicatory hearing within 30 days" (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1971, ch.
37, par. 704--2). This court concluded that the legislature did not
intend a mandatory construction of the statute. In re Armour, 59 Ill. 2d at 105. In so finding, this court reasoned that dismissing
a petition would not further the goals of the Juvenile Court Act to
rehabilitate and protect minors. In re Armour, 59 Ill. 2d at 104.
In addition, the court concluded that the language of the statute
did not evince the legislative intent necessary for a mandatory
construction. The court reasoned that unlike the familiar criminal
speedy-trial provision, the legislature did not include a
consequence for the failure to set the adjudicatory hearing within
the time period. In re Armour, 59 Ill. 2d at 105.
The provision at issue in In re Armour is readily
distinguishable from section 2--14. Section 2--14 contains an
explicit statement of policy that delay can cause grave harm to
minors. 705 ILCS 405/2--14(a) (West 1994). Section 2--14 also gives
explicit directions on how the time period is to be calculated and
the manner of granting continuances. 705 ILCS 405/2--14(c) (West
1994). More importantly, section 2--14 provides for the dismissal
without prejudice of any petition where an adjudicatory hearing is
not timely held. 705 ILCS 405/2--14(c) (West 1994); see also People
v. Porter, , 85 (1988) (finding that a mandatory
construction is indicated where statute prescribes the result that
will occur if the specified procedure is not followed). For these
reasons, we find that the legislature intended a mandatory
construction of section 2--14.
The State also argues that the appellate court erred in
construing section 2--14 to require that the adjudicatory hearing
be completed, rather than commenced, within the statutory time
period. The State argues that section 2--14 should be interpreted
similarly to the speedy-trial provision in the Code of Criminal
Procedure of 1963 (725 ILCS 5/103--5 (West 1994)), which has been
interpreted to require only that the proceeding begin before the
expiration of the statutory time period. See People v. Williams, , 405 (1974). The State argues that any contrary
interpretation would provide an incentive for the parties to simply
delay the proceedings to obtain a dismissal.
We reject the State's interpretation. We agree with the
appellate court that section 2--14 requires adjudicatory hearings
be completed prior to the statutory deadline. The legislature used
the phrase "shall be held within 90 days" rather than "shall begin"
or "shall commence" within 90 days. In addition, section 2--14(c)
further provides that "[i]f the adjudicatory hearing is not heard
within the time limits *** the petition shall be dismissed without
prejudice." (Emphasis added.) 705 ILCS 405/2--14(c) (West 1994).
This perfective language supports the view that the legislature
intended for adjudicatory hearings to be completed prior to the
statutory deadline.
Our conclusion based upon the plain language of section 2--14
is buttressed by the history of the provision. A prior scheduling
provision required that petitions for adjudication of wardship
"shall be set for an adjudicatory hearing within 30 days." Ill.
Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 37, par. 704--2. The legislature specifically
changed the language of the scheduling provision from requiring
that a hearing "shall be set" to requiring that the hearing "shall
be held" within the statutory time period. Presumably, this change
reflects a legislative desire to actually require that adjudicatory
hearings be completed within the statutory time period, rather than
simply started.
This conclusion is also consistent with the stated purpose of
the statute to "insure" the speedy resolution of abuse and neglect
cases. If we allowed a technical start of the hearing followed by
an indeterminate period of delay to satisfy section 2--14, the
statutory protection could be easily circumvented and timeliness
would not be guaranteed. Indeed, the hearing in the present case
was delayed for an additional three months after the start of the
hearing on December 15. We are also confident that the trial judge
can exercise sufficient control over the proceedings to prevent a
party from obtaining a dismissal through purposeful delay. We
therefore hold that the legislature intended a mandatory
construction of section 2--14 and that the adjudicatory hearing
must be completed within the statutory period.

B. Application and Waiver
Applying the statute, the adjudicatory hearing was not timely.
Section 2--14 provides that the 90-day statutory time period begins
on the date of service of process. 705 ILCS 405/2--14(b) (West
1994). We therefore take the default entered against the absent
fathers on September 1, 1992, as the starting date for the 90-day
statutory period. Fifty-one days had elapsed when the public
guardian's office was granted a continuance on October 22, which we
will assume satisfied the requirements for a continuance pursuant
to section 2--14(c). Section 2--14(c) provides that upon the
expiration of the 30-day continuance, the 90-day period shall
continue at the point at which it was suspended. 705 ILCS 405/2--
14(c) (West 1994). Thus, 30 days later on November 21, 1992, the
time again began to run on the 90-day time period, starting at 51
days. The 90-day period therefore expired 39 days later on December
30, 1992. The hearing, however, was not concluded until March 12,
1993, well beyond the statutory period.
The public guardian's office argues that the adjudicatory
hearing need not have been held within the statutory period because
Pearlie waived her right to a prompt adjudicatory hearing. See 705
ILCS 405/2--14(d) (West 1994). The public guardian initially argues
that Pearlie waived her right to a prompt hearing after the hearing
first commenced on December 15, 1992, by agreeing to have the case
heard thereafter on a piecemeal basis. The public guardian further
argues that Pearlie again waived her right to a prompt hearing on
January 11, 1993, by declining the judge's offer to hear the case
on a piecemeal basis and instead requesting a set block of time at
a future date.
The public guardian's waiver arguments represent a brazen
distortion of the record. Throughout the entire proceedings,
Pearlie's attorney repeatedly voiced Pearlie's frustration at the
slow pace of the proceedings and her desire for a quick completion.
After the beginning of the adjudicatory hearing on December 15, the
court gave the parties the option either to have the case heard on
a piecemeal basis at the end of the call each day or to schedule
the case for a block of time in February. When Pearlie's attorney
pressed the court on the scheduling issue, the court explicitly
responded that if he was unwilling to waive the 90-day period and
have the case scheduled at a remote time, then he must accept the
prospect of having the case proceed "bit by bit." Pearlie's
attorney responded that he would agree to have the case heard "bit
by bit." In agreeing to having the case heard when time was
available, Pearlie was exercising her statutory right to a prompt
hearing, not waiving it.
The public guardian further argues that Pearlie again waived
her right to a prompt hearing on January 11, 1993, by agreeing to
have the case heard in a block of available time in March. In its
effort to manufacture waiver, the public guardian's office again
distorts the record. At no time during the January 11 hearing did
the court or the parties even discuss a waiver of the statutory
time period. Indeed, Pearlie's attorney at first rejected both
hearing the case immediately on a piecemeal basis and hearing the
case at a later block of time, suggesting instead that the court
reschedule other cases and fit the case in the call over the next
week or two. After hearing from the parties, the court ruled that
the case would proceed in March when the court had a block of time
available in its busy call. Our review of the record thoroughly
undermines the contention that Pearlie ever waived her statutory
right to a timely hearing.
Last, the public guardian argues that the motion filed by
W.G.'s attorney to disqualify the public guardian's office tolled
the statutory time period. The public guardian notes that in
addition to the speedy-trial provision, a statutory right to
counsel exists in the Juvenile Court Act (705 ILCS 405/1--5 (West
1994)). The public guardian reasons that the circuit court acted
properly in balancing the competing statutory policies by resolving
the representation issue prior to continuing the hearing.
Section 2--14 provides no support for the public guardian's
contention that resolving issues surrounding the children's
representation should toll the statutory time period. Section 2--14
provides that only one 30-day continuance of the proceedings is to
be granted. 705 ILCS 405/2--14(c) (West 1994). We decline to read
any exceptions into the clear statutory language requiring that
adjudicatory hearings be held within the statutory time period.

C. Separation of Powers
The State argues that a mandatory construction of section 2--
14 which requires the dismissal of a petition for adjudication of
wardship violates the separation of powers provision of our
constitution. Ill. Const. 1970, art. II, 1. According to the
State, the judiciary possesses the inherent plenary authority under
the doctrine of parens patriae to act in the best interest of
minors which cannot be taken away by statute. Therefore, the State
argues that the legislature may not require the dismissal of a
petition for adjudication of wardship on timeliness grounds where
the circuit court decides that such a dismissal is not in the best
interest of the minor.
At the outset, we note that "a strong presumption of
constitutionality attaches to any legislative enactment and that
the burden rests upon the challenger to demonstrate its
invalidity." Sanelli v. Glenview State Bank, , 20
(1985). The separation of powers provision of the Illinois
Constitution, contained in section 1 of article II, provides:
"The legislative, executive and judicial branches are
separate. No branch shall exercise powers properly
belonging to another." Ill. Const. 1970, art. II, 1.
Section 1 of article VI further provides:
"The judicial power is vested in a Supreme Court, an
Appellate Court and Circuit Courts." Ill. Const. 1970,
art. VI, 1.
The separation of powers provision does not seek to achieve a
complete divorce between the branches of government. Strukoff v.
Strukoff, , 58 (1979). Neither does the provision
require the "division of governmental powers into rigid, mutually
exclusive compartments." People v. Walker, , 473
(1988). Inevitably, there are areas in which separate spheres of
governmental authority overlap and certain functions are thereby
shared. Walker, 119 Ill. 2d at 473. Ultimately, the purpose of the
provision is to prevent the whole power of two or more branches
from residing in the same hands. Knuepfer v. Fawell, , 292 (1983); Walker, 119 Ill. 2d at 473.
The constitution does not define the exact nature of the
different governmental powers. However, this court has sketched the
judicial power as including the adjudication and application of law
and the procedural administration of the courts. People v. Bainter,
, 302-03 (1989); DeLuna v. St. Elizabeth's Hospital,
, 68 (1992). Where matters of procedure are at issue,
this court has noted that the constitutional authority to
promulgate procedural rules can be concurrent between the court and
the legislature. O'Connell v. St. Francis Hospital, , 281 (1986); Strukoff, 76 Ill. 2d at 61; People v. Cox, , 274 (1980). In determining whether a legislative enactment
pertaining to judicial practice or procedure is constitutional,
this court has looked to whether the statute conflicts with any
court rules or unduly infringes on inherent judicial powers.
Bainter, 126 Ill. 2d at 302-03; Walker, 119 Ill. 2d at 474; Cox, 82 Ill. 2d at 274.
The State does not suggest that section 2--14 conflicts with
a supreme court rule. Cf. Cox, 82 Ill. 2d at 274 ("where a rule of
this court on a matter within the court's authority and a statute
on the same subject conflict, the rule will prevail"). Instead, the
State argues that in requiring the dismissal of a petition on
timeliness grounds, section 2--14 unduly infringes on the inherent
powers of the court in its role as parens patriae to protect
children.
The doctrine of parens patriae refers to duty of the
government to care for infants, the insane and the infirm. County
of McLean v. Humphreys, 104 Ill. 378, 383 (1882). In order to
satisfy this duty, the English courts of chancery became imbued
with the jurisdiction to act on the behalf of those unable to care
for themselves. "The source of this jurisdiction is quite
uncertain" and it is unclear "[w]hether the power was originally a
mere usurpation, or was legally delegated to the chancellor by the
crown as parens patriae, or grew out of the practice of appointing
guardians ad litem." Thomas v. Thomas, 250 Ill. 354, 364-65 (1911).
In any event, this doctrine exists in our courts by its inheritance
from the English courts of chancery, and this court has recognized
that it provides the authority to appoint guardians independent of
any authority granted by the legislature. In re M.M., , 63 (1993).
Neither the doctrine of parens patriae nor our inherent
guardianship powers provide a basis to judicially invalidate
section 2--14. The doctrine of parens patriae is not solely a grant
of jurisdiction to the courts, but represents an expression of the
general power and obligation of the government as a whole to
protect minors and the infirm. People ex rel. Pauling v. Misevic,
, 14 (1964); People ex rel. Wallace v. Labrenz, , 623-24 (1952). For this reason, each branch of government
has concurrent powers and responsibilities that are in the nature
of parens patriae. Although our courts possess some powers that are
in the nature of parens patriae, that doctrine does not represent
an independent judicial power to strike down legislation on grounds
that it violates "the best interest of the child."
This court has also rejected the State's contention that
because the Juvenile Court Act is merely a codification of our
court's inherent parens patriae authority, a circuit court retains
its equitable powers and may exercise them in contravention of the
statute. In People ex rel. Carey v. White, (1976),
the trial judge, responding to a writ of mandamus, argued that
because the Juvenile Court Act represents a codification of the
inherent parens patriae power, he may exercise the traditional
equitable power to impanel an advisory jury for the proceedings.
White, 65 Ill. 2d at 202. This court rejected that view and held
that the trial court could not exercise its equitable powers
contrary to the parameters outlined by the legislature. White, 65 Ill. 2d at 202.
This court has also rejected a broad construction of the
inherent guardianship powers our courts possess. In In re M.M., (1993), this court was presented with several cases
where the trial judge sought to impose restrictions on a guardian's
power to consent to an adoption. In each case, the trial judge
found that it was in the child's best interest to retain contact
with his or her biological parents. Therefore, the trial judges
attempted to limit the guardian's consent to an adoption to
instances where the adoptive parents had agreed to keep the child
in contact with his or her biological parents.
In rejecting this practice, this court acknowledged that the
circuit court possesses the "inherent plenary power to appoint
guardians of minors independent of any authority given to the
courts by the legislature." In re M.M., 156 Ill. 2d at 63. However,
this court refused to give that power a broad construction because
at common law the court's inherent guardianship power did not
include the power to consent to an adoption. In re M.M., 156 Ill. 2d at 63-66. Furthermore, this court reasoned that a court may not
seize upon "the best interest of the child mandate" to enlarge its
statutory powers. In re M.M., 156 Ill. 2d at 69-70.
More importantly, this court has directly upheld the Juvenile
Court Act against challenges that it invades the court's
guardianship powers. In People ex rel. Houghland v. Leonard, (1953), the petitioner in a habeas corpus action
challenged the constitutional validity of the Juvenile Court Act on
grounds that it infringed on the court's guardianship authority.
Leonard, 415 Ill. at 138. This court rejected that view and held
that the Juvenile Court Act represents a broad legislative
expression of public policy that goes beyond the equitable
jurisdiction of courts to appoint guardians. Leonard, 415 Ill. at
139.
The responsibility to protect children rests upon all three
branches of government, which have separate functions under our
constitution. In order that our governmental system operate in
harmony where functions are shared between branches, we have
understood the "necessity to exercise sparingly the inherent powers
of the judiciary" and recognized that "deference should normally be
accorded the governmental branch having initial responsibility."
Knuepfer, 96 Ill. 2d at 293. The initial responsibility for setting
public policy relating to the care and custody of minors rests with
the legislative branch of government. For this reason, this court
has routinely deferred to the legislature by acknowledging that the
Juvenile Court Act is "a purely statutory creature whose parameters
and application are defined solely by the legislature." See People
v. P.H., , 223 (1991); In re M.M., 156 Ill. 2d at
66.
Consistent with this view, this court has rejected challenges
that provisions in the Juvenile Court Act violate principles of
separation of powers. For example, this court held that the
legislature can mandate the removal of a petition for adjudication
of wardship from the juvenile to the criminal court. See P.H., 145 Ill. 2d at 221-24. In addition, this court has held that the
legislature may require mandatory sentences of confinement for
juveniles. See People ex rel. Carey v. Chrastka, , 78-
79 (1980). In so holding, this court reasoned that these provisions
do not infringe on any inherent judicial power because they merely
define and implement a statutorily created remedy. P.H., 145 Ill. 2d at 224. Chrastka, 83 Ill. 2d at 80.
The State relies on In re J.J., (1991), as the
sole support for its position that a court can decline to dismiss
a petition for adjudication of wardship on timeliness grounds
pursuant to its inherent powers. In In re J.J., the State's
Attorney argued that he had the exclusive right to dismiss a
petition for adjudication of wardship because of his role in the
executive branch of government. This court rejected that view and
determined that the circuit court had an independent duty to
determine whether the State's motion to dismiss was in the best
interest of the minor. In re J.J., 142 Ill. 2d at 9. The State
suggests that the trial court can similarly refuse to dismiss a
petition pursuant to section 2--14 where it determines that
dismissal is not in the best interest of the minor.
This court's decision in In re J.J. was not premised on any
inherent judicial power to act in derogation of a statute where a
court determines it is in the best interest of a minor. Instead,
this court found that the Juvenile Court Act itself imposed an
independent statutory duty on the court to inquire into whether the
dismissal is in the best interest of a minor. In re J.J., 142 Ill. 2d at 8-11. This court determined that such a statutory duty did
not violate the principle of separation of powers because the
State's Attorney does not act in his traditional adversarial role
in dependency and neglect proceedings. In re J.J., 142 Ill. 2d at
8-10. In addition, the court's statutory duty did not conflict with
the State's Attorney's role under the Act because both are
similarly charged with acting in the minor's best interest. In re
J.J., 142 Ill. 2d at 8-10. The statutory duties recognized in In re
J.J. do not support the view that the circuit court possesses the
inherent power to express a child's best interest and thereby
dispense with the requirements of the Act.
We therefore hold that section 2--14 does not violate the
constitutional principle of separation of powers. Section 2--14
represents a legislative expression of public policy requiring the
expeditious resolution of abuse and neglect cases. In setting this
policy, the legislature has provided for a reasonable and adequate
period of time, at least 90 days, for the exercise of judicial
duties. Furthermore, section 2--14 does not take from the courts
the judicial power to adjudicate a child's best interest, but
merely requires that judicial duties get exercised in a manner that
protects all the rights of the parties. Neither the doctrine of
parens patriae nor our inherent guardianship powers provide for the
broad judicial power to express a child's best interest and thereby
decline to carry out this legislative policy. Therefore, section 2-
-14 does not unduly infringe on any inherent judicial power and our
courts are duty bound to dismiss a petition for which an
adjudicatory hearing is not timely held.
In closing, we reject the contention that our decision to
apply the plain language of section 2--14 will place children at
risk. Trial judges are aware of the statutory deadline and are
charged with controlling their docket accordingly. The Juvenile
Court Act further provides for the liberal supplementing of
petitions. See 705 ILCS 405/2--13(5) (West 1994). Moreover, section
2--14 provides that the dismissal of a petition on timeliness
grounds is without prejudice. 705 ILCS 405/2--14(c) (West 1994).
Therefore, the State may immediately file a new petition where
children may be put at risk.

III. CONCLUSION
We conclude the legislature intended that the circuit court
dismiss a petition for adjudication of wardship pursuant to section
2--14 where an adjudicatory hearing is not completed within the
statutory time period. We further conclude that in this case the
statutory time period for a hearing expired and Pearlie did not
waive her right to a timely hearing. Last, we conclude that the
statutory mandate contained in section 2--14 requiring dismissal of
a petition for adjudication of wardship does not violate the
constitutional principle of separation of powers. We therefore
affirm the judgment of the appellate court.

Appellate court judgment affirmed.

JUSTICE McMORROW, dissenting:
My colleagues today content themselves with a purely literal
interpretation of section 2--14 of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987
(705 ILCS 405/2--14 (West 1994)). In doing so, they ignore one of
the cardinal rules of statutory construction: the proper
interpretation of any legislative enactment cannot be based solely
upon the language of the statute in question, but "must be grounded
on the `nature, objects and the consequences that would result from
construing it one way or the other.' " Mulligan v. Joliet Regional
Port District, , 313 (1988), quoting Carrigan v.
Illinois Liquor Control Comm'n, , 233 (1960). By
failing to consider the consequences of its literal interpretation
of section 2--14, the majority inadvertently contributes to the
very hardship that the legislature intended to prevent, i.e.,
inordinate delay in resolving allegations of child abuse and
neglect. Under the majority's approach, the State--on behalf of the
minors--must now refile its petition for wardship, thereby starting
the entire adjudicatory process over again. Equally troubling,
however, is the fact that the majority fails to consider the
circuit court's finding that a dismissal would not be in the best
interests of the four children who are at the heart of this case.
The General Assembly enacted the Juvenile Court Act to
safeguard the best interests of the children, and further charged
the court system with construing the Act liberally to carry out
that purpose. See 705 ILCS 405/1--2 (West 1994). The court today
fails to carry out that mandate. Because I believe that section 2--
14 can be construed so as to fulfill the legislature's intent of
securing the best interests of the children without the automatic
dismissal of the petition, I respectfully dissent.

I
The dispositive issue in this case is whether section 2--14 of
the Juvenile Court Act requires an automatic dismissal where the
adjudicatory hearing is commenced, but not completed, within 90
days from the date of service of process. According to the
majority, the General Assembly's use of the phrase "shall be held"
rather than "shall begin" or "shall commence" indicates that the
legislature must have intended that the hearing be fully completed
within the statutory time period. See slip op. at 8-9. Had the
legislature wanted the hearing to "commence" within 90 days, the
majority reasons, it would have said so directly in the statute.
The majority further suggests that its literal interpretation of
section 2--14 is "consistent with the stated purpose of the statute
to `insure' the speedy resolution of abuse and neglect cases." Slip
op. at 9. I disagree with this interpretation for the following
reasons.
From a linguistic point of view, the majority errs in
reasoning that the absence of the words "begin" or "commence"
signifies an express legislative intent that the hearings must be
"completed" or "concluded" within 90 days. The error in that
reasoning stems from the fact that an argument based on the
opposite inference could just as easily be supported. Had the
legislature intended for all adjudicatory hearings to be finished
within the time allotted, it would have expressly stated that the
hearings shall be "completed" or "concluded" within 90 days. But
the legislature did not do so. Because I do not believe that the
absence of the words "begin" or "commence" is any more indicative
of the legislature's intent than the absence of the words
"completed" or "concluded," I am not persuaded by the majority's
argument concerning what the legislature might have said.
Throughout its analysis, the majority focuses exclusively on
the legislature's goal of preventing serious delay in the
adjudication of abuse and neglect cases. Noticeably absent from
that analysis, however, is any mention of the overriding
legislative intent to safeguard the best interests of the minors.
See In re J.J., , 8 (1991); see also 705 ILCS 405/1--2
(West 1994) (requiring Juvenile Court Act to be "liberally"
construed to carry out its purpose of securing that which is best
for the minors). That paramount interest permeates the entire
Juvenile Court Act, including section 2--14. As our appellate court
has recognized, "[w]hile one of the express purposes of [section 2-
-14] is to prevent grave harm to minors and families by less than
diligent court proceedings [citation], the overall purpose of the
Act is to safeguard the children [citations]." In re H.R., 283 Ill.
App. 3d 907, 912 (1996). Indeed, it was in accordance with that
purpose, as well as the legislative mandate to construe the Act
liberally, that Judge Smierciak, who presided over this case from
its inception, denied the respondents' motion to dismiss pursuant
to section 2--14. The transcript here reveals that Judge Smierciak
specifically found that granting the motion to dismiss would not be
in the best interests of the children. He stated:
"Each of the continuances that was had in this case
was done with the best interest of these children in
mind. Each was done out of necessity. And we certainly
believe that the spirit of the statute has been followed.
I would also state unequivocally that it would not
be in the best interest of these children to dismiss
these petitions at this time."
Ignoring Judge Smierciak's finding, the majority today
assumes, without explanation, that the speedy resolution of
adjudicatory hearings, as contemplated by section 2--14, will
always be consistent with the legislature's overall intent to
safeguard the children. In my opinion, however, the swift
prosecution of these hearings may not always be in a child's best
interest. The case at bar amply reinforces and highlights my
position. Although I am not unmindful that the legislature stated
that serious delay "can cause grave harm to the minor and the
family" (705 ILCS 405/2--14(a) (West 1994)), I also cannot ignore
the fact that the legislature expressly provided that the best
interests of the children must prevail under the Act. Given this
statutory scheme, the desire for a prompt adjudication, no matter
how laudable in the abstract, should and must yield when necessary
or desirable to the best interests of the children in a particular
case. To hold otherwise would be to undermine the very essence of
our Juvenile Court Act.
I take issue with the majority's statement that its
interpretation of section 2--14 comports with "the stated purpose
of the statute to `insure' the speedy resolution of abuse and
neglect cases." Slip op. at 9. On the contrary, requiring a
dismissal under the circumstances of this case will only serve to
defeat the will of the legislature by generating further delay. I
note that Judge Smierciak had already ruled on numerous pretrial
motions, entertained opening arguments, and began hearing witness
testimony. As such, he was familiar with the participants in the
case as well as the allegations of abuse and neglect.
Notwithstanding the depth of his involvement, the majority now
insists that Judge Smierciak erred by not dismissing the petition
in the middle of the trial. In my opinion, a dismissal of the
petition at this juncture will not only undo all that has been
accomplished so far, but will also set off a chain of events which
will prolong the final adjudication of the charges of abuse and
possibly put the victims at risk. Indeed, under today's ruling, the
State must once again file its petition for wardship, obtain
service of process, seek a new order of temporary custody, and
attempt to reset the matter for trial. There is no guarantee that
this case will even be reassigned to Judge Smierciak. Assignment to
a new or different judge to reconsider previously litigated issues
represents a waste of judicial time and effort.
The majority's literal interpretation of section 2--14 has the
potential of encouraging an endless cycle of litigation. I point
out that it was not judicial foot dragging which prevented the
trial judge from trying this complex case within the statutory
deadline. Rather, it was an over-crowded court docket. In this
respect, we have for review the detailed record made by the trial
judge in this case so as to fully inform the reviewing courts of
the extent of the problem and the reason for the delay. As Judge
Smierciak explained in denying the motion to dismiss:
"This case is unusual because of the substitution of
attorneys, because of the great number of pretrial
motions that were filed on behalf of the children and
other parties as well as by the fact that the lawyers
have suggested that there would be as many as 10 to 12
witnesses testifying in this case.
In fact, I've blocked out this day and two
subsequent days on this court's calendar to hear this
case because of its complexity and because of the
adversarial stances that have been taken by the parties.
With 4000 cases on the Court call, it's just impossible
to hear 10-, 12-witness cases and take 20 hours of court
time to try them without scheduling in this manner."
The majority pays little heed to Judge Smierciak's explanation
as to why this case could not be resolved within 90 days of service
of process. Had it done so, the majority would have been cognizant
of the impractical consequences of its decision to require the
dismissal of the present action. Assuming, as we should, that the
State still has an interest in prosecuting this case, it must now
return to the same congested court system from which the case is
being dismissed. The State must refile without any guarantee that
the system will be any less congested, or that the second action
will produce a result any different from the first. Indeed, the
majority offers little, if any, assurance that a refiled petition
will not suffer the same fate as the original petition.
Instead, the majority callously suggests that "the legislature
has provided for a reasonable and adequate period of time, at least
90 days, for the exercise of judicial duties," and further that
"[t]rial judges are aware of the statutory deadline and are charged
with controlling their docket accordingly." Slip op. at 17. In my
view, it is nave to think that even the most conscientious trial
judge will be able to fully try all adjudicatory hearings within 90
days of service of process, especially when one considers what is
involved in trying these cases. Presumably, the 90-day period
includes the filing of motions disputing personal jurisdiction,
contesting service of process, or challenging the sufficiency of
the complaint. After those motions are disposed, defendants will
then be afforded an opportunity to answer the complaint so as to
place the parties at issue. At this point, the parties may commence
discovery: propounding written interrogatories, responding to
requests to produce documents and/or admit facts, and taking of the
parties' depositions. Discovery may be further complicated if the
parties wish to present expert testimony, as is often the case
where allegations of sexual abuse are involved. If the parties do
not comply with discovery orders, additional court time will be
needed to rectify the noncompliance. Finally, the court must
actually hear the witnesses and render its decision. All of this in
a case which is given what the majority deems is a "reasonable"
statutory life of 90 days.
In view of the foregoing, I do not share my colleagues'
confidence "that the trial judge can exercise sufficient control
over the proceedings to prevent a party from obtaining a dismissal
through purposeful delay." Slip op. at 9. Even if a trial judge
suspected that a party was engaging in such tactics, it is not
likely that the additional burden of disciplining the laggard party
would have a positive impact upon the judge's ability to try the
matter in 90 days. If anything, taking the time to issue rules to
show cause, hold contempt hearings and order sanctions would
actually hamper the progress of the case. Therefore, unlike the
majority, I have serious doubts about whether trial judges can
realistically comply with the deadline set forth in section 2--14,
as interpreted by the majority, simply by exercising judicial
oversight of recalcitrant litigants. Moreover, I think it unwise to
underestimate the ingenuity of respondents who have now been given
an incentive to extend the litigation beyond the statutory
deadline. I am concerned that today's opinion opens the door for
such respondents to thwart the legislature's desire to protect the
best interests of the minors.
It is well settled that "a court construing the language of a
statute will assume that the legislature did not intend to produce
an absurd or unjust result." State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v.
Yapejian, , 541 (1992), citing People v. Steppan,
, 316 (1985). In addition, "[w]hen the literal
enforcement of a statute would result in great injustice and lead
to consequences which the legislature could not have contemplated,
the courts are bound to presume that such consequences were not
intended and will adopt a construction which it may be reasonable
to presume was contemplated by the legislature. City of Chicago v.
Mayer, 290 Ill. 142." People ex rel. Cason v. Ring, ,
312-13 (1968), quoting Village of Glencoe v. Hurford, 317 Ill. 203,
220 (1925). The majority's literal interpretation of section 2--14
leads to absurd results while at the same time prejudices society's
interest in protecting its children. Because the legislature could
not have intended such consequences, I believe this court should
adopt a more reasonable construction than that suggested by my
colleagues. Such a construction may be found in a recent decision
of the Fourth District of the Appellate Court, decided after we
granted leave to appeal in the instant case. In re H.R., 283 Ill.
App. 3d 907 (1996).
In In re H.R., the State filed a petition for adjudication of
wardship on November 9, 1995. The circuit court of Champaign County
commenced the adjudicatory hearing 85 days later. After hearing
extensive testimony, the court continued the matter for an
additional 45 days. Shortly thereafter, the respondent mother filed
a motion to dismiss pursuant to section 2--14. The court granted
the motion to dismiss, and the State appealed. In reversing the
order of the circuit court, the Fourth District expressly rejected
the analysis utilized by the appellate court, and which is being
used by this court, in the instant case. H.R., 283 Ill. App. 3d at
910. Instead, the H.R. court held that section 2--14 does not
require a dismissal of a petition where the hearing is begun, but
not yet completed, within the 90-day period. H.R., 283 Ill. App. 3d
at 912. In support of this holding, the H.R. court stated at
length:
"We disagree with the S.G. court's interpretation of the
word `heard.' Although the matter must be `heard,' that
is not synonymous with `concluded.' Witnesses and parties
may be `heard' at a hearing on a matter which is not
concluded. See Black's Law Dictionary 721 (6th ed. 1990)
(definition of `hearing' [hold means "[t]o administer; to
conduct or preside at; to convoke, open and direct the
operations of"]). A hearing need not be concluded and the
decision of the tribunal need not be made for the matter
to be in the process of being `heard.' It must be
recognized that the number and availability of witnesses
affects when the hearing will be concluded. The
legislature could not have reasonably meant that a
hearing, though commenced, must be halted and the cause
dismissed because of the illness of one of the witnesses,
or that the parties to the proceeding would simply be
denied the opportunity to present witnesses who would not
be available on time." H.R., 283 Ill. App. 3d at 912.
In addition, the court in H.R. further emphasized that the
overall purpose of the Juvenile Court Act is to safeguard the best
interest of the children. H.R., 283 Ill. App. 3d at 912, citing 705
ILCS 405/1--2(1) (West 1994). The court then pointed out that
"[g]iving the persons alleged to be endangering the children the
opportunity to retain custody of the children simply because an
adjudicatory hearing, though started, has not been concluded within
the 90-day period is not consistent with the overall purpose of the
Act." H.R., 283 Ill. App. 3d at 912. Accordingly, the court
concluded that the "beginning of the adjudicatory hearing within 90
days in the case at bar satisfied the statute, and the dismissal of
this case was an abuse of discretion." H.R., 283 Ill. App. 3d at
912.
I find the foregoing reasoning reflects the will of the
General Assembly more accurately than the literal approach endorsed
by my colleagues. The United States Supreme Court has "repeatedly
warned against the dangers of an approach to statutory construction
which confines itself to the bare words of a statute [citations],
`for literalness may strangle meaning.' " Lynch v. Overholser, , 710, 8 L. Ed. 2d 211, 215, 82 S. Ct. 1063, 1067 (1962).
I would heed that warning in this case and hold, like the Fourth
District appellate panel, that the only way to fully effectuate the
mission of the legislature is to liberally construe the word
"heard" so as to include the commencement of a hearing. See, e.g.,
People v. Williams, , 405 (1974) (holding speedy-
trial provision ("[e]very person *** shall be tried *** within 120
days" (emphasis added)) satisfied by commencement of proceeding).
Any other interpretation would lead to absurd consequences that
could not possibly have been contemplated by our General Assembly.
Finally, I realize that my voice is only that of a dissenter,
and that the majority opinion speaks with the force of law.
Accordingly, I call upon the legislature to act promptly in
amending the Juvenile Court Act so as to provide trial courts with
some degree of discretion in granting or denying motions to dismiss
pursuant to section 2--14. In this respect, I urge our legislature
to take note of those factors which can cause--unavoidably at
times--a violation of the 90-day statutory deadline, such as
congested court calendars and the exigencies of litigation.
Indeed, if safeguarding the rights of children is to have any real
significance in Illinois, courts must be given a legitimate
opportunity to pass upon the allegations of abuse and neglect.
Sadly, when that opportunity is needlessly hampered, it is the
abused and neglected children--in whose interest the General
Assembly acted in the first place--who suffer the tragic
consequences.
Because I would affirm the order of the circuit court denying
respondents' motion to dismiss, I respectfully dissent.

CHIEF JUSTICE HEIPLE and JUSTICE MILLER join in this dissent.

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