People v. Chester
Annotate this Case
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NO. 4-08-0841
Filed: 1-12-10
Corrected: 8-4-10
IN THE APPELLATE COURT
OF ILLINOIS
FOURTH DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
GREGORY J. CHESTER,
Defendant-Appellant.
)
Appeal from
)
Circuit Court of
)
McLean County
)
Nos. 07CF1069
)
07CF797
)
)
Honorable
)
Robert L. Freitag,
)
Judge Presiding.
_________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE POPE delivered the opinion of the court:
In October 2007, defendant, Gregory J. Chester, was
indicted on three counts of aggravated battery (720 ILCS 5/124(a), 124(b)(6) (West 2006)) and one count of resisting a peace
officer (720 ILCS 5/31-1(a-7) (West 2006)).
Following a jury
trial, defendant was convicted and sentenced to 12 years' imprisonment for aggravated battery (McLean County case No. 07-CF-1069)
with the sentence to run consecutive to defendant's sentences in
McLean County case No. 07-CF-797 of 5 years' imprisonment for
obstructing justice and 364 days in jail for resisting arrest.
Defendant appeals only on issues raised in his aggravated-battery
case (McLean County case No. 07-CF-1069), arguing the following:
(1) the trial court violated Supreme Court Rule 431(b) (Official
Reports Advance Sheet No. 8 (April 11, 2007), R. 431(b), eff. May
1, 2007); (2) the State improperly commented during closing
argument on defendant's exercise of his right to refrain from
testifying and presenting evidence; and (3) the trial court
abused its discretion in sentencing defendant to 12 years'
imprisonment.
We affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
On October 6, 2007, Bloomington police officer Andrew
Chambers was in complete police uniform patrolling in a marked
police car when he passed a purple Cadillac driven by defendant,
who Officer Chambers knew did not have a valid driver's license.
After Officer Chambers activated his car's lights and siren, the
Cadillac pulled into the driveway of an apartment complex.
Defendant exited the vehicle and looked back at Officer Chambers,
then proceeded to take off running.
Officer Chambers got out of
his vehicle and, standing approximately 20 feet from defendant,
yelled at defendant to stop.
Defendant proceeded into the common
area of the apartment building through a steel door.
As Officer
Chambers followed, defendant slammed the door into the officer.
Officer Chambers shielded his face with his left arm.
He immedi-
ately felt extreme pain, and his fingers went numb when the door
slammed on his arm.
Once inside the building, Officer Chambers attempted to
deploy his taser, but the probe fell off in the hallway.
As he
proceeded up the stairs, defendant yelled, "[B]aby, police are
chasing me.
Open the door."
Officer Chambers followed defendant
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up the stairs and saw defendant banging on the door of apartment
C, saying "let me in, let me in."
A female inside the apartment
opened the door for defendant, who entered the apartment and
slammed the door on Officer Chambers' right arm.
Officer Cham-
bers braced himself and pushed the door back on defendant,
knocking him to the ground.
Defendant continued to resist arrest
as Officer Chambers attempted to subdue him with pressure-point
tactics.
Defendant ripped the officer's uniform and ripped off
his credentials and badge.
Officer Chambers was eventually able
to conduct a "drive stun" on defendant, holding the gun directly
against defendant's body.
The drive stun was not successful, and
defendant continued hitting Officer Chambers and became more
aggressive in his resistance.
The officer issued a second drive
stun for approximately five seconds.
Defendant dropped his arms
to his side and said, "I quit."
X-rays of Officer Chambers's left arm revealed fractures in the ulna and radius, both of the bones in the forearm.
Because of the injuries he sustained, he was in physical therapy
for 1 1/2 months and missed approximately 3 months of work.
After presenting its case, the State dropped one count
of aggravated battery (720 ILCS 5/12-4(b)(6) (West 2006)) as
improperly charged.
The jury convicted defendant of the remain-
ing two aggravated-battery charges and resisting a peace officer.
After the trial court found the resisting charge and one of the
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aggravated-battery charges merged with the remaining count of
aggravated battery, the court sentenced defendant as stated.
This appeal followed.
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II. ANALYSIS
A. Voir Dire
Defendant argues the trial court violated Supreme Court
Rule 431(b) (Official Reports Advance Sheet No. 8 (April 11,
2007), R. 431(b), eff. May 1, 2007) when it failed to question
jurors on the third and fourth Rule 431(b) principles, which
provide defendant is not required to present evidence on his own
behalf and defendant's choice not to testify may not be held
against him.
Defendant concedes he failed to preserve this issue
for review but maintains the issue may be addressed by this court
as it constitutes plain error.
The plain-error doctrine allows a reviewing court to
consider an unpreserved and otherwise forfeited error when "(1)
the evidence is close, regardless of the seriousness of the
error[;] or (2) the error is serious, regardless of the closeness
of the evidence."
People v. Herron, 215 Ill. 2d 167, 186-87, 830
N.E.2d 467, 479 (2005).
A harmless-error analysis applies when
the defendant timely objected to the error.
People v. Johnson,
388 Ill. App. 3d 199, 203, 902 N.E.2d 1265, 1268 (2009).
Because
defendant failed to object at trial, we analyze any error under
the plain-error doctrine.
However, before we consider the plain-
error doctrine, we must determine whether the trial court committed an error.
We review the trial court's compliance with a
supreme court rule de novo.
People v. Suarez, 224 Ill. 2d 37,
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41-42, 862 N.E.2d 977, 979 (2007).
In People v. Zehr, 103 Ill. 2d 472, 477, 469 N.E.2d
1062, 1064 (1984), our supreme court held essential to the
qualification of a jury in a criminal case is each juror's
knowledge of the following four principles: (1) a defendant is
presumed innocent, (2) he is not required to present evidence on
his own behalf, (3) the State must prove him guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt, and (4) his decision not to testify may not be
held against him.
The subject matter of these principles should
be addressed in the course of voir dire as a juror's prejudice as
to any of them would not be automatically cured with closing
remarks by counsel or jury instructions from the trial court.
Zehr, 103 Ill. 2d at 477, 469 N.E.2d at 1064.
In 1997, our supreme court adopted Rule 431(b) to
embrace the voir dire principles established in Zehr.
2d R. 431(b).
177 Ill.
The original rule provided, "[i]f requested by the
defendant, the court shall ask each potential juror, individually
or in a group, whether that juror understands and accepts" the
four Zehr principles.
(Emphasis added.)
177 Ill. 2d R. 431(b).
At that time, the trial court had no obligation to sua sponte
question jurors as to the Zehr principles.
People v. Graham, 393
Ill. App. 3d 268, 272, 913 N.E.2d 99, 103 (2009).
However, effective May 1, 2007, the supreme court
amended the language to require trial courts to question jurors
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on the Rule 431(b) principles without a defendant's prompting,
providing:
"'The court shall ask each potential
juror, individually or in a group, whether
that juror understands and accepts the following principles: (1) that the defendant is
presumed innocent of the charge(s) against
him or her; (2) that before a defendant can
be convicted the State must prove the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt; (3)
that the defendant is not required to offer
any evidence on his or her behalf; and (4)
that the defendant's failure to testify cannot be held against him or her; however, no
inquiry of a prospective juror shall be made
into the defendant's failure to testify when
the defendant objects.'"
People v. Arredond-
o, 394 Ill. App. 3d 944, 950, 916 N.E.2d
1263, 1268 (2009), quoting Official Reports
Advance Sheet No. 8 (April 11, 2007), R.
431(b), eff. May 1, 2007).
By removing the language that only required Zehr
questioning at defendant's request, our supreme court imposed a
sua sponte duty on courts to ask potential jurors individually or
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in a group whether they accept these principles.
Ill. App. 3d at 273, 913 N.E.2d at 103.
Graham, 393
In carrying out this new
duty, trial courts are required to allow each juror to respond.
Graham, 393 Ill. App. 3d at 273, 913 N.E.2d at 103.
The trial in the present case occurred after the 2007
amendment became effective.
Thus, the trial court had a duty to
question the jurors about the Rule 431(b) principles and allow
the jurors to indicate whether they accepted the principles.
During voir dire in the present case, the trial court
addressed the Rule 431(b) principles as follows:
"The defendant in this case is presumed
to be innocent of the charges against him.
This presumption remains with the defendant
throughout every stage of the trial and during the jury deliberations on the verdict,
and it is not overcome unless from all the
evidence in this case the jury is convinced,
both individually and collectively, that the
defendant has been proven guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt.
The State has the burden of proving the
guilt of the defendant beyond a reasonable
doubt, and this burden remains on the State
throughout the case.
The defendant is not
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required to prove his innocence."
The trial court then asked the potential jurors in
groups, row by row, whether they understood and accepted those
basic propositions of law.
Everyone answered in the affirmative.
After the court addressed individual issues with jurors, defense
counsel began questioning.
Defense counsel told the prospective
jurors the following:
"Now [defendant] may or may not testify.
We haven't made that decision yet, but that
is his right to not testify and it is also
his right to testify.
If he chooses that he
wishes to do that[,] would anybody have a
problem if he chose not to testify or would
you hold it against him in any way if he did
not testify?"
All of the prospective jurors indicated they accepted the fourth
Rule 431(b) principle.
At the end of the trial, before the jury
retired for deliberations, the court properly instructed the jury
on all four Zehr principles.
Defendant argues the trial court erred when it failed
to advise the potential jurors of the third and fourth Rule
431(b) principles, i.e., that defendant need not present evidence
on his own behalf and his decision not to testify cannot be held
against him.
The court's statement that "defendant is not
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required to prove his innocence" would be interpreted by a
reasonable jury to satisfy the third Rule 431(b) principle
because if defendant is not required to prove his innocence, he
has no reason to present evidence.
As Rule 431(b) does not
require the court to recite the principles verbatim, the court's
language was sufficient to comply with the rule.
Despite its satisfaction of the third Rule 431(b)
principle, the trial court erred by not addressing the fourth
principle.
However, defendant concedes defense counsel rectified
this error by addressing the fourth principle with the prospective jurors.
Because the court itself is required to address
this principle, the court committed error while conducting voir
dire.
In light of defense counsel rectifying the court's error,
we next consider whether the error amounts to plain error.
Under the second prong of the plain-error test, we
presume the defendant suffered prejudice because of the importance of the right at issue.
N.E.2d at 480.
Herron, 215 Ill. 2d at 187, 830
When a defendant has been denied the right to a
fair trial, a reviewing court must take corrective action to
preserve the integrity of the judicial process.
People v. Blue,
189 Ill. 2d 99, 138, 724 N.E.2d 920, 940 (2000).
"To determine
whether defendant's right to a fair trial has been compromised,
we employ the same test that this court uses whenever it applies
the second prong of the plain error test."
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Blue, 189 Ill. 2d at
138, 724 N.E.2d at 940.
We consider whether a substantial right
has been affected to the extent we doubt that defendant's trial
was fundamentally fair.
940-41.
Blue, 189 Ill. 2d at 138, 724 N.E.2d at
Regardless of the weight of the evidence presented
against defendant, a new trial is essential where the trial
court's error threatens the integrity of the judicial process.
Blue, 189 Ill. 2d at 139, 724 N.E.2d at 941.
Illinois appellate courts have recently reviewed a
variety of Zehr-related cases.
Although our supreme court has
not yet reviewed a case that has applied Rule 431(b) after the
March 2007 amendment, it recently addressed the preamendment Rule
431(b) in People v. Glasper, 234 Ill. 2d 173, 917 N.E.2d 401
(2009).
It subsequently directed this court in People v. Stump,
233 Ill. 2d 592, 914 N.E.2d 490 (2009) (nonprecedential supervisory order on denial of petition for leave to appeal), to vacate
its order and reconsider that decision in light of Glasper
despite Glasper's application of the preamendment rule and
Stump's application of the postamendment rule.
In Glasper, our supreme court provided violation of a
supreme court rule does not always mandate reversal as such an
error relates to a right created only by the court, not a fundamental right or constitutional protection.
at 193, 917 N.E.2d at 414.
Glasper, 234 Ill. 2d
Significantly, the original Rule
431(b) only extended the right in question to defendants who
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specifically requested it.
N.E.2d at 413-14.
Glasper, 234 Ill. 2d at 193, 917
Under both versions of the rule, the supreme
court provided trial courts "shall" question potential jurors
where the rule is applicable.
177 Ill. 2d R. 431(b); Official
Reports Advance Sheet No. 8 (April 11, 2007), R. 431(b), eff. May
1, 2007.
Because the amendment to Rule 431(b) merely changed the
application of the rule from optional to automatic, and not the
obligations of the trial court once the rule is invoked, we
consider Glasper's rationale in the present case.
In Glasper, our supreme court considered a trial
court's failure, after informing jurors of all four Rule 431(b)
principles, to question them on the fourth principle, whether
they would hold against defendant his decision not to testify.
Glasper, 234 Ill. 2d at 188-89, 917 N.E.2d at 411.
The defendant
in Glasper argued the trial court's failure to comply with Rule
431(b) deprived him of his sixth-amendment rights and warranted
automatic reversal because the impact of the error could not be
measured.
Glasper, 234 Ill. 2d at 189, 917 N.E.2d at 412.
The
State countered that any error was harmless because the evidence
against defendant was overwhelming.
90, 917 N.E.2d at 412.
Glasper, 234 Ill. 2d at 189-
The State further argued the United
States Supreme Court does not recognize this type of error as a
structural error that mandates automatic reversal.
Ill. 2d at 191, 917 N.E.2d at 412.
- 12 -
Glasper, 234
Our supreme court agreed with the State, noting the
United States Supreme Court recognizes errors as structural in a
very limited group of cases.
N.E.2d at 416.
Glasper, 234 Ill. 2d at 198, 917
While Glasper framed its analysis in terms of
structural error instead of plain error, our supreme court
explained in Blue the grounds for reversal based on structural
error are the same as the second prong of the plain-error doctrine.
Glasper determined the trial court's error did not rise
to the level of structural error because the error did not
involve a fundamental right or a constitutional protection.
Glasper, 234 Ill. 2d at 199-200, 917 N.E.2d at 417-18.
Glasper
acknowledged it would not hesitate to reverse a defendant's
conviction if the facts showed that the failure to abide by Zehr
resulted in the defendant's conviction by a biased jury.
r, 234 Ill. 2d at 200-01, 917 N.E.2d at 418.
Glaspe-
Further, Glasper
emphasized its holding is "limited to the version of Rule
431(b)(4) that was in effect at the time of [that] trial, and
would not necessarily apply to subsequent versions of the rule."
Glasper, 234 Ill. 2d at 200, 917 N.E.2d at 418.
Glasper addressed another argument defendant raises in
the case sub judice, i.e., that we cannot ascertain the damage
caused by an improperly selected jury once the defendant has been
convicted.
Quoting language from People v. Rivera, 227 Ill. 2d
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1, 22, 879 N.E.2d 876, 888 (2007), our supreme court invoked the
rational juror standard and reasoned a Zehr violation cannot
prejudice a defendant when the State's evidence against him is so
overwhelming no rational jury would have acquitted him.
234 Ill. 2d at 201, 917 N.E.2d at 418.
Glasper,
Glasper ultimately
concluded a Rule 431(b) violation does not require automatic
reversal and is subject to harmless-error review.
Ill. 2d at 201-02, 917 N.E.2d at 418.
Glasper, 234
(We assume, because our
supreme court engaged in harmless-error review, the defendant in
Glasper preserved the error by objecting in the trial court.)
The First District has reviewed Rule 431(b) several
times since its March 2007 amendment and has consistently held a
trial court's violation of Rule 431(b) deprives a defendant of a
substantial right and a fair trial, obviating the need for a
harmless-error inquiry or determination of prejudice.
See People
v. Anderson, 389 Ill. App. 3d 1, 9, 904 N.E.2d 1113, 1121 (2009),
vacated, 233 Ill. 2d 565, 914 N.E.2d 487 (2009) (nonprecedential
supervisory order on denial of petition for leave to appeal);
Graham, 393 Ill. App. 3d at 276, 913 N.E.2d at 106;
Arredondo,
394 Ill. App. 3d at 955, 916 N.E.2d at 1272.
Unlike the First District, the Fourth District has
allowed for the harmless-error analysis when considering Zehr
violations.
In People v. Stump, 385 Ill. App. 3d 515, 521, 896
N.E.2d 904, 909 (2008), vacated, 233 Ill. 2d 592, 914 N.E.2d 490
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(2009) (nonprecedential supervisory order on denial of petition
for leave to appeal), the trial court addressed all four Zehr
principles but only questioned jurors on two of the principles.
This court held that any error caused by the court's failure to
fully comply with Rule 431(b) was harmless error because (1) the
jurors were at least informed of all four principles during
voir dire and (2) the evidence was overwhelming.
App. 3d at 522, 896 N.E.2d at 909.
Stump, 385 Ill.
Similar to Stump, in People
v. Owens, 394 Ill. App. 3d 147, 152, 914 N.E.2d 1280, 1284
(2009), the trial court addressed all four Rule 431(b) principles
when addressing the entire venire.
However, in Owens, the court
failed to ask any questions of prospective jurors relating to any
Rule 431(b) principles.
This court distinguished Owens from
Stump, finding the trial court committed plain error by failing
to question prospective jurors on any of the principles.
Owens,
394 Ill. App. 3d at 153-54, 914 N.E.2d at 1285.
In People v. Blanton, No. 4-08-0120, slip op. at 8
(November 10, 2009), ___ Ill. App. 3d ___, ___, ___ N.E.2d ___,
___, the trial court questioned the prospective jurors on three
of the Rule 431(b) principles and allowed prospective jurors to
respond.
The court failed to inform and question jurors regard-
ing the fourth principle that the defendant's decision not to
testify cannot be held against him.
Blanton, slip op. at 8, ___
Ill. App. 3d at ___, ___ N.E.2d at ___.
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The defendant did not
present evidence or testify in that case.
Blanton, slip op. at
4, ___ Ill. App. 3d at ___, ___ N.E.2d at ___.
Blanton held the
trial court committed plain error when it failed to question each
prospective juror on the fourth Rule 431(b) principle, substantially affecting the fundamental fairness of the proceeding.
Blanton, slip op. at 9-10, ___ Ill. App. 3d at ___, ___ N.E.2d at
___.
In the present case, while we find the trial court
committed error by failing to comply with Rule 431(b), we are
guided by our supreme court's holding in Glasper that a Zehr
violation does not require automatic reversal.
2d at 200, 917 N.E.2d at 418.
Glasper, 234 Ill.
We determine whether this case
warrants reversal in light of Blanton and Owens.
Here, the court informed jurors of three of the four
Rule 431(b) principles and questioned them about their understanding and acceptance of those principles, but failed to advise
of or question the jury on the fourth principle.
However, as
defendant concedes in his brief, defense counsel rectified the
situation by informing the prospective jurors of the fourth Rule
431(b) principle and questioning them as to their acceptance of
it.
In this regard, the present case is distinguishable from
Blanton, where jurors were never apprised of the fourth principle
by anyone.
Similarly, in Owens, the court failed to question the
jurors as to any of the Rule 431(b) principles.
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As the jurors in
the present case were questioned on all four principles, albeit
by defense counsel on the fourth, the court's error does not
amount to plain error.
We find further support for affirming the trial court
in Glasper.
There, our supreme court advised it would not
hesitate to reverse a conviction if the facts showed the Rule
431(b) violation resulted in a biased jury.
at 200, 917 N.E.2d at 418.
Glasper, 234 Ill. 2d
However, Glasper reasoned if no
rational jury would acquit the defendant, a trial court's Rule
431(b) violation does not require reversal of the defendant's
conviction.
Glasper, 234 Ill. 2d at 202, 917 N.E.2d at 419.
Here, the State's case against defendant was such that
no rational jury would have acquitted him.
2d at 202, 917 N.E.2d at 419.
See Glasper, 234 Ill.
Officer Chambers provided thorough
testimony explaining the circumstances surrounding the aggravated
battery.
Further, defendant has not shown the trial's fundamen-
tal fairness was jeopardized by the court's error.
Following
closing arguments, the court instructed the jury on all four Rule
431(b) principles, and defendant does not show the jury acted
with bias in reaching its verdict.
Accordingly, we conclude the
court's voir dire error did not rise to the level of plain error
and did not prejudice defendant.
B. Closing Arguments
Defendant argues the State improperly commented on
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defendant's decision not to testify and his failure to present
evidence during closing arguments.
The statements at issue are as follows:
"What did the defendant do?
Well, we
have heard testimony from the officer and the
officer testified, hasn't been refuted or
questioned in any way, you haven't heard any
other testimony to refute what the officer
said, and that is that the defendant got out
of the vehicle, turned around and saw the
officer's squad car and proceeded to run.
***
I want to kind of go over the testimony
of the door detail because I think it is
important because what the officer said about
what happened next shows that what happened
here was a deliberate intentional act.
was definitely a knowing act.
accident here.
It
There was no
There hasn't been any one
testify that it was an accident."
Defendant contends the State told the jury "no one"
refuted Officer Chambers and "no one" testified that the door
slamming incident was an accident.
is not entirely accurate.
Defendant's characterization
The State actually said "you haven't
- 18 -
heard any other testimony to refute what the officer said."
Improper remarks during closing argument are only
reversible when they cause the defendant substantial prejudice
and affect the defendant's right to an impartial and fair trial.
People v. Ward, 371 Ill. App. 3d 382, 426, 862 N.E.2d 1102, 1144
(2007).
When no witness besides defendant could provide evidence
contrary to the State's case, the State may argue the evidence is
uncontradicted but may not repeatedly tell the jury "no one"
contradicted the State's evidence.
People v. Edgecombe, 317 Ill.
App. 3d 615, 620-21, 739 N.E.2d 914, 919-20 (2000).
In Edge-
combe, the State made the following references to the State's
uncontradicted evidence:
"'There has been no evidence whatsoever from
that witness stand that says $60 wasn't taken
***.
No one said $60 wasn't taken from them
***'; 'There's no one that got up there that
said anything different ***'; 'There's no one
that got up there and said the defendant was
just standing there'; and 'Is there any evidence that you heard that this guy was just
there?
Nobody told you that.'"
Edgecombe,
317 Ill. App 3d at 621, 739 N.E.2d at 920.
The Edgecombe court found the repeated references to
"no one" refuting the testimony "crossed the line" and were
- 19 -
improper comments on the defendant's failure to testify.
combe, 317 Ill. App 3d at 621, 739 N.E.2d at 920.
Edge-
Here, the
State used the phrase "no one" once while describing the doorslamming incident.
While the comment was improper, the error did
not deny defendant a fair and impartial trial.
The trial court
corrected this error with the following jury instructions: "The
defendant is not required to prove his innocence.
The fact that
the defendant did not testify must not be considered by you in
any way in arriving at your verdict."
Thus, defendant suffered
no prejudice because the jury knew the State was required to
prove the elements of aggravated battery and it was to give no
consideration to defendant's failure to testify.
C. Twelve-year Sentence
Defendant argues the trial court abused its discretion
in imposing a 12-year sentence for his aggravated-battery conviction.
Trial courts are given broad discretion in fashioning
appropriate criminal sentences.
People v. Stacey, 193 Ill. 2d
203, 209, 737 N.E.2d 626, 629 (2000).
Absent an abuse of the
court's discretion, we will not alter the sentence on review.
Stacey, 193 Ill. 2d at 209-10, 737 N.E.2d at 629.
Here, defendant's aggravated-battery conviction was
elevated to a Class 1 felony because defendant knew the victim
was a peace officer (720 ILCS 5/12-4(e)(3) (West 2006)), rendering him eligible for a 4- to 15-year sentence (730 ILCS 5/5-8- 20 -
1(a)(4) (West 2006)).
Despite defendant's stated remorse for his
actions, the 12-year sentence was appropriate considering defendant's scant rehabilitative potential.
Defendant's criminal
record dates back to 1995 when at 18 years old he was first
convicted of unlawful use of a weapon.
Since then, defendant has
been convicted of unlawful use of a weapon twice, once as a
felon, manufacturing and delivering narcotics, criminal damage to
property, assault, and numerous traffic violations.
The court
observed that at age 31, defendant had amassed 10 felony convictions.
In 2003, defendant was given a seven-year prison term for
delivery of a controlled substance.
While on mandatory super-
vised release in 2007, defendant committed the offenses in the
present case.
In light of defendant's penchant for criminal
activity, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in rendering the statutorily permissible 12-year sentence.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court's
judgment.
As part of our judgment, we grant the State its $50
statutory assessment against defendant as costs of this appeal.
Affirmed.
APPLETON and McCULLOUGH, JJ., concur.
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