People ex rel. Muhammad v. Muhammad-Rahmah

                                             Sixth Division






No. 1-96-1665


THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS   )  Appeal from the Circuit
ex rel. JABIR MUHAMMAD,               )  Court of Cook County
                                      )
     Plaintiff-Appellant,             )
                                      )  
          v.                          )
                                      )
SAFIYYA MUHAMMAD-RAHMAH, OMAR         )
MUHAMMAD and MULAZIM RAHMAH,          )  Honorable
                                      )  Lester D. Foreman,
     Defendants-Appellees.            )  Judge Presiding.


     JUSTICE ZWICK delivered the opinion of the court:
     Plaintiff sought leave to file an action sounding in quo
warranto, alleging that defendants had improperly assumed
directorships and corporate offices of the Muhammad Islamic
Corporation and had acted without authority in removing plaintiff
as president and chairman of the board of directors of the
corporation.  Upon defendants' motion, the trial court denied
plaintiff's request to bring suit, finding that resolution of
plaintiff's claims required the court to interpret Islamic
religious doctrine.  Plaintiff has appealed, contending that the
court abused its discretion in denying him leave to bring suit
because his claims could properly be resolved by application of
"neutral principles of law."
     In his petition for leave to file an action sounding in quo
warranto, plaintiff alleged the following relevant facts.
     The Muhammad Islamic Corporation (hereinafter "the
corporation") was originally established in 1978 and was
subsequently incorporated under the General Not For Profit
Corporation Act of 1986.  805 ILCS 105/101.01 et seq. (West
1996).  The purpose of the organization was to promote and
further the Islamic faith in the Chicago area.  The corporation
operated an Islamic mosque, which was the principal corporate
asset.
     Plaintiff Jabir Muhammad served as the corporation's
president and chairman of the board of directors since it was
originally organized in 1978.  The other members of the
corporation's board of directors were Dr. Samella B. Abdullah,
Mr. John Glenn Omar and Dr. Tasneema Ghazi.  Defendants were not
legitimately appointed directors or officers of the corporation,
although defendant Safiyya Muhammad-Rahmah, plaintiff's daughter,
had on occasion served as secretary for the corporation in
addition to serving as plaintiff's personal assistant and
secretary.
     The corporate bylaws specifically provide that the affairs
of the corporation shall be managed by the board of directors. 
Directors are chosen by majority vote of existing Directors from
among the mosque members, and the act of a majority of those
directors present at a meeting at which a quorum is present shall
be the act of the board of directors.  A quorum requires the
presence of two or more directors, at least one of whom shall be
the President or a prayer leader.  The corporate bylaws also set
forth the notice requirements for a special meeting, which 
mandate that written or actual oral notice of the time and place
of any special meeting of the Board of Directors shall be given
at least 2 days prior thereto.  The members of the corporation
are not entitled to vote on directors.
     The Illinois Not For Profit Corporation Act provides that "a
director may be removed by the affirmative vote of a majority of
the directors then in office present and voting at a meeting of
the board of directors at which a quorum is present.  805 ILCS
105/108.35(b) (West 1994).  Notice of a meeting whose purpose is
to remove a director requires written notice of the proposed
removal be delivered to all directors as lease 20 days prior to
such meeting.  805 ILCS 105/108.25 (West 1994).
     On or about January 19, 1995, defendants Safiyya Muhammad-
Rahmah, Omar Muhammad and Mulazim Rahmah, plaintiff's daughter,
son and son-in-law, respectively, ostensibly held a meeting of
the corporation, removed plaintiff as president and chairman of
the board of directors, and installed themselves as directors and
officers of the corporation.  Mulazim Rahmah was installed as
president, Omar Muhammad as treasurer, and Safiyya Muhammad as
secretary.
     The January 19, 1995, meeting was not called by plaintiff or
by the other directors.  Directors Abdullah and Omar did not
receive written notice of the January 19, 1995, meeting, and they
were not in attendance.  Plaintiff received a telephone call on
the night of January 19, 1995, shortly before the meeting,
requesting his presence at a "family gathering," but he declined
to attend due to ill health.
     As a result of defendants' actions, they obtained exclusive
control of the corporation's Islamic mosque and closed the mosque
to the members of the local Islamic community, including
plaintiff, effectively denying them the opportunity to worship.
     Plaintiff claimed the actions of defendants were invalid and
sought leave to file the instant quo warranto action, challenging
their right to hold corporate offices and directorships.
     Defendants filed a motion to dismiss plaintiff's petition,
asserting that the court was precluded from adjudicating the
matter.  Defendants characterized the dispute as a question of
religious doctrine and contended that plaintiff had been removed
as president and chairman of the board of directors of the
corporation "because he was no longer living according to Islamic
religious tenets."  In support of this contention, defendants
referred to a written document entitled "The Top Islamic
Agreement Commitment for the Cause of Allah (SWT)."  This
document, which was prepared almost four years after adoption of
the corporate bylaws, included a provision which stated as
follows:
          "5.  If the President and any member of the Board
     breaks any of the rules that have been thus far been
     [sic] mentioned; and if [the] President and the members
     of the Board is [sic] found to be in violation of the
     rules of the Muhammad Islamic Foundation which are
     based upon the Holy Qur'an and the Sunnah of Prophet
     Muhammad (SAW) or if he is found trying to lead the
     Foundation and Corporation on an [sic] non-Islamic
     path--then any member of the Board or Corporation shall
     be allowed to call for the termination of his position
     as President or as a member of the Board."
     The trial court granted defendants' motion and dismissed
plaintiff's petition, finding that resolution of the claims
asserted in the petition required interpretation of the Holy
Qur'an and Islamic religious doctrine.  On appeal, plaintiff
argues that the dismissal order constituted an abuse of the
court's discretion because his claims could properly be resolved
by application of "neutral principles of law."
     The State has a legitimate interest in providing a forum for
the peaceful resolution of internal church disputes which are
concerned with control or ownership of church property, and civil
courts have general authority to resolve such controversies. 
Jones v. Wolf,  443 U.S. 595, 602, 61 L. Ed. 2d 775, 784, 99 S. Ct. 3020, 3025 (1979).  Courts must defer to the resolution
reached by the church's highest ecclesiastical authority on
questions of religious doctrine, faith or polity.  Jones, 443 U.S.  at 604, 61 L. Ed. 2d  at 785, 99 S. Ct.  at 3026; Watson v.
Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 727, 20 L. Ed. 666, 676 (1872);
Lowe v. First Presbyterian Church, 56 Ill. 2d 404, 415, 308 N.E.2d 801 (1974).  However, where the court can resolve the
dispute according to "neutral principles of law," without
invading ecclesiastical doctrine, mandatory deference is not
required.  Jones, 443 U.S.  at 603, 61 L. Ed. 2d 784, 99 S. Ct. 3025; St. Mark Coptic Orthodox Church v. Tanios, 213 Ill. App. 3d
700, 713, 572 N.E.2d 283 (1991); York v. First Presbyterian
Church, 130 Ill. App. 3d 611, 617, 474 N.E.2d 716 (1984).  Under
the neutral-principles approach, the court objectively examines
pertinent church charters, constitutions and bylaws, deeds, State
statutes, and other evidence to resolve the matter the same as it
would a secular dispute.  Jones, 443 U.S.  at 603, 61 L. Ed. 2d  at
784-85, 99 S. Ct.  at 3025; Clay v. Illinois District Council of
the Assemblies of God Church, 275 Ill. App. 3d 971, 976-77, 657 N.E.2d 688 (1995); Tanios, 213 Ill. App. 3d at 714; York, 130
Ill. App. 3d at 618.
     In the case at bar, the court was not required to examine
religious doctrine or practice to determine whether plaintiff had
been properly removed as president and chairman of the board of
directors of the corporation.  The corporation's bylaws and the
statute under which it was organized clearly set forth the
procedure for appointment and removal of directors, the notice
requirements for directors' meetings, and other attendant
corporate matters.  These instruments constituted the rules which
the members of the mosque chose to be bound by before the dispute
arose.  The allegations in plaintiff's petition required the
court to decide only whether those procedures had been complied
with, and not whether the plaintiff was living as a good Muslim. 
Thus, the trial court was not required to interpret the Holy
Qur'an or to rule on an ecclesiastical question.
     Our decision is unaffected by defendants' reliance upon the
terms of "The Top Islamic Agreement Commitment for the Cause of
Allah (SWT)," which provided that any member of the board or
corporation was entitled to call for the termination of the term
of the president or a member of the board if found to be in
violation of the rules of the Muhammad Islamic Foundation or is
found trying to lead the foundation and corporation on a non-
Islamic path.
     Although this agreement, which is purportedly signed by
plaintiff, specified particular reasons why a president's or
director's term might be terminated, it did not alter the
procedural mechanisms which defined how such official action was
to be taken.  The fact that a member of the corporation can "call
for the termination" of the term of the president or a member of
the board does not dispense with the necessity of a majority vote
by the existing directors, nor does it relieve them of the
obligation to provide proper notice to the directors that such a
vote would be called.  Those procedures, which are precisely
delineated in the corporate bylaws, must be adhered to regardless
of the reason for or manner of calling for a vote to terminate
the term of the president or member of the board of directors.
     Accordingly, we hold that the trial court should have
utilized the "neutral principles of law" analysis in ruling on
plaintiff's petition, requiring only the application of objective
legal principles to the corporation's governing documents and the
interpretation of the Illinois Not For Profit Corporation Act,
without reference or reliance upon Islamic religious doctrine. 
This analysis would have enabled the court to resolve the secular
question of whether defendants had complied with the procedural
requirements for removal of the plaintiff as president and
chairman of the board of directors of the Muhammad Islamic
Corporation.
     The decision to grant or deny a petition for leave to file a
quo warranto action is a matter within the trial court's sound
discretion.  People ex rel. Hansen v. Phelan, 158 Ill. 2d 445,
449, 634 N.E.2d 739 (1994).  In the exercise of its discretion,
the court should consider all of the conditions and circumstances
in the case, the motives of the relators in instituting the
proceedings, the policy of and necessity for the remedy sought,
and whether the public interest will be served or damaged by the
writ.  People ex rel. Hansen, 158 Ill. 2d  at 449.
     In light of our decision, we conclude that the cause must be
remanded and that the trial court must apply neutral principles
of law and consider the above factors when deciding whether
plaintiff should be granted leave to pursue his quo warranto
claim.
     Finally, we consider defendants' motion to strike portions
of plaintiff's reply brief which was taken with the case. 
Defendants note that plaintiff referred to a transcript of
proceedings in an unrelated case, which was not included in the
record on appeal.  Inclusion of this argument and transcript was
improper, and defendants' motion to strike is granted.  See In re
Estate of Marks, 231 Ill. App. 3d 313, 320, 595 N.E.2d 717
(1992).  Although we do not condone a party's disregard for the
supreme court rules, we do not find that this is an appropriate
case for imposition of sanctions.  Accordingly, defendants'
motion for sanctions is denied.
     For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court
of Cook County is reversed, and the cause is remanded for further
proceedings consistent with the views expressed herein.
     Reversed and remanded.
     THEIS, J., and QUINN, J., concur.